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A Political and Cultural History of Modern Europe

In Four Volumes, Volume 4

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by Carlton J. H. Hayes

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PART VI

AN EMBATTLED AND NATIONALIST WORLD SINCE 1910

XXIII. THE PROMISE OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
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CHAPTER XXIII

THE PROMISE OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

I. ENLIGHTENED PROGRESS

BELIEF prevailed at the opening of the twentieth century that the world was making progress at a rapidly accelerating rate. An "enlightenment," dawning in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, had now reached bright noontide in a truly progressive age of science, of increasing control over nature, of broadening personal liberty, of expanding democracy, of growing brotherhood of individuals and of nations. The Era of the Enlightenment seemed clearly to be drawing to a climax.

Climax of Era of Enlightenment

Science was at length triumphant. Its principles were now revered and exploited for the welfare of mankind. Under its beneficent sway, men could fly in the air, swim under the water, converse with one another wherever they might be, escape physical pain, lengthen their span of life, and possess knowledge and enjoy creature-comforts beyond the experience of any philosopher or prince of previous ages.

Science

Machine industry was concurrently ascendant. It was now a common European phenomenon, and from Europe it was spreading out to the farthest corners of the earth, conferring inestimable benefits upon mankind. By aid of machinery human beings might produce more food than they could eat, more clothing than they could wear, more buildings than they could inhabit. They need fear famine and inclement weather no longer. They might have, indeed, not only the bare necessities of life but an abundance and range of luxuries which no king of earlier times, not even Louis XIV, had possessed, and a still more extraordinary leisure in which they might rest from toil and engage in play. Europe, once reputed a poor and sparse continent, was now rich and populous. Exclusive of

Material Comfort

an unprecedented emigration to America and Australasia, the number of Europeans doubled within a century until in 1910 they totalled over 400 million, representing a density of population more than twice that of Asia and ten times greater than America's or Africa's.

Wealth and Benevolence

There appeared to be no longer any serious problem about the production of wealth. Machinery had solved it. There were, admittedly, some problems about the distribution of wealth. But these, too, it was confidently believed, must and would be solved shortly. Economic nationalism which Bismarck had championed in Germany and which was now being developed all over the Continent promised at least a partial solution of the problem of equitable wealth distribution, and the social legislation which Lloyd George and his fellow British Liberals were sponsoring pointed to a similar outcome. Marxian socialism was cocksure that it had a complete solution of the problem, and the rapid increase of its following during the first decade of the twentieth century was special proof of the optimism and millennial enthusiasm of the time.

Education and General Literacy

Education, not merely of the classes, but of the masses, was being fostered as never before in the world's history. Universities were being reorganized and expanded, new ones founded, and attendance at them was multiplying. A host of professional schools and technical institutes were springing up. Public libraries were bulging with books and magazines. Newspapers were being printed and circulated in enormous quantities. Elementary schooling was compulsory in most countries, and secondary schooling becoming popular. In the next generation, it was prophesied, every European would be able to read and write; and with new leisure for self-improvement and new facilities for higher education, what an intelligent and informed race would issue forth! Enlightenment would be universal and progress assured.

Triumph of Liberty

Liberty was surely broadening out, and all those personal rights which for centuries had been denied men were now being written into solemn constitutions and sworn to as a permanent legacy of the enlightened age. Slavery was gone. Serfdom was gone. Even passports for travellers were going. True, the state was newly interfering in private business and abridging certain economic liberties; eco-

nomic nationalism, as we have elsewhere observed, was not really liberal.[1] Yet the trend toward basic personal liberties of conscience, worship, speech, publication, association, meeting, and profession was uninterrupted and apparently compelling. It was most manifest in western Europe, but with the spread of constitutionalism (and industrialization) it was making notable headway in the Habsburg Empire and even in the Empires of Russian Tsar and Turkish Sultan.

Triumph of Democracy

It seemed also that the Europe of the twentieth century must be democratic. Kings might remain as ornamental figureheads, but whatever the nominal form of government might be, whether royal or republican, it would almost certainly represent and be guided by the majority of the whole citizenry of the several nations. All this democratic movement was hailed as happy fruition of centuries of effort to get rid of despotism and oligarchy, and as unmistakable evidence that in the enlightened Europe of the new century the will of "the people" would everywhere prevail.

War a "Backward" Phenomenon

There still were wars—the Spanish-American, the South African, the Russo-Japanese, the Turco-Italian, the Balkan. But these were outside Europe or in "backward" regions of Europe. There still were some internal tumults—"revolutions" in Russia, in Turkey, in Portugal. But these too were in "backward" countries, and were accounted a result of temporary resistance to democratic progress. By and large, Europeans were now too intelligent, too educated, and too humane to wage vast destructive wars among themselves, and besides, under the new industrial order, any such war would be altogether too expensive. Just as the duel and the blood feud had disappeared, so there would be an end to the causes of revolution and a surcease of international war.

Such, in brief, were the principal items in the optimistic creed and program of influential leaders—and presumably of the masses—of Europe at the beginning of the twentieth century. The items were especially impressive and convincing, not only because they were obviously being realized in Europe, but also because the whole world was being Europeanized and with almost magical swiftness was undergoing conversion to the same optimistic creed. Imitation had always been the sincerest form of

[1] See above, pp. 224–227.

flattery, and enlightened Europe was not reluctant to be the object of flattery.

2. EUROPEANIZATION OF THE WORLD

Swift Progress, 1880–1910

The process of Europeanizing the world—of making Europe the model for material and intellectual development in all the other continents—had been going on since the sixteenth century. Not until the second half of the nineteenth century, however, did it gather great momentum and give promise of speedy and universal realization. Toward providing the whole world with a common pattern of life and ideals, essentially European, greater progress was made during the forty years from 1870 to 1910 than during the four centuries previous.

The explanation of this phenomenon lies partially in Christian missionary enterprise, but far more in the Industrial Revolution and its attendant galvanizing of European economic (and political) activity. Both the capitalistic and the religious foundations of the European imperialism of the latter part of the nineteenth century we have indicated and discussed elsewhere.[1] Here we shall sketch its course and summarize its achievements, taking care to distinguish three major types of "Europeanization." One was represented on the American continents and in Australasia, South Africa, and northern Asia. This involved a large-scale colonization by European peoples and hence a transplanting of all the peculiar features of European culture. It was literally an "expansion of Europe." The second was exemplified in Asia and in northern Africa, where European civilization came into contact with other long-established civilizations, superimposing itself upon them and modifying them without destroying them. The third type of Europeanization appeared in central Africa and in South Sea islands. Here, primitive indigenous cultures were undermined by European political domination and economic exploitation with relative rapidity and yet without assistance from any considerable influx of European colonists.

Three Types of Europeanization

If Europe is anything more than a geographical expression, then the American nations—and likewise Australia, New Zealand,

[1] On the economic aspects of the "new imperialism," see above, pp. 227–231, and on its religious aspects, see above, pp. 321–325.

South Africa,[1] and even Siberia and the Philippine Islands—are, and for a long time have been, as much a part of Europe as Britain, Spain, or Russia. Their languages are European. So are their religious beliefs, their social customs, their cultural traditions. Their histories are inextricably interwoven with Europe's. They have thought similar thoughts, cherished similar ideals, followed similar fashions, experienced similar vicissitudes. In the main they are European in blood; and if it be insisted that one or another of them includes such alien breeds as Negroes, Indians, Maoris, Mongols, or Malays, it should be recalled that these are Europeanized in every other respect and that racial purity does not exist in any nation on the continent of Europe. Altogether, the American countries—and the other regions mentioned—constitute with Europe a common area of Western, or European, civilization.

First Type: Expansion of Europe

Area of "Western" Civilization

In 1914 the population of the American continents was little short of 200 million, half that of Europe. Of the total, a little more than 50 per cent were English-speaking, while the remaining 94 million were "Latin Americans"—speaking Spanish, Portuguese, or French.

American Continents

Of self-governing Canada and Newfoundland, we have spoken elsewhere.[2] Here we merely remark the essentially European character of their society, politics, and culture. Of the United States, we shall speak only of outstanding developments which were strikingly similar to Europe's. The United States grew enormously in population during the nineteenth century, partly because of natural increase of the European stock that had come to it as colonists in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, partly because of a similar increase of the African stock that had been imported as slaves, partly because of a swelling stream of new immigrants from Europe.[3]

United States

[1] On the Europeanization of these British Dominions, see above, pp. 63–66, 366–376.

[2] See above, pp. 64–66, 367–369.

[3] The number of European immigrants, amounting to 400,000 for the forty years from 1790 to 1830, totalled almost 20 million for the forty years from 1870 to 1910. The original stock, and most of the early immigration, was British. Beginning in the 1840's, large numbers came from Germany and Ireland, and, in the latter part of the century, from Scandinavia, Italy, Hungary, and the Slavic countries. In 1914, 15 per cent of the total population of the United States were foreign born, and 10 per cent Negroes.

Like Europe, the United States was nationalistic. It sought, with noteworthy success, to "Americanize" all its inhabitants—immigrants and Negroes as well as original white stock—which meant that they were Europeanized in a particular English fashion and with special devotion to their own national government and history. English was the unifying language, and English were the common literary traditions, though at the same time the political and social developments were regarded as peculiarly "American." Like western Europe, moreover, the United States evolved and applied on a gigantic scale a system of free public schools, by means of which illiteracy was almost completely done away with and patriotism promoted. Like Europe, the United States became ever more democratic in the form and operation of its political institutions. Qualifications of religion and property were gradually abolished and universal manhood suffrage was introduced about the same time as in France. Two major political parties alternated in the conduct of the national government, just as in England, though the United States was more sluggish than England in giving rise to a third, "Labor," party. And the United States, like Germany and Italy, was doomed to fight, at about the same time, a great war of national unification—the Civil War, or "War between the States," of 1861–1865.

The United States felt the same intellectual currents as did Europe, and almost if not quite at the same periods. First, it shared in the mid-century vogue of liberalism and romanticism, under whose twin influence it inaugurated a distinctively "American" literature, realized the ideal of "free churches in a free state," elaborated the freedom of education, and waged a crusade against Negro slavery. Subsequently, in the latter part of the nineteenth century, it participated in the European drift toward "realism" and economic nationalism, adopting high tariff protectionism, enacting some labor legislation, going in for the newer navalism and overseas imperialism, and in its literature beginning to indulge in "muck-raking," in sociology and psychology.

Following the example of European Great Powers—Britain, France, Germany, and Italy—the United States at the end of the nineteenth century embarked on definitely imperialist policies. Hawaii was appropriated in 1898. In 1899–1900 the Samoan Islands were partitioned with Germany and Britain. In 1898 was brought on the Spanish-American War, eventuating in the annexation of Puerto Rico and the Philippines and in a virtual protectorate over Cuba. In 1900, in coöperation with European Powers, a military expedition was sent into China. In 1901 a native revolt in the Philippines was suppressed by force. In 1903, the separation of Panama from Colombia was engineered, and across the isthmus a "zone" was acquired in which the Panama Canal was promptly built.

Latin America

The Latin American nations were essentially European too, though their cultural ties were with another part of Europe from that with which the United States was most intimately connected. In one respect they were less "European" than the United States; that was in blood. Whereas the vast majority of the inhabitants of the United States (and Canada) were of European stock, a very large proportion of the inhabitants of most Latin American countries had aboriginal Indian or Negro blood in their veins. There had not been in Latin America the wholesale extinction of Indians or the strong feeling against racial intermixture which characterized "Anglo-Saxon" America. In the West Indies and along the coasts of the Caribbean, Negro blood predominated, while in Mexico, Central America, and a large part of South America most of the "common people" were Indians or cross-breeds. Only the wealthy upper classes were apt to be "pure" Spanish or Portuguese.

Yet, though many Indians preserved their tribal speech and customs, the prevailing civilization all over Latin America was unmistakably European and Latin. The language of officialdom, of schools, armies, courts, newspapers, and of polite society, was Spanish or Portuguese, and the only publicly professed religion of any importance was Catholic Christianity. Like Latin Europe, too, Latin America was predominantly agricultural, and in politics it presented marked resemblances to Spain and Portugal.

There was the same indifference of the masses to ordinary political action, the same supremacy of particular classes and professional politicians, the same cliques of "liberals" and "anti-clericals," or of "conservatives" and "clericals," the same preponderant influence of army officers, the same tendencies toward dictatorship and sudden revolution. All the Latin-American governments were republican in form, but presidents were usually superior to constitutions and rifles more decisive than ballots.

The Latin tradition was sustained and reënforced, moreover, by a steady immigration from Latin Europe, especially from Portugal, Spain, and Italy, and also by an habitual sending of the sons of the upper classes to institutions of higher learning in Spain or France. This meant a strengthening of cultural ties between Latin Europe and Latin America, and more particularly a familiarity of the governing groups in most Latin-American countries with the latest Parisian ideas and fashions.

Then, too, Latin America was increasingly dependent on Europe—and on the United States—in the economic sphere. It remained overwhelmingly agricultural at a time when most of the "Western" world was undergoing intensive industrialization. It grew surpluses of coffee, wheat, cattle, sugar, tropical fruit, etc., the markets for which were in North America and Europe; and for the development of its agriculture, for the exploitation of its natural resources—notably its mines and oil-wells—and for the development of its armies and public works, it sought loans in Paris, London, or New York and granted "concessions" to European or North American corporations.

Nations of Latin America

Nationalism played a somewhat different rôle in Latin America—at least in Spanish America—from what it played in the United States or in Latin Europe. Instead of uniting a linguistic nationality in a single national state, it confirmed the political separatism of an earlier day and fostered rivalry among a gradually increasing number of proudly sovereign states. The Portuguese-speaking people of South America managed to hold together and to emphasize their unity in the federal state of Brazil, but the Spanish-speaking population of the New World had begun their independent political career as eight distinct nations, and within a century the number swelled to eighteen. The eight which emerged from the Wars of Independence of 1810–1825 were: Mexico, Central

America, Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, Paraguay, Argentina, and Chile. In 1828 Uruguay revolted against Argentina, and after resisting Brazilian aggression established its independence in 1830. From Colombia seceded Venezuela in 1829, Ecuador in 1830, and Panama, much later, in 1903. In the 1840's Central America broke up into the five separate republics of Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Salvador, and Costa Rica, while Santo Domingo became a state distinct from Haiti. Cuba, after repeated revolts and the intervention of the United States, gained general recognition as an independent republic in 1899. Each of the eighteen Spanish republics, thus established, had a distinctive nationalism of its own, and likewise the Portuguese republic of Brazil and the French Negro republic of Haiti.

Brazil

The largest and in many ways the most important of the Latin-American nations was Portuguese-speaking Brazil. Its area exceeded that of continental United States (exclusive of Alaska), and its population rose from 4 million in 1830 to over 30 million in 1910. Its economic resources and development were remarkable. By 1914 it was furnishing almost three-fourths of the world's coffee, exporting large amounts of timber and minerals and meat, and producing manufactured goods of an annual value of half a billion dollars.

The political foundations for this economic progress had been laid by a monarchical régime, which had been established by a branch of the Portuguese royal family in 1822,[1] and which lasted, as the Empire of Brazil, from that date to 1889. Especially helpful was the long reign of the Emperor Pedro II (1831–1889), an enlightened prince and inveterate reformer. The slave trade was abolished in 1853, and Negro slavery, abated in 1871, was ended, without civil war, in 1888. In 1889, however, the Empire of Pedro II was abruptly overthrown. Influential landlords resented the loss of their slaves, and army officers chafed at the subordinate position in which the Emperor kept them. The latter therefore supported the Republic which one of their number, Marshal Deodoro da Fonseca, proclaimed in November 1889, and the former offered no resistance. Pedro and his family were exiled. State and church were separated.

[1] On the establishment of the Brazilian Empire by Pedro I in 1822, see Vol. 2, pp. 781–782.

A republican constitution, modelled closely after that of the United States, was adopted in 1891.

Fonseca might profess liberalism and democracy, but actually his régime was a military dictatorship and one of scandalous corruption. In 1891 he was overthrown by another army chieftain, Marshal Floriano Peixoto, who in turn had to deal in 1893 with a stubborn insurrection of still other military and naval officers. Following the retirement of Peixoto in 1894, the republican government passed into civilian hands and gradually gained stability and respect.

Of the Spanish-American states, the foremost, in one way or another, were Argentina, Chile, and Mexico. Argentina, during the first half of the nineteenth century, was a prey to civil war and military dictatorship, but from 1862, under a more orderly republican régime, it significantly gained in population and in material well-being. It became a great grain-growing and meat-producing country, and its capital city of Buenos Aires became the metropolis of the southern hemisphere and one of the most beautiful and cultured urban centres in the world. In military and naval strength, Argentina ranked with its neighbors, Brazil and Chile, forming with them the so-called group of A-B-C Powers.

Argentina

Chile, occupying the long narrow strip of territory along the Pacific west of Argentina and the Andes, achieved fairly early a kind of political stability. The civil government, republican in form, was conducted most of the time by the conservative upper classes in harmony with the military. Education was fostered, agriculture and commerce promoted, art cultivated, and the cities of Santiago and Valparaiso developed. As an outcome of a war with Bolivia and Peru in 1879–1883, Chilean rule was extended northward over the provinces of Tacna and Arica, with their rich nitrate deposits.

Chile

Mexico was the most populous of all the Spanish-American states; though exceeded in area by Argentina, it had twice as many inhabitants. Yet Mexico was relatively "backward," exemplifying in an extreme form the traditional social cleavage which to some extent characterized all Latin America. Most of the country's basic agriculture was conducted on extensive plantations, which were owned and exploited by an upper class of cultured well-to-do persons, Spanish

Mexico

in descent and tradition and influential in state and church, and on which lived and toiled a lower class of ignorant, poverty-stricken peasants—or "peons," as they were called—largely Indian in blood and servile in condition. Among the upper class emerged the usual divisions of conservative and liberal, clerical and anti-clerical, but such divisions ordinarily meant little to the lower class. In the 1850's and 1860's, it is true, Benito Juarez, a full-blooded Indian and a declared champion of the lower class, led a revolutionary movement and succeeded in overcoming French interference and in putting the intruded Emperor Maximilian to death (1867).[1] Juarez, nevertheless, displayed far more energy in fighting "reactionaries" and promulgating decrees against the Catholic Church than in improving the lot of the peons. And his successor, Porfirio Diaz, who was virtual dictator of the country from 1877 to 1911, though less hostile to the church, was not at all concerned with social reform.

In certain respects Mexico made progress under Diaz. Foreign capital was employed for the construction of railways and the development of the country's mineral and oil resources. Fiscal reforms were instituted and general administration improved. Some Mexicans waxed wealthy, and likewise a considerable number of American, British, and other foreign investors. But in measure as Mexico was brought into contact with the outside world and as Diaz aged and became more despotic, Mexican "liberals" multiplied and the Indian masses grew restless. At length in 1910, a wealthy landowner, Francisco Madero, raised the standard of constitutionalism and agrarian reform and, with several disaffected army officers, took the field against Diaz. Diaz resigned and fled to Europe, and Madero was made president —without accomplishing any agrarian reform, however. Then a counter-revolutionary movement ensued; General Victoriano Huerta overcame Madero and had him put to death in 1914. Next, revolutionary satellites of Madero, with the support of the United States, overthrew Huerta (1915), and, after much quarreling and fighting among themselves and an armed intervention by the United States, one of them, Venustiano Carranza, got the upper hand, and under his auspices a new constitution was adopted in 1917 and drastic anti-clerical legislation enacted. But

[1] See above, pp. 142–143.

not until later when the "Mexican Revolution" took on a more radical complexion, was social reform seriously attempted.[1]

Conditions similar to those in Mexico existed in most of the lesser Latin American states. But their economic backwardness and political revolutions must not be allowed to overshadow the very real European civilization which obtained throughout Latin America.

Western Civilization in Two Regions of Asia

In Asia, the greatest of all the world's continents, European influence had been continuously exerted since the sixteenth century, but in only two parts of Asia did it produce such a fundamental Europeanization in language and culture as was simultaneously produced in America. One part was the northern plain—the vast expanse of Siberia—into which Russian colonists trickled during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and poured during the eighteenth and nineteenth, bringing with them Russian speech, Russian customs, Russian Christianity, and the rule of the Russian Tsars. In the frozen "far north" of Siberia and in the desert regions to the south, primitive tribes remained; but by the latter part of the nineteenth century Siberia as a whole was quite Russian and was rapidly expanding.

1. Siberia

The other fundamentally Europeanized part of Asia was the Philippine archipelago, which, subject to Spanish rule from 1565 to 1898, experienced a development similar to Spanish America's. There was much racial intermixture, and the emerging "Filipino" nationality, though predominantly Malay in blood, was Spanish in speech, Catholic in religion, and Latin European in culture. Some Moslem and some pagan tribesmen remained, it is true, in out-of-the-way islands of the archipelago, and its conquest by the United States introduced a new and alien rule. Yet neither of these circumstances could alter the basic fact that on the whole the Philippines were as European as, say, Mexico or South Africa.

2. Philippines

The vast region of India and the East Indian Islands of Sumatra, Java, and Celebes had been in contact with European Powers—Portugual, the Netherlands, France, or England—for as long a time as the Philippines had been subject to Spain, or Siberia to Russia. Until the nineteenth century, however, the

[1] See below, pp. 789–792.

contact was primarily commercial, and secondarily political. With the exception of certain centres on the Malabar coast of India, whither Portuguese colonists and missionaries came in the sixteenth century, familiarizing natives with the Portuguese language and converting them to Catholic Christianity, there was no real Europeanization of a cultural sort. The population of India was altogether too numerous and too deeply rooted in its own complex culture to be much affected in this respect by the presence of European merchants or "governors" in a few coastal cities.

Second Type of Europeanization: Superimposing Western on other Civilizations

In the nineteenth century, European influence was enormously extended and quickened in India—and in other parts of Asia too—as an accompaniment of the Industrial Revolution. With the rapidly increasing eagerness of the industrialized nations of Europe to secure raw materials, to sell manufactured commodities, and to invest surplus capital, and with their greatly improved means of establishing and exercising overseas imperial sway, European merchants were no longer content with limited coast traffic in Asia or with cumbersome dealings of chartered commercial companies with native princes and potentates. They must penetrate inland, building railways, stringing telegraph wires, accustoming natives to machine-made goods and machine-age civilization; and all these things they could accomplish more satisfactorily if their particular national state in Europe acquired supremacy throughout the economically backward area. Industrialized European nations now had naval and military establishments and financial resources adequate to bring Asiatic rulers to terms.

Stimulated by Industrial Revolution

Thus, in the second half of the nineteenth century, a new European imperialism was inspired and expedited in India and indeed over the greater part of the huge Asiatic continent and its adjacent large islands. It involved, in many areas, an expansion and intensification of direct European rule, and, on a wider front and even more significantly, it served to spread European material civilization and European political ideas on top of the abiding linguistic, religious, and social cultures of the several Asiatic peoples. In a word, there was now a material Europeanization of Asia.

Applied on Large Scale in Asia

How the British constructed and ruled the Empire of India

has elsewhere been explained.[1] Here we shall merely catalogue the acquisitions of Asiatic territory by European Powers, and then pass on to a summary consideration of the Europeanization of Japan and China, with a few supplementary words about Siam and the Moslem regions of the "Middle East."

By British

Great Britain added to her Indian Empire in the 1880's Burma and Baluchistan. In southeastern Asia she bordered Singapore and Malacca with the Federated Malay States (1874, 1909) and across the sea to the east appropriated a third of the island of Borneo (1881–1888). In southwestern Asia, she acquired between 1839 and 1901 a series of protectorates from Aden at the foot of the Red Sea to Kuwait at the head of the Persian Gulf, and by agreement with Russia in 1907 a "sphere of influence" in southern Persia. From China she wrested Hongkong in 1842, leased Weihaiwei in 1898, and shortly afterwards obtained a privileged position in Tibet and the Yangtze valley. At the opening of the twentieth century, Britain governed a third of the whole population of Asia.

By French

France, besides continuing to hold a few trading posts on the coast of India, built up an empire of Indo-China. In 1896 she delimited with Great Britain "spheres of influence" in Siam, and in 1899 she leased Kwangchow from China and obtained a privileged position in the Chinese provinces of Kwangsi and Hainan. By 1914 France ruled twenty million Asiatics, the majority of whom were Buddhists.

By Dutch

The Dutch East Indian empire, whose administration had been transferred from the Dutch East India Company to the government of the Netherlands in 1798, was greatly extended and solidified through the conquest and exploitation of the interior of the islands of Sumatra, Java, Celebes, of two-thirds of Borneo, and of a half of New Guinea. Java alone had almost four times the area and population of the Netherlands. Altogether the Dutch Netherlands in 1914 dominated fifty-four million Asiatics, the majority of whom were Moslems.

By Other Europeans

Portugal still maintained a few trading posts in India and the port of Macao in China. Germany in the 1880's took possession of 70,000 square miles of northeastern New Guinea, rechristening it Kaiser Wilhelmsland, and in 1898 leased from China the port of Kiaochow, with 200

[1] See above, pp. 66–67, 379–383.

square miles. Russia held Siberia and pushed its frontier, in the second half of the nineteenth century, through Turkestan and other regions of west-central Asia to the borders of India, Afghanistan, and Persia, and in 1907, by agreement with Great Britain, obtained a "sphere of influence" in northern Persia. By 1910, over a third of the area of Asia was immediately subject to Russia. In addition, we may note that the United States, by its victory in the Spanish-American War of 1898, acquired near the Asiatic continent the Philippines, with an area of 100,000 square miles and a population of ten million.

By Americans

Altogether, in the first decade of the twentieth century, almost three-fifths of the entire area of Asia (and adjacent Malaysia) was ruled by European Powers (including the United States), and a little over four-ninths of the total population of 925 million. In other words, the number of Asiatics subject to direct European influence of a governmental sort was larger than the total population of Europe itself.

Still nominally independent of European rule were two sections of Asia: the "Far Eastern" countries of China, Japan, and Siam, together comprising a little more than a quarter of the area, and about half the population, of the Continent; and the "Middle Eastern" regions of the Ottoman Empire, Persia, Afghanistan, and Arabia, embracing together a little less than one-seventh the area and one-twenty-third the population of the continent. But all these lands were now being influenced by European material civilization as they had never been before. Japan, in particular, was already a Great Power in the European sense, more strikingly Europeanized in government, industry, and armaments than any Asiatic country actually administered by Europeans.

Remaining "Independent" Countries

There had been some European commercial and missionary penetration of Japan back in the sixteenth century.[1] Portuguese traders had "discovered" Japan in 1542, and Francis Xavier, a famous Jesuit, had inaugurated Catholic missions there in 1549. By the end of the century Japanese converts to Christianity numbered 300,000; and Spaniards and Dutchmen were competing with Portuguese for Japanese trade. Presently, however, the major native princes and the leading

Japan

[1] See Vol. 1, pp. 72, 77, 392.

exponents of native religion (Buddhism or Shinto) became alarmed lest their influence should be undermined, and their power destroyed, by the ambition and intrigue of Europeans. In 1587 foreign priests were ordered to leave the country on penalty of death, and in 1614 Christianity was definitively banned. In 1624 Spanish merchants, as well as missionaries, were excluded, and in 1638 Portuguese. Thousands of native Christian converts were put to death, and commercial intercourse with the outside world was rigidly restricted to one closely supervised station to which a few Dutch ships might come. Otherwise no foreigner might enter Japan, while absolutely no native might go abroad and no ocean-going ships might be constructed. For over two centuries, from 1638 to 1853, Japan was practically cut off from Europe, and Europe from Japan.

The "reopening" of Japan to European influence was an outcome of a naval expedition, under Commodore Matthew Perry, which the United States despatched to the Far East in 1853 with instructions to secure from the Japanese government a pledge of protection for American trade. The Japanese were duly impressed by the spectacle of Perry's four warships steaming into Uraga Bay near Yokohama, still more impressed by the sewing machines and other devices which he exhibited as samples of Western industrial civilization, and most impressed by the sight and sound of the big grim cannon which his ships carried as the final proof of Western superiority. So vastly impressed, indeed, was the Japanese governing prince that in 1854 he signed with Perry a treaty, by which Japan promised to allow American merchantmen to visit two ports. Very shortly, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and Russia obtained similar privileges. Then, in 1859, another envoy from the United States, Townsend Harris, negotiated a new treaty whereby the port of Yokohama was opened to American commerce. And, again, similar treaty rights were soon accorded to merchants of other foreign countries.

The prince who signed these commercial treaties in the name of Japan was not the sovereign of the country, but only the hereditary chief official (or "Shogun") of the Emperor (or "Mikado"). The Mikados belonged to a "divine" family which was supposed to have sprung from a sun-goddess and to have

reigned in Japan continuously since the seventh century B.C.[1] Being so very sacred, they had long since taken to living in ceremonial seclusion in the "holy city" of Kyoto and leaving the exercise of regal authority to one or another of the feudal princes —or "daimios"—of the realm, who thus was styled the Shogun. Since the end of the sixteenth century the daimio of the Tokugawa clan had been the Shogun, and to keep himself in power he had had to wage war repeatedly with other daimios.

The Shogun's action in "opening" Japan to foreigners in the 1850's was resented by other daimios and by the Mikado as a sacrilegious reversal of traditional policy, and was utilized by them to undermine the Shogun's authority and to reassert the Mikado's. But even the anti-foreign sentiment of daimios and Mikado was altered when, in 1863–1864, bombardments of Japanese ports proved the effectiveness of Western gunnery and the inability of Japan to defend herself unless she possessed the Western type of cannon. Hence daimios who had recently been most vehement in reviling "European barbarians" now suddenly changed their tune and began to insist that Japan should freely admit the Westerners, learn from them, and excel them in their own arts. At the same time they retained their hostility to the Shogun and demanded that the powers which he had been exercising should be restored to the Mikado.

The ensuing agitation against the Shogun thus involved a demand for an assimilation of Western civilization and likewise a mounting enthusiasm for national unification under the Mikado and for the national religion of Shinto of which he was at once the sacred representative and the chief object of worship. It eventuated in the Japanese Revolution of 1867–1868. The last of the Shoguns was compelled to abdicate and to retire into private life, and the youthful but able Mikado, Mutsuhito, was made actual as well as titular monarch of Japan. By a remarkable act of patriotism, the chief daimios surrendered to him their respective feudal rights and possessions, and the lesser nobles followed their example. Then in 1871 feudalism was formally abolished by imperial decree. The ex-daimios and certain other leaders in the revolution were rewarded with new titles of nobility borrowed

Japanese Revolution of 1867–1868

[1] There is solid historical evidence that it has reigned since at least the fifth century A.D.

from European usage and with high offices and ample salaries under the new centralized government. The peasants were freed from servile dues and made owners of the land they tilled and immediate subjects of the Empire.

Under Mutsuhito (1867–1912) Japan was rapidly European-ized, militarily, politically, and educationally. Young Japanese were sent to Europe (and America) to observe and study. Europeans (and Americans) were welcomed to Japan. Christian missions were tolerated. Foreign trade was encouraged. European counsel was eagerly sought, and European models closely followed, in modernizing the political, economic, and military institutions of the country. The Japanese army was reorganized in the 1870's on the Prussian pattern, and a navy was constructed in accordance with British advice. Codes of civil and criminal law were fashioned after those of France and Germany. A public-school system of the "Western" type was established, and universities were set up at Tokio and Kyoto. In 1889 the Emperor promulgated a constitution, vesting legislative power in a bicameral parliament, the upper chamber being aristocratic and the lower "liberal" that is, elected by the propertied classes.

Emperor Mutsuhito, 1867–1912

Simultaneously the material civilization of Europe (and America) was making swift progress in Japan. The first railway, steeling the eighteen miles from Tokio to Yokohama, was opened in 1872. By 1914 Japan had 6,000 miles of railway, almost all of which were owned by the state. Moreover, within fifteen years of the repeal of the old law prohibiting the construction of seagoing ships, Japan had 138 such vessels, and by 1914 her merchant marine exceeded the French in tonnage and was plying to Europe, America, Australia, and India. The cotton industry, which was non-existent in Japan prior to 1880, grew so fast that in 1914 Japanese cotton factories contained two and a half million spindles, which turned out 550 million pounds of yarn.

Industrial Revolution in Japan

The foregoing figures testify that in the last quarter of the nineteenth century and the first decade of the twentieth, Japan experienced (like Europe and the United States) the Industrial Revolution. And with it emerged trade unions and serious labor problems as well as business corporations and high finance. Industrial bourgeoisie combined with agricultural aristocracy to

direct governmental policies, and workingmen became infected with imported principles of political democracy and even of Marxian socialism.

In part because Japan was imitating so many other features of European development, in part because her industrialists were anxious to extend their operations and add to their profits, and in part because her population was cramped and uneasy and her army officers ambitious and ultra-patriotic, the Japanese government was not content merely to Europeanize the homeland. It must perform the imperialistic mission of propagating its own brand of Europeanization, and incidentally of expanding its own military and political sway, in the Far East. Early in the 1890's, Japan began seriously to meddle in Chinese affairs, and in the resulting Chino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 she detached Korea from the Chinese Empire and acquired the island of Formosa. She would likewise have acquired Port Arthur and the Liaotung peninsula had not Russia, with the backing of France and Germany, intervened and stopped her.

Chino-Japanese War of 1894

It soon became clear that Russia had designs of her own on Port Arthur and also on Manchuria and Korea; and at length in 1904 she went to war with Russia. For this, her first struggle with a European Power, Japan was well prepared. She had the advantage, moreover, of being relatively near to the scene of hostilities and of commanding the united loyalty and intense patriotism of her whole population. The story of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905 has been sketched elsewhere.[1] Here it suffices to note that, by the treaty of Portsmouth terminating the war, Japan took over from Russia the lease of Port Arthur and the Liaotung peninsula, reacquired the southern part of the island of Sakhalin which she had ceded to Russia back in 1875, and obtained from Russia a pledge of political disinterestedness in Korea and Manchuria.

Russo-Japanese War of 1904

With Russia out of the way and with the support of Great Britain (which had been in alliance with Japan since 1902),[2] Japanese officials and financiers proceeded with a "peaceful penetration" of Korea, until in 1910 its native ruler was deposed and it was formally incorporated, under the name of "Chosen,"

[1] See above, pp. 480–481.

[2] See below, p. 557 and note.

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with the Japanese Empire. The territory thus annexed, about twice as large as the American state of Ohio and thrice as populous, was valuable as a granary for Japan, a market for Japanese goods, and a field of investment for Japanese capitalists.

Japanese Annexation of Korea, 1910

The Chinese Empire, though "opened" to European trade and influence somewhat earlier than Japan, was much more sluggish in undergoing Europeanization. In considerable part this was attributable to the size of the Empire and to the peculiar nature of its civilization. In area and in population it was approximately equal to the entire continent of Europe. The large majority of its 375 million inhabitants dwelt along the river valleys of the Hoang (or Yellow), the Yangtze, and the Si, and were included within the eighteen provinces of China proper, which territorially constituted about a third of the Empire as a whole.

Chinese Empire

China Proper

China proper was the core of the Empire. But there were numerous outlying provinces. (1) Manchuria, to the north, had been united with China in the seventeenth century when an ambitious Manchu warrior had supplanted the native dynasty of Chinese Emperors. Since then, a Manchu dynasty had ruled the whole Empire. (2) The Amur coastal district, north of Korea, was a relatively undeveloped dependency of the Empire. (3) Mongolia, to the northwest of China proper, was a vast territory almost seven times the size of France but with fewer people than Paris and these chiefly nomadic. "Inner Mongolia" adjoining Manchuria, was under the immediate rule of the Manchu Emperors of China, but "Outer Mongolia" was too remote and too unruly, and, although a Chinese agent was maintained at Urga, the hereditary khans were practically independent. (4) Sinkiang, in the far west of the Empire, embraced the regions of Eastern Turkestan and Kuldja. (5) Tibet, south of Sinkiang (and west of China proper), was another vast and sparsely settled region. At its capital of Lhasa resided the Buddhist "pope," the Dalai Lama, whom the Tibetans regarded as their religious head and ultimate authority. The Empire was represented by a few Chinese officials and some Chinese soldiers.

Manchuria

Mongolia

Sinkiang

Tibet

Altogether, the Chinese Empire was vast, yet notably persistent.

If any European analogy is sought, it may be found in the ancient Roman Empire rather than in any modern state.

There had been some intercourse of Europe with the Chinese Empire in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.[1] It had been primarily commercial and secondarily religious. Europeans had met Chinese Emperors and officials, had traded in Chinese seaports, and had converted some Chinese to Christianity. But these achievements had been spasmodic and relatively unimportant. They had not affected the mass of the Chinese people or appreciably altered the traditional course or content of Chinese civilization. In the seventeenth century, China, like Japan, had banned Christian missionaries and all but banned European merchants.

In the nineteenth century, however, China was forcefully "opened" and kept open by the newly industrialized Great Powers of Europe. The process began in 1840 with the so-called Opium War waged by Great Britain against the Chinese Empire. It grew out of a quarrel between the Chinese government, which had forbidden the importation of opium, and British traders at Canton, who persisted in bringing opium from India into China. It was marked by British bombardment and capture of several Chinese cities on the coast, and was terminated by the treaty of Nanking (1842) in accordance with which the four ports of Amoy, Ningpo, Foochow, and Shanghai, in addition to Canton, were opened to British traders, the island and city of Hongkong were ceded outright to Britain, and China had to pay a war indemnity. The fruits of British victory were soon shared with other Western nations—American, French, Belgian, Prussian, Dutch, and Portuguese—for the governments of these nations during the next decade obtained similar treaty privileges for their citizens.

Opium War of 1840

In 1856 both France and Great Britain made war on China, the former to avenge the murder of a missionary and the latter on the ground that the crew of a ship sailing under the British flag had been arrested and jailed as pirates by a Chinese official. The British again occupied Canton, while a combined Franco-British military expedition captured the defences of Tientsin and advanced toward Peking, the Emperor's capital. Only after protracted negotiations and the arrival of the expedition at the very gates of Peking was the

Second Chinese War of 1856

[1] See Vol. 1, pp. 66, 69–70, 72, 77, 392.

Second Chinese War ended by the treaties of Tientsin (1860). China now agreed to open six additional ports (including Tientsin) to foreign trade, to legalize the opium traffic, to receive foreign ministers at Peking, to tolerate and protect Christian missionaries, and to guaranty the safety of Europeans travelling in the interior.

Russian Aggression, 1860

In 1860, the very year of the Emperor's yielding to Britain and France, Russia extorted from him the Amur coastal district in the far northeast, and here she founded Vladivostok and used it as a point for radiating her influence in Manchuria.

More steps toward the dismemberment of the Chinese Empire were taken in the 1890's. They were inaugurated by the Chino-Japanese War of 1894–1895, already referred to, as an outcome of which the Empire was compelled to cede Formosa and the Liaotung peninsula (within striking distance of the capital city of Peking) to Japan and to renounce suzerainty over Korea. Russia at once stepped in, as we know, with the support of Germany and France, and prevented Japan from taking the strategically important peninsula of Liaotung. But this action signified no tender regard on the part of Western Powers for the integrity of the Chinese Empire. Only three years later (1898), Russia wrung from the Emperor a "leasehold" of Liaotung (including Port Arthur) for herself, and with it numerous economic concessions in Manchuria. In the same year, Germany, on the pretext of indemnifying herself for the murder of two missionaries of German nationality, acquired a similar ninety-nine-year lease of Kiaochow and similar economic concessions in the Chinese province of Shantung. Also, in the same year, France demanded and obtained a like lease of Kwangchow and like economic rights in the island of Hainan and the mainland provinces of Kwangsi and Yünnan. Great Britain, not to be left behind by her imperialist rivals of Continental Europe, made due representations at Peking, eventuating in a lease of the port of Weihaiwei, opposite Port Arthur, "for as long a period as Port Arthur shall remain in the possession of Russia," in an additional ninety-nine-year lease of the Kowloon peninsula, opposite Hongkong, and in the recognition of Britain's "privileged position" in the Yangtze valley.

Subsequently, in 1904–1905, as we have learned, Russia and

Japan warred over their respective shares in the "dismemberment" of the Chinese Empire. Russia was forced to surrender the Liaotung peninsula to Japan and to give Japan a free hand in Korea. Shortly afterwards, however, Japan and Russia were agreeably delimiting "spheres of influence" between themselves throughout the northern area of the Empire. Japan annexed Korea in 1910 and acquired railway concessions in Manchuria. Russia in 1913 obtained a virtual protectorate over Outer Mongolia.

European Influence in China

In the meantime, between 1842 and 1912, and more especially from the 1890's, European influence was progressively affecting the Chinese Empire in different ways and by various means. The "opening" of China proper to foreign trade, missionary enterprise, and financial investment, as well as the transfer of outlying provinces to foreign rule and the lease of seaports to foreign Powers, brought into the country a steadily augmenting number of Europeans (and Japanese), with Western customs and ideas. From the "treaty ports," in which Europeans had their own settlements and law courts, and from the Catholic and Protestant missions, which gradually dotted the interior as well as the coast and with which were associated schools, hospitals, and orphanages, and from the official representatives of Western nations, radiated ever more widely a knowledge of European industry, European politics, European "progress," and a desire to emulate the West in all these respects. The peasant masses were least touched—there was such a multitude of them! and they were so habituated to old customs! But in the cities were "Western" stirrings, and ambitious young natives began to go abroad, observing and studying the West in its universities and commercial centres, and to return imbued with patriotism and a conviction that China, like Japan, to save herself, must be "Westernized."

In the economic sphere some Westernization was obviously going forward. The value of Chinese foreign trade grew from 215 million dollars in 1875 to 608 million in 1914,[1] and by the latter date some 6,000 miles of railway were in operation within the Empire and 2,300 miles more under construction.

In other respects, nevertheless, the Westernization of China

[1] Most of the tonnage of foreign shipping was distributed in 1913 as follows: Great Britain, 38,120,000; Japan, 23,422,000; Germany, 6,320,000; France, 1,233,000; the United States, 900,000; and Norway, 740,000.

was seriously impeded by the enormous size of the country and the bitterness of the popular reaction against chronic interference and aggression of the European Great Powers and Japan, and by the unwillingness or inability of the Chinese government to adopt and pursue any such revolutionary program as had enabled Japan to become politically and militarily European. The Chinese Empire was presided over by the Manchu dynasty, originally alien to the real Chinese and now seemingly decadent. The Emperor Kuang Hsü (1875–1908) was a small boy when he ascended the throne and, though he was hailed as "the son of Heaven" and surrounded with the utmost pomp, he remained a weakling, dependent upon the reactionary advice of court mandarins, upon the uncertain support of a corrupt group of military chieftains and civil governors, and upon the vigorous but capricious promptings of his aunt, the Empress Dowager, Tz'ŭ Hsi, who had been regent during his minority. Had it not been for this remarkable old lady, the Manchu dynasty would not have lasted as long as it did, and she was the personification of hostility to "Europe" and the "West."

"Backwardness" of Chinese Government

Following the Chino-Japanese War and just when all the European Great Powers seemed most intent on dismembering his Empire (1898), Kuang Hsü surprised everyone by issuing a series of reforming decrees. The imperial bureaucracy was to be reorganized and Westernized. An imperial university and a system of schools were to be established for the study of modern European science as well as ancient Chinese classics. A central cabinet of ministers of the European type was to be instituted, and corresponding changes wrought in the high command of the army. These decrees aroused a storm of opposition from officials, civil and military, who by conviction or interest were wedded to the old order and also from some moderate reformers who thought the action of the Emperor too precipitate. The Empress Dowager Tz'ŭ Hsi put herself at the head of the opposition and coöperated with a prominent army general, Yüan Shih-kai, to effect a palace revolution in September 1898. Kuang Hsü was practically imprisoned, and obliged to assent to the restoration of a regency under Tz'ŭ Hsi. For the next ten years the crafty forceful Dowager Empress was

Reform Edicts of Emperor Kuang Hsü

Reaction under Empress Tz'ŭ Hsi

the ruler of China, and the nominal Emperor a shadowy figure in the seclusion of the palace.

Tz'ŭ Hsi promptly annulled the reform decrees, put several reformers to death, and announced her intention of combating all foreign influences. Encouraged by her attitude, reactionaries throughout the Empire gave vent to their hatred of foreigners, and the more violent among them formed a body known as "Righteous Patriotic Fists," or "Boxers," who attacked the property of aliens and massacred Christian missionaries and their Chinese converts. In the spring of 1900 Boxer outrages occurred in all the major cities and reached a climax at Peking, where the German minister was killed and the foreign residents were closely besieged and threatened with extermination. Whereupon an international military expedition, comprising soldiers or marines of Russia, Great Britain, the United States, France, Italy, Germany, and Japan, hastily assembled at Tientsin, fought its way to Peking, and put the Chinese troops to rout and the imperial court to flight. In 1901 Tz'ŭ Hsi reluctantly accepted the Allied terms of peace: China would pay to the several Powers indemnities totalling 333 million dollars, would safeguard foreigners and foreign interests within her territories, and, as a precautionary measure, would permit foreign Powers to maintain armed forces for self-protection at Peking and Tientsin.

Boxer Movement and Its Suppression

The reactionary policy of Tz'ŭ Hsi thus proved worse than a failure, and henceforth the somewhat chastened Empress Dowager tried to make amends by restraining anti-foreign agitation and introducing some Europeanizing reforms. The traditional classical education of Chinese officials was modified and some attention given in the schools to natural science, European history, political economy, and modern languages. A commission was sent abroad to investigate the political institutions of the West, and Chinese students were encouraged to attend universities in Europe and America.

These reforms were not radical enough to satisfy the growing party of "Westernizers" among the younger generation of Chinese intellectuals, many of whom by this time had studied abroad and all of whom were coming to believe that Chinese regeneration depended upon getting rid of the Manchu dynasty and its conservative bureaucracy. The leader of the party was Sun

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Yat-sen, a man of humble origin who had been trained in medicine and had become a Christian and who, though compelled to live in exile, exerted a tremendous influence on the formulation and propagation of a revolutionary program of nationalism, republicanism, and political and social democracy. In 1908 the almost simultaneous deaths of the Dowager Empress Tz'ŭ Hsi and the puppet Emperor Kuang Hsü served to quicken the revolutionary agitation of Sun Yat-sen and his radical following, for the succeeding Emperor, Hsüan T'ung, was only an infant.

Sun Yat-sen and Chinese Nationalism

In vain the conservative régime at Peking made concessions to the radicals, sanctioning provincial assemblies in 1909 and convoking a National Assembly in 1910. The followers of Sun Yat-sen refused to compromise with the existing government and in October 1911 rose in arms against it. Ambitious military chieftains, including the powerful Yüan Shih-kai, refused or delayed to obey the orders of the court to suppress the rebellion, and very soon the revolutionaries were in possession of several important cities and provinces. In December 1911 a provisional republican government was established at Nanking, with Sun Yat-sen as President, and in the following February the boy-Emperor Hsüan T'ung[1] abdicated and the Manchu dynasty ceased to rule.

Chinese Revolution of 1911

To consolidate the new Chinese Republic, Sun Yat-sen turned over the presidency to General Yüan Shih-kai; and to render it democratic, a constitution was adopted at Nanking in March 1912 providing for a popularly elected parliament to which the president and his ministers should be responsible. All of which was hailed by optimistic "progressives" in Europe and America as indicating the speedy triumph of the latest and best principles of government and society throughout the world.

Chinese Republic and Its Difficulties

In fact, however, the Chinese Revolution of 1911–1912 was but an episode in the long and very painful process of European-

[1] This was his ceremonial name. After his abdication he was known as Henry Pu-yi. For a time he continued to live in the palace at Peking and to receive a pension from the Chinese Republic. Subsequently he made his escape and became a pensioner of Japan, through whose interested offices he was installed in 1932 as Emperor of Manchuria (Manchukuo). See below, p. 796.

izing the Chinese Empire, and for sometime afterwards China's internal affairs went from bad to worse. The failure and overthrow of the imperial government destroyed the prestige and ended the orderly functioning of the traditional civil and military bureaucracy; and the Republic was too novel and too weak to provide a substantial substitute. Its informed and sincere supporters were only a small fraction of the Chinese nation, intellectuals of the stamp of Sun Yat-sen, inexperienced in practical politics and inclined to be very doctrinaire. Between these, constituting a majority in the parliament and forming a political group known as the Kuomintang, and a self-seeking President with an army in back of him, an unequal conflict soon raged. Parliament enacted laws, and the President ignored or violated them. Then, in 1913, when the Kuomintang inspired a revolt, Yüan Shih-kai easily suppressed it and followed up his success by exiling Sun Yat-sen and destroying the parliament. In 1915, by virtue of a "referendum" which he carefully directed, Yüan proclaimed the restoration of the monarchy with himself as Emperor. Resistance was again offered by the Kuomintang and this time also by jealous generals, and only death from disease in 1916 saved Yüan Shih-kai from death by violence.

Siam

Siam was the third country of the Far East which underwent considerable Europeanization during the latter part of the nineteenth century without losing its identity or sovereignty. True, it was pressed in upon by France from the east and by Great Britain from the west. Both of these European Powers deprived it of border provinces, and in 1896 they agreed upon a division of the whole country into "spheres of influence" for themselves. Nevertheless, thanks to an adaptable and far-sighted King, Chulalongkorn (1868–1910), the greater part of Siam remained intact and won general respect for the orderly progress it made toward Westernization. Chulalongkorn abolished slavery, erected schools and hospitals, modernized the army, remodelled the civil administration, and introduced scientific and mechanical features of Western civilization. He established a standard coinage, postal and telegraph services, and a department of public health. He built a thousand miles of railway. He lighted his capital city of Bangkok with electric

lights. He had several of his sons educated in England. At the same time he promoted Siamese nationalism and retained the traditionally autocratic form of government, believing that Siam would make greater progress under benevolent despotism than under the newfangled democracy then in vogue in Europe.

The Moslem "Near East" and "Middle East" felt the impact of Western European civilization simultaneously with the non-Moslem "Far East," although the relative poverty of the Moslem world as a whole, together with the traditional tribalism and religious fanaticism of its peoples, tended to make it less alluring and less amenable to European exploitation and hence to European imperialism.

Moslem Near East

In another place we have described the delayed Europeanization of the Asiatic provinces of the Ottoman Empire—the introduction of railways, the scramble of European Powers for economic concessions and political preëminence, the resulting development at the beginning of the twentieth century of a sentiment of nationalism and a demand for reform among Turks and Arabs.[1] The Arabs undergoing some Europeanization were those of Mesopotamia, Syria, and the narrow settled coasts of Arabia. Much the greater part of the Arabian peninsula was desert, peopled by nomadic warlike tribes who were left usually to their own devices. The Moslem population of Turkestan, too, was mainly nomadic, though, being better off economically and less bellicose, it was gradually absorbed into the Russian Empire, as we have elsewhere noted,[2] and brought under Russian influence. Afghanistan, a region considerably larger than France and almost as large as the whole Japanese Empire, was so mountainous and unproductive, and its population, though numbering fewer than six million, was so adept at fighting, that it successfully resisted encroachments of Russia from the northwest and Great Britain from the southeast and preserved both its independence and its "backwardness."

Turks

Arabs

Afghanistan

Persia, the seat of an ancient empire and civilization, had been for centuries an independent Moslem state, presided over by a "king of kings," or "shah," and characterized, like most Moslem countries, by religious fanaticism, economic primitiveness, some delightful domestic art, and chronic

Persia

[1] See above, pp. 490–493.

[2] See above, p. 474.

warfare between ambitious chieftains. In the latter part of the nineteenth century, Persia's internal affairs were immensely complicated by rivalry between the European Great Powers of Russia and Great Britain for control of the country's resources and government. If Russia supported and influenced one faction, Great Britain supported and dominated an opposing faction. If Russia obtained a concession, Great Britain must be compensated by securing another. At least this was the situation until 1907, when the two Powers agreed to recognize each other's "sphere of influence" in Persia—Russia's in the north and Britain's in the southeast and along the Persian Gulf—and to coöperate in exploitation. Which was better for them but worse for the Persians.

In resisting foreign imperialism and effecting needed internal reform, no real leadership was provided by the sovereigns. One Shah after another travelled repeatedly in Europe, but what they chiefly derived therefrom was a lively taste for European pleasures and an inordinate extravagance in satisfying it. To get all the money they could, they imposed burdensome taxes, abetted the official corruption which ate like a canker throughout the government, and mortgaged themselves and their country ever more heavily to Russia and Britain. In vain a party of Nationalists arose and forced the grant of a constitution in 1906 and the deposition of a Shah in 1908. Russian troops, on the pretense of "preserving order," invaded and occupied the northern part of the country, and the Nationalists fell to quarreling among themselves. For a time in 1911 an improvement of Persian conditions was promised by the appointment of disinterested Swedish officers to modernize the native army and of a resourceful young American, Morgan Shuster, to reform the national finances. Within a year, however, Russia obliged the Persian government to dismiss Shuster, who had declared with more truth than prudence that the selfish policies pursued by the Russian and British were largely responsible for the misgovernment and anarchy prevalent in "weakened, war-cursed Persia."

North Africa

Northern Africa, like western Asia, had long been overwhelmingly Moslem. Here, since the seventh century, the indigenous Egyptians and Berbers had been largely fused with conquering Arabs and subjected to a succession of essentially oriental despotisms—Arab or Turkish—characterized by common Moslem culture and by incessant strife

within and depredations from without. Gradually, too, Moslem religion and Arab customs had been communicated to Negro tribesmen along the eastern coast of Africa and across the Sahara desert into the Sudan. Timbuctu had become a Moslem commercial centre in the sixteenth century, and by the second half of the nineteenth century the whole interior of the vast African continent bade fair to become Moslem like the North.

By this time, however, the partition and exploitation of Africa by European Great Powers was more startling and impressive than the conversion of primitive Negroes to the tenets of Islam. We have already explained how the more civilized part of Africa—the northern coastland along the Mediterranean—the part which had always been in contact, friendly or hostile, with Europe—was loosed from the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century and appropriated piecemeal by various European Powers: Algeria by France between 1830 and 1870; Tunis by France in 1881; Egypt by Great Britain in 1882; Tripoli and Cyrenaica by Italy in 1911–1912. Morocco alone had had no nominal connection with the Ottoman Empire, but its native Sultan in the nineteenth century had as many troubles at home and abroad as the Khedive of Egypt, and though like the Ottoman Sultan he profited for some time from the rivalry of European Powers he eventually in 1912 had to submit to a division of his country into a major French protectorate and a minor Spanish protectorate.

Prior to 1880, Europeans knew relatively little of Africa as a whole and usually styled it the "Dark Continent." Nor had there been much interest in it beyond the northern shore and the few coastal stations which Portuguese and Dutch, French and British had established here and there as stopping-places on the way to India or for traffic in "gold dust" or, much more lucratively, in Negro slaves. The Portuguese had been most persistent and tenacious in occupying territories on the east and west coasts (Mozambique and Angola, respectively), and the Dutch and British in promoting some real colonization in a limited area of South Africa. But the net result, in respect of the Europeanization of Africa, was slight, and with the abolition of the slave trade in the first half of the nineteenth century it promised to become even less.

Third Type of Europeanization: Partitioning the Dark Continent

In fact, nevertheless, the abolition of the slave trade proved

to be the prelude to a swift partition of almost all Africa among European Powers and a rapidly ensuing extension of European influence from the coastal regions into the far interior. For the abolition of the slave trade was inspired by humanitarian zeal and the new industrialism, and both these phenomena continued to function. Humanitarians were not content to abolish traffic of British or other European slave dealers on the coasts of Africa. They must interfere with the slave-dealing of Arabs and Negroes, and bring light to all benighted humanity; they must push inland and uplift potential slaves and acquaint them with Christianity and European civilization. Moreover, the new industrialism demanded rubber and other raw materials which tropical Africa could supply, and at the same time raised up the hope that a Europeanized Africa would provide a profitable field for European salesmanship and investment and, through the achievements of modern sanitation, for European colonization.

Exploration

European penetration of the "Dark Continent" was inaugurated just after the middle of the nineteenth century by a number of intrepid explorers and adventurers, of whom three or four merit mention. David Livingstone (1813–1873), a Scottish physician, went to Africa in 1840 as a Protestant missionary, but he won fame less as an evangelist than as an explorer. For thirty years he headed expeditions into the wild jungles of south-central Africa and published accounts which fascinated scientists and aroused a lively interest throughout Europe and America. Towards the close of his life Livingstone seemed to have been lost in the jungle, and a New York newspaper proprietor capitalized the widespread curiosity concerning Livingstone's fate by despatching a clever and adventurous Anglo-American journalist, Henry Stanley (1841–1904), to find him. Stanley "found" Livingstone in 1871, and then engaged in important explorations of his own, circumnavigating the great lakes of Tanganyika and Victoria and tracing the whole course of the Congo River. The thrillingly told tale of his trip *Through the Dark Continent* went through countless editions, while Stanley himself interested King Leopold II of Belgium in the commercial possibilities of the Congo region and became the chief "promoter" of that greedy monarch's "Congo Free State." [1]

Livingstone and Stanley

[1] On Leopold II and the Congo Free State, see above, pp. 437–438.

Another famous European adventurer in Africa was Karl Peters (1856–1918), a German student of British colonial activities and the organizer and chief propagandist of a German colonial society. In 1884 with a few companions he landed on the east coast of Africa, and, by plying native chieftains with grog and presenting them with an assortment of toys, he obtained from them within ten days as many as a dozen "treaties" ceding to his company about 60,000 square miles of territory. The next year he prevailed upon Bismarck to take the company and its land under the formal protection of the German government, and within the next five years, by methods similar to Peters's, German East Africa was expanded into a domain of 200,000 square miles.

Peters

Even more celebrated as an African "empire builder" was the Englishman Cecil Rhodes (1853–1902). The son of an Anglican clergyman, he was intended for the church, but being sickly in his youth he was sent off in 1870 to "rough it" in Natal (in South Africa) and soon found wealth (as well as health) in the newly discovered diamond fields at Kimberley. Then, after returning to England and studying at Oxford, he went back to South Africa and became its outstanding "promotor," financier, and statesman. He acquired an enormous fortune from mining and commercial activities. In 1889 he organized the British South Africa Company, which obtained title, in manner resembling Karl Peters's, to the vast area known later as Rhodesia. From 1890 to 1896, as prime minister of Cape Colony, he actively advanced plans for incorporating the Dutch republics of Transvaal and Orange Free State with British South Africa and extending the sway of the British Empire the whole length of Africa northward from the Cape of Good Hope to Alexandria on the Mediterranean. At his death in 1902 he left a part of his fortune as an endowment to provide for the education of select young men from "Anglo-Saxon" countries—the British colonies, the United States, and Germany—as "Rhodes Scholars" at the intellectual centre of the British Empire, the University of Oxford.

Rhodes

Under pressure from such active propagandists as Rhodes, Peters, and Stanley, and from a host of explorers, traders, prospectors, and missionaries, who roamed over Africa in the 70's and 80's, and in accordance, furthermore, with the evident wishes of industrialists and journalists and zealous patriots at home,

various European governments were soon parcelling out almost the whole of the African continent among themselves. A claim to a region was asserted, a flag raised, "treaties" negotiated with native chieftains, a police force landed, and a protectorate or "colony" established. When rival claims to the same region were asserted, the respective European governments involved would negotiate a special "deal," whereby one would be left in possession of the disputed area and the other receive compensation elsewhere, usually at the expense of native tribes. In the incredibly brief span of twenty-seven years—from 1885, when an international congress at Berlin authorized the erection of King Leopold II's Congo Free State and laid down certain simple rules which the Powers should observe in acquiring African territory, to 1912, when Morocco passed finally under Franco-Spanish "protection"—the entire continent, with the exception of two very minor countries (Ethiopia and Liberia), was partitioned by European nations.

Appropriation

The partition occasioned a good deal of friction in international relations, but it was eventually accomplished without direct or immediate recourse to armed conflict among the European Powers. The aspiration of Portugal to link up Mozambique on the east coast with Angola on the west, and the desire of the Dutch Boers to retain their independence, alike ran counter to the ambition of Britain to extend her African empire northward from Cape Colony; the Portuguese aspiration was sacrificed by a treaty of 1891 and the Dutch desire by the Boer War of 1899–1902.[1] Still further north, the project of a continuous stretch of British dominion from the Cape to Cairo was threatened by the extension of German East Africa inland to the frontiers of the Congo Free State, and by the ambition of France to join Algeria and Tunis not only with her holdings in Senegal and on the Congo but also with her foothold on the Somali coast of the Red Sea in a huge imperial domain that would cover northern Africa from west to east. Britain thought fit to compromise the German claim in a treaty of 1890 and thereby to concede at least a temporary severance of her projected north-and-south empire. But in respect of France, Britain deemed it safe to be less yielding.

In 1898 a French expedition headed by an army officer, a certain Captain Marchand, proceeded all the way from the mouth

[1] On the Boer War, see above, pp. 373–374.

of the Congo (on the west coast) to the upper valley of the Nile (in eastern Africa), and here in the Egyptian Sudan, at a little village called Fashoda, the captain hoisted a French flag and asserted French claims to the surrounding country. But the British insisted that the Egyptian Sudan was a part of Egypt and that Egypt was in their own "sphere of influence," and against the French Captain Marchand at Fashoda advanced from Khartum the British General Kitchener with a larger expedition and bigger guns.[1] Under protest and with great reluctance, Marchand withdrew from Fashoda; and by treaty of 1899 France yielded to Britain the Egyptian Sudan. This treaty of 1899 proved to be the forerunner of the close *entente* concluded between France and Britain in 1904, whereby the latter was entrenched in Egypt and the former assured of a privileged position in Morocco.

The last phase of international negotiations concerning Africa, prior to the World War, had to do chiefly with the effort of Germany to thwart the French in Morocco and, failing in this, to secure "compensation" for Germany at the expense of French Equatorial Africa. A settlement was eventually arrived at in 1911–1912,[2] but the accompanying exacerbation of Franco-German ill will helped to prepare the way for the World War.

European Empires in Africa

By 1914 Europe owned almost all of Africa. Of the eleven and a half million square miles of territory in the continent, almost four million were French, three and three-quarters million were British, nine hundred thousand were German and about the same number Belgian, eight hundred thousand were Portuguese, six hundred and fifty thousand Italian, and a hundred thousand Spanish, while only the remaining four hundred thousand (barely a thirtieth part of the whole) belonged to independent native states. Included in the area reckoned as owned by Europe were, to be sure, certain countries which still retained native sovereigns, but so long as the Khedive of Egypt had to follow the advice of a British "resident," and the Bey of Tunis or the Sultan of Morocco had to obey the instructions of French "high commissioners," such countries could hardly be termed independent.

[1] Kitchener had just won the decisive victory of Omdurman (near Khartum) over the Sudanese natives and had thus fortified the "rights" of Great Britain in the Egyptian Sudan. See above, pp. 378–379.

[2] See below, p. 563.

Included within European Africa, moreover, were gigantic tracts either quite unfit for European habitation, such as French Equatorial Africa, Belgian Congo, and British Nigeria, or quite



SOUTHERN AFRICA, 1914

unprofitable for European exploitation, such as the great Sahara Desert. Yet none could doubt that toward the end of the nineteenth century and at the beginning of the twentieth, enormous strides were taken toward a real Europeanization of Africa. It was not merely that European Powers held political sway or that European immi-

European Civilization in Africa

grants were coming into South Africa from the British Isles and into North Africa from Italy and France. The Negro tribesmen of tropical Africa were being taught by European missionaries and school teachers, were learning European languages and ways, were more or less docilely working for European capitalists and serving under European army officers. Even the Arabs of desert Africa were becoming accustomed to the profits of European trade and the penalties of European police. Optimists, with whom the first decade of the twentieth century abounded, were eloquent in voicing the expectation that within another generation or two the formerly "Dark Continent" would bask in the full sunshine of European civilization—with railways and telegraph wires radiating everywhere, with modern science bringing salubrity to the tropical jungles and fertility to the desert sands, and with the twin spirits of "progress" and "prosperity" duly communicated from white men to black and tan.

Ethiopia

Two African countries were still independent—and correspondingly "backward." The larger of the two was Abyssinia (or Ethiopia), a landlocked Negro state wedged in the mountainous country between Somaliland and the Egyptian Sudan. Its dominant tribes had been Christian of a primitive sort since the fourth century, and in the latter part of the nineteenth century its "King of Kings," the Emperor Menelek II (1889–1913), who claimed descent from King Solomon and the Queen of Sheba, succeeded in fighting off Italian invaders and winning from Italy, and other European Powers, a recognition of Abyssinian independence.[1] Even the Emperor Menelek, however, was not averse to Europeanizing his army and permitting French capitalists to construct a railway from his capital to the coast.

Liberia

The smaller of the two independent African states was Liberia, which had been established on the west coast in 1847 by emancipated Negro slaves from the United States. Its civilized English-speaking inhabitants were greatly outnumbered and given a good deal of trouble by barbarous natives in the hinterland, and gradually its area was hemmed in and reduced by encroachments of the British from the west and of the French from the east and north. In the first decade of the twentieth century it was a small, poor country, and the main

[1] See above, p. 424.

question was whether it would be Europeanized and rendered "progressive" through its own efforts or through the forceful intervention of France or Britain or perhaps the United States.

By 1914 Africa, along with Asia, was being subjected to a process of Europeanization which bade fair to produce in the near future, out of the distinctively Western civilization of Europe, America, and Australia, a truly great and unifying world civilization. And by this time, the world as a whole was known as it had never been known before. In 1909 an indefatigable Arctic explorer, Robert Peary, reached the North Pole and in the ice which covered the ocean depths below planted an American flag. In 1911 a Norwegian explorer, Roald Amundsen, perilously making his way over the big, ice-encased, and mountainous continent of Antarctica, reached the South Pole.

Discovery of North and South Poles

3. INTERNATIONAL COÖPERATION AND PEACE

The twentieth century, as it opened, promised to Europeanize the whole world and likewise to promote peaceful cooperation among the advanced and powerful nations on whom the progress of Europeanization seemed to depend. These nations still waged wars, it was admitted, against "backward" peoples and in "uncivilized" parts of the world, but it was obvious that among themselves there had been no violent conflict since 1871—almost half a century—and it was confidently predicted that once the world was truly Europeanized there would remain little or no reason for international war anywhere.

Peace among Great Powers, 1871–1914

The principle that the leading large nations constituted a "Concert" of Great Powers which should set an example to lesser Powers of substituting negotiation for violence, harmonious coöperation for discord, was newly exemplified in 1878 by the Congress of Berlin,[1] which prevented the Russo-Turkish War from precipitating a much vaster struggle wherein Great Britain and Austria-Hungary might easily have become involved with Russia. In 1885 Austria, with the consent of the other Great Powers, stopped a war between Bulgaria and Serbia. In 1897 Russia, Great Britain, France, and Italy coöperated to end an armed conflict between Greece

Concert of Europe

[1] See above, pp. 193–196.

and the Ottoman Empire. In 1913 an "ambassadorial conference" of the Great Powers sat at London to expedite the pacific settlement of the Balkan Wars.

The "backward" area of the Ottoman Empire and the Balkan states was not the only region where the Concert of Europe functioned with considerable success from 1878 to 1914. Africa was partitioned in accordance with general regulations laid down by the Great Powers at the Congress of Berlin of 1884–1885, and in detail through an ensuing series of diplomatic negotiations and compromises among the Powers concerned. In China, moreover, the European Great Powers jointly intervened in 1900, with Japan and the United States, to suppress the Boxer insurrection; and with politeness if not perfect sincerity they unanimously endorsed the American proposal that China's territorial integrity should be maintained and her trade doors kept open to all.

Nor was the Concert of Europe the only effective agency of inter-state coöperation. There appeared also a kind of Concert of America. In 1881 the United States invited the several countries of Latin America to participate in a Pan-American Conference "for the purpose of considering and discussing the methods of preventing war between the nations of America." The first such conference was held at Washington in 1889, a second at Mexico City in 1901, a third at Rio de Janeiro in 1906, and a fourth at Buenos Aires in 1910. The results were somewhat disappointing, and yet they indicated an increasing desire for international conciliation.

Pan-American Conferences

Coöperation was spreading and taking many forms among "civilized" nations of the world. All these supported the international Red Cross society (1864). Thirty formed a Universal Telegraph Union (1875). Twenty-three agreed to make common use of the metric system of weights and measures (1875). Sixty adhered to a Universal Postal Union, created in 1878, with headquarters at Berne (in Switzerland). Nineteen ratified a convention of 1883 for the standardization of patent laws. Fifteen signed another convention of 1887 providing for practically uniform copyright laws.

International Co-operation

The judicial settlement of international disputes was apparently gaining favor likewise. Great Britain and the United States developed a habit of submitting their disputes to arbitration—the *Alabama* claims in 1871–1872, a controversy over Bering Sea

in 1892, a quarrel over the boundary between Alaska and Canada in 1903—and with such success that the possibility of war between the two major English-speaking countries seemed more and more remote and unthinkable. In 1886 Pope Leo XIII arbitrated a colonial dispute between Germany and Spain. In 1902 King Edward VII of Great Britain arbitrated a boundary dispute between Chile and Argentina. In 1909 France and Germany submitted a Moroccan dispute to international arbitration.

Arbitration

It should be borne in mind that all the governmental arbitrations and conventions and all the coöperative efforts of Pan-American Conferences and the Concert of Europe betokened popular interest in international solidarity. As the nineteenth century advanced and the Industrial Revolution progressed and the most diverse localities and nationalities were knit together by railways, steamships, telegraphs, and cables, the number and importance of common concerns rapidly increased. There was a prodigious stimulation of trade and travel from one country to another.

Internationalism

The international character of industrial and commercial capitalism was emphasized by banks and corporations which outgrew the country where they originated and became world-wide in their ramification and functioning. The international character of the problems of industrial workers was stressed by international congresses of Socialists and by international federations of coöperative societies and trade unions. An international agricultural institute was founded at Rome in 1905. Similarly, in the political sphere, earnest advocates of parliamentary government organized an international Parliamentary Union (1889), and proponents of woman suffrage and feminism took to holding international congresses. Religion, too, felt the same general impulse. Protestant Christians of a hundred divergent creeds met in world congresses, and Catholic Christians, more mindful than ever of the universal traditions of their faith, instituted in 1881 a series of Eucharistic Congresses, which drew large numbers of clergymen and laymen from many climes now to Paris, now to London, now to Jerusalem, now to Montreal. For the advancement of science and learning, moreover, there were periodical world congresses of distinguished physicists, chemists, biologists, historians, and economists, and exchange of professors

and students between the universities of different countries. There was developing around the globe a community of intellectual interests, the product of what has happily been termed "the international mind."

Rise of Pacifism

Pacifism was undoubtedly growing. Especially after 1878, associations of professed pacifists multiplied throughout the Western world, and their international congresses became regular annual events after 1889. The movement was patronized, moreover, by outstanding industrialists. Alfred Nobel, a Swedish scientist and capitalist, devoted the major part of the princely fortune which he had amassed from the manufacture of high explosives to the cause of international peace. Andrew Carnegie, a Scottish-American business man, drew liberally upon the wealth that he had accumulated in the iron and steel industry to endow pacifist propaganda and to build a "temple of peace" at The Hague and a Pan-American "palace" at Washington.

To the generation of pacifists that flourished in the first decade of the twentieth century, war, at least among great civilized nations, seemed anachronistic and therefore fated to disappear in the near future. The capitalists of every progressive country had too many foreign investments or were too involved in foreign trade to welcome war, and they were too influential to be ignored by their several governments. The industrial workers had too much to lose from a state of war in the way of employment and wages, and, besides, many of them were so actively identified with international Socialism as to threaten a revolutionary overturn of any government which might engage in foreign war. The intellectual classes were too "enlightened" and by this time too internationally minded not to perceive the fallacies in all arguments and pretexts for war. The Christian churches were traditionally committed to support of peace.

Peace and Armaments

Pacifists were somewhat troubled by the obvious fact that since 1860 military and naval armaments had been increasing in almost every country. To be sure, most advocates of heavy national armament, themselves influenced wittingly or unwittingly by the pacifist spirit of the age, insisted that all such armament was strictly defensive, that it constituted mere preparedness against dreadful but possible eventualities and was the surest pledge of enduring peace. Never-

theless, foremost pacifists scented danger in military and naval preparedness, and many other persons who were not professionally pacifist complained of the growing burdens of taxation which that kind of "peace insurance" entailed. A conspicuous and attractive plank in the pacifist platform, therefore, was the demand for a limitation of armaments by international agreement, coupled usually with a plea for the establishment of an international court of arbitration.

Hague Peace Conferences, 1899, 1907

For the express purpose of meeting this demand, the Tsar Nicholas II of Russia, with the concurrence of Queen Wilhelmina of the Netherlands, convoked an international peace conference at The Hague in 1899. "The preservation of peace," the Tsar said, "has become an object of international policy." At the conference the sovereign states of Europe and Asia and likewise the United States and Mexico were represented—twenty-six nations in all. No agreement could be reached on any general limitation of armaments, but steps were taken to restrict the use of certain weapons in the event of war, to codify international law, and to establish a court of arbitration.

In 1907, with the prompting of President Theodore Roosevelt of the United States and on the formal invitation of the Tsar, a second international peace conference was held at The Hague, representing this time forty-four governments, including nineteen in America. Again the much-mooted question of general limitation of armaments was left unanswered, but certain humane amendments were made to the laws of maritime and land war, an international prize court was provided for, and conventions were adopted requiring a formal declaration of war before the opening of hostilities and restricting the employment of force for the collection of foreign debts. Finally, the holding of similar conferences at regular intervals in the future was recommended.

International Federation?

Here, optimistic pacifists imagined, was a real beginning of an organized international community, with its capital at The Hague, with its periodic congresses, with its statutes and codes, with its court of arbitration. If the German Empire, the United States, and Switzerland could be organized and function successfully as federal states without internal strife, why should not external war be banished through an International Federation of the World? In fact, the

international court of arbitration was duly instituted, and by it several international disputes were pacifically settled between 1901 and 1914. A third Hague conference was projected for 1915; it might take a big step forward on the road of international coöperation and peace.

Before 1915, however, the promise of the twentieth century had taken on a somewhat different complexion. The pacifist ideal was not to be realized so easily. In truth, as we now look back upon the first years of the twentieth century, we can all see that they held an even greater promise of war than of peace and that the pacifists of the time, like most of their contemporaries, looked so intently on evidences of material and scientific progress as to neglect the more fateful evidences of impending disaster.

4. INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION

In the midst of optimism about the bigger and better Europe, about the Europeanization of the world, and about the world's peace, there was room for some pessimism. International competition was more real than international coöperation.

The "state system" of Europe, and of the world, was anarchical. Coöperation was ordinarily determined by and directed toward the supposed self-interest or self-importance of each state involved. In last analysis, force or the threat of force was the supreme arbitrament. Every state had some armaments, and hence all were called "Powers," but those that had very big armaments were distinguished as "Great Powers." Among these there might be a theoretical "Concert"—

"Powers"

and an actual one on the rare occasions when they thought their several self-interests could thereby be served without sacrifice of individual prestige—but the continuous and fast-developing feature of their mutual relationships was competition. The competition, superficially at least, was for prestige—being most feared and therefore most respected by the rest of the world.

Economic Competition

The Industrial Revolution was accentuating the competition among the Great Powers. It was prompting economic nationalism, with attendant tariff controversies and scrambles for the exploitation of "back-

ward" regions.[1] It was also providing means for a new assertiveness of patriotic ambition.

Imperialist Competition

Imperialistic competition was especially menacing. So far, there had been no outright war between European Great Powers over the newer economic and political partition of the world, but the Spanish-American War of 1898, the Boer War of 1899–1902, the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905, and the Turco-Italian War of 1911–1912 were portentous. The weakness of the Chinese and Ottoman Empires and the inability of such lesser Powers as Portugal, the Netherlands, and Belgium to hold their extensive colonial empires if they should be attacked, were as obvious as were the conflicting ambitions of the Great Powers.

Conflicting Nationalism

Nationalism, sentimental quite as much as economic, complicated and imperilled the relationships among European states. It had already, in the middle of the nineteenth century, inspired a series of wars for the political unification of Italy and of Germany. Since then it had overspread all eastern Europe and been intensified everywhere by the rise of popular schooling and popular press and by the multiplying propaganda of scholars and artists, publicists and patriotic societies. It embittered relations between France and Germany and gravely menaced the integrity and very existence of some of the imperial Powers, most notably Austria-Hungary.

Rival Alliances and the Balance of Power

Aggravating the situation was the marked tendency of the Great Powers of Europe to align themselves by formal alliance or informal *entente* in rival aggregations. Each aggregation viewed the activities of the other with increasing suspicion and fear. Each competed with the other in pushing its own members farther along on the path of military preparedness and in attempting to draw lesser Powers into the orbit of its influence and control. Yet neither was quite sure how solid it was, or how solid its rival, or how dependable were its satellites among the lesser Powers.

[1] For a fuller account of economic nationalism and accompanying phenomena of imperialism and militarism during the period from 1880 to 1914, see above, pp. 225–235.

A "balance of power" between rival aggregations became alarming only in the twentieth century. From 1871 to 1890, it had hardly existed. From 1890 to 1905, though in process of formation, it promised to be a stabilizing rather than a disruptive force. Only from 1905 did it point to ultimate disaster. How this came about, we shall try to make clear by a brief survey of international relations from 1871 to 1914.

International Relations, 1871–1914

The Franco-German War of 1870–1871 had served to establish the military and diplomatic hegemony of Germany, and for the next twenty years Prince Bismarck, as Chancellor of the German Empire, was undoubtedly the most influential statesman in Europe. His international policy, in its broad outlines, was simple. He would maintain the military superiority of his country. He would be content with what had been won in the wars of 1866 and 1870–1871.[1] He would especially seek no further territorial aggrandizement in Europe, which might arouse the hostility of Russia, or any outside Europe, which might provoke colonial and maritime rivalry with Great Britain. He would keep the peace and he would make sure that France kept the peace.

Germany's Hegemony, 1871–1890

Bismarck was well aware of the humiliation which France had suffered from the war of 1870–1871 and of her willingness to seize the first favorable opportunity to recover Alsace-Lorraine and repair her damaged prestige. He did not fear an attack upon Germany by France single-handed, but he was acutely conscious that if she were to obtain active assistance from any of the other Great Powers a second Franco-German war might result differently from the first. Wherefore, the German Chancellor devoted his major diplomatic efforts to keeping France isolated and deprived of potential allies.

In the main, the international situation from 1871 to 1890 was favorable to Germany, and the astute, and not too high-principled, Chancellor took full advantage of it. First of all, he adopted a most conciliatory attitude toward Austria-Hungary. He had purposely been lenient in dictating terms of peace to the Emperor Francis Joseph in 1866; and after 1871 the internal exigencies of the Dual Monarchy, and the desire of the Habsburg family to recoup what they had lost in Italy and Germany by

[1] See above, pp. 169–170, 175–177.

pursuing an expansionist policy in the Balkans, led the governing classes of Austria-Hungary to seek support of Germany's strong military arm and Bismarck's dexterous diplomatic hand. Then, too, Bismarck could count upon the friendship of the newly formed kingdom of Italy. Many Italians remembered that it was through an alliance with Bismarck's Germany that they had been enabled to wrest Venetia from Austria in 1866. Besides, the Italian government was at feud with the papacy, and so was the German in the 1870's, at the very time when France was dominated by "clericals," many of whom favored intervention in Italy for the purpose of restoring the pope's temporal rule.

With Great Britain, Bismarck sedulously avoided conflict. He insisted during the war of 1870–1871 upon the scrupulous observance of Belgian neutrality—an object dear to the British foreign office—and he hesitated for a decade and more about engaging in overseas imperialism. When eventually in the 1880's he yielded in this matter to the importunities of German merchants and patriots, he took special pains to avoid quarrels with Great Britain. He knew that British imperialists were far more troubled by the aggressiveness of Russia in Asia and of France in Africa than by Germany's belated and relatively modest imperialism. He knew also that many English intellectuals admired the German people and extolled the "Teutonic race" which had produced the two leading states of modern Europe—Germany, the master of the Continent, and Great Britain, the mistress of the seas. He knew that it had become a tradition of the British foreign office to avoid "entangling alliances" upon the continent of Europe so long as British maritime supremacy was unquestioned. From all this, Bismarck could be confident that Germany need not fear an alliance between Great Britain and France.

Russia was a very different quantity. Her growing rivalry with Austria-Hungary in the Balkans might prevent Germany from cultivating equally friendly relations with the two, and if Germany should favor Austria-Hungary, Russia would tend to gravitate toward an alliance with France. But several circumstances aided Bismarck to forestall a Franco-Russian alliance. Politically, autocratic Russia was more sympathetic with monarchical Germany than with republican France. The Tsar Alexander II (1855–1881) detested the revolutionaries who were reputed to have learned their doctrines in France, and he grate-

fully remembered how Bismarck had offered him Prussian aid for the suppression of the Polish insurrection of 1863,[1] and how again in 1871 Bismarck had graciously acquiesced in Russia's recovery of the right to maintain warships on the Black Sea.[2] He felt the need of German support in overcoming British opposition to Russian expansion whether in the Balkans or in Asia.

Of these considerations Bismarck took canny account. In September 1872, a meeting at Berlin of the Emperor William I, the Emperor-King Francis Joseph, the Tsar Alexander II, and their several ministers, served to advertise to the world that cordial and intimate relations existed among the three great Empires of central and eastern Europe. In 1873 the members of this so-called Three Emperors' League agreed to coöperate in the preservation of peace, and, in case war should threaten, to consult together "in order to determine a common course of action."

Three Emperors' League, 1873–1878

For a moment in 1875 a press campaign in Germany against the military preparations then going on in France threatened the Russo-German friendship, for the Russian government (and likewise the British), suspecting that the campaign was inspired by Bismarck and was preliminary to a German assault upon France, protested against such a possible development. Bismarck declared with no little asperity that the suspicion was quite ill-founded. The press campaign was halted, and the excitement over the "affair of 1875" soon subsided.

A more serious difficulty for Bismarck was presented by the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878. The triumph of Russia, and her seeming ability to dictate a peace settlement giving her a dominant position in the Balkans, provoked the liveliest apprehension in Austria-Hungary as well as in Great Britain, and at the ensuing Congress of Berlin (1878) Bismarck undertook to play the rôle of "honest broker" in apportioning the Turkish spoils.[3] By reducing the Russian share and by handing over Bosnia-Herzegovina to the Dual Monarchy, Bismarck kept the balance of power in the Balkans nicely adjusted between Russia and Austria, but while he thus strengthened the friendship between Germany and Austria-Hungary he aroused the

[1] See above, p. 166.

[2] See above, p. 178.

[3] On the Russo-Turkish War, the Russian peace settlement of San Stefano, and the ensuing Congress of Berlin, see above, pp. 190–197.

enmity of Russia. The Three Emperors' League was in effect destroyed.

In order to guard Germany against untoward results of Russian ill-feeling, Bismarck in 1879 concluded a defensive alliance between Austria-Hungary and Germany, in accordance with the terms of which each party bound itself to support the other with all the military forces at its command if either party or both should be attacked by Russia or by another Power backed by Russia.[1] Then, in order still further to offset the danger of Russian hostility, Bismarck turned his attention to Italy. Italy, as has been remarked, was already naturally well disposed toward Germany, but Bismarck was unwilling to bind the two Powers by an alliance unless Austria-Hungary were included, and relations between Austria and Italy were strained by the memory of recent wars between them, and also by conflicting ambitions as to Trent and Trieste and the mastery of the Adriatic. Nevertheless, the Italian government felt the weakness of diplomatic isolation; and in 1881 Italians were angered by French occupation of Tunis, the region of ancient Carthage, which they had begun to think of as the stepping-stone toward a new Italian imperialism. In the midst of ensuing Franco-Italian recriminations, Italy responded cordially to the overtures of Bismarck, consented to banish anti-Austrian propaganda, and in 1882 signed a treaty of alliance with both Germany and Austria-Hungary. This treaty provided that if Italy or Germany were attacked by France without provocation these two allies would go to war with France; and that if any one or any two of the three allies were attacked by two or more Great Powers, all should engage in the conflict. The Triple Alliance, first formed in 1882 for five years, was renewed in 1887 with an additional stipulation that neither Austria nor Italy should attempt to occupy any territory in the Balkan peninsula without preliminary accord, and that such accord should be based on the principle of reciprocal compensation.[2] Moreover, Serbia and Rumania became satellites of the Triple Alliance. Disgruntled by the favor-

German-Austrian Alliance, 1879

Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria, Italy, 1882

[1] The existence of the alliance was widely advertised at the time, but its terms were not published until 1888.

[2] The Triple Alliance was subsequently renewed for continuous periods in 1891, in 1903, and in 1912. Its terms were not fully divulged until the World War.

itism shown by Russia to Bulgaria in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878, Serbia contracted a secret engagement with Austria-Hungary in 1881, and Rumania in 1883.[1]

In the meantime, danger of conflict between Germany and Russia perceptibly lessened. The assassination of the Tsar Alexander II in 1881 and the accession of the ultra-reactionary Alexander III precluded any immediate understanding between autocratic Russia and democratic France; and the new Tsar, painfully aware of the isolation to which Bismarckian diplomacy had been condemning Russia, reached the conclusion that he must acquiesce in the Balkan settlement of 1878 and seek a renewal of the previous understanding with Germany and, if necessary, with Austria. Bismarck, of course, deemed the inclusion of Austria necessary; and consequently another Three Emperors' League was negotiated in 1881. By its terms, Russia, Germany, and Austria-Hungary mutually promised benevolent neutrality in case any of them should be involved in war with a fourth Power. This arrangement, entered into for a period of three years, was renewed in 1884 for another three-year period.

New Three Emperors' League, 1881–1887

The new Three Emperors' League was temporarily reassuring to both Russia and Germany, but it was not a very substantial structure. It was weakened by the policy of tariff protectionism which Germany pursued in the 1880's and which, being directed in large part against the importation of Russian grain, roused the ire of influential classes in Russia. It was still more seriously weakened by continuing friction between Russia and Austria-Hungary in the Balkans. This became acute in 1885, when Austria intervened in a war between Serbia and Bulgaria. A crisis lasted throughout the following year, and in 1887 Russia refused to renew the Three Emperors' League.

Bismarck's failure to keep Russia yoked with Austria-Hungary occurred at the very time when the agitation of General Boulanger was gathering headway in France for a war of revenge against Germany. The German Chancellor, greatly alarmed, took ex-

[1] The Austro-Serbian treaty of 1881 provided that Serbia should not conclude any political treaty with another Power without previous approval by Austria-Hungary, and that each state should preserve friendly neutrality if the other was at war; with minor changes, it remained in force until 1895. Rumania's treaty of alliance with Austria-Hungary was endorsed by Germany and lasted, at least on paper, until 1916.

traordinary steps to meet the situation. While renewing and strengthening the Triple Alliance with Austria-Hungary and Italy, he made a secret three-year pact, the so-called "Reinsurance Treaty," with Russia, pledging Germany's diplomatic support of Russian predominance in Bulgaria and even of Russian occupation of Constantinople, and obtaining in return a pledge of Russia's benevolent neutrality in case of a French attack upon Germany. At the same time (1887), in order to deter Russia from becoming too aggressive in the Balkans, as well as to hold France in check, he secretly encouraged a special agreement among Great Britain, Austria-Hungary, and Italy for the preservation of the *status quo* in the Mediterranean and the Near East. In 1889 he sought to bring Great Britain into direct alliance with Germany. In this he was unsuccessful, for, while the British government of the day was by no means anti-German, it was unwilling to commit Great Britain to definite participation in a Franco-German conflict. Then in 1890, with the forced retirement of Bismarck from office,[1] the Reinsurance Treaty between Germany and Russia was allowed to lapse.

Russo-German Reinsurance Treaty, 1887–1890

The lapse of the Reinsurance Treaty in 1890 was a symptom, rather than a cause, of a change which was coming about in international alignments. Previously, Bismarck had been able, by Triple Alliance and Three Emperors' League, to keep France isolated and Russia in check; and with the breakdown of the League in 1887, he had anxiously hoped to preserve the same general situation by means of the separate Reinsurance Treaty with Russia. In fact, however, the growing differences between Russia and Germany (to say nothing of those between Russia and Austria) militated against the Reinsurance Treaty. The treaty had not stopped Russia from building strategic military railways toward the German frontier or Germany from heightening her tariff walls against Russian grain; and Bismarck himself had dealt a blow at financial coöperation between the two countries by discouraging German loans to Russia. There was no such popular backing for a Russo-German alliance as for the Austro-German alliance. By 1890 most German statesmen other than Bismarck were opposed to the continuance of solemn commitments to Russia which might endanger the Austrian alliance and

[1] On Bismarck's retirement from the Chancellorship, see above, pp. 450–451.

which, at the same time, might embroil Germany in quarrels between Russia and Great Britain.

The Russian government would doubtless have consented in 1890 to a temporary renewal of the Reinsurance Treaty, but it would have done so without enthusiasm. It was being pressed by the "Slavophiles" of the time "to purge holy Russia of Teutonic influence," and it was unable to obtain necessary loans from Germany for Russia's industrial development—for the building of railways, the erection of factories, the opening of mines, the stabilization of currency. But what the Berlin bourse withheld, the Paris money market supplied; and by 1890 Russia was already financially dependent upon France. In the circumstances, Russia was naturally drawn to France, and financial need (and also anti-Teutonic Slavophile sentiment) gradually overcame the Tsar's antipathy to the democratic politics of France, while on the other hand the prospect of escape from the international isolation in which France had been since the time of Napoleon III conquered the scruples of French republican politicians about Russian autocracy.

Hence, little by little, following the lapse of the Reinsurance Treaty between Germany and Russia, Russia and France drifted into an alliance. An informal diplomatic entente was inaugurated in 1891, and an exchange of friendly naval visits followed. By a military convention of 1893 Russia promised to employ all her forces against Germany if France should be attacked by Germany, or by Italy supported by Germany, and France promised to combat Germany if Russia should be assailed by Germany, or by Austria-Hungary supported by Germany. That such a Dual Alliance had come into existence was publicly announced by the French premier in 1895, but its precise terms were revealed only in 1918 when the tsardom was overthrown and the alliance at an end.

Franco-Russian Dual Alliance, 1893

In appearance, at any rate, the previous hegemony of Germany (and isolation of France) was thus offset in the early 1890's by a "balance of power" in Europe between the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy, on the one side, and the Dual Alliance of Russia and France, on the other. In reality, however, the new alignment was not revolutionary; it did not materially change affairs. Both alliances were expressly "defensive"; and though

Toward a Balance of Power, 1890–1914

the conclusion of the Dual Alliance gave France a sense of security and prestige, it actually operated to discourage any French ambition for the early recovery of Alsace-Lorraine. And, for a time, what Germany seemingly lost through the lapse of the Reinsurance Treaty with Russia was offset by British coöperation.

British Foreign Policy

Great Britain, while maintaining a general policy of aloofness from the international policies of the Continent, was more inclined in the 1890's toward the Triple than toward the Dual Alliance. She had contracted special obligations in 1887 with Austria and Italy in the Mediterranean and Near East; and in 1890, just after the retirement of Bismarck, the way was paved for an Anglo-German entente by friendly negotiations which settled outstanding colonial disputes between the two Powers in Africa and transferred the North Sea island of Heligoland from Britain to Germany. In the 1890's, moreover, in a decade of fast developing imperialism, Great Britain's chief competitors were France and Russia. If it was natural for France and Russia to draw together, it seemed quite as natural for Great Britain to gravitate toward Germany. Certainly no *rapprochement* appeared possible between Britain and France, for the latter's vigorous acquisition of colonies after 1880 served to accentuate imperialistic rivalry between them and to raise many serious territorial questions in Africa and Indo-China. As late as 1898 France and Britain were on the verge of war over a dispute as to their respective spheres of influence in the Egyptian Sudan.[1] Nor did any *rapprochement* appear possible between Britain and Russia. They had been rivals in the Near East since before the Crimean War, and their rivalry had latterly been intensified and extended to Persia, Afghanistan, and the Far East.

Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1902

It was against Russian aggressiveness in China that Great Britain concluded in 1902 a defensive alliance with Japan.[2]

Yet as the decade of the 1890's advanced, the expected entente between Britain and Germany failed to materialize. Germany made new imperialistic thrusts into China and the Ottoman

[1] The so-called "Fashoda Incident." See above, pp. 539–540.

[2] The Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902 provided that if either Power should become involved in war with two Powers over China or Korea, the other would give assistance. In 1905 the alliance was renewed for ten years with the additional stipulation that both would fight if either should be attacked by a single Power in India as well as in the Far East.

Empire, which in effect were more anti-British than anti-Russian.

Friction between Britain and Germany

Then, in 1899, when the British undertook the conquest of the Dutch republics in South Africa, the German press was quite sympathetic with the Boers and critical of the British. And, to cap the climax, Germany began, under enactments of 1898 and 1900, greatly to enlarge her navy. Already, many Britishers were uncomfortably aware that Germany was becoming Britain's most formidable competitor in manufacturing and commerce. It was now apparent to the British that their naval supremacy, and hence their Empire, might soon be threatened by Germany unless they quickened their own naval construction and enormously increased their public expenditure. The relations between Great Britain and Germany were moving, not toward intimate friendship, but toward openly voiced hostility.

In the circumstances, the balance of power between Triple Alliance and Dual Alliance seemed of less moment than a possible

Coöperation of Germany and Dual Alliance

coalition of Germany with France and Russia looking toward the isolation of Britain. Commercial relations between Germany and Russia were improved in the early 1890's by a reciprocal lowering of tariffs; and soon the two Powers, and France also, were coöperating in the Far East. They jointly compelled Japan to revise her peace settlement with China in 1895, and by concerted action shortly afterwards they severally acquired territories in China. During the Boer War there was a good deal of discussion on the Continent about the need of a "Grand Alliance" of Germany, France, and Russia to give aid to the Boers and set limits to the British Empire. France, secretly consulted by Russia on the subject, declined to commit herself unless Germany should reopen the question of Alsace-Lorraine, which Germany refused to do. But, although no such Grand Alliance was forthcoming, the relations of France and Germany underwent improvement and those of Russia and Germany became really cordial.

Simultaneously, Germany's associates in the Triple Alliance dropped into the background, and the Triple Alliance itself seemed hardly existent. Austria-Hungary, fully occupied with internal troubles, willingly signed a treaty with Russia for the preservation of the *status quo* in the Balkans. Italy, weakened by defeat in Abyssinia, perceived the desirability of halting her

vendetta with France, especially since a strongly anti-clerical and therefore sympathetic French government was now in power. So, two secret agreements were concluded by France and Italy. By the first, a convention of 1900, Italy recognized the French protectorate over Tunis and French claims to Morocco, and France accorded Italy a free hand in Tripoli and Cyrenaica. By the second, an engagement of 1902, Italy and France mutually pledged themselves to remain neutral if either should be attacked by a third Power or if either, "as the result of a direct provocation, should find itself obliged, in defence of its honor or security, to take the initiative of a declaration of war." The text of this arrangement remained a secret until 1918; but the visit of President Loubet to King Victor Emmanuel III in 1904 announced to the world the termination of the open feud between the Latin sisters.

Franco-Italian Agreement of 1902

With peace assured between Russia and Austria in the Balkans, and between France and Italy in the Mediterranean, Germany encouraged Russia to go to war with Japan in 1904 and cordially seconded her efforts. Then, in July 1905, when Russian troops had been decisively defeated in Manchuria, the German Emperor met the Russian Tsar at Bjorkö and persuaded him to agree to a Russo-German alliance, directed actually (though not expressly) against Great Britain and open to French adherence. France declined to adhere to it, the advisers of the two Emperors deemed it unwise or unnecessary, and it came to naught. It was a kind of anti-climax to a decade of informal coöperation between Triple and Dual Alliances.

Projected Russo-German Alliance, 1905

Already the British government, faced with increasing hostility of Germany as well as of continuing hostility of France and Russia, was ceasing to glory in Britain's "splendid isolation" and beginning to consider how she might best secure foreign friends. It still seemed as if close coöperation between Britain and Germany was more practicable than close coöperation between Britain and the Dual Alliance, and accordingly the British government in 1901 sounded out Germany regarding a special understanding between the two countries. Germany insisted, however, that Britain should adhere formally to the Triple Alliance, and the British were unwilling to assume such definite and far-reaching obligations. So the Anglo-German negotiations broke down, and Great

Britain's Anxiety to Escape Isolation

Britain looked elsewhere. In 1902 she concluded her alliance with Japan, and presently she turned to France.

The British foreign minister, Lord Lansdowne, proposed to the French ambassador at London a friendly settlement of colonial differences between the two countries. The proposal was welcomed by the ambassador, and also by the French foreign minister, Théophile Delcassé; and it eventuated, after several months' negotiations, in the conclusion in 1904 of several conventions affecting Franco-British relations in Africa and overseas. These conventions not only gave Great Britain free rein in Egypt, and France in Morocco, but marked the end of a long period of intense imperialist rivalry and paved the way for the development between 1904 and 1914 of particularly friendly relations between the peoples and governments of France and Great Britain—the so-called *Entente Cordiale*.

Anglo-French Entente, 1904

The Anglo-French agreement of 1904 was not an alliance, any more than the similar Anglo-German agreement of 1890 had been. Now, as then, it was hoped that, by removing sources of friction, the countries concerned would be more friendly and coöperative. The Anglo-German arrangement had not achieved that end. That the Anglo-French arrangement turned out differently is attributable to circumstances of the next few years. The defeat of Russia by Japan made the French especially eager to develop the entente, and the growing naval strength of Germany had a corresponding effect on the British. Besides, as we shall presently explain, an international crisis over Morocco in 1905–1906 served to cement the *Entente Cordiale*.

One embarrassing feature of the Anglo-French Entente was evident during 1904–1905 when Russia, the ally of France, was at war with Japan, the ally of Great Britain. British sentiment was still vehemently anti-Russian, and, as we have seen, the impressionable Russian Tsar was then strongly influenced by the German Emperor. With the defeat of Russia, however, the situation changed radically. Russia reacted sharply against German influence, which had been predominant during the preceding ten years and which was blamed (rather unjustly) for the ensuing disaster. On the other hand, Great Britain lost her fear of Russia and began to perceive advantages in coming to terms with her. Consequently, in 1907, the British and Russian governments

managed to arrive at a mutual understanding concerning disputed spheres of influence in Persia, Afghanistan, and China, and to sign conventions which paralleled the Entente between Great Britain and France with a second Entente between Great Britain and Russia. Japan, also, was brought into harmonious relations with the new Entente, through a Russo-Japanese convention of 1910 and through the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance in 1911.

Anglo-Russian Entente, 1907

In Germany, meanwhile, many publicists and the government itself were viewing with alarm what was termed a "hostile encirclement." Italy was suspected, correctly as we now know, of disloyalty to Germany and Austria. Russia had broken with Germany and was again in full alliance with France. Great Britain was in ententes with France and Russia. Japan was in alliance with Britain. Austria, alone of the Great Powers, remained a friend of Germany.

German Alarm, and Recurring Crises, 1905–1914

From 1905 to 1914 German diplomacy sought in divers ways to break up the Ententes, to strengthen Austria and increase her prestige, to win the Ottoman Empire as an ally, and to insist upon Germany's right to participate on the same basis as other Powers in world commerce and foreign investment. The new German effort did not break up the Ententes, but it produced periodic crises in the relations between the Entente Powers (Great Britain, France, and Russia) and the Central Powers (Germany and Austria-Hungary)—crises which grew ever more menacing to the preservation of any semblance of a Concert of Europe and more symptomatic of an impending war of huge dimensions. These crises had to do alternately with Morocco and with the Near East.

In the case of Morocco, a crisis was precipitated at the end of March 1905. By this time, the French foreign minister, Delcassé, had plans well advanced for the establishment of a French protectorate over the greater part of the country. He had obtained the assent of Italy in 1900 and of Great Britain in 1904; and he had just reached an agreement with Spain whereby she would obtain a protectorate over the part not appropriated by France. To be sure, the independence of Morocco had been affirmed by an international congress at Madrid in 1880. But Morocco was a backward and brigand-

Moroccan Crisis of 1905–1906

ridden country, bordering on the French empire in Africa and on Spanish posts on the Mediterranean; and its fate seemed to Delcassé to be a practical concern of only France and Spain. The German Chancellor, Bülow, thought otherwise. He was anxious to assert Germany's interest in Morocco and to utilize the occasion to check Delcassé and weaken the Entente between France and Great Britain. Bülow picked a favorable opportunity—exactly three weeks after the decisive defeat of the Russians by the Japanese in the battle of Mukden—when he knew that Russia could give no support to France. On that date he had the Emperor William II disembark at Tangier and declare in a vigorous speech that he came to visit the Sultan of Morocco as an independent sovereign in whose lands all foreign Powers were to hold the same footing and enjoy the same rights.

There followed a brief moment of awful suspense. Then Delcassé resigned, and his colleagues in the French ministry agreed to submit the whole Moroccan question to an international congress. The Congress, meeting at Algeciras in Spain in 1906, did not reveal the cleavage between France and Great Britain which Bülow had hoped for. On the contrary, Britain consistently backed the French position, and so did Italy. The agreement finally reached at Algeciras, while paying lip service to the territorial integrity of Morocco and the sovereignty of its Sultan and pledging the "open door" to merchants and investors of all the Powers, authorized France and Spain to instruct and officer a native police force and to oversee the execution of "reforms." To all intents and purposes, it was a French victory.

Algeciras Congress

Civil war in Morocco and outrages against foreigners, especially Frenchmen, afforded the French government an excuse to land marines at Casablanca in 1907. Germany repeatedly expostulated against the continued presence of French troops in Morocco; and in 1908 an attempt on the part of the German consul at Casablanca to protect from arrest a number of deserters from the French foreign legion precipitated a second crisis, which was successfully passed in 1909 by reference of the questions at stake to the Hague Tribunal. The simultaneous negotiation of a special Franco-German convention in 1909 seemed to preclude future misunderstandings. Germany put on record that her interests in Morocco were "only economic"

Moroccan Crisis of 1907

and pledged herself, so long as "economic equality" was safeguarded, to recognize the political preponderance of France.

But the Franco-German agreement of 1909 was not observed. The French discriminated against German trade and investment in Morocco, and the Germans protested against the tightening of French political and military control. A new and severe crisis was precipitated in 1911 by the action of France in sending an army to Fez, the Moroccan capital, "to restore order." Germany then despatched a warship to the Moroccan port of Agadir, ostensibly to safeguard German mining property, but with a significant hint that the warship would be withdrawn as soon as conditions were sufficiently settled to admit of French withdrawal from Fez. The gravity of the international situation was felt throughout Europe, and military preparations were hurried forward both in Germany and in France. Russia was not yet sufficiently recovered from the Japanese War to be of much assistance to France, but the British proclaimed their full support of France.

Moroccan Crisis of 1911–1912

The German government did not desire war and after considerable bickering contented itself with concluding a second Franco-German convention, whereby Germany promised not to oppose the establishment of a French protectorate over Morocco, and France agreed to maintain the "open door" there and to cede two strips of French Equatorial Africa to Germany. Although France was thus enabled in 1912 to settle the political question of Morocco satisfactorily to herself and to Spain, the Agadir crisis in 1911 served to quicken anti-German sentiment in France, and at the same time to consolidate the friendship between France and Great Britain. On the other hand, Germans felt that their legitimate interests in Morocco had been prejudiced and their position as a World Power jeopardized by the joint machinations of the French and the British.

Even more disquieting than the Moroccan crises were the crises in the Near East, where Russia and Austria-Hungary, instead of France and Germany, were the protagonists. But while in the case of Morocco, Russia, on account of her weakened military position, was able to give but little effective support to her French ally, in the case of the Near Eastern crises Germany had economic motives and powerful military means for backing Austria-Hungary.

Russia *vs.* Austria in Balkans

From the opening of the twentieth century the Austro-Hungarian government favored the political and economic expansion of the Dual Monarchy in a southerly direction through Bosnia and Macedonia to Salonica on the Ægean, and many influential Germans cherished the idea of "Germanizing" the Balkan states and the Ottoman Empire. So Germany and Austria-Hungary, acting in harmony, gradually extended their political and economic influence in southeastern Europe. In 1899 the Emperor William II ostentatiously visited the Ottoman Sultan Abdul Hamid II, and in 1903 a German company obtained a concession for the construction of a railway across Asia Minor, Armenia, and the fertile valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates, to Bagdad and the head of the Persian Gulf. Austrian influence was paramount at the Serbian court from the Congress of Berlin (1878) to the assassination of King Alexander in 1903; and Prince Ferdinand of Bulgaria, a German by birth, was long estranged from Russia and dependent upon Austria-Hungary. The King of Rumania was a kinsman and ally of the German Emperor, and the wife of the future King Constantine of Greece was a sister of William II. In a word, the Teutonic Powers stood in the way of the Russian ambition of ousting the Turks from Europe and ruling at Constantinople; they began to buttress the Turk, to train his army, to exploit his country, and to seek to minimize both Russian and British influence throughout southeastern Europe.

Growing Influence of Central Empires in Near East

In 1903 the Balkan policy of Germany and Austria-Hungary received a check. A palace revolution at Belgrade put an end to the rule of the pro-Austrian dynasty in Serbia and brought to the throne a King, Peter I, who was ardently in sympathy with the nationalist propaganda of the Serbs and openly dependent on Russia.

Change in Serbian Policy

The first serious crisis in the Near Eastern Question affecting the new balance of power between the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente occurred in 1908, when Austria-Hungary, taking advantage of the internal revolution in the Ottoman Empire, formally annexed the Serb-speaking provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, thereby violating a provision of the treaty of Berlin of 1878, and arousing a storm of indignation in Serbia and Montenegro. Russia immediately took steps to back the Serb states and to resist Austro-Hun-

Balkan Crisis of 1908

garian "aggression," but Germany announced her firm intention of giving full military support to Austria-Hungary. Russia, still not fully recovered from the Japanese War and her own internal revolutionary upheaval, thereupon gave way, and Serbia was compelled to make a solemn promise that in the future she would not abet any anti-Austrian propaganda but would live on "good neighborly terms" with the Dual Monarchy. Peace was preserved, but Russian and Serb patriots did not forget the humiliation which their respective countries had suffered at Teutonic hands. Russia and Serbia drew closer together. The latter became more fiercely nationalist and expansionist. The former became intent upon army reforms and the strengthening of her ties in the Balkans.

A second crisis in the Near East was at least threatened by the war which Italy waged against the Ottoman Empire in 1911–1912. Russia was not directly concerned in the struggle, but it was distasteful to Germany as well as to Austria-Hungary, both of which were endeavoring to bolster up Turkish power, and it was bound sooner or later to produce grave consequences, in the Near East and throughout Europe. In the first place it brought Italy's policy in the Near East into conflict with that of Austria-Hungary. Second, the war showed a possible community of world interests between Italy and the Powers of the Triple Entente. Third, and most significant, it opened the way to the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913, out of which emerged the gravest international crises.

Turco-Italian War of 1911

In the course of the Balkan Wars, Austria-Hungary adopted a most unyielding attitude toward Serb ambitions. On threat of war, in which she was backed by Germany, she deprived Montenegro of the important town of Scutari and compelled Serbia to evacuate various Adriatic towns which her armies had conquered from the Turks. Also, by securing the sanction of the Great Powers for the erection of an autonomous Albania, she effectually prevented Serbia from obtaining an outlet to the sea. Then, when Serbia obtained some compensation by warring on Bulgaria, the government and general staff of Austria-Hungary reached the decision that their southern neighbor must be attacked and despoiled. The decision was not immediately acted upon only because Italy and Germany interposed objections.

Austria's Anti-Serb Policy

In 1913 the international situation was extraordinarily perilous. Recurrent crises in Morocco and in the Near East had cost every Great Power some measure of prestige. Germany had been outplayed in the Moroccan crises by France and Great Britain. Yet France had been forced to cede African territory to Germany, and Great Britain to yield predominance in the Ottoman Empire. Russia had been outplayed in the successive Near Eastern crises by Austria-Hungary and Germany. Yet Austria-Hungary had been flouted by Serbia and held in leash by Italy, and Germany had to face the fact that instead of exercising an hegemony in Europe, as she had done in the days of Bismarck, she was now "encircled" by a ring of potentially hostile Powers.

Question of Prestige

But the more a Great Power was threatened with the loss of prestige, the less yielding and conciliatory it was likely to be. By the end of 1913 Austria-Hungary was determined not to submit to any further diplomatic rebuffs or military threats, and so was Russia. So, too, were Germany and France.

In an atmosphere less conciliatory, the current winds were more gale-like than ever. Naval rivalry was in full swing between Great Britain and Germany, and attempts to halt it by mutual agreement had been unsuccessful [1] and had now ceased altogether. Imperialistic rivalry, if assuaged as between Great Britain and France and Russia, was intensified for all these Powers by recent achievements of Italy and new thrusts of Germany in the Near East. Nationalism, in an aggravated form, was everywhere rampant; it was dictating to governments an emotional, rather than a reasoned, behavior; and, quite triumphant now in the Balkans, it threatened speedily to become so throughout east-central Europe.

In Serbia, the King and his prime minister, Pašič, were determined that the war which they had directed against the Ottoman Empire in 1912–1913 should lead to a political unification of all the Yugoslavs. "The first round is won," remarked Pašič; "now we must prepare for the second, against Austria." No wonder that Austria-Hungary tried to

Serbia *vs.* Austria

[1] Lord Haldane, on behalf of the British government, had made such an attempt through direct negotiations at Berlin early in 1912. The German government insisted that Britain should pledge neutrality in the case of war, a pledge which the British government would not give.

weaken Serbia and to deprive her of some of the fruits of her victory over the Turks. No wonder, too, that nationalistic Serbs redoubled their subversive propaganda, by means of secret societies and clandestine publications (and with the connivance of government officials), among kindred Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes within the Habsburg Empire.

The threat against Austria-Hungary had no terror for Russia, and Russia sympathized with Serbian ambitions. It did have a terror, however, for Germany; Austria-Hungary was Germany's one dependable ally. France had no immediate stakes either in Serbia or in Austria-Hungary, but she was the ally of Russia and a Russian Balkan quarrel might embroil her in war. Great Britain's position was less certain, and so likewise was Italy's. Great Britain was in an *entente* with France and Russia, and was concerting military and naval plans with them, but she was not bound by a formal alliance and she was notoriously prone "to consult her own interests." Italy was in formal alliance with Germany and Austria-Hungary but she simultaneously had a foot in the rival camp and what one of her leading statesmen described as a "sacred egotism." In the very uncertainty as to what Italy and Great Britain might do in a conflict between Russia and Austria-Hungary over Yugoslav nationalism, there was special peril. There was a temptation to gamble.

Concern of Great Powers

Meanwhile, during the year 1913, the Powers vied with one another in making preparations against possible attack. Germany increased her standing army from 656,000 men to 870,000 and appropriated almost a billion marks for "extraordinary" military purposes. France lengthened the term of compulsory service from two years to three. Russia adopted a new program of army expansion. Great Britain added considerably to her already huge naval expenditure.

Military Preparedness in 1913

No responsible statesman really desired war, and "enlightened" and "progressive" people still assumed that a general European war would not and could not occur. In the spring of 1914 the German Emperor and the Russian Tsar were still exchanging letters couched in the most endearing terms, and Germany and Great Britain were newly arranging with each other, secretly but quite amicably, for joint coöperation in the immediate financing of the

Lull before Storm

Bagdad railway and in any future partition of the Portuguese colonies.

Nevertheless, despite all appearances and optimistic longings to the contrary, international competition had now reached a stage in which world peace was at the mercy of an accident. Indeed, the powder magazines throughout Europe were so well stocked, and nationalist feeling so strong and the pursuit of prestige so eager, that any untoward event was likely to produce a world-rocking explosion.

5. TOWARD WORLD WAR

Assassination of Austrian Archduke

On June 28, 1914, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, nephew of the Emperor-King Francis Joseph and heir to the Habsburg Empire, was assassinated, together with his wife, at Sarajevo, the chief town of Bosnia, by a band of fanatically nationalist Serbs. The assassination sent a thrill of horror all over Europe and evoked a storm of indignation in Austria and Germany.

Austria's Opportunity

Here was a peculiarly favorable opportunity as well as a perfectly obvious obligation, reasoned the Austrian Foreign Minister, Count Leopold Berchtold, to have a final reckoning between Imperial Austria and that centre of subversive Yugoslav nationalism, the independent state of Serbia. Berchtold had harried and repeatedly thwarted Serbia during the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913, but he had been restrained by Germany and Italy from attacking Serbia. Now he would chastise Serbia so severely that she would be unable to endanger the integrity of the Habsburg Empire.

We now know that the assassins of the Archduke, though natives of Bosnia and subjects therefore of the Habsburg Empire, were members of the Serbian secret society of the "Black Hand," [1] that they had obtained their weapons and training in Serbia, and that they had planned and executed their crime with the assistance of several high officers in the Serbian army. Also, we now have grounds for believing that Nicholas Pašič, the prime minister of Serbia, had foreknowledge of the conspiracy and yet gave the Austrian government no adequate warning. In other words, the Serbian government had a real share of responsibility.

At the time, however, Berchtold lacked proof of Serbia's com-

[1] See above, p. 497.

plicity. Indeed, his own official investigator reported that there was "nothing to prove or even to cause suspicion of the Serbian government's cognizance of the steps leading to the crime." Nevertheless, Berchtold was resolved to act, and he accordingly pretended to have evidence against Serbia which actually he did not possess.

Austria's Appeal to Germany

Before venturing to take drastic action, Berchtold sought the consent of his own government and the sanction of Austria's ally, Germany. The Hungarian premier, Count Stephen Tisza, had qualms, however; he thought the policy too adventurous and counselled the Emperor Francis Joseph not to assent to an armed attack upon Serbia. The aged Emperor hesitated, and it required all of Berchtold's powers of persuasion to get him to sign the communication which the Foreign Minister had prepared for secret despatch to the German Emperor William II. "The crime against my nephew," the communication read, "is the direct consequence of the agitation carried on by Russian and Serbian Pan-Slavists, whose sole aim is to weaken the Triple Alliance and shatter my Empire. . . . Though it may be impossible to prove the complicity of the Serbian government, there can be no doubt that its policy of uniting all Yugoslavs under the Serbian flag promotes such crimes, and that a continuation of this situation endangers my dynasty and my territories. The aim of my government must henceforth be to isolate and diminish Serbia."

German Assurances to Austria

On July 5–6 the Austrian ambassador to Germany and a special emissary of Count Berchtold bearing the communication from the Emperor Francis Joseph conferred secretly with the Emperor William II at Potsdam. How fully the Austrians revealed Berchtold's plan we do not know. We do know that William II definitely pledged Germany's unqualified support of Austria in any action she might take against Serbia, even if such action involved war with Russia. He was doubtless influenced by the emotion he felt over the murder of his friend, the Austrian Archduke, and he must have been impressed by the urgency of the situation and by the fear that unless Germany decisively backed Austria she would lose her one dependable ally. William II neither wished nor expected to precipitate a world war. He imagined that Austria could make quick work of Serbia and that German threats would

suffice in 1914, as they had sufficed in 1909, to deter Russia from intervening. He considered, of course, the possibility of Russia's not being deterred this time, but William II was willing to gamble, and his Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, an honest but weak man, was meekly acquiescent. So Germany presented a "blank cheque" to Austria-Hungary and underwrote Berchtold's venture.

Thus fortified, Count Berchtold had no serious difficulty in persuading all the members of the Austro-Hungarian government, including Count Tisza, that drastic action should be taken forthwith against Serbia. Then, while the Austrian Chief of Staff was planning the military campaign, Berchtold drafted an ultimatum which Serbia would be almost certain to reject. The ultimatum was presented to Serbia on July 23. It declared that Serbia, by failing to suppress anti-Austrian conspiracies, had violated her solemn promise of 1909 to "live on good neighborly terms" with Austria-Hungary and had therefore compelled the government of the Dual Monarchy to abandon its attitude of "forbearance" and to insist on guaranties of good behavior by the Serbian government. Specifically, Serbia was called upon to ban anti-Austrian publications and societies, to oust any official whom the Austrian government should accuse of subversive propaganda, to discard anti-Austrian textbooks from the Serbian schools, "to accept the collaboration in Serbia of representatives of the Austro-Hungarian government for the suppression of the revolutionary movement directed against the territorial integrity of the Dual Monarchy," and to signify unconditional acceptance of the whole ultimatum within forty-eight hours.

Austrian Ultimatum to Serbia

On July 25 the Serbian government replied, promising compliance with such demands as "would not impair the country's independence and sovereignty" and offering to refer all disputed points to the international tribunal at The Hague or to a conference of the Great Powers. Simultaneously Serbia ordered the mobilization of her army. Whereupon the Austro-Hungarian government pronounced the reply evasive and unsatisfactory, broke off diplomatic relations with Serbia, and likewise ordered mobilization. War was clearly impending between Austria-Hungary and Serbia.

Serbian Reply

But a much vaster and more terrible war was also impending. The Russian government felt that if it stood aside from what promised to be a supreme test between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, Russian prestige would suffer irreparable harm. It had suffered enough through Russia's standing aside in 1909; it must now be maintained at any cost. In the present emergency, moreover, national sentiment among the Russian people, and among other Slavic peoples also, could be counted upon to back energetic action by the Russian government—and by the Russian army if necessary. Consequently, on July 18—five days before the presentation of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia—the Russian foreign minister, Serge Sazonov, had clearly warned the Austrian ambassador at St. Petersburg that "Russia would not be indifferent to any attempt to humiliate Serbia; Russia could not permit Austria to use menacing language or military measures against Serbia."

Russian Concern

Besides, Russia soon received assurances of French support, for Raymond Poincaré, the President of the French Republic, paying a state visit to St. Petersburg on July 20–23, declared to the French ambassador that "Sazonov must be firm, and we will support him." Neither Sazonov nor his sovereign, the Tsar Nicholas II, wished war—any more than did the German Emperor and his Chancellor. But the Russian Foreign Minister was confident that Austria-Hungary could be checked by a firm stand just as Russia had been checked in 1908–1909, and the Tsar, in an exalted mood, hoped for the best. As for the French government, it too had no eagerness for war, though it had a morbid fear lest France should lose her ally and the alliance should lose its prestige; and if, peradventure, general war should come, it might have the advantage of enabling France to undo the defeat of 1870.

French Assurances to Russia

On July 26, Sir Edward Grey, the British Foreign Minister, urged that a conference of diplomatic representatives of Italy, France, Germany, and Great Britain "meet in confidence immediately for the purpose of discovering an issue which would prevent complications" and that "all active military operations be suspended pending results of conference." The Italian and French governments responded favorably, but the German government, fearful lest such a conference, like the one at Algeciras in 1906, would put

British Efforts at Mediation

Germany in a minority and lower the prestige of the Central Empires, replied that the basic dispute concerned Austria-Hungary and Serbia alone and that the efforts of other Powers should be concentrated on "localizing" it. With this evidence of Germany's firm stand, Austria-Hungary on July 28 declared war on Serbia, in order, as Berchtold informed the German ambassador at Vienna, "to cut the ground from any attempt at intervention."

Austria at War with Serbia

Thenceforth events marched fast. Amidst frantic endeavors of diplomats to discover some means of preserving peace without losing prestige, military preparations went feverishly forward. Already, on July 26, Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty in the British cabinet, had given orders on his own responsibility that the British fleet, then mobilized for annual manœuvres, should not disperse but should hold itself in readiness for war. Then, on July 29, when news of the Austrian declaration of war reached St. Petersburg, the Tsar was prevailed upon to sanction a general mobilization of the armed forces of Russia.

Development of Crisis

For a few hours that same night and the next morning the prospect of a peaceful outcome seemed to brighten. William II and Bethmann-Hollweg, who had rashly given a "blank cheque" to Berchtold and blindly allowed him to use it as he would, were suddenly shocked by the realization of the enormous payment in money and men which Germany was almost certain to be called upon to make in honoring the "cheque." They had imagined that they could "localize" the Austro-Serbian conflict; the determined attitude of Russia now filled them with consternation. So, somewhat tardily, Bethmann-Hollweg pressed Austria to negotiate directly with Russia; and when he got no immediate response, he testily wired the German ambassador at Vienna: "As an ally we must refuse to be drawn into a world conflagration because Austria does not respect our advice. Tell Berchtold with all emphasis and great seriousness." And just as the Tsar was ordering Russian mobilization William II frantically wired him imploring him to avoid military measures which "would precipitate a calamity we both wish to avoid."

German Efforts to Stay Austria

The change of front at Berlin had little effect on Count Berchtold, who refused to believe that Germany would really go back

on the original promise she had made to Austria-Hungary. It did have some effect, however, on the impressionable Tsar Nicholas II, who, on receipt of the telegram from William II, promptly countermanded the order for general mobilization of the Russian army (which had not yet been published) and decreed instead a partial mobilization, "as a precautionary measure," along the Austrian (but not the German) frontier.

Austrian Obstinacy

What thus began auspiciously, though tardily, ended speedily and direfully. The Tsar's shift of orders threw the Russian military authorities into a panic. They had a detailed plan for general mobilization but not for such a partial mobilization as the Tsar now contemplated, and they begged the Foreign Minister, Sazonov, unless he would disorganize the Russian army and do without it in his negotiations, to bring about another shift in the Tsar's mind. Sazonov saw the point and on July 30 entreated Nicholas II to renew the order for general mobilization. Nicholas hesitated: "Think of the responsibility you are advising me to take! Think of the thousands and thousands of men who will be sent to their death!" Sazonov persisted, and presently the Tsar yielded. Sazonov rushed to the telephone and informed the Chief of Staff that he was authorized to proceed with general mobilization. "Now you can smash the telephone," Sazonov added; "give your orders, General, and then disappear for the rest of the day."

Russian Mobilization

Russian mobilization transformed the Austro-Serbian war into a Russo-German war. For the German Chief of Staff had no difficulty in convincing William II and Bethmann-Hollweg that the Russians meant business and that any delay in counter-mobilization would spell disaster for Germany. On July 31 Germany presented a twelve-hour ultimatum to Russia, demanding immediate demobilization. Russia did not comply. Germany declared war.

Germany at War with Russia

Germany knew that war with Russia was practically certain to involve France. Accordingly, on the very day of delivering the ultimatum to Russia, Germany presented an ultimatum to France, demanding that she declare her neutrality within eighteen hours. If perchance such a declaration should be forthcoming, Germany was prepared to make the further demand that France permit German troops

Germany at War with France

to occupy the fortresses of Toul and Verdun until general peace should be restored. In fact, the declaration was not made. France merely stated, on August 1, that she "would consult her interests," and at once began mobilization. On August 3, 1914, Germany declared war on France.

Thus, within a week of the declaration of hostilities by Austria-Hungary against Serbia, four Great Powers were in a state of war—Germany and Austria-Hungary opposed to Russia and France. Italy and Rumania, nominal allies of the Central Powers, promptly proclaimed their neutrality, on the ground that the war was not defensive on the part of Austria-Hungary and Germany, but offensive, and that therefore they were not bound to give assistance to their allies. Thereby Italy kept her secret agreement of 1902 with France; and it was not long before Italy, and Rumania likewise, was pressing Austria-Hungary for "compensations" in accordance with provisions of the Triple Alliance.

Italian Neutrality

Great Britain, on the other hand, almost immediately entered the war. The British people, on the whole, had by this time greater sympathy for France than for Germany, and Sir Edward Grey had already informed Germany that he could not bind Great Britain to observe neutrality. On August 2 he went farther and announced that Great Britain would not tolerate German naval attacks on French coasts or shipping. There was still considerable pacifist sentiment in the British cabinet, and a minority in it were critical of the Foreign Minister's manifest partiality for France. On August 4 occurred an event, however, which enabled Sir Edward Grey and the other pro-war members of the cabinet to force out the pacifists and to unite the overwhelming majority of the British parliament and British nation in enthusiastic support of Great Britain's entrance into the war on the side of her fellow members of the Entente—France and Russia.

British Assurances to France

German troops had been set in motion toward the French frontier, not only against the French border fortresses of Verdun, Toul, and Belfort, but toward the neutral countries of Luxemburg and Belgium, which lay between Germany and less well-defended districts of northern France. Both Germany and France had signed treaties to respect the neutrality of these "buffer states," and France had already announced her intention of adhering to

her treaty engagements. But on August 2 German troops occupied Luxemburg, despite protests from the Grand-Duchess; and on the same day the German government presented a twelve-hour ultimatum to Belgium, demanding that German troops be permitted to cross into France, promising, if permission were granted, that Belgium would be indemnified, and threatening, if resistance was encountered, that the decision of arms would determine the future relations of Belgium to Germany. The Belgian government characterized the ultimatum as a gross violation of international law, refused to grant the German request, and appealed for British help in upholding the neutrality of Belgium.

German Violation of Belgian Neutrality

The neutrality of Belgium had always been an important point in the foreign policy of Great Britain. The British had fought against Napoleon I in part because of the annexation of Belgium by France, and they had been hostile to the ambition of Napoleon III in respect of Belgium. They were not likely to view with pleasure Belgium's incorporation with the German Empire. On August 4, therefore, when news was received in London that German troops had actually crossed the border into Belgium, Sir Edward Grey despatched an ultimatum to Germany, requiring assurances by midnight that Germany would respect Belgian neutrality. Germany refused, on the ground of military necessity, and Bethmann-Hollweg, the German Chancellor, terribly tired and disappointed, berated the British ambassador: "Just for a word 'neutrality,' a word which in war time has so often been disregarded—just for a scrap of paper—Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation who desired nothing better than to be friends with her." At midnight Great Britain declared war on Germany.

Britain at War with Germany

On August 7, Montenegro joined her fellow Yugoslav state of Serbia against Austria-Hungary. Then Japan became a party to the war, partially to fulfill her treaty obligations to Great Britain and partially to avenge herself on Germany, for the Japanese had not forgotten the German Emperor's slighting references to them in the past, nor the part Germany had played in preventing Japan from retaining Port Arthur in 1895 after the Chino-Japanese War. Accordingly, on August 17 Japan presented an ultimatum to Germany, demanding that she immediately withdraw all her warships from Chi-

Japan at War with Germany

nese and Japanese waters and deliver up the leased territory of Kiaochow before September 15, "with a view to the eventual restoration of the same to China." Upon the refusal of the German government to comply with the ultimatum, Japan declared war (August 23, 1914).

Against the combination of so many foes, Germany and Austria-Hungary obtained support from the Ottoman Empire. Many patriotic Turks had come to believe that the integrity of their empire was menaced far more by the Entente Powers than by Germany and Austria-Hungary. On August 1, the very day that Germany declared war against Russia, the Ottoman government, dominated by Enver Pasha, signed a secret treaty with Germany, promising to aid her against Russia. For a time the Ottoman Empire pretended to be neutral, but at length on October 29, 1914, when military preparations seemed sufficiently advanced, Turkish warships bombarded Russian ports on the Black Sea. Russia responded with a declaration of war, and on November 5, France and Great Britain declared war on the Ottoman Empire.

Ottoman Empire at War with Triple Entente

Thus, in the three months from July 28 to October 29, 1914, a conflict between Serbia and Austria broadened into a world war in which Germany, Austria-Hungary, and the Ottoman Empire were arrayed against Russia, France, Great Britain (with Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa), Japan, Belgium, Serbia, and Montenegro. Six of the eight Great Powers were immediately involved, and five of the six continents.

No nation willed the war, and statesmen blundered into it rather than sought it. Nor is there any scientific way of apportioning blame for it among the various sovereigns and diplomats and chiefs of staff whom we have referred to in the preceding pages. Some of them were cunning, some were cowardly, and some of them were merely stupid. They would have been quite unable to precipitate a world war, had they not been, equally with millions of common people, the more or less willing agents of immense forces which for a generation had been predisposing the civilized world to mortal combat. The world was parcelled out among states whose mutual distrusts were quickened by rival nationalisms and rival imperialisms; and the existence among these states of a group of Great Powers, divided in the twentieth century into

Blundering into the World War

two huge armed camps, provided a special impetus to rival militarisms.

The coming of the World War took most governments and certainly the masses of mankind by surprise. The preceding age had been so "enlightened." The first decade of the twentieth century had pointed so unmistakably toward material progress, toward a world of European civilization, toward peaceful development and coöperation. Suddenly, as in the twinkling of an eye, the "promise of the twentieth century" assumed a different significance. There might still be material progress and Europeanization of the world, but what loomed foremost now was a bigger and more destructive war than the world had ever known. The World War, as the event proved, really closed an era of "enlightenment" and inaugurated an era of "disillusionment."



CHAPTER XXIV

THE WORLD WAR

I. FROM MOBILIZATION TO TRENCH WARFARE, 1914



EARS of World War were introduced with astounding suddenness. For an instant, the popular reaction to it was one of shock, but this soon gave place to a strange sense of resignation. The masses, no more than the governments, had wished war, and yet war was now a grim reality.

Mobilization

Once the die was cast, there was little opportunity or inclination to "reason why." For from declaration of war to mobilization of troops the passage in every belligerent country was immediate and inexorable. By the system of conscription and mobilization which Prussia had developed by 1866 and which other Continental nations had adopted during the generation following 1870, the strength of the peace-time army was doubled or trebled by calling back to the colors reservists who had already received military training; and the regiments thus raised to war footing were entrained for the frontier according to prearranged plans. Within a fortnight from the ordering of mobilization, therefore, five million men or more throughout Europe were suddenly drawn from their ordinary occupations, clothed and equipped for war, gathered into military units, and transported to the frontiers. Mobilization with such rapidity and on such a scale involved a quasi-paralysis of the economic life of Europe, an upsetting of the normal affairs of practically every family in the belligerent countries.

National Solidarity

Mobilization was likewise attended in every country by an almost instantaneous merging of partisan differences in national solidarity. Opposition parties lined up behind the several governments. All elements and all strata of society reacted similarly. The specifically "disaffected" groups—revolutionary or anti-militarist—behaved like

the rest. In the supreme crisis, pacifism collapsed, and no effective protest was forthcoming from any international society or movement—from the Christian churches, from Marxian socialism, from scholars, business men, or financiers.

Each warring government published its own account of the diplomatic negotiations preceding the war, suppressing whatever appeared unfavorable to its own cause, exaggerating whatever seemed unfavorable to the cause of enemy countries, and on occasion deliberately falsifying the account. These official apologies of the several governments were soon "interpreted" and supplemented by patriotic propaganda; and the pious mythologies, thus built up, and protected by military censorship, became veritable creeds for entire nations, promoting and sustaining the collective morale of each. Everybody was expected to think and say the best of one's own country and its allies, and the worst of the enemy combination, and the vast majority of the warring populations did what was expected of them.

War Propaganda

To the winning of the war was directed all this nationalist propaganda. To the same end was directed a radical reorganization of economic life within each belligerent nation. Industry, transportation, agriculture, commerce, and finance were progressively subjected to drastic regulation and control by the several governments, to such a degree as eventually to introduce *de facto* a war-time "state socialism" and to engage all the economic resources as well as the whole man-power of a nation in support of the war.

National "Socialism" and Unity

Thus the economic as well as strictly military effort of the warring governments fused all elements of each nation into an unprecedented unity of purpose—the limited purpose of seeing the war through. Party alignments were wiped out in each country; class divisions and religious quarrels were put aside. National solidarity was exalted as never before, and this fact made it possible alike for the masses and for the classes to endure the protracted hardships and suffering which the war entailed. From the standpoint of social history, this temporary fusion, or unity, is perhaps the outstanding fact of the World War.

At the outset, there was anxious hope that the war might be brief and end in a "knock-out blow." The wars of 1859, 1866, and 1870–1871 had each centred in a single campaign and been decided by a single battle. The Russo-Japanese War of 1904–

1905 had been over within a year, and the Balkan War of 1912–1913 within a few months. With all the latest mechanical inventions, the present war might conceivably set a record for speed and decisiveness. Otherwise, the prospect would be too dreadful to contemplate.

Expectation of Brief War

The common system of mobilization on the Continent made it certain that big armies would be ready to move against each other in little more than a fortnight from the declaration of war. Each of the general staffs had carefully elaborated a scheme for the opening operations with a view to taking the offensive and winning a decisive battle within the shortest possible time. In general, the French and Russians planned to strike Germany simultaneously from two sides. While the French would attempt a general advance along the Franco-German frontier from Charleroi to Nancy and a more concentrated attack in Lorraine, the Russians would hold off the Austrians and invade East Prussia in force. On the other hand, the Germans planned to cope with their hostile neighbors in turn: to overwhelm the French with superior numbers, and then to turn against the Russians.

Strategic Plans

To overwhelm the French and any British army which might come to their assistance, the German staff, under its chief, General von Moltke,[1] gathered a decisive superiority of forces on the northern and western wing of the armies facing Belgium and France. Belgium, when summoned to let the Germans pass, courageously refused, and made a stand against overwhelming odds. The gallant defense of the Liége forts allowed the Belgian army to mobilize, but the last fort at Liége fell by the time the German right-wing armies were ready to move forward. These scattered the Belgian army, crossed the country,[2] and reached

German Success in Belgium and in Battles of Frontier

[1] A nephew of the Moltke who had commanded in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870.

[2] Acts of retaliation which German troops inflicted on Belgium for her resistance—such as the burning of the library of the University of Louvain—provided some substantiation for a host of "atrocity stories" which were utilized to confirm the morale of Allied peoples and to arouse anti-German sentiment in neutral countries. By the latter part of August 1914, most of Belgium was under military occupation by Germany, and a German governor was installed at Brussels. King Albert of Belgium with a remnant of his army was with the French and British.

the French border according to plan; and here with a decisive superiority they met the northern wing of the French army (and a supporting "expeditionary force" from Britain). Not only here, but in the whole series of opening engagements known as the Battles of the Frontier, the French armies were defeated. The French offensive from Charleroi to Nancy was halted in its tracks, and the French advance into Lorraine was turned back. All the German armies were ordered forward in pursuit, and on August 25 Moltke wired to William II that "in six weeks the whole story will be concluded."

This interpretation proved an error. The German plan had assembled a superiority of forces at the critical point and had defeated the enemy at the time and place anticipated. But the defeat was less severe than at first appeared, and in the next conflicts the French troops proved far steadier. Above all, Joffre, the French commander-in-chief, held his retiring armies under firm control; transferred troops from right to left; and continued an orderly retreat until he could redispose his forces and stand to fight along a more favorable position. Just south of the Marne, he halted the retreat; and on September 6 his forces turned to deliver battle.

All the armies between Paris and Verdun were engaged in this new conflict. The Battle of the Marne, as it came to be known, comprised five or six more or less distinct battles along a 150-mile front, lasting four days. These actions were fought by troops not yet hardened to war, who had been marching or fighting for three weeks in the hottest of midsummer weather. Along most of the battle front, the actions were indecisive; but the German advance was definitely halted, and in the western sector the British army pushed steadily forward through a gap between the German armies of Kluck and Below. By the morning of September 9 the British had crossed the Marne; Kluck and Below were completely separated; and to prevent disaster the German right wing retreated from the Marne to the Aisne. The armies farther east followed suit, and by September 14 the Germans were on the defensive.

German Failure at Marne, Sept. 1914

GIRLS C

The Western Front
1914 - 1916

Battles of the Frontier -
(August 20 - 25 . 1914)
Morhange
The Ardennes
Charleroi
Mons

Battles on the Entrenched Front -
Ypres October - November 1914
Champagne September 1915
Verdun February - July 1916
The Somme (July - Nov. 1916) and the withdrawal to the Hindenburg Line.

Dover
Calais
Boulogne
Abbeville
Amiens
Beauvais
Compiegne
Soissons
Laon
Arras
Lille
Ypres
Ypres
Antwerp
Brussels
Liege
Mons
Charleroi
Namur
The Somme
St. Quentin
Mezieres
Ardennes
Luxemburg
Treves
Thionville
Metz
Verdun
Rheims
Champagne
Verdun
St. Mihiel
Morhange
Chalons
Meaux
PARIS
The Marne
Sept 9
(Sept 5)
Melun
Arcis-sur-Aube
Bar le Duc
Toul
Nancy
Nancy
Strasbourg

The French in turn had to face the disappointment of not being able to force the defensive position of the Germans, and thus the third phase of the opening engagements in the West ended in a stalemate. But though tactically indecisive, the Marne campaign marked the complete failure of the strategy of a speedy German victory over France. Moltke, the German commander, realized only too clearly the full meaning of the failure of his offensive. On September 9, the day his armies began their retreat, he wrote his wife: "It goes badly—The first hopes have been utterly belied. . . . Bitter disillusionment is already upon us." Moltke himself collapsed from the blow, and a new German Chief of Staff, Erich von Falkenhayn, had to be appointed in the midst of the crisis.

Stalemate on Western Front

The stalemate along the Aisne left the opposing armies pinned to the ground with their western flanks uncovered and with vital railway communications unprotected. From common necessity both Falkenhayn and Joffre set to work to prolong their lines in this quarter and, if possible, to outflank each other. Falkenhayn, with spirited energy, ordered a new attack in the West in order to cut off Paris from the Channel ports (through which British reënforcements were arriving) and from all northern France. Joffre checked the attack and turned the line northward, but try as he would during the next month he could not outflank the Germans. The net result was a new entrenched front reaching from the Aisne northward to the western tip of Belgium. In the last phase of this "race to the sea," Falkenhayn gathered all available troops and a new army corps of fresh troops raised since the beginning of hostilities and made a fierce attempt to break through to the Channel ports. The British army, centring at Ypres, had to bear the brunt of the assault, which continued without let-up for three weeks. The Battle of Ypres was in fact the longest and most hard-fought battle up to this time. It left both armies exhausted; and with the commencement of winter the Western Front stabilized in entrenched lines running from Nieuport and Ypres (in southwestern Belgium) southward to the Aisne River, thence eastward to Verdun, and thence southward again to Belfort and the Swiss frontier—a total distance of about six hundred miles.

Failure of Outflanking

Entrenched Western Front

The outline of this long Western Front was the result of suc-

cessive fortunes of battle rather than of purpose or design. Its effect was to leave in German hands most of the industrial area of Belgium and northern France, which was to prove a serious handicap to the Allies throughout the war. The Allies, however, maintained securely their hold on the Channel ports, which assured effective lines of communication between France and England and made it easier for the Allies to blockade the German coasts. With their existing supplies, the Allies had little prospect of breaking through the entrenched German position across France. But, on the other hand, the existence of this "impregnable front" committed the German army to the very thing the General Staff had sought to avoid: an interminable siege warfare which might drain away Germany's resources while permitting France and Britain to draw freely upon the outside world.

In the East, meanwhile, the war had reached a similar result.

Start of War in East

The war plans of Russia, Austria, and Germany alike had ended in frustration, and the failure of the German offensive in the West was parallelled by a deadlock along an entrenched Eastern Front.

Originally the Russian war plan had contemplated offensives against both Germany and Austria, but some years before 1914 the Russian military authorities had promised the French that, in case the main German attack was launched against France, the major part of the Russian forces would be directed at the outset against Germany. This promise was not carried out. When war actually came, the Russians yielded to the temptation to direct their chief effort against the "favorite enemy"—

Russian Success against Austria

Austria. They were rewarded by a striking victory along the whole Austrian front in Galicia. But between the diversion of forces thereby entailed and an extraordinarily faulty execution of the long-planned invasion of East Prussia, the Russian offensive against Germany ended in sensational disaster. The Russian armies which advanced into East Prussia were together numerically superior to the German army, but while the Russian generals dismally failed to coöperate, the Germans (under the central command of

Russian Defeat by Germany

General Paul von Hindenburg, with General Erich Ludendorff as his chief of staff) acted as a unit and managed to deal with the Russians piecemeal. It thus transpired that in each of the three battles fought in East Prussia

in August 1914, the Germans brought into action more battalions than the Russians. And at the culminating Battle of Tannenberg (August 26–29) one of the Russian armies was routed with a loss of 125,000 prisoners, while another broke to pieces in attempting a sudden retreat and lost an equal number of men.

By this disaster the Russians lost the strategical opportunity to overrun East Prussia, which was of critical importance to their general war plan. Moreover, it prevented them from fully "harvesting" their victory on the Austrian front (in Galicia). And the loss of 300,000 trained officers and men, with corresponding quantities of war material, was irreparable.

The Austrian misfortunes arose from cross-purposes at the outset of the war. Throughout the diplomatic crisis of July the government at Vienna held to the plan of a war on Serbia alone, on the premise that clear-cut diplomatic support from Germany would keep Russia from actual conflict. When Russia suddenly ordered mobilization and Germany declared war, an Austrian army was already on its way to Serbia; and the government decided to carry through the Serbian campaign as planned. Through shocking mismanagement, this campaign ended in utter defeat, and the Austrian invaders had to retire behind their own frontiers. The troops used for the vain effort could not take their place in the line of battle in Galicia, where the Russian advance had to be met immediately afterwards. With a substantial superiority of numbers, the Russians hammered back the whole Austrian line to western Galicia, and here the exhausted and sadly weakened Austrian army made a stand behind the Dunajetz River. Desperately the Austrian commander called upon the German General Staff for the reenforcements due at this stage—six weeks after the outbreak of war. He called in vain. The Austrian defeat in Galicia had taken place almost simultaneously with the Battle of the Marne, and the Western Front held in ever firmer grip the main strength of the German army.

Austrian Failures

By the end of 1914 the lines in the East settled down in a more or less entrenched front extending from the borders of East Prussia through western Russian Poland and across Galicia to the Carpathian Mountains—a distance of some nine hundred miles. In the East, as in the West, the war had reached a seeming deadlock. On both fronts, and by both sides, the opportunity for

a strategic decision and a "knock-out blow" was lost. The prospect now was a dreadful one of prolonged trench warfare.

2. GROWING MAGNITUDE AND INDECISIVENESS OF WAR, 1915–1916

By the winter of 1914–1915 the war was assuming unprecedented magnitude. Millions of men were under arms, and "trench warfare" was taking the place of field operations. Each of the contending armies was ensconced in a system of trenches, running two or three deep in zigzag parallels, connected with one another by laterals, and connected also with underground "dugouts" in which soldiers rested and supplies were kept. Between the opposing systems was "no man's land," a waste space obstructed with mounds of dirt and tangles of barbed wire, through which infantry must advance if they would capture the enemy's trenches.

Trench Warfare

On the Western Front, as we have pointed out, such trench systems of the Germans and of the French and British (and Belgians) now faced each other in a line six hundred miles long. On the Eastern Front, the opposing trench systems of the Russians and of the Germans and Austrians were less elaborate but more extensive, covering a distance of some nine hundred miles.

Trench warfare was supplemented by the latest mechanical devices. Cavalry, in the circumstances, could be employed very little, but artillery was used on a scale hitherto undreamed of. Machine guns were utilized in prodigious numbers, and big cannon were installed all along the trenches to mow down the obstructions in "no man's land," to destroy the enemy's positions, and to screen the charges of infantry. Chemical inventions and appliances were increasingly made use of, so that to shell and shot were added explosive bombs and exploding mines, and considerably later in the war poisonous gases were discharged with deadly effect. Later in the war, too, the Allies built "tanks," cars encased in iron and driven by gasoline engines, which crawled over hills and gullies on caterpillar treads and spat out bullets. Gasoline engines proved, in fact, a most important auxiliary of the new warfare. They were employed not only eventually in "tanks," but immediately in the myriads of motor lorries which supplied troops at the front with ammunition and food and conveyed prisoners and the disabled to

Machine Warfare

the rear, and also in the host of airplanes which darted above the trenches, spying out the movements of the enemy, fighting off hostile planes, and dropping explosives.

With these new methods of warfare, and with millions of men directly involved on each side, the winning of decisive battles appeared almost impossible. To "carry" trenches required a vast concerted effort of artillery and infantry and an enormous expenditure of shot and shell and of human life. And to provide the millions of soldiers at the front with needful supplies necessitated the persistent and united cooperation of the whole civilian population of every belligerent nation. The financial expenditure was gigantic. Heavy taxes were levied and huge sums were borrowed.

Expensive Warfare

Nevertheless, in the late winter and early spring of 1915, despite German success in East Prussia and outright conquests in Belgium, northern France, and western Russian Poland, the Allied nations of France, Russia, and Great Britain were sanguine of ultimate triumph. In population, in wealth, and in natural resources they collectively excelled the Central Empires of Germany and Austria-Hungary. They made much of the fact that the latter constituted a "beleaguered fortress," against which the Russians would exert increasing pressure from the east, while the French and British (now being rapidly reënforced by volunteers from the British Isles and by armies from Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) would push hard from the west. They confidently predicted that their superior numbers and resources would prove decisive and that even without "knock-out blows" they could exhaust the Central Empires and bring them to terms. British sea power was already destroying Germany's oceanic trade, detaching her colonies, and threatening to deprive her of needful supplies, while it was strengthening the French and promising to strengthen the Russians.

Allied Expectations

In such an optimistic frame of mind the Allied governments arranged a division of the spoils which would accrue to them from their eventual triumph. Back in September 1914, they had solemnly promised one another, by the Pact of London, not to make peace separately but to hold together until they had achieved a common victory. Then, in March 1915, they secretly agreed among themselves that in the future peace settlement Russia should appropriate

Pact of London and Secret Treaties

Constantinople and all of Poland, France should regain Alsace-Lorraine and dominate the left bank of the Rhine, and Great Britain should take most of the German colonies.

But the Germans hoped for ultimate victory too. They were superbly united and resolute. The military endeavors of Austria-Hungary had been disappointing, but the Dual Monarchy had not been shaken by any actual revolt of its subject peoples—as the Allies had hoped—and some of the most influential Polish leaders, for example, were so anxious to prevent Poland from being Russianized that their continuing loyalty to the Habsburg Empire could be depended upon. Under German leadership, the armies of Austria-Hungary, and of the Ottoman Empire also, could be made efficient and very useful.

Germany and Austria-Hungary admittedly constituted a "beleaguered fortress," but this fact, in German eyes, had its advantages. It meant that the armies of the Central Empires could operate on interior rather than exterior lines, and that reënforcements could be transferred with relative ease and despatch from one front to another, wherever they might count the most. Besides, the whole military strategy of the Central Empires could be directed by a single authority, the German General Staff, which, by coördinating the efforts of the Austrians, Hungarians, and Turks with those of the Germans, could strike telling blows first in one direction and then in another. In this respect the situation within the "beleaguered fortress" was in marked contrast to that of the besieging hosts, who were subject to the orders of several separate and jealous general staffs—Russian, French, British, and Serbian. Unity of command was as advantageous to the Central Empires as disunity was costly to the Allies.

German Hopes and Advantages

For the new type of entrenched warfare, the Central Empires at the beginning of 1915 had very real advantages in equipment and trained soldiery. Germany, no more than the enemy Powers, had originally accumulated stocks of munitions sufficient to outlast the opening campaigns, but with methodical foresight the war ministry at Berlin had planned the inevitable expansion of war industry. It had made surveys of German industrial plants, determined what work each could do, and prepared specifications for a rapid change to production of war material. As a result, munitions contracted for after the declara-

tion of war were being delivered in huge quantities to the German field armies early in 1915, just when the Allies were facing a serious shortage of munitions—when France was deprived of her major industrial centres, when Britain was only beginning to transform peace-industries into war-industries, and when Russia was literally starving for guns and munitions.

At this time, also, Germany could put reserves of man-power more promptly in the field. Joffre, the French commander, had far fewer of such reserves upon which to draw; and Lord Kitchener, the British war minister, having started with only a relatively small professional army, had to take time to recruit and train wholly new units. Falkenhayn, on the other hand, by a skillful mixing of fresh young conscripts and trained personnel, put a group of new army corps into the field in November 1914; and by the close of the year, in addition to supplying losses in the existing ranks, he had ready another body of fresh troops as large as the entire British army in France.

In the circumstances Falkenhayn sought a military decision without delay. He would attempt a smashing attack upon the British sector of the Western Front before Kitchener's new British army could arrive. Such an attack might well have been decisive. Beyond doubt the general condition of the Western Front at the time offered a better opportunity than was ever to occur again for the Germans to smash through and overwhelm France and Britain.

German Plan in West Upset by Austrian Need

But the Austrian failures of 1914 in the East now embarrassed the German Command. The Russian armies seemed on the point of breaking through the Carpathian Mountains and deluging the Hungarian plain. A second disastrous attempt to invade Serbia had weakened still further the Austrian army and left it divided on two far distant fronts. Moreover, both the diplomatic and the military authorities in Germany were agreed that Italy and Rumania were preparing to enter the war on the side of the Allies and against the Central Empires. If they should enter the war, they might overwhelm Austria.

To avert such a catastrophe, Falkenhayn compelled the Austrian foreign minister to offer Italy territorial "compensations" as a price for her continuing neutrality. Italy had been demanding "compensations" (in accordance with the terms of the Triple Alliance) ever since the beginning of the war, but the Austrian

government had been quite unheedful until pressed by Germany, and even now it had no faith that Italy could be satisfied. Public sentiment in Italy was by this time predominantly anti-Austrian and pro-Ally; and, after all, the Allies could promise Italy more territory at Austria's expense than Austria could be expected to do. So Italy, while continuing to negotiate with Austria, signed at London in April 1915 a secret treaty with the Allies. Thereby she obtained from them a pledge that if she helped them in the war she might annex the southern half of the Tyrol (including Trent), Trieste, Istria, and part of the Dalmatian coast, and, in addition, she might enlarge her African colonies and share in the partition of the Ottoman Empire. "This," the British statesman, Lord Balfour, later explained, "is the sort of thing you have to do when you are engaged in war."

Threat of Italian Intervention

In Rumania were divided counsels. The Hohenzollern King Ferdinand and a number of the country's "elder statesmen" wished to be loyal to the Triple Alliance and perceived in taking sides with the Central Empires an opportunity to obtain from the Russian Empire the Rumanian-speaking province of Bessarabia. On the other hand, a majority of the "younger statesmen" were inclined to throw over the Triple Alliance entirely, to unite with the Allies, and to participate in a partition of Austria-Hungary, whence Rumania might secure provinces larger and more valuable than Bessarabia. The Allies offered the main part of Transylvania but they were precluded by Russian and Serbian objections from offering as much as the King and his advisers deemed necessary to overcome their scruples. Consequently the Rumanian government wavered back and forth and awaited the time when its services would command a higher price.

Possible Rumanian Intervention

While Falkenhayn was doing his best to keep Italy and Rumania neutral, Hindenburg, the "hero" of the Battle of Tannenberg and now the military idol of the whole German nation, came forward boldly with promises of swift annihilating victory over Russia. The German Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, and likewise Admiral von Tirpitz backed Hindenburg; and finally, in view of Austria's critical position, Falkenhayn acquiesced.

Wherefore Falkenhayn abandoned (most reluctantly) the prospect of victory in the West and turned East for the campaign of

1915. "With a heavy heart" he sent off to Hindenburg his reserve of fresh troops, "including the best that Germany possessed



in the war." These troops were used up at once in battles fought in a midwinter blizzard—without perceptibly diminishing the pressure of the Russian army against Austria. After this fiasco,

Falkenhayn took the relief offensive in his own hands. The French and British were already commencing to hammer at the Western Front, and it was impossible to transfer another whole army eastward. But by draining men from each of the divisions in the West, Falkenhayn was able to assemble twelve new divisions in time to save the Austrian front. They were grouped with picked Austrian divisions, under a good general, August von Mackensen, and one of the best German staff officers, Hans von Seeckt, whose careful arrangements produced for the first time the grand-style artillery preparation which thereafter became a characteristic feature of the war. The result was a triumph of Austro-German operations: the Austrian divisions did as well as the German; the Russian line was broken through at Gorlice; and in a fortnight (in May 1915) Falkenhayn's "relief-offensive" advanced ninety-five miles. The whole Russian front in Galicia began crumbling, and the general balance of the war in the East was suddenly reversed.

German Drive against Russia, 1915

Rumania dropped at once all idea of intervening against the Central Empires, but even in the full tide of Austro-German success Italy declared war on Austria-Hungary. This was a disappointment to Falkenhayn's hopes, although the defeat of the Russians permitted Austria to reënforce her troops on the Italian border. For Austria the crisis had passed, and the mountainous Italian frontier was easily organized for defensive warfare. For over a year, in fact, it stood secure against Italian offensives.

Italy's Juncture with Allies, 1915

In Poland, meanwhile, the Austro-German advance relentlessly continued, and it presently became clear that the Russian armies were woefully short of munitions. Up to the last minute the war ministry at Petrograd sought to escape blame by concealing and then by denying the fact. It was then too late to supply the shortage; and all that the Russian commander-in-chief, the Grand-Duke Nicholas, could do was to avoid battle and keep retreating. It was thus possible for Falkenhayn to extend his advance in the East without drawing reenforcements from the Western Front. By September 1915 all Poland, together with the greater part of Lithuania, was in military possession of the Central Empires.

German Conquest of Poland

Russian losses in the summer of 1915 were not confined to territory. Half a million soldiers were killed, a million wounded,

and another million captured. The remaining Russian armies, at least temporarily, were demoralized by defeat and retreat. And it boded ill for the future that the Tsar Nicholas II, now more than ever under the spell of his hysterical wife and her strange bewitcher, the "monk" Rasputin,[1] dismissed the Grand-Duke Nicholas and took nominal command himself of the Russian armies. The Tsar insisted that the war would go on, but he was too irresolute to prevent confusion in the conduct of the war from becoming worse confounded.

Russian Losses

Having badly battered Russia, Falkenhayn hurried West with some detachments to meet an expected French attack in Champagne. It was in the nick of time. Joffre was launching the most powerful offensive yet seen on any front. The German line was on the point of yielding, and Falkenhayn arrived just in time to cancel an order for retreat which would have broken the entrenched front in France.

Failure of French Attack in Champagne

This crisis passed, Falkenhayn next switched a group of divisions from Poland to the Serbian front and prepared with due care the invasion twice bungled in Austrian hands. As a by-product of the Austro-German victory over Russia, Bulgaria definitely allied herself with the Central Empires (September 1915), accepting their offers of territorial aggrandizement and promising to coöperate with them in the attack on Serbia. In October, therefore, Serbia was assailed simultaneously from the east by Bulgarian armies and from the north by an Austro-German army under Marshal von Mackensen. Against the double invasion Serbia could not stand, and a motley expeditionary force which the Allies managed to organize "for the relief of Serbia" and to land at Salonica (in Greek territory[2]) was too small to do aught but prevent King Constantine from bringing Greece into the war on the side of the Central Empires. Within two months, Serbia was overrun by the Austro-Germans and Bulgarians, and her royal family and the remnants of her army were refugees. The same fate was meted out to Montenegro, and Albania also was occupied.

Bulgaria's Juncture with Central Powers, 1915

Conquest of Serbia

[1] See above, p. 485.

[2] This involved, of course, an Allied violation of Greek neutrality, but it was excused on the ground of "military necessity" (as Germany had excused her earlier violation of Belgian neutrality) and of assent by the Greek minister Venizelos (who was notoriously hostile to his sovereign).

At the outset of 1915 Germany had been viewed, and had viewed herself, as a beleaguered fortress. By the end of the year Falkenhayn had extended the fortress to include all Poland, most of the Balkan peninsula, and the Ottoman Empire in Europe and Asia Minor. A new ally in Bulgaria, with a strong army, counterbalanced Italy's turning to the opposite side; and the conquests in the Balkans redoubled the value of Turkey as an ally.

Already, in the winter of 1914–1915, when Russia was in dire need of munitions, the British Admiralty had counselled the Allies to force open the Turkish Straits connecting the Mediterranean with the Black Sea, so that commerce between Russia and Britain might be expedited. Winston Churchill, the First Lord of the Admiralty at the time, contended that Allied success in such an undertaking would decide the whole war. Joffre, the French commander-in-chief, afraid of weakening the Western Front and convinced that the war must ultimately be decided there, was opposed to a military diversion at the Straits; and the British had more ships than men to spare. As a compromise, it had been agreed that a naval attack should be made on the Straits, and accordingly, in February and March 1915, a powerful Franco-British fleet essayed to silence and destroy the Turkish land forts lining both sides of the Dardanelles. The attempt failed. Several battleships were sunk, and the others had to be withdrawn.

Allied Failure at Dardanelles

Much wrangling ensued in Allied headquarters as to whether a military expedition should and could be sent to do what the naval expedition had failed to do. By the time another compromise was reached and an expeditionary force of Britishers, Australians, and New Zealanders, with a sprinkling of colonial French troops, was ready to disembark at the tip of the Gallipoli peninsula (bordering the Dardanelles), the Turks, under a German commander, Marshal Liman von Sanders, had had ample time to perfect their defenses and render the peninsula well-nigh impregnable. The expeditionary force fought gallantly, but it could make little headway, and its commander, Sir Ian Hamilton, was denied necessary reënforcements. It struggled intermittently for several months, and always unsuccessfully. In December 1915 it was finally withdrawn.

Not only were the Turks enabled, through German advice and supplies, to defeat the Allies at the Dardanelles but also to

hold in check an attempted Russian advance through the Caucasus into Armenia and at the same time to threaten the Suez Canal and to capture an Anglo-Indian expeditionary force which had been landed in Mesopotamia. Simultaneously the Bulgarians, likewise buttressed by Germany, were holding the Balkans and keeping an Allied force pinned to defensive positions at Salonica. The Bulgarian and Turkish armies were thus contributing to an almost fatal diversion of Allied troops from the crucial Western Front to isolated sectors in the Near East, while permitting the Germans to overcome Russia and then to concentrate on the West.

Other Allied Discomfiture in Near East, 1915

Against the brilliant German record of 1915, the Allies could offer merely a drab background of failure. On the Western Front, they had felt obliged to maintain almost constant attacks in order to prevent a greater shifting of German divisions to the Russian front. These attacks had begun before a proper reënforcement of guns and munitions was at hand, and some had been badly bungled. They had perhaps saved the Russian army from annihilation, but they brought no victories and they involved terrible wastage.

General Allied Failure in 1915

By the end of 1915, however, the British and French were at last amply provided with munitions. Falkenhayn, knowing this, concluded that Germany could no longer expect to win a "military decision" against them. But to stand indefinitely on the defensive would mean the certain exhaustion of the Central Empires. The war could not go on forever as a stalemate. It must be ended, and this could be brought about only by proving to France that a military victory over Germany was impossible. To wear down French morale, therefore, he proposed a sustained offensive against a favorable point on the Western Front.

German Plan to Exhaust France

The German government endorsed Falkenhayn's proposal, and without waiting for the end of winter the offensive was opened against Verdun (in February 1916). But the opening attack did not succeed as planned. The spirit of the French army stiffened to meet so direct a challenge, and the wearing-out battle dragged on in more and more hopeless effort from February to July. Both armies suffered frightful losses and both were exhausted, but Verdun remained in French hands. And

Assault on Verdun, 1916

at the end the test of strength lowered the morale of the German nation at large more than the French.

Moreover, the Allies by now were far stronger than in 1915. A much larger British army was provided for by the imposition of universal conscription in January 1916. Both French and British armies were far better supplied with guns and munitions, and even the Russian forces were now being rearmed. Besides, the Allies arranged to co-ordinate their military effort; and at a conference presided over by Joffre in the spring of 1916, France, Britain, Russia, and Italy agreed to concentrate their energies each on a single vigorous offensive. These attacks on various fronts were to be delivered simultaneously in July.

Conscription in Britain

Joint Allied Plans

The drain of Verdun diminished radically the French share in the joint effort, but in the East the Austrian commander, Conrad, played directly into the Allied plans. Yielding to the temptation of a decisive victory over Italy, he transferred against her a large part of his best troops and heaviest artillery from the Russian Front, and then opened a drive from the Tyrol. The Italians soon brought this to a halt, and a Russian army (under General Brusilov) then struck the sector whence the Austrian troops and guns had been withdrawn. The Austrian line collapsed quite as brusquely as the Russian line early in 1915. The Russians reoccupied eastern Galicia and took numerous prisoners.

Russian Offensive

By shifting divisions from other fronts, Falkenhayn was able to stay the Russian advance and reëstablish new lines in Galicia. But on the heels of Brusilov's attack, the British and French drove hard at the German front in the West in the region of the Somme. The first assaults failed to break the German position, and slow progress could only be made with heavy loss. But from the German perspective, the general situation of the war was again reversed. Verdun, then at its extreme point of danger, was relieved of serious pressure, and the German forces in the West were thrown on a desperate defensive.

Franco-British Offensive on Somme

Soon afterwards, at the command of General Cadorna, the Italian army opened an energetic offensive in Istria on the Isonzo front. It profited from Austrian concern with Brusilov and his Russians and began with brilliant promise. Gorizia, a key point, was promptly captured; and once again Austria appeared on the verge of collapse.

Italian Offensive

These events elicited a declaration of war from Rumania against the Central Empires, and on the same day (August 27, 1916) Italy declared war on Germany.[1] The failure of the long German effort in the West, at Verdun, and the obvious weakening of the Austrian army convinced the Rumanian leaders that their country's intervention would bring about the immediate débâcle of the Habsburg Empire. As a first impression, this opinion was held unquestioningly by the public at large, not only in Allied nations, but even more poignantly in Germany and Austria.

Rumania's Juncture with Allies, 1916

In point of fact, the Rumanians had waited just too long—partly in driving a hard bargain with the Allies.[2] At the crisis of Brusilov's offensive in Galicia, in June, Rumanian intervention might well have been decisive. But by the end of August the Galician front had been patched up, and Falkenhayn, fully warned, had prepared against Rumania's action. He had been able. even in the thunderstorm of enemy offensives on every front, to gather a new army along the Transylvanian border. This army struck promptly; and soon the whole Rumanian plain north of the Danube was another Austro-German conquest. Instead of destroying the Habsburg Empire, the net result of Rumania's entry into the war was that all the Balkan states (except Greece) were now controlled by the Central Empires.

Conquest of Rumania

But within Germany, meanwhile, Rumania's declaration of war had produced an immediate crisis of despair. The Emperor William II was thoroughly broken by the news, and to his intimates he declared that the war was lost and that peace must be made without delay. On the country at large the effect was much the same, for the fearfully wearing struggle at Verdun, followed by a storm of enemy offensives at every point, had strained all nerves to the breaking point. In this general mood, Bethmann-

Crisis in Germany: Pacifism and Hindenburg's Supremacy

[1] Italy, in declaring war against Austria back in May 1915, had then refrained from declaring war against Germany. It should be noted that in March 1916, prior to Rumania's intervention, Great Britain had persuaded Portugal to seize German vessels in her harbors and to follow up Germany's resulting declaration of war by sending some Portuguese soldiers to the Allied trenches in France.

[2] The secret treaty, as finally signed in August 1916 by Rumania with the Allies, pledged her, as the price of her military support, not only Transylvania and Bukovina but also the Serbian Banat and the plain of Hungary as far as the Theiss River.

Hollweg, the Chancellor, with other high officials, prevailed upon William II to dismiss Falkenhayn and to summon Hindenburg and Ludendorff to the supreme command (August 1916).

William II had resisted this step for a year and a half. Ever since 1913 there had been sharp personal enmity between him and Ludendorff; and since the beginning of the war Ludendorff had industriously built up Hindenburg's popularity and prestige in opposition to the Emperor and to Falkenhayn. William II understood clearly that, in summoning Hindenburg and Ludendorff, he was in effect abdicating his "ultimate" authority in the state to a masterful and domineering rival, and he yielded only because the pressure upon him was too great.

Change in Character of War

The appointment of Hindenburg as commander-in-chief, with Ludendorff as quartermaster-general (and virtual dictator), amounted to a political revolution in Germany, and produced no less radical a change in the character and scope of the war. Falkenhayn's policy of "possibilities," as regards strategy and war aims, gave place by degrees to an unlimited program of conquest and an arraying of almost the whole world against the Central Empires.

Hindenburg's first act after assuming command was to inspect the Western Front, which he and Ludendorff now saw for the first time. The two were appalled by the character of the Somme offensive, still under way; and without delay they ordered the building of the "Hindenburg Line," a heavily fortified line in the rear, whither the German divisions could take refuge from the untenable positions into which they had been forced. In addition, Hindenburg and Ludendorff reported certain conclusions: (1) that against such military resources as the Allied Powers were now bringing into the field, there was no possibility of Germany's winning the war by land offensives; (2) that even by holding to the defensive, the troops could not stand the strain of another continuous battle such as the Somme; and (3) that the only hope was for Germany to turn to unrestricted submarine warfare. Through the submarine Britain might be compelled within the first six months of 1917 to cease effective coöperation with her allies and thereby to leave them with no choice but to make peace with Germany.

Towards Submarine Warfare

In the minds of the new German Command, Britain held the

key position. Allied fortunes had waxed in 1916 with increasing British success on the seas. They would wane rapidly if Britain suffered sea disaster in 1917.

3. BRITISH MARITIME SUCCESSES, 1914–1916

Great Britain's naval superiority had been utilized from 1914 to 1916 in many ways advantageous to the Allied cause. First, it was employed to clear the high seas of enemy warships. One British squadron, it is true, was defeated by a German fleet off the coast of Chile near Coronel in November 1914; but another British squadron was promptly sent out, and in the next month near the Falkland Islands it encountered and destroyed that German fleet. In general, German warships which were at sea when war was declared put hurriedly into neutral ports and were duly interned, and the main battle fleet and some of the finest cruisers of Germany, which happened to be in home waters, stuck close to the German harbors where floating mines and land batteries could protect them against British attack. Occasionally, German cruisers made stealthy trips across the North Sea and bombarded English coast towns. Occasionally, too, German "raiders" took to the high seas and preyed upon Allied merchantmen, but their careers were usually brief and always ended either in capture or in internment in neutral ports.

Britain's Naval Superiority

The British kept their major battle fleet "in reserve," that is, stationed in the waters north of Scotland, carefully guarded against surprise attacks by German submarines or bombers and yet ready to engage the German fleet if it should issue from its havens. In this way the British may be said to have exercised their naval power more by frightening the enemy than by actually fighting him. On one occasion—at the end of May 1916, almost two years after the beginning of hostilities—the German battle fleet did emerge into the North Sea and oblige the British armada to fight. The British lost more lives and ships than the Germans in the battle of Jutland, as the contest was called, but they could afford to lose more, and they were victorious in that the surviving German warships returned to their home harbors and did not again venture out on the high seas.

Battle of Jutland, 1916

With German (and Austrian) warships driven from the high

seas, Great Britain and France could freely transport troops and munitions to and from oversea areas. French colonial troops from Algeria, Senegal, and Indo-China were thus transported in safety to France to reënforce the Allied Western Front. To France, moreover, for the same purpose, armies were brought not only from Great Britain but also from Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and India. Thereby, the number of British troops in France grew steadily until, with the imposition of conscription by the British parliament in January 1916, it equalled the number of French troops.

Transport of Troops and Supplies

There was opposition to conscription in Ireland, and a group of extremists of the Sinn Fein and Labor parties rose in revolt at Dublin in Easter week of 1916 and proclaimed an "Irish Republic." [1] The majority of the Irish people, however, remained quiet, and, thanks again to British sea power, troops which were despatched from England suppressed the revolt quickly—and vindictively.

Suppression of Irish Revolt, 1916

The uninterrupted stream of men and munitions which the British poured into France during 1915 and 1916 explains, along with the fighting ability and good generalship of the French, why the Germans in those years could make no such headway in western Europe as they made in the east. But western Europe was not the only field of military operations where British naval supremacy counted heavily. With Germany deprived of the means of aiding her overseas colonies, these were invaded and conquered by Allied forces. The British navy was, indeed, the chief factor in expanding the European war into a real World War.

Conquest of German Colonies

In August 1914 the German colony of Togoland in Africa was captured. Then, expeditionary forces penetrated into the larger and more important German colony of Kamerun, gradually overcoming the resistance of its weak garrison and compelling its surrender at the beginning of 1915. Against German Southwest

[1] See above, pp. 362–365. Only about 2,000 Irishmen actively engaged in the insurrection of 1916. About a hundred British soldiers were killed in putting down the "revolt." Afterwards, fifteen "rebels" were executed, and many others, including "suspects," were imprisoned.

Africa, General Louis Botha [1] inaugurated a campaign with a South African army in September 1914, but anti-British sentiment among a portion of the Dutch-speaking Boers produced within the Union of South Africa a serious revolt. Halting the campaign against German Southwest Africa, therefore, General Botha, with the coöperation of General Smuts, crushed the revolt in the Union. As soon as this was accomplished, early in 1915, Botha and Smuts renewed the attack on German Southwest Africa and completed its conquest in July.

The conquest of German East Africa proved more difficult. Although British warships seized the port of Dar-es-Salaam in August 1914, the German governor of the colony, General von Lettow-Vorbeck, was so resourceful in commanding the loyalty of the natives and in conducting military operations that he kept the British on the defensive throughout 1915 and actually carried the war into British East Africa. In 1916 General Smuts managed to conquer the greater part of German East Africa, but the surrender of Lettow-Vorbeck was not effected until November 1918.

In the southern Pacific, a contingent of New Zealanders captured German Samoa in August 1914, and shortly afterwards Australian expeditions seized New Guinea, Kaiser Wilhelmsland, and the Bismarck archipelago. In the northern Pacific, and in the Far East generally, Japan as the ally of Great Britain was enabled to make short work of German concessions and colonies. Japanese warships seized the Ladrones and Caroline Islands and convoyed to China a military expedition which captured Kiao-chow in October 1914.

In the Near East, Great Britain employed her naval superiority to penalize the Ottoman Empire for siding with Germany. At the beginning of Turkish hostilities, in October 1914, Britain formally freed both Cyprus and Egypt from nominal vassalage to the Ottoman Empire. Cyprus was transformed into an outright British colony, and Egypt into a full-fledged British protectorate. Then, while an Anglo-Egyptian army warded off Turkish attacks against the Suez Canal, an Anglo-Indian army was landed at the head

British Assaults on Ottoman Empire

[1] See above, pp. 374–375.

of the Persian Gulf and undertook the conquest of Mesopotamia.

In 1915 the Turco-British phase of the World War was disappointing to Great Britain (and the other Allies). The Anglo-Egyptian army was on the defensive and barely able to hold the Suez Canal. Half of the Anglo-Indian army, after advancing 180 miles up the Tigris, was surrounded by superior Turkish forces at Kut-al-Amara and compelled to surrender in April 1915. And, as we have previously pointed out, the prolonged efforts of the British at the Dardanelles, first by sea and next by land, ended in sorry failure.

Failures in 1915

In 1916, however, the tide turned and Great Britain gained several advantages in the Ottoman Empire. First, the peninsula of Sinai (between Egypt and Palestine) was conquered by an Anglo-Egyptian army reënforced by Australians and New Zealanders who had been transported from Gallipoli. Second, the town of Kut-al-Amara on the Tigris was retaken by an Anglo-Indian army; in March Bagdad was captured, and by the end of the year the greater part of Mesopotamia was in British hands. Last, but not least, a young Britisher, known as Colonel Lawrence, ingratiated himself with the Arab sherif of Mecca, Hussein, and with his fighting son, Feisal, and persuaded them to head a general Arab revolt against the Turks. Hussein proclaimed the independence of Hejaz in June 1916; and presently Feisal, with Lawrence as the liasion officer between him and the British, was making raids against the Turks and spreading nationalist propaganda among the Arabs northward to the very gates of Damascus.

Successes in 1916

Arab Aid

Back of these growing threats against the Asiatic provinces of the Ottoman Empire, as back of the overthrow of Germany's colonial empire in Africa and the Pacific, was British naval supremacy. And less showy but more fundamentally important were the commercial effects of Great Britain's naval superiority. German merchantmen, as well as German warships, were driven from the seas; and the British navy enforced, with growing stringency, a virtual "blockade" of German seaports and interfered more and more with neutral trade with Germany. Germany, of course, continued to import and export goods across the Netherlands or the Scandinavian countries, but vessels to or from these countries were subjected to search by the British and commodities clearly

Destruction of German Commerce

German in origin or destination were usually confiscated. Germany was thus deprived of profitable foreign markets for manufactures and likewise of a copious supply of needful raw materials.

Britain's industry was correspondingly stimulated. It profited from the slowing down of non-military production in Allied countries, from enemy occupation of the chief industrial centres of France, and especially from the disappearance of German competition. With the stimulation of industry and commerce went a relatively great accumulation of "war profits," so that Britain, retaining her position as workshop and banker of the world, was enabled to lend money to her allies, as well as to furnish them with more munitions.

Britain's Financial Superiority

Even Britain would have cracked under the strain of financing and supplying all her far-flung naval and military forces—and acting as banker and munitions-maker for her numerous allies—had she not been in a position to avail herself of the trade with neutrals which she denied to Germany. With the United States, particularly, Great Britain traded freely and permitted her allies to trade, just as she practically forbade American trade with Germany. This meant that, thanks to British supremacy on the high seas, the mills and factories of industrialized America were at the service of the Allies rather than of the Central Empires and that many manufacturers and bankers in neutral America were themselves amassing "war profits" from the sale of munitions and the loan of money to Great Britain, France, Italy, etc. Furthermore, it meant that the United States was more open to Allied propaganda than to that of Germany, and that consequently the majority of American citizens were disposed to sympathize with the Allies rather than with the Central Empires.

Allied Use of Neutral Countries

Especially of United States

Still another commercial advantage of great importance Great Britain had over Germany, and that was in respect of foodstuffs. At the beginning of the war, Germany with Austria-Hungary was almost if not quite self-sufficing in grain, meat, and most other agricultural staples, while Britain was dependent for most of her foodstuffs on foreign imports. As the war went on, Britain's mastery of the seas assured to herself and her allies a sufficient importation of foodstuffs from the United States, Canada, Argentina, and Australia, but it worked increasing hard-

ship for the Central Empires, and especially for Germany.

Threatened Starvation of Germany

Germany had to put more farm-hands in her armies or in her munition plants, with consequent loss of agricultural self-sufficiency; and the British "blockade" steadily lessened the chance of Germany's supplying the deficiency from abroad. By the end of 1916 hunger threatened to undermine German morale.

In the submarine—or "U-boat," as they called it—the Germans had one weapon which, if fully developed and freely used,

Possible Rôle of German Submarines

might nullify the advantages accruing to the Allies from British supremacy on the seas. It might be employed to destroy enemy warships, to interfere with the transportation of men and munitions from England to the Continent, and perhaps to starve out Great Britain. Some enemy warships and transports were actually destroyed by German submarines in the early stages of the war, and in June 1916 the cruiser on which Lord Kitchener, the British War Minister, was travelling to Russia for a conference with the Tsar, was sunk by a mine which had been planted by a German submarine. By 1917 it seemed as though a large-scale submarine campaign against British shipping was the one chance—and a good chance—which Germany had of overcoming Great Britain.

So the Germans reasoned. Unfortunately, a large-scale submarine campaign was fraught with danger for Germany as well as for Britain. The ultimate success of such a campaign would

Potential Perils of Submarine Warfare

depend upon the destruction of many merchant vessels bound to or from England, some of which might be flying neutral flags and carrying neutral passengers. Neutral nations would be apt to protest emphatically against the torpedoing of their ships and the killing of their citizens, and, if Germany were to persevere in the campaign, this or that neutral nation would be almost certain to abandon its neutrality and enlarge the already big circle of her active enemies. The United States, of all the neutrals, had most at stake. American citizens were always travelling to England, frequently on British ships; quantities of American munitions and foodstuffs were being sold in Britain; and the United States was the only Great Power, which was not yet identified with one or the other of the belligerent coalitions.

In May 1915 a German submarine torpedoed and sank, off the

coast of Ireland, one of the largest of British merchant vessels, the Lusitania, which was carrying from the United States to Britain a cargo of arms and some 1,200 passengers, including a hundred American citizens. The United States government had previously protested against British interference with American property on the high seas. Now, backed by strongly pro-Allied sympathy at home, it protested with greater vigor against German destruction of American lives on the high seas. For a year diplomatic notes were exchanged between Germany and the United States, interrupted now and then by new submarine attacks and by acute crises, until in May 1916 Germany acceded to American demands and promised that thereafter, unless she gave due notice to the contrary, no merchant vessel would be sunk without warning and without provision for the safety of passengers.

German Assurances to United States, 1916

It thus transpired that the United States called a halt on Germany's using to the full the one weapon which might directly and seriously cripple Great Britain. In the meantime Great Britain clinched her hold on the seas and on lands oversea; and, by pressing her "blockade" of Germany's home ports, she intensified the threat of starving out the German people and nullifying their military successes on the Continent.

4. THE CRISIS OF THE WAR, 1917–1918

Despite the brilliant successes of the Central Empires against Russia and Serbia in 1915 and against Rumania in 1916, despite the drain of man-power which Germany had latterly exacted from her enemies on the Western Front, hopes of the Allies ran high in the winter of 1916–1917. The course of events seemed as auspicious for the Allies as it was critical for the Central Empires. Germany was suffering from the British "blockade," and her armies could apparently make no headway against France; they had been repulsed at Verdun, and farther west they had been obliged to retire to the "Hindenburg Line." In Austria-Hungary, the death of the venerable Emperor-King Francis Joseph in November 1916 gave impetus to disruptive agitation among subject peoples, and his conciliatory grand-nephew who succeeded him as Charles I soon initiated secret negotiations with the Allies

Allied Hopes, 1916–1917

Austrian Peace Proposals

looking toward the Dual Monarchy's withdrawal from the war.

The Emperor Charles indicated his willingness to let France regain Alsace-Lorraine, Russia take Constantinople, Serbia gain an outlet to the sea and a portion of Albania, and Italy annex Trent. The negotiations, begun in January 1917, broke down in May because of stubborn opposition from both Italy and Germany. Charles sadly confessed that his realm could not fight another year without internal revolution.

German Resort to Submarine Warfare

The main reason why Germany opposed the Austrian peace proposals was the prospect of winning the war by resort to unrestricted submarine warfare. Hindenburg and Ludendorff advised it. The German Admiralty pronounced it feasible and predicted that it would starve out England in six months. The Chancellor and the Reichstag approved, and public opinion was favorable. Both the military and the diplomatic authorities recognized that in reply the United States would probably go to war, but they thought that American intervention could not thwart the prompt success of the U-boat campaign. The possibility of an American army being sent to Europe was also taken into account, but it was reckoned—quite accurately—that no large force could be organized and transported until long after the six-months period counted upon for the submarines to achieve their aim.

Preparations for the new German effort were matured by January 1917, at the very time when the Habsburg Emperor was making his peace overtures to the Allies. On the last day of the month Germany notified the United States and other neutral Powers that she was withdrawing the pledges previously given and that thenceforth all sea traffic within specified areas adjoining the British Isles, France, and Italy would, "without further notice, be prevented by all weapons." In other words, German submarines would sink at sight all merchantmen, regardless of the flag they might fly and the passengers they might carry. The United States, under the leadership of its President, Woodrow Wilson, at once broke off diplomatic relations with Germany, and, after debating a project for "armed neutrality," at length on April 6 declared war on Germany.

America's Juncture with Allies, 1917

The American declaration of war was but a logical outcome of

the position which Wilson had taken about unrestricted submarine warfare a year previously. It was naturally hailed with popular applause in the Allied countries. It justified their cause anew and temporarily reassured them. Yet, just as the Germans anticipated, America could be of hardly more practical help to the Allies immediately after the declaration of war than she had been previously. Whether American intervention was of significance or not would depend in last analysis upon the success or failure of the German U-boats in 1917.

Almost simultaneously with the intervention of the United States, Russia underwent an internal revolution which also, at the moment, was popularly acclaimed in Allied countries, though actually it was of very dubious value to the Allied cause. Ever since the terrifying military reverses of 1915, affairs in Russia had been going from bad to worse. The temporary comeback which General Brusilov staged in eastern Galicia in the summer of 1916 was more than offset by the increasing incompetence of the Tsarist régime. The Tsar himself was quite unequal to the rôle of commander-in-chief, and the Tsarina, left in charge of the government at Petrograd, blindly followed the whims of Rasputin in filling offices and determining policies, and stubbornly refused to heed the gathering storm of criticism and opposition. In December 1916 a group of noblemen, headed by a relative of the Tsar, hatched a plot against Rasputin as the evil genius of the régime and made doubly sure of getting rid of him by poisoning him and then stabbing him. Not even this assassination brought the Tsarina to reason, for the dead Rasputin exercised upon her disordered mind, and through her upon the Tsar's mind, an even greater influence than had the living Rasputin.

Russian Revolution of March, 1917

During the winter of 1916–1917 popular disaffection overspread Russia. Patriots complained that the government was hampering the prosecution of the war and hinted that it was conducting treasonable negotiations with the enemy. The subject nationalities grew restless. The middle classes grumbled. There were riots of peasants in the country and strikes of workingmen in the cities.

Revolution was precipitated by decrees of the autocratic government, on March 11, 1917, that Petrograd strikers should return to work and that the recently reassembled Duma should

again go home. The strikers refused to obey and won over to their side the soldiers whom the government relied upon to suppress them; they then formed a revolutionary "soviet [or council] of soldiers and workingmen." The Duma likewise refused to obey, and its president despatched a telegram to the Tsar, imploring him to name a new and liberal ministry. On March 15, a deputation from the Duma waited on the Tsar at Pskov and convinced him that he must abdicate. Abdicate he forthwith did in favor of his brother, the Grand-Duke Michael. But already it was too late for any member of the imperial Romanov family to command the revolutionaries, and Michael declined to assume the crown.

Abdication of Tsar Nicholas II

By agreement between the Duma and the Petrograd Soviet, a provisional government had been established on March 14, 1917, under the chairmanship of Prince George Lvov, a liberal landlord, head of the Union of Zemstvos, and member of the Constitutional Democratic party. It at once proclaimed freedom of association, of the press, and of religion. It liberated thousands of political prisoners and removed the ban on political exiles. It restored full autonomy to Finland and promised to extend it to Poland. It announced that a National Constituent Assembly would shortly be elected by universal manhood suffrage to determine the permanent form of Russia's future government. Simultaneously it labored to infuse new energy into Russia's conduct of the war.

There was rejoicing in the countries allied with Russia and in the United States. Russia, it was popularly believed, would fight harder and more effectively now that she was overthrowing autocracy and becoming democratic. The struggle against the Central Empires would henceforth be, as President Wilson declared, "a war to make the world safe for democracy."

Allied Offensives

In March, when the Russian Revolution occurred, the British administered a stinging defeat to the Turks in Mesopotamia and captured the important city of Bagdad. In April, when the United States entered the war, General Robert Nivelle, who had succeeded General Joffre as commander-in-chief of the French armies, opened a fierce offensive against the German trenches on the Western Front along the Aisne River. Simultaneously, elaborate preparations were made for an offensive in the Balkans on the part of the Allied army at

Salonica, now commanded by General Sarrail and comprising 600,000 men. To ensure that the pro-German King of Greece would not embarrass this offensive, an Anglo-French naval expedition was despatched to Athens; in June, it obliged Constantine to abdicate and quit the country and installed the pro-Ally Venizelos as Greek premier under the purely nominal rule of Constantine's youthful second son, Alexander I. In the meantime, the United States persuaded Panama and Cuba to declare war on Germany (April 1917). Siam followed suit in July, and Liberia and China in August. The whole world seemed to be arraying itself on the side of the Allies.

With American intervention and the Russian Revolution to the fore, and with the German army on the defensive, awaiting the outcome of the submarine campaign, it was not surprising that a wave of popular pacifism—or "defeatism"—swept over Germany. Early in 1916 the German Social Democrats had split into two factions, the majority, under Friedrich Ebert and Philip Scheidemann, continuing to support the government in the prosecution of the war, and the minority, under Hugo Haase and Eduard Bernstein, refusing to approve of further military expenditure.[1] Now, early in 1917, the majority joined the minority in counselling peace and urging democratic reform within Germany, and to the pacifist agitation of the Socialists was added that of the Catholic Centre party. Against this agitation Hindenburg and Ludendorff were adamant. They countered it by promising German victory in the submarine warfare and eventually on the Western Front; and in July they forced the Emperor William II to dismiss the Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, whom they accused of being too conciliatory to the Socialists and Centrists, and to appoint in his place a conservative bureaucrat who would be a mere agent of the army chiefs. But even with the backing of Hindenburg and Ludendorff, the new Chancellor could not prevent the Centrists and Socialists from putting through the Reichstag in July 1917 a resolution requesting the government to make peace on the basis of "no annexations, no indemnities."

Defeatism in Germany

[1] A third and smaller group of German Socialists, led by Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, were even more radical. Known as "Spartacans," they denounced the war and advocated the establishment of "a dictatorship of the proletariat." Their leaders were jailed by the German government.

Nor was the internal situation in the Habsburg Empire reassuring. Already, mutinies were occurring in Czech, Croatian, and Polish regiments of the Austro-Hungarian armies, and presently some of their soldiers deserted to the Allies, while "provisional governments" of the several disaffected nationalities were set up at Paris or London. In July 1917, on the Greek island of Corfu, representatives of the Austro-Hungarian Yugoslavs (Croats, Slovenes, and Serbs) signed with Nicholas Pašič, the premier of Serbia, a formal "declaration" of their joint purpose to create at the close of the war a unified democratic state with King Peter of Serbia as their common sovereign.

Disaffection in Austria

In the circumstances, seemingly auspicious for a general peace settlement, Pope Benedict XV on August 1, 1917, called upon the warring countries to end "the fratricidal conflict" and to negotiate "a just and durable" peace. He proposed the substitution in international affairs of the "moral force of right" for the "material force of arms," the restoration of all conquered territories, and the mutual cancelation of claims to indemnity, a guaranty of the freedom of the seas, provision for the future adjustment of international disputes by arbitration, a decrease in armaments, and a conciliatory settlement, involving plebiscites if necessary, of rival claims to such territories as Alsace-Lorraine, Poland, and Trentino. By August 1917, however, neither group of belligerents was willing to listen to papal admonitions. The war was at a crisis. German hope of victory had recently risen again with the progress of the U-boat campaign and with the firm and reassuring attitude of Hindenburg and Ludendorff. And the Allies were more than ever reluctant to negotiate with Germany, now dominated by a High Command which was committed to territorial annexations. President Wilson replied to the Pope, in behalf of "the Allied and Associated Powers," that peace could not be made with such a régime as Germany's. The war must continue.

Papal Peace Proposals, 1917

Reviving German Hopes, 1917–1918

Back in April, the French offensive on the Aisne had broken down, with terrible losses, and the luckless General Nivelle was supplanted as commander-in-chief of the French armies by General Pétain, with General Foch as his chief of staff. The Allies were barely holding their own

Failure of Allied Offensives

on the Western Front. Nor was the elaborately prepared offensive in the Balkans, under General Sarrail, any more successful.

While the Central Empires were holding their military conquests on the Continent, Germany was prosecuting her submarine campaign with considerable success. From January to June 1917, German submarines sank nearly four million tons of Allied shipping. If this amount could be doubled during the second half of 1917, Germany, it was recognized, would be enabled to starve out England and also to prevent the transportation of American troops to France.

Submarine Menace

America did her utmost, after declaring war on Germany, to aid the Allies. She increased her taxes and floated huge "liberty loans," from the proceeds of which she made liberal financial grants to the Allies. She speeded up her production of munitions and other war supplies. She conscripted four million young men and prepared them for active service. She joined her naval forces to those of Great Britain, and constructed hundreds of new transports for conveying soldiers and supplies to Europe. But the doing of all these things took time. It was estimated that at least a year must elapse before the full weight of America's participation in the World War could be felt. In the meantime the German submarine warfare threatened to nullify it completely.

Delay in American Aid

In the circumstances, pacifism, or "defeatism," passed from the Central Empires to some of the Allied countries. In France, several bankers and politicians worked to bring about an early peace with Germany on the basis of mutual concessions, and, paralleling their conferences and intrigues, pacifist agitation spread among the French populace and produced serious mutinies in the French army. In Italy, a similar "defeatist" movement gathered even greater headway during the summer of 1917 and threatened to undermine the morale of the Italian army.

Defeatism in France and Italy

In Russia, "defeatism" grew rapidly and most alarmingly. As the event proved, the high expectation popularly entertained in France, Britain, and America of the help which the Russian Revolution of March 1917 would be to them was quite unjustified. Most Russian soldiers were much more concerned with getting something for themselves from the provisional government at home than with waging a foreign war;

In Russia

and the provisional government, though anxious to continue the war, was unable to agree upon a generally acceptable program of internal reforms or to resist the importunities of the rapidly spreading "soviets of soldiers, workers, and peasants." In May the conservative Prince Lvov resigned, and was succeeded by a radical, Alexander Kerensky.

This change in the personnel of the Russian government did not silence the destructive criticism or halt the subversive activity of the extreme Socialists, the "Bolsheviks" or "Communists." [1] These, astutely led by Lenin, who had returned from exile in Switzerland under safe conduct from the German government, and by Leon Trotsky, who had returned similarly from America, preached the doctrine that the Revolution should make no compromise with capitalism and the bourgeoisie, that a dictatorship of the proletariat must be established by the Bolsheviks alone, and that the cessation of foreign war was a necessary condition for accomplishing any real domestic reforms. Lenin and Trotsky gradually acquired great influence over the Petrograd Soviet and over other soviets. A large part of the industrial proletariat was soon converted to enthusiastic support of the Bolshevik program, and a multitude of peasants in the armies at the front, if a bit hazy about the economic philosophy of the Communists, were ready to acclaim any group which promised to take them out of the trenches and let them go home. Such readiness on the part of Russian soldiers was quickened, moreover, by propaganda which German agents spread along the Eastern Front.

In vain Kerensky begged the Allies to consent to a general peace "without annexations or indemnities." In vain he labored to combat both Bolshevik and German propaganda, and to restore the discipline of the faltering Russian armies. In vain he launched a desperate offensive, in July, 1917, against the Austrians and Germans. Russian troops mutinied. The Austrians recovered all of Galicia. The Germans captured Riga and penetrated into Estonia. In vain, Kerensky turned to the "Right" and schemed for the establishment of a military dictatorship; he and the army chiefs could not agree upon the dictator, and none of them was sufficiently daring to strike. In vain he turned to the "Left" and promised speedy reforms within Russia. Kerensky was a weak and wordy man, but a much

Collapse of Russian Armies

[1] On the various groups of "Socialists" in Russia, see above, pp. 479–480.

stronger man would have had difficulty in counteracting Bolshevik agitation and in making the Russian masses fight when they would not fight. In November 1917 a second revolution occurred in Russia. Kerensky's "provisional government" was overthrown, and Lenin at the head of the Communists took charge of affairs.[1]

Communist Revolution, Nov. 1917

One of the first acts of the Communist régime was to agree to a truce with the Central Empires; and in March 1918, after protracted wrangling and practically at the point of the victor's bayonet, a peace treaty was signed at Brest-Litovsk by Russia on one side, and by Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and the Ottoman Empire on the other. It practically involved a German partition of the Russian Empire. Poland, Lithuania, and the Latvian province of Courland were ceded outright to Germany (and Austria). Bessarabia was entrusted to the Central Empires for transference to Rumania, and Armenian districts south of the Caucasus were surrendered to the Ottoman Empire. Finland, Estonia, the Latvian province of Livonia, and the huge area of the Ukraine ("Little Russia") were detached from Russia and recognized as "independent" states.

Russia Out of War: Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, March 1918

Rumania, completely isolated by the collapse and defection of Russia, felt obliged to sue for peace and to agree to a treaty which the Central Empires imposed upon her at Bucharest in the same month of March 1918. Thereby Rumania yielded Dobruja to Bulgaria and certain mountain passes on the Hungarian frontier to the Dual Monarchy; and in return for her promise of close coöperation with Germany and Austria, she was promised Bessarabia.

Rumania Out of War

With the surrender of Russia and Rumania, German might was unquestionably paramount throughout central and eastern Europe.. The areas appropriated from Russia were administered as dependencies of Germany, which was thus relieved of the necessity of maintaining an eastern battle front and enabled to devote undivided efforts to the task of crushing resistance of Italians, French, and British in the West. "Defeatism" ceased to disturb the German government. The German people as a whole seemed to forget the slogan

Germany's Will to Victory

[1] On the Russian Revolution of November 1917 and its domestic consequences, see below, pp. 669–686.

of "no annexations and no indemnities" and to rally behind Generals Hindenburg and Ludendorff with renewed enthusiasm for "victory and conquest first, peace afterwards."

In October 1917 Austro-Hungarian armies, taking advantage of the prostration of Russia and the development of "defeatism" among the enemy, undertook to put Italy out of the war. They overwhelmed a demoralized Italian army at Caporetto and compelled the rapid retirement of all the Italian forces from Austrian soil back into Italy as far as the Piave River, close to Venice. Only Austrian inability to bring up arms and supplies necessary for pursuit and the prompt coöperation of France and Great Britain permitted the Italians to reform their lines and to cling to the Piave.

Italian Defeat at Caporetto

Throughout the winter of 1917–1918, while German diplomats were negotiating peace with Russia and Rumania, General Ludendorff was making gigantic preparations for a supreme German military effort against the Allied armies in France. All available troops were concentrated on the Western Front. All available machine-guns and ammunition were brought hither. The biggest cannon (the so-called "Big Berthas") were put in place to shell Paris at a distance of sixty miles. All was made ready for a series of assaults surpassing any that the world had ever known.

Supreme German Effort in West

In March 1918 the Germans smote the British trenches in the valley of the Somme, near St. Quentin, and ploughed a path through to Amiens. In April, they hit the British west of Lille and advanced some fifteen miles. In May, they assailed the French along the Aisne and fought their way southward across the intervening hills to the Marne River, reaching Château-Thierry, only about forty miles from Paris. These furious "drives" and sledge-hammer blows netted Germany considerable territory and much booty of prisoners and guns and served to restore the Western Front approximately as it had been in 1914 on the eve of the battle of the Marne. Nevertheless, they were supremely expensive, for they were attended by awful devastation and by a frightful loss of life of Frenchmen and Britishers and of Germans also.

In June 1918 the Austrians made a desperate attempt to supplement the German "drives" in France by assailing the Italian front along the Piave. They crossed the river at several

points, and at one place advanced five miles. But the Italians rallied and dislodged them with heavy losses. This failure of the Austrians on the Piave marked the turn of the tide. Military successes of the Central Empires ceased, and the final triumph of the Allies began.

Supreme Austrian Effort

5. THE TRIUMPH OF THE ALLIES, 1918

Despite the collapse of Russia, the submission of Rumania, and the forced retirement of the Italians to the Piave and of the French to the Marne, the Central Empires were not winning the World War. Allied resistance was stiffening in Italy, in France, and on the high seas. The governments of the Allied Great Powers were displaying a greater energy than ever before, and their peoples were evincing anew a firm determination to achieve "peace through victory." What was most decisive, the German submarine warfare was proving ineffectual.

Previously there had been much bungling by cabinet ministers in Allied countries and notorious lack of coöperation on the part of Allied generals. As early as December 1916 the British government had been reformed and put into the competent hands of David Lloyd George. Then, in November 1917, after the disaster at Caporetto, the Italian ministry was reorganized, with Vittorio Orlando as premier and practical dictator. Simultaneously, the French government passed into the active hands of Georges Clemenceau, the veteran politician of the "Radical" Left and a very determined person. And in Woodrow Wilson the United States had a president distinguished equally for his vigor in pressing the war and for his eloquence in sustaining popular morale.

Strengthening of Allied Governments

In November 1917 a Supreme Allied War Council was created to coördinate the military efforts of France, Great Britain, Italy, and the United States; and in March 1918, in the midst of the furious German drives on the Western Front, the Allied Great Powers at last agreed to entrust to one man the central direction of their military operations in France. For this responsible post, Marshal Ferdinand Foch, a short, grizzled, deep-eyed Frenchman of sixty-five, the foremost military genius of the time, was selected. To Foch were subordinated the French armies under Marshal Pétain and the British under Sir Douglas Haig. Thus in the fourth year

Marshal Foch

of the war the Allies finally achieved a real coördination of command.

There can be little doubt that popular morale in Allied countries was heightened, as that in the Central Empires was gradually lowered, by the idealistic utterances of Woodrow Wilson. In one of his most famous speeches, in January 1918, he appealed to world sentiment to back the Allied war aims, which, he declared, consisted of "fourteen points": (1) open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, and in the future no secret diplomacy; (2) absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war, except when the seas are closed by general international agreement; (3) removal, as far as possible, of all economic barriers to international trade; (4) reduction of national armaments; (5) impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, with the interests of the subject populations receiving equal weight with the government seeking title; (6) evacuation of Russian territory, with full opportunity for Russia to determine her own future development; (7) evacuation and restoration of Belgium; (8) evacuation and restoration of French territory, and righting of the wrong done in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine; (9) readjustment of Italian frontiers along clearly recognizable lines of nationality; (10) autonomous development for the peoples of Austria-Hungary; (11) evacuation and restoration of Serbia, Montenegro, and Rumania, with an outlet to the sea for Serbia and with interrelations of the several Balkan states according to historically established lines of allegiance and nationality; (12) secure sovereignty for the Turkish portions of the Ottoman Empire, with autonomy for other portions and with freedom of shipping through the Straits; (13) establishment of an independent Poland, including all territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, and having access to the sea; (14) formation of a general association of nations under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guaranties of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike. These "fourteen points," though vague in general and ambiguous in detail, elicited the hearty approval and stimulated the hopes of multitudes, not only in America, Britain, France, and Italy, but also among the "subject nationalities" of the Austrian and Ottoman Empires. Even in the German Empire, a growing number of

Wilson's Fourteen Points

people read into Wilson's words a promise that if only they would democratize their country it would be let off easily.

Most significant, the submarine campaign was not bringing Germany the speedy victory which Hindenburg and Ludendorff had predicted. By virtue of the vigilance of the British and American navies and the convoy and patrol systems which they jointly developed, the destruction of Allied shipping by German submarines gradually declined. The tonnage destroyed in the first half of 1917 was four million; in the second half of 1917, two and a quarter million; and in the first half of 1918, less than two million. Meanwhile, shipbuilding was being pushed so rapidly that in 1918 newly launched merchant vessels far exceeded in tonnage old ones destroyed. England, therefore, was not starved out by Germany, nor were the oceanic communications of the Allies seriously interfered with. On the other hand, Great Britain, with the active coöperation of the United States, drastically tightened the "blockade" of German ports and starved Germany to a degree never felt or anticipated before her submarine effort. Meanwhile the United States was contributing men and money to the Allies, and was persuading still other nations to make common cause with them. Brazil declared war on Germany in October 1917; Guatemala, in April 1918; Nicaragua, in May; and Haiti and Honduras in July. By the summer of 1918 the four states of the Mid-European Confederacy were confronted with a hostile coalition of twenty-five independent nations [1] and five "dominions," [2] representing every continent and most of the islands of the world.

Waning of Submarine Menace

Most of World with Allies

In June 1918 military successes of the Central Empires on the Continent of Europe ceased. Austria-Hungary was exhausted by her desperate "drive" against the Italians on the Piave. Germany was halted by the British on the Somme and by the French at the Marne, and no reserves of man-power were left her to withstand the hundreds of thousands of American soldiers who were beginning to reënforce the Allied armies in France.

Passing of Offensive to Allies

In July, when the Germans attempted to cross the Marne,

[1] Four of these—Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, and Uruguay—broke off diplomatic relations with Germany in 1917 but did not participate actively in the War.

[2] Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and India.

Marshal Foch called fresh American troops to the assistance of his French and British veterans and gave battle. The resulting "second battle of the Marne" was a deadly two weeks' combat



THE ALLIED ADVANCE, JULY–NOVEMBER 1918

I July 18–August 7
II August 8–October 10
III October 10–November 1
IV November 2–November 11

and an Allied triumph. Not only was the German advance definitively stopped, but the French drove the enemy back northward across the Aisne River. To the Germans the second battle of the Marne, in 1918, was far more disastrous than the first battle of the Marne in 1914. In 1914 the Germans, with superior artillery and greater

Second Battle of Marne, July 1918

stores of ammunition, could entrench themselves on the heights of the Aisne and successfully resist the counter-attacks of the French. In 1918, however, they had no such advantage. They were unable to repair the damage done, and they were helplessly inferior to the Allies in numbers and equipment.

The Allies, flushed with victory and guided by the master-hand of Marshal Foch, did not fail to follow up their success at the Marne. Relentlessly they hammered at the German trenches everywhere in France. While Franco-British armies recaptured Cambrai and Lille, Franco-American armies drove the Germans from St. Mihiel, south of Verdun, and cleared the ground northward in the Argonne along the Meuse River. By the end of October 1918 the Germans were crowded almost completely out of France and compelled to evacuate a large part of Belgium.

German Expulsion from France and Belgium

Allied military success was not confined to the Western Front. Already in October 1917 the British army which had previously advanced from Egypt and defeated the Turks in the Sinai peninsula, penetrated victoriously into Palestine under the command of General Edmund Allenby and in coöperation with the Arab forces of Feisal and Captain Lawrence. Turkish resistance, organized and conducted by the German General von Falkenhayn, was stubborn but ineffectual. Jaffa fell to the British in November, and Jerusalem in December. The British and Arabs then overran all Palestine, secured the country east of the Jordan, and advanced into Syria. At the beginning of October 1918 they captured Damascus, and by the end of the month they were in possession of Aleppo and prepared to effect a juncture at Mosul with the Anglo-Indian (and Arab) army in Mesopotamia.

British-Arab Triumph in Near East

Meanwhile, in September 1918 the composite Allied army at Salonica, newly reënforced and put under the command of General Franchet d'Espérey, struck out northward into the Balkan peninsula against the Bulgarians. The Bulgarian army no longer had the support of Austrian and German divisions, and its protracted inaction in Macedonia had lowered its morale. Consequently the vigorous Allied offensive from Salonica produced sudden and decisive results. Within two weeks, Macedonia and Serbia were recovered, and the Allies were ready to subjugate Bulgaria.

Allied Triumph in Macedonia

Almost simultaneously, the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary collapsed. Encouraged by Allied victories in the Balkans and by German defeats in the West, the Czech and Yugoslav deputies in the Austrian parliament publicly proclaimed on October 1, 1918, the absolute right of their respective peoples to national self-determination. On October 18 the formal declaration of the independence of the "Czechoslovak Republic" was issued by a "provisional government" headed by Thomas Masaryk, an outstanding Czech scholar and patriot. Eleven days later the Croatian Diet voted to break its ties with Hungary and to join Serbia in creating a national union of all the Yugoslavs. Nor were the Austro-Hungarian armies in any position to oppose such revolts in Croatia and Bohemia. The victorious Allied army of General Franchet D'Espérey threatened Hungary from the south. The Rumanians, tearing up the humiliating treaty of Bucharest which they had signed with the Central Empires in March, resumed hostilities and invaded Hungary from the east. The Italians, under General Diaz, drove the Austrians in disorder from the Piave and pursued them into Istria.

Collapse of Habsburg Empire

Revolt of Czechs and Croats

The confederacy of the Central Empires, which had stood like a granite fortress for four years, was finally crumbling. Its armies were defeated and demoralized. Its generals were discredited. Its monarchs and statesmen were panic-stricken. Its peoples were clamoring for peace. Bulgaria, the last to join the confederacy, was the first to quit it. She surrendered unconditionally to the Allies on September 30, 1918. A month later, both the Ottoman Empire and the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary followed suit. Germany was left to end the World War as best she could.

Surrender of Germany's Confederates

Already, in August 1918, General Ludendorff had told William II that the war was lost, and at the end of September, prostrated by the news of Bulgaria's surrender, he besought the Emperor to make peace immediately. The Emperor responded by appointing a new and liberal Chancellor, Prince Maximilian of Baden, and instructing him to negotiate with the Allies. Prince Maximilian appealed to the President of the United States to mediate, and Wilson, reiterating his contention that the imperial régime in Germany could not be trusted, practically called for an internal

Peace Counsels in Germany

revolution. Ludendorff, outraged by the prospect of revolution more than by that of carnage at the battle front, then begged William II to dismiss Prince Maximilian and go on with the war. But the Emperor knew that to go on would mean certain revolution, and when he gave no heed to the General's impassioned pleas, Ludendorff angrily resigned and retired to Sweden. For once, Hindenburg, the nominal commander of the German armies, refused to follow his mentor, and remained at the front.

After a month's interchange of notes between Prince Maximilian and President Wilson, the Allies agreed to make peace on the basis of the "fourteen points," subject to reservations on the freedom of the seas and the fate of Austria-Hungary and to an explicit pledge of German reparation "for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allies." On this basis an armistice was signed on November 11, 1918, between Germany and the Allies, but by this time revolutionary agitation and naval and military mutinies within Germany had brought about the downfall of the imperial government of William II and Prince Maximilian and the succession of a republican and socialist government. It was consequently this latter government which signed the armistice of November 11.

Armistice of Nov. 1918

In accordance with the armistice, the Allies occupied the left bank of the Rhine, the French establishing themselves in Alsace-Lorraine and at Mainz, the Americans at Coblenz, and the British and Belgians at Cologne. To the Allies, furthermore, Germany surrendered all her battleships and submarines and great numbers of guns, locomotives, motor lorries, and railway cars. The Mid-European Confederacy was broken and disarmed. Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and the Ottoman Empire lay prostrate at the feet of the triumphant Allies.

The armistice of November 11, 1918, brought an immediate sense of relief and exhilaration to the whole world. The horrible blood-letting of four years and more, with all its attendant havoc, suffering, and misery, was at last halted. Permanent peace might now be made, and the delayed millennium of optimistic progressives finally achieved.

Formal peace was made, but it ushered in no millennium. What the World War and the ensuing peace settlement actually did was to disillusion a vast number of Europeans and to stimulate pessimism rather than optimism. As we now look back on the first

two decades of the twentieth century, we perceive that the World War—its antecedents, its course, its immediate consequences—marked the end of one historic era and the beginning of another. It ushered in a different Europe, and a different world, politically, economically, and intellectually.

Emergence of a Different Europe

It could hardly be otherwise. Continuity of thought and habit and of steady advance along rutted roads of past achievement could not be maintained in the midst of events as cataclysmic and universal as those of the World War. The World War was waged by thirty nations, including every one of the so-called Great Powers. Sixty-five million men bore arms in it. Eight and a half million men were killed. Twenty-nine million men were wounded, captured, or "missing." Every family in eastern and central Europe, every family in Italy, France, and the huge British Empire, and many families in America suffered loss of near relatives or close friends. The direct financial cost of the World War has been estimated at over two hundred billion dollars; its indirect cost, at over a hundred and fifty billion dollars more; and these figures do not include the additional billions in interest payments, veterans' care and pensions, and similar expenses with which the world was saddled after the war. Never had there been a struggle so gigantic, so deadly and costly.

Magnitude of World War

CHAPTER XXV

AFTERMATH OF THE WORLD WAR

I. THE REVOLUTIONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE

THE military disaster which befell the Mid-European Confederacy in the autumn of 1918 was the signal for immediate political revolutions within its members. The revolutions, though precipitated in several instances by Socialists, proved to be uniformly mild, and more conducive to democratic nationalism than to any basic social change.

Revolution in Germany

In Germany, Prince Maximilian, the Chancellor on whom the Emperor William II imposed the unpleasant task of opening peace negotiations with the Allies, sought to allay domestic unrest by promising in October a number of constitutional reforms. But the more he promised in the way of reform, the louder grew the demands for an overturn of the whole monarchical régime, and to such demands the counsel of the American President, Woodrow Wilson, gave point and cogency. On October 28 a naval mutiny occurred at Kiel, and on the next day the Emperor hurried from Berlin to military headquarters at Spa, imagining that the army would safeguard alike his person and his throne.

Within a week, almost every city in the German Empire witnessed Socialist rioting and the formation of revolutionary "workers' councils." On November 8, amid disorders at Munich, Bavaria was proclaimed a "democratic and socialist republic," with Kurt Eisner, a left-wing Socialist, as president. In vain Chancellor Maximilian begged William II to save the Hohenzollern dynasty by abdicating in favor of his infant grandson. The Emperor, relying on the army, was deaf to the Chancellor, and by the time the high military officers (including Hindenburg) reluctantly informed him that even the army was seething with sedition and could not be relied upon, there was no longer a

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friendly Chancellor to advise him. In the night of November 9–10 William II ingloriously took flight across the frontier into the Netherlands. The history of the German Empire of the Hohenzollerns was thus almost exclusively the history of two reigns—that of William the First (1871–1888), under whom the Empire had been reared in might, and that of William the Last (1888–1918), under whom it fell with a fearful crash.

Flight of William II, Nov. 1918

Already, on November 9, 1918, Prince Maximilian of Baden had felt obliged to turn over the Chancellorship to a Socialist, Friedrich Ebert, and presently, under the latter's guidance, a "Council of People's Commissars" was installed at Berlin in imitation of the contemporary revolutionary administration in Russia. But though Ebert and his fellow Socialists in Germany were willing to borrow nomenclature from the Russian Bolsheviks, they had no serious thought of adopting their policies. Only a small group of German Socialists —the so-called "Spartacans"—were in full sympathy with the Russian Communists and eager to emulate them in a violent exercise of proletarian dictatorship. The major groups, on the other hand—those that shared in the provisional government—were too anxious for national regeneration to countenance civil war, and too devoted to democracy to favor any dictatorship, even of themselves.

Socialists in Charge

The "moderation" of the Socialists was supported by the Catholic Centre party, led by Mathias Erzberger, and also by the Progressives and left-wing National Liberals, newly fused into a Democratic party. It thus transpired that the three political organizations—Progressive, Centrist, and Social Democratic—which had repeatedly united in opposition to illiberal policies of the Hohenzollern Empire,[1] now joined anew to supplant the Empire with a liberal democratic republic. Against this republican *bloc* were arrayed a Royalist "Right" and a Communist "Left." The "Right" comprised the former Conservative and Free Conservative parties, now reorganized as the Nationalist party and intent upon the restoration of monarchy, and the more moderate group of right-wing National Liberals who, under the leadership of Gustav Stresemann, a wealthy industrialist, assumed the title of "Ger-

German Parties and the Revolution

[1] See above, pp. 443–447, 455–456.

man People's party" and, while preferring monarchy, expressed a willingness to collaborate with republicans. The "Left" was composed of Liebknecht's Spartacans, who refused to participate with the "bourgeoisie" in the election of a Constituent Assembly and preached popular insurrection.

In January 1919, on the eve of the elections, the Spartacans staged a revolutionary demonstration at Berlin, but their leaders were more adept at talking than at acting and the attempted insurrection was sternly suppressed. In the following month the assassination of Kurt Eisner, the radical socialist president of Bavaria, gave rise to fresh disorders, which, however, were firmly dealt with by the central government.

Suppression of Extremists

Meanwhile a Constituent Assembly was elected by secret ballot of all Germans over twenty years of age, men and women alike; and on February 6 it met at Weimar. Its overwhelming majority was composed of Socialists, Centrists, and Democrats, and these jointly directed its constructive work—its ratification of the peace treaty with the Allies in June 1919 and its adoption of a constitution at the end of July for the future government of the country.[1] Ebert was elected first constitutional president of the republic, and another Socialist, Scheidemann, was appointed its first chancellor.

Weimar Assembly, 1919

By August 1919 it seemed as if the German revolution was successfully accomplished. The Hohenzollern Empire was ended and a democratic Republic inaugurated with comparatively little bloodshed and with the backing of a large majority of the popular electorate. There were many differences of aim and policy among the groups composing the victorious coalition. But for the time being, at any rate, democratic republicanism was allowed to function in Germany.

German Republic

In the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary, the revolution of 1918–1919 was not only democratic but disruptive. In vain the Emperor-King Charles I published a conciliatory manifesto on October 16, 1918, promising to reorganize the monarchy on a federal basis so that each of its nationalities would possess democratic autonomy. By this time it was too late for compromise. Leaders of the subject nationalities were resolved on achieving a separation from the

Revolution in Austria-Hungary

[1] On the Weimar Constitution of 1919, see below, p. 655.


1. ITALY
2. YUGOSLAVIA
3. RUMANIA
4. POLAND
THE BREAK UP OF THE HABSBURG EMPIRE
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
AUSTRIA
HUNGARY
1
2
3
4
New boundaries are drawn in broken lines

Habsburg Empire, and the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian armies removed the one means which Charles might have employed to enforce obedience.

On October 18, a group of Czech patriots, including Thomas Masaryk and Eduard Benes, proclaimed at Paris the deposition of Charles of Habsburg as King of Bohemia and the independence of the "Czechoslovakian Republic." Ten days later, a self-constituted Czech "national council" took over the government at Prague, and the next day a similar "national council" in the Slovak provinces of Hungary voted for a union of the Slovaks with the Czechs in a unified "Czechoslovakia." A national assembly was speedily convened at Prague. In November it ratified what had been done and chose Masaryk as president of the Republic, with Benes as foreign minister, and eventually in February 1920, after protracted debates, it adopted a democratic constitution.

Czecho-slovak Republic

The southern Slavs of Austria-Hungary revolted simultaneously with the Czechs and Slovaks in the north. On October 29, 1918, the Croatian Diet proclaimed the deposition of Charles of Habsburg and the separation of the "kingdom of Croatia and Dalmatia" from Hungary. Authority was then transferred to a revolutionary Yugoslav Congress, to which representatives were admitted from Bosnia-Herzegovina and likewise from the Slovene province of Carniola; and on November 23, in accordance with the earlier Declaration of Corfu,[1] the Congress voted to incorporate all the Yugoslav territories of Austria-Hungary with the independent state of Serbia in a "Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes." Of the new kingdom—really a Greater Serbia—King Peter of Serbia assumed the kingship in December, with his son Alexander as regent and with a ministry headed by the veteran Serbian politician, Nicholas Pašič. Against the Yugoslav union, Austria-Hungary was powerless. Only King Nicholas of Montenegro attempted to oppose it. But his little country was quickly occupied by Serbian troops and subjected to the new régime.

Yugoslav Union with Serbia

The Poles of Austrian Galicia likewise seceded from the Habsburg Empire and joined the Poles of Prussia and Russia in establishing a national state. In this they were unexpectedly aided by the military reverses of all their "oppressors," not

[1] See above, p. 610.

only Austria and Germany but also Russia. In the early stages of the World War, Polish patriots had been divided on the question of tactics. One group, represented by the celebrated musician Ignace Paderewski, hoped for an Allied victory, imagining that the defeat of Austria and Germany would force them to surrender their respective Polish provinces and that victorious France and Britain would persuade their Russian ally to grant autonomy if not complete independence to reunited Poland. Another and larger group, taking their cue from a soldier and "radical," Joseph Pilsudski, were not so sanguine of Allied victory or of Russian altruism or Franco-British benevolence. Mindful that Austria had treated her Polish subjects better than Russia had treated hers, they thought that their immediate task was to assist the Central Powers in conquering Russian Poland and uniting it with Austrian Poland. Consequently, while Paderewski was issuing pro-Allied propaganda and currying favor with French and British statesmen, General Pilsudski had organized a Polish legion and fought on the side of the Central Powers.

Resurrection of Poland

Paderewski and Pilsudski

Fortunately for the Polish nation, the conflicting efforts of Pilsudski and Paderewski were both crowned with success. Pilsudski had the satisfaction of witnessing the Russian military débâcle of 1915–1916 and of securing from the Austrian and German Emperors a joint pledge, on November 5, 1916, that they would create an "independent" kingdom of Poland, "a national state with an hereditary monarch and a constitutional government," in "intimate relations" with their own realms. Whereupon, a "regency" was set up at Warsaw, and by the treaty of Brest-Litovsk, in March 1918, Russia formally renounced all claim to Poland.

By this time, however, Pilsudski was becoming disillusioned about the magnanimity of the Central Powers. For it was quite clear that in their hour of triumph over Russia they had no intention of bestowing real independence on Russian Poland or of joining their Polish provinces to it. So Pilsudski turned against the Germans and was duly imprisoned by them, while Paderewski had the satisfaction of knowing that at last his own pro-Allied efforts would command the united support of the whole Polish people. During 1918 Austrian Galicia, as well as Prussian Posen, was rife with Polish sedition, and Polish volunteers joined the

Allied armies in increasing numbers. With the triumph of the Allies and the pledges of Woodrow Wilson, Poland's final deliverance was at hand.

The deliverance came in the midst of the revolution throughout central Europe. When the Dual Monarchy collapsed, Galicia naturally gravitated toward "independent" Poland; and when Germany surrendered, the Poles of Posen, West Prussia, and Upper Silesia moved in the same direction. Pilsudski, released from his German jail, arrived in Warsaw in November 1918 and took over from the Austro-German Regency the provisional government of the country. Then, in January 1919, with himself as president and Paderewski as premier and minister of foreign affairs, a Constituent Assembly was elected by universal suffrage.

Polish Republic

The revolutionary emergence of a united and independent Poland thus synchronized with the attainment of political unity and freedom by Czechoslovakia and by Yugoslavia, and also with Rumania's forceful appropriation of Bessarabia from Russia, Transylvania from Hungary, and Bukovina from Austria. The national unification of the Rumanian-speaking peoples was an important phase of the general revolutionary movement and of the attendant disintegration of the Habsburg Empire.

Rumanian Annexations

Simultaneously the two cores of the Dual Monarchy—Magyar Hungary and German Austria—were revolutionized. In Hungary, Count Michael Károlyi, who, despite aristocratic ancestry and great wealth, was a chronic critic of the existing illiberal and monarchist régime, put himself at the head of a "provisional government" on October 24–25, 1918. Two weeks later he proclaimed Hungary an independent republic, with himself as governor, pledged to democratize the country and to redress the grievances of its subject nationalities. Károlyi's government soon encountered extraordinary difficulties. The subject nationalities would not recognize it, and it was unable to prevent the secession of the Croats and Slovaks or to resist the occupation of Transylvania by a Rumanian army.

Károlyi's Hungarian Republic

In March 1919, when it became clear that the Allies meant to back the aggrandizement of Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia at Hungary's expense, Károlyi resigned the government into the hands of a left-wing Socialist and Jewish journalist,

Béla Kun's Communist Dictatorship

Béla Kun by name, who had recently returned from Russia where, as a prisoner of war, he had acquired a fanatical enthusiasm for Communism. Béla Kun at once proclaimed a "dictatorship of the proletariat" in Hungary and feverishly proceeded to rain Communist decrees upon the Magyars and at the same time to employ force against the revolting nationalities. He organized a "red army" and despatched it in turn against the Slovaks and against the Rumanians. Against the former, he obtained a temporary success. But against the Rumanian army, the ragged and ill-equipped forces of Communist Hungary could not stand. As the Rumanians advanced on Budapest and domestic plots thickened against him, Béla Kun in terror fled on August 1, 1919, into Austria, where he found refuge in a mad-house. Budapest was occupied by Rumanian troops throughout the autumn of 1919, while control of the internal affairs of Hungary passed to a group of aristocrats, including Admiral Nicholas Horthy and Count Stephen Bethlen. Following the withdrawal of the Rumanian army, a general election was held in Hungary in January 1920, with results favorable to the reactionaries. Admiral Horthy was immediately made "Regent," and in April 1921 Count Bethlen began what proved to be a ten-year term as premier and practical dictator.

Reaction in Hungary

Meanwhile, Vienna was the scene of a revolution. Here, on October 30, 1918, in the midst of military collapse and governmental paralysis, and at the very time when the disintegration of the Empire was reducing "Austria" to its original German provinces, mobs of workingmen and students inaugurated a series of demonstrations which rapidly grew in size and in determination to have done with the Habsburgs. The Emperor Charles knew that he was powerless to stem the tide. He was ruined by the World War which he had not made and by circumstances over which he had little control. Young, well-intentioned, and amiable, his respectable personal qualities were no proof against the vast elemental forces which took his ancestral realm from him and left him the unenviable fame of being the last of the Habsburg Emperors. On November 11, 1918, Charles abdicated.[1]

Revolution of 1918 at Vienna

Abdication of Emperor Charles

[1] In March 1919 he took up his abode in Switzerland. Subsequently, when pro-

The "provisional government" of the "national German state of Austria" was already constituted by mutual agreement among the leaders of the Social Democratic, Christian Socialist, and Nationalist parties, and on November 12 it proclaimed Austria a republic. In the following February a Constituent Assembly was elected by universal suffrage, and eventually it adopted a democratic constitution similar to the one prepared at Weimar for Germany.

Austrian Republic

The World War had begun in July 1914 with the attack of the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary, then rated as a Great Power, upon the little Slav state of Serbia. Five years later, thanks to military fortunes and revolutionary upheavals, Serbia was free and amply revenged. Within the former confines of the Dual Monarchy were now the three independent states of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and German Austria, while large portions of its erstwhile territories were appropriated by Serbia, Rumania, Poland, and Italy.

Moreover, all those Powers which had taken their stand with the Dual Monarchy in the World War were undergoing revolution. Germany, as we have already indicated, was supplanting the Hohenzollern Empire with a democratic republic and relinquishing some of its territory to resurrected Poland. And political revolutions were simultaneously occurring in Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire.

In Bulgaria, the dynasty and the form of monarchy remained, thanks largely to the circumstances that King Ferdinand was canny enough to abdicate the crown and leave the country in October 1918 and that his youthful son and successor, Boris III, entrusted practically dictatorial power to a forceful and popular statesman, Alexander Stambulinsky. Stambulinsky, a peasant by birth and the leader of the Agrarian party in Bulgaria, had spent three years in jail for opposing King Ferdinand's juncture with the Central Empires in the World War. He could not be held responsible, therefore, for the resulting misfortunes, and his vigorous insistence upon internal reforms which would be beneficial to the peasantry

Revolution in Bulgaria

fessed royalists had obtained the upper hand in Hungary, he made two unsuccessful attempts to regain the Hungarian crown—in March and in October 1921. After the second attempt, the Allies practically exiled him to Madeira, where he died in April 1922, leaving his claims to his young son, the Archduke Otto.

tended during the critical post-war period to allay the outraged patriotic sentiment and to brighten the economic prospects of the Bulgarian masses.

Revolution in Ottoman Empire

In the Ottoman Empire, Sultan Mohammed V had died in July 1918, and in the ensuing October, when Allied armies and Arab forces were overrunning Palestine, Syria, and Mesopotamia, his successor, Mohammed VI, accepted the resignation of Enver Pasha and the other "Young Turk" ministers whose alliance with Germany had brought the Turkish power to the brink of ruin. Against the pusillanimous conduct of the Sultan during the winter of 1918–1919, as well as against the seeming determination of the Allies to partition the Empire utterly, patriotic Turks found a capable and resourceful leader in Mustafa Kemal, who belonged to the left wing of the Young Turk movement but who had been notably critical of Enver Pasha's policies in the World War. While the Sultan Mohammed VI maintained only the form of an imperial Ottoman government at Constantinople, Mustafa Kemal began in the late spring of 1919 to establish a separate and strongly nationalist Turkish government in Anatolia. Gradually, through military prowess as well as organizing genius, Mustafa Kemal secured the unity and independence of the Turkish provinces of the Empire, until by 1923 he was able to appropriate Constantinople, depose Mohammed VI, and finally transform the Ottoman Empire into the national republic of "Turkey," with its capital at Angora.

Mustafa Kemal and Turkish Republic

2. THE PEACE OF PARIS

The revolutions in central Europe and the prompt establishment of democratic republics in Germany, Austria, and Hungary aroused popular hope in the defeated and disarmed countries that the victorious Allies in dictating the peace settlement would be exceptionally considerate. The President of the United States had declared that chastisement by the Allies would be directed not against peoples but against autocratic governments, and it was on the basis of his "fourteen points" that Germany had agreed on November 11, 1918, to lay down her arms and make peace.

Hope of Defeated Peoples

The hope of the defeated peoples simply did not square with realities in the victorious countries. Allied statesmen had paid

lip service to the "fourteen points," which at best were vague and susceptible of various interpretations, but they were much more definitely committed to the series of "secret treaties" which they had negotiated with one another during the war and which promised to this or that country, as the price for its services on the Allied side, specific aggrandizement at the expense of Germany or her confederates. Even if Allied statesmen had been minded to interpret the "fourteen points" in a conciliatory sense and to revise the secret treaties accordingly, they could hardly have commanded the support of their respective nations, now fired with a fierce hatred of the "enemy."

Commitments of Allied Statesmen

For four years and more, the popular psychology in Allied countries, especially in France, Great Britain, and Italy, had been keyed up to fever pitch, we must remember, by war propaganda and by personal experience of the horrors of death and destruction. The vast majority of people in every Allied country held Germany guilty of the war and responsible for its havoc. They were mindful, too, of the imperialist peace which Germany, as recently as March 1918, had dictated to Russia and Rumania, and they believed that if her armies on the Western Front had been successful in the summer of 1918, she would have shown no mercy to them. Now that their own armies were triumphant, why should they show mercy to Germany?

War Psychology of Victors

Clemenceau of France and Orlando of Italy, backed by their nations, demanded the dire punishment of the Central Empires. In Great Britain a general election of December 1918 registered a thumping majority for Lloyd George's slogan of "Hang the Kaiser and Make Germany Pay." In the United States, two ex-Presidents of the Republican party, Theodore Roosevelt and William Taft, issued a joint pronouncement against any "parleying" by Wilson which might concede to Germany "a peace around a council-table instead of a sentence from a court," and the Republican party carried the Congressional elections of November 1918.

Allied Peace Congress at Paris

It had been decided to exclude the enemy states from the peace congress until the Allies should have agreed among themselves upon the terms of peace. It had also been decided that the negotiations should be conducted at Paris, the very centre of Allied hostility to Germany. Just as January 18 had been the date in 1871 when a Hohen-

zollern King of Prussia, in the midst of a successful war against France, and surrounded by his triumphant generals and statesmen, had stood in the Hall of Mirrors in the palace at Versailles and been proclaimed German Emperor, so now, precisely forty-eight years later, at the close of an overwhelmingly victorious war against Germany, statesmen and generals of the Allies assembled in the same hall to undo the work of Bismarck and the Hohenzollerns. On January 18, 1919, the peace congress held its inaugural session.

Opening Session at Versailles, Jan. 1919

It was a brilliant assemblage of the foremost men of the Allied countries—except Russia. The Russian Empire of the Romanov Tsars, which had played a stellar rôle in bringing on the World War, had disappeared from the stage before the war was over, and the succeeding Russia of the revolutionary Communists was as much a pariah among the Allies as Germany or any other enemy state. The remaining "allied and associated" Powers—there were thirty-two of them [1]—were eminently represented, however. There was Clemenceau, the old "tiger" of French politics, premier of his country and honorary president of the congress. There was Marshal Foch, the organizer and winner of military victory. There was President Wilson, who in coming to Europe for the congress had established a wholly new precedent for American executives. There was Lloyd George, who from being the most resolute social reformer in Great Britain had become the most conspicuous patriot in all the dominions of King George V. There was Orlando, the Italian premier; Marquis Saionji, twice prime minister of Japan; Venizelos, the chief statesman of Greece; Arthur Balfour, British foreign secretary, who had attended the Congress of Berlin in 1878; Generals Botha and Smuts, erstwhile Boer warriors against Great Britain, now stalwart champions of the British Union of South Africa; the

[1] The thirty-two did not include Russia or Montenegro (which was now incorporated with Serbia), but they did include, in addition to the other twenty-four Powers which had broken with Germany, the three newly formed states of Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hejaz and the five British "Dominions" of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and India.

prime ministers of Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and Newfoundland; princes from India and Arabia; the president-elect of Brazil; the premiers of Belgium, Portugal, and Rumania, and likewise of the new states of Yugoslavia, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. Attending these celebrities were a host of more obscure "experts"—geographers, historians, economists, lawyers, and secretaries—a host as necessary to the making of peace as privates had been to the waging of war. And waiting upon them, and seeking to influence them, were numerous "agents" from a great variety of national, racial, and religious groups—Irishmen, Koreans, Jews, Egyptians, Ethiopians, etc.

The Peace Congress, after its formal inauguration on January 18, 1919, met rarely, and then in manner ceremonious and perfunctory. The real work of the Congress was done by special committees of diplomats and "experts" selected as needs arose, and it was done in privacy, only such reports being passed on to the whole congress as met the approval of the spokesmen of the Allied Great Powers. For several months the principal decisions were made by the "Big Four"—Clemenceau, Lloyd George, Orlando, and Wilson.

"Big Four"

It was no easy task to reconcile differences of opinion and policy among the thirty-two delegations and to preserve a united front on the part of all the "allied and associated" governments. Woodrow Wilson, who had set his heart upon fashioning a permanent League of Nations, felt obliged to make repeated concessions to his fellow negotiators in order to enlist their support for his pet project. The tragedy of the American President's position at Paris was that for the assurance of the "fourteenth point" of his peace program he had to surrender or compromise many of the other thirteen points. For example, Point One (open covenants openly arrived at) quickly evaporated in the atmosphere of the Congress. Also, Point Two (freedom of the seas), of which the President talked much before he went to Europe, was sacrificed to British susceptibilities. It was likewise a concession to British demands that Point Five was so interpreted as to admit of the transfer of the bulk of German colonies, under a so-called "mandatory" system, to the British Empire. Wilson, with the backing of Lloyd George,

Compromising the Fourteen Points

did resist the French demand for the whole left bank of the Rhine, and he also held out so stubbornly against the Italian demand for the Adriatic port of Fiume, that the Italian delegates temporarily withdrew from the congress. Eventually, however, Italy got Fiume.

Adjusting Rival Claims

It was very difficult to satisfy the territorial demands of the lesser Powers—Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Greece—without doing injustice to the principle of nationality. Nationalities were too intermingled in central and southeastern Europe to permit any hard-and-fast segregation of them within national frontiers. If, for example, all Poles were included in Poland, a considerable number of Germans would be included too; or, if all Czechs and Slovaks were incorporated in Czechoslovakia, a large number of Germans and Magyars would likewise be incorporated. In general, wherever the Allied diplomats had to choose between being unjust to enemy states and being unjust to pro-Ally states, they made the former choice. But in many instances, bitter boundary disputes raged between pro-Ally states themselves. Only the weariness of the several peoples concerned and the dictatorial attitude of the representatives of the Allied Great Powers enabled the peace congress to conclude its labors.

Agreeing on Draft Treaty

The draft of the proposed peace treaty with Germany, containing about 80,000 words, was agreed to by the "Big Four" and endorsed by the Congress in plenary session on May 6, 1919.[1] On the following day the German plenipotentiaries were admitted to the Congress and presented with the draft. They protested that it was intolerably severe and obviously contradictory of the "fourteen points," on the basis of which they had consented to the armistice. They pleaded for its radical amendment. To German entreaties, the Allies were deaf; and after demonstrations of protest throughout Germany, after threats of compulsion on the part of the Allies, after the resignation of the Scheidemann ministry at Berlin, after several days of awful suspense, the German Constituent Assembly at Weimar on June 23, 1919,

German Acceptance

[1] This plenary session was secret, and the treaty draft was endorsed without its details being fully known. Only a 10,000-word digest was submitted to the session. Several Powers—Portugal, France, China, and Italy—agreed to it "with reservations."

the last day of grace, voted to accept unconditionally the Allied terms of peace.

Treaty of Versailles with Germany, June 1919

On June 28, in the Hall of Mirrors in the stately old palace of Louis XIV, the treaty of Versailles was signed by representatives of Germany and of thirty-one nations leagued against her.[1] The scene was that in which in 1871 the German Hohenzollern Empire had been proclaimed, and the date was that on which in 1914 the Archduke Francis Ferdinand of Austria-Hungary had been assassinated. The World War was thus formally ended on the fifth anniversary of the immediate occasion of its beginning, and with deepest humiliation to Germany.

Other Treaties, 1919–1920

Though President Wilson returned home soon after the conclusion of peace with Germany, many diplomats remained in Paris for another year, drafting treaties with the other enemy states and working out numerous details of the general settlement. Peace was formally concluded with Austria in September 1919; with Hungary in June 1920; and with the Ottoman Empire in August 1920. All these treaties, including the one of June 1919 with Germany, were negotiated at Paris and signed at various places in the vicinity of Paris. Together, therefore, they constituted what we may call the Peace of Paris.

League Covenant and Labor Convention

Into each of the four major treaties was written a "covenant," providing for the establishment of a League of Nations and of a Permanent Court of International Justice; and supplementing the treaties was a special "convention," designed to effect an international organization of labor. Of the Labor Convention and League Covenant, we shall treat in some detail in a later chapter.[2] Here we merely note that, while they were part and parcel of the Peace of Paris, they were incidental and secondary, in the minds of most of the negotiators, to the territorial and financial provisions of the several treaties. These we shall now outline.

The treaty of Versailles profoundly altered the position of Germany. Territorially, Germany ceded Alsace-Lorraine to France,

[1] One of the thirty-two delegations on the Allied side—China—refused to sign the treaty of Versailles, because of concessions to Japan. General Smuts, in attaching his signature on behalf of South Africa, protested against what he conceived to be the illiberality of the victors to the vanquished.

[2] See below, pp. 746–757.

the towns of Eupen and Malmédy to Belgium, the city of Memel to Lithuania,[1] and the province of Posen and a strip through West Prussia (the so-called "corridor") to Poland.[2] Furthermore, she consented to the holding of plebiscites, under international auspices, to determine whether Upper Silesia and the southern part of East Prussia should be annexed to Poland, and Schleswig to Denmark.[3] Besides, she surrendered outright the important Baltic port of Danzig, which became an internationalized "free city," and for a period of fifteen years the valuable coal region of the Saar, which passed under the administration of the League of Nations and the economic control of France. In the case of the Saar, a plebiscite would determine at the end of fifteen years whether it would remain permanently under international government or revert to Germany or be annexed by France.[4]

Provisions of Treaty of Versailles: Territorial

In addition to territorial cessions in Europe, Germany parted with all her overseas imperial domain. Her lease of Kiaochow and privileged position in the Chinese province of Shantung, as well as her Pacific islands north of the equator, were transferred to Japan; her portion of Samoa, to New Zealand; her other Pacific possessions south of the equator, to Australia; German Southwest Africa, to the British Union of South Africa; German East Africa, to Great Britain, except a small section in the northwest, which went to Belgium; and Kamerun and Togoland were divided between Great Britain and France. In most cases the Powers receiving German colonies did so not as absolute sovereigns but as "mandatories" of the League of Nations, to which they promised to give periodic accounts of their stewardship.

Germany recognized, moreover, the independence of Belgium, and likewise of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and German Austria. She specifically denounced the treaties of Brest-Litovsk and

[1] The treaty merely provided for the cession of Memel to the Allies. Memel was "appropriated" by Lithuania in 1923 and retaken by Germany in 1939.

[2] The "corridor," which cut off East Prussia from the rest of Germany, had belonged to Poland until 1772. See the maps, below, pp. 648–649.

[3] As the outcome of these plebiscites, in 1919, the northern third of Schleswig joined Denmark and all East Prussia remained with Germany. In Upper Silesia, the plebiscite was delayed and interfered with by nationalistic fighting and disorder; when it was held, in 1921, it was generally favorable to Germany, though certain districts gave Polish majorities; and in 1922 the League of Nations arbitrarily partitioned Upper Silesia between Germany and Poland.

[4] The plebiscite, held in 1935, was favorable to Germany. See below, p. 799.

Bucharest, which she had signed in March 1918 with Russia and Rumania respectively, and gave the Allies *carte blanche* to settle as they would the affairs of eastern Europe.

Militarily, Germany promised to reduce her army to 100,000 men; to abolish conscription; to raze all fortifications between her western frontier and a line drawn fifty kilometers east of the Rhine; to stop all importation, exportation, and nearly all production of war material; to reduce her navy to six battleships, six light cruisers, and twelve torpedo boats, without submarines; and to abandon military and naval aviation. She agreed, furthermore, to demolish fortifications at Heligoland, to open the Kiel Canal to all nations, to refrain from building forts on the Baltic, and to surrender her transoceanic cables. She expressly consented to the trial, by an international tribunal, of the Emperor William II for "supreme offense against international morality." [1]

Military

Germany was forced to acknowledge responsibility for the World War, and to promise that she would make financial reparation "for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allies and their property." She was to make an initial payment of five billion dollars and such subsequent payments, up to "the utmost of her ability," as a special Reparations Commission of the Allies should direct. In the meantime she was to pay shipping damage on a ton-for-ton basis by cession of most of her existing merchant marine and by new construction; to devote her economic resources to the rebuilding of devastated areas in France; to supply France, Belgium, and Italy with coal; to return works of art taken from Belgium and France, and to deliver to Belgium manuscripts and books of equivalent value to those destroyed at Louvain.

Financial

Until the treaty of Versailles was fully executed, Allied armies should continue to occupy the left bank of the Rhine and the bridgeheads on the right bank of Cologne, Coblenz, and Mainz, with Germany footing the bills. The one concession was that if

[1] In accordance with this provision, Great Britain, France, and Italy, in 1920, requested the Netherlands to hand over William II for trial. Queen Wilhelmina's advisers declined on the ground that no existing international court possessed legal jurisdiction and that the Dutch people "could not betray the faith of anyone who has confided himself to their free institutions." Upon the promise of the Dutch government to take necessary precautions to prevent the ex-Emperor from endangering the world's peace, the Allies dropped the project of trying William II.

Germany should be duly fulfilling her obligations, Cologne would be evacuated at the end of five years, Coblenz at the end of ten, and Mainz at the end of fifteen.

Harsh indeed were the terms which the Peace of Paris imposed on Germany. Her domain in Europe was restricted; her overseas empire was destroyed; she was disarmed and mortgaged; for a long time, it seemed, she would be at the mercy of her conquerors. And hardly less harsh was the punishment which the Peace of Paris meted out to Germany's confederates.

Treaty of St. Germain with Austria

Austria, by the treaty signed at St. Germain, near Paris, on September 10, 1919, was required to recognize the independence of Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Yugoslavia, and to cede to them, and to Italy and Rumania, the bulk of the realm which previously, in union with herself, had composed the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary. Austria was left, thereby, a small independent German state, with an area and a population smaller than Portugal's. Part even of the German-speaking Tyrol was detached from her and added to Italy, and Austria had to promise that she would not unite in the future with Germany. She was deprived of seaports; her army was restricted to 30,000 men; and she was obligated, like Germany, to pay such indemnity as the Reparations Commission should determine.

Treaty of Neuilly with Bulgaria

From Bulgaria were taken, by the treaty signed at Neuilly, near Paris, on November 27, 1919, most of the land she had acquired in the Balkan War of 1912–1913 and all her conquests in the World War. Dobruja went to Rumania; the greater part of Macedonia, to Yugoslavia; and the Thracian coast, to Greece. Bulgaria promised to pay an indemnity of almost half a billion dollars and to reduce her army to 33,000 men.

Treaty of Trianon with Hungary

Hungary, by the treaty of the Trianon signed on June 4, 1920, was stripped of non-Magyar subjects as completely as Austria had been shorn of non-Germans. The Slovak provinces went to Czechoslovakia. Transylvania and a strip of land to the west of it were ceded to Rumania. Croatia was yielded to Yugoslavia. The Banat was divided between Yugoslavia and Rumania. Hungary thus shrank from an imperial and maritime domain of 125,000 square miles, with twenty-two million inhabitants, into a landlocked Magyar

state of 36,000 square miles with a population of eight million and with an army limited to 35,000 men.

Determination of the fate of the Ottoman Empire was delayed by the persistence of acute differences among the Allies—especially between France and Great Britain, and between Italy and Greece—about the distribution of the spoils, and also by the existence of rival Turkish governments, that of the Sultan at Constantinople and that of Mustafa Kemal at Angora. At length, on August 10, 1920, an agreement was reached among the Allies, and on the same day they signed at Sèvres, near Paris, a treaty of peace with the Sultan's government. Thereby, the Arab state of Hejaz, embracing the strip of territory east of the Red Sea, would be independent; Armenia would be a free Christian republic under international guaranties; Palestine, Mesopotamia, the trans-Jordan area, and Syria would be detached from the Empire and the first three made "mandatories" of Great Britain, and the fourth, of France; Cilicia would be a "sphere of influence" for France, and southern Anatolia, including the port of Adalia, a "sphere of influence" for Italy; Smyrna and adjacent territory on the coast of Asia Minor, together with Thrace, Adrianople, the peninsula of Gallipoli, and the remaining Ægean islands would be surrendered to Greece. The Dardanelles and the Bosphorus would be internationalized, and the once mighty Ottoman Empire would be contracted into a petty Turkish state retaining only the city of Constantinople and the interior of Asia Minor and subjected to crushing debts and to foreign control of its finances.

Treaty of Sèvres with Ottoman Empire

The government of the Sultan Mohammed VI at Constantinople agreed to the treaty of Sèvres, but the Turkish National Assembly at Angora, under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal, refused to ratify it. Taking advantage of the demobilization of the Allied armies and of the war weariness of the Allied peoples, Mustafa Kemal, with his Turkish forces, obliterated the Armenian republic and obliged Italian troops to quit southern Anatolia and the French to desist from occupying Cilicia. The governments of France and Italy, thus discomfited by the Turkish military revival and already critical of the advantages conferred by the treaty of Sèvres on Great Britain and Greece, were favorable to a revision of the treaty.

Its Repudiation by Turks

At the same time, at Moscow, the Communist government of Russia signed a treaty with the Turkish Nationalists, condemning the treaty of Sèvres, disavowing Russian ambitions in the Ottoman Empire, re-ceding Kars and Ardahan to Turkey, and proclaiming "the solidarity which unites Turkey and Russia in the struggle against imperialism."

Græco-Turkish War of 1921–1922

In the meantime the British government, which had most to lose by the revival of Turkish power, was abetting the proposals of Venizelos and of the recently restored King Constantine that Greece should undertake the suppression of the militant Turkish Nationalists and the enforcement of the treaty of Sèvres.[1] Accordingly, in July 1921 a large Greek army, under Constantine, advanced from Smyrna against Mustafa Kemal. At first the Greeks gained some ground, but presently they were turned back and eventually overwhelmed and driven from Smyrna. They received no real aid from the British, who distrusted King Constantine and who had had enough fighting for the present, while, on the other hand, the Turks were supplied with arms and munitions by the French and the Italians. In triumph, therefore, the troops of Mustafa Kemal possessed themselves of the whole of Asia Minor and in November 1922 occupied Constantinople.

The victories of Mustafa Kemal and his Turkish Nationalists scrapped the treaty of Sèvres and called for a new peace settlement in the Near East. After another series of difficult and delicate negotiations, peace was finally concluded between Turkey and the Allies at Lausanne, in Switzerland, on July 24,

Treaty of Lausanne with Turkey, 1923

1923. By the terms of the treaty of Lausanne, Turkey definitely resigned all claims to Hejaz, Palestine, Trans-Jordania, Mesopotamia, and Syria, but she retained the whole of Anatolia and likewise Cilicia, Adalia, Smyrna, Constantinople, and eastern Thrace. She consented to the freedom of the Straits and their demilitarization,

[1] Both Venizelos and Constantine favored war with Mustafa Kemal, but no love was lost between the two Greeks or between the republican and royalist factions which they respectively headed. Following the death of King Alexander I of Greece in 1920, Venizelos and his republicans were defeated in a general election by the royalists; Venizelos accordingly withdrew from the government, and Constantine was restored (November 1920). In September 1922, following the disastrous rout of his armies in Asia Minor, King Constantine again abdicated, this time in favor of his son, George II, and removed himself finally from Greece.

but she escaped most of the onerous foreign control of her internal affairs which the treaty of Sèvres had imposed upon her.[1]

The Peace of Paris of 1919–1920 included not only the Turkish treaty of Sèvres (as subsequently revised by the treaty of Lausanne), the Hungarian treaty of the Trianon, the Bulgarian treaty of Neuilly, the Austrian treaty of St. Germain, and the German treaty of Versailles, but numerous supplementary conventions and agreements among the Allies.

Italy and Yugoslavia

To delimit the boundary between Italy and Yugoslavia proved especially troublesome. Italy insistently demanded not only Istria, the Adriatic islands, and that part of Dalmatia pledged her by the secret treaties of wartime, but the important port of Fiume also. But counter-claims of Yugoslavia, particularly to Fiume, were stubbornly backed, as we have said, by President Woodrow Wilson and hardly less so by the French. In September 1919, Fiume was forcibly seized by a free-lance Italian expedition under Gabriele D'Annunzio, the ultra-patriotic litterateur, now turned soldier-adventurer. Eventually a settlement was reached by the treaty of Rapallo (November 1920): Fiume became a free neutralized city; a strip of Dalmatian coast extending southward from Istria as far as Fiume, and also the town of Zara, passed to Italy, and the remainder of Dalmatia to Yugoslavia. Still later, in accordance with the supplementary treaty of Rome (January 1924), the main part of Fiume was definitively annexed by Italy, and its chief suburb by Yugoslavia.

Treaties with "Minority Rights"

Meanwhile a series of treaties was concluded by the Allied Great Powers with national states which had recently been created or much enlarged—Yugoslavia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, etc. These treaties related to boundaries, to the assumption of the public debts of annexed regions, and to commercial affairs. In most instances, moreover, they guarantied certain rights and privileges to national, racial, or religious minorities within the several states. In the case of Poland, and in that of Rumania,

[1] Greece lost most heavily by the treaty of Lausanne. She was compelled not only to surrender Smyrna, Gallipoli, and eastern Thrace to Turkey, but also to resign to Italy the Greek-speaking Ægean islands known as the Dodecanese. By a remarkable special arrangement between Greece and Turkey, the Christian Greek inhabitants of Asia Minor were transplanted to Greece and the Moslem Turkish residents of Greece were removed to Turkey.

"minority rights" were primarily intended for the benefit of Jews, while in the case of Yugoslavia and in that of Czechoslovakia they were in behalf of Germans and Magyars.[1]

SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE, 1923
Compare with maps above, pp. 180, 195, and 503.

[1] The chief proponents of the treaty rights of minorities were Jews, who were fearful of losing their identity or being discriminated against in the fiercely nationalistic countries of central Europe; and they gained the interested support of the

In the Peace of Paris and its manifold negotiations and treaties, Russia had no direct part. Indeed, at the very time when the Allies were making peace with Germany, they were encouraging military revolts against the Communist government in Russia.[1] Nevertheless, the Russian Communists gradually got the upper hand in their own country, and the series of separate treaties which they concluded in 1920–1921 with the non-Russian states that had emerged out of the old Russian Empire belonged, logically and chronologically, to the general peace settlement.

Russia and the Peace of Paris

From its advent to power in November 1917 the Communist dictatorship of Russia had proclaimed its intention of abandoning the imperial policies of previous Russian governments and respecting the doctrine of national self-determination, and to this intention it adhered after Germany had been compelled by the Allies to renounce the treaty of Brest-Litovsk and after the peoples in the former western provinces of the Russian Empire had set up provisional governments of their own. Consequently, Russia negotiated treaties in 1920 with Finland, with Estonia, with Latvia (comprising the Letts of Livonia and Courland), and with Lithuania, recognizing the independence of each.

Independence of Baltic States

Poland, egged on by the Allies, declined for a time to negotiate with the Russian dictatorship and actually made war against it. But when hostilities reached a deadlock, peace negotiations were opened in earnest; and on March 18, 1921, was signed the treaty of Riga. Russia recognized the independence of Poland, and each of the countries pledged itself not to participate in military activities against the other and not to interfere in any way in the internal affairs of the other. There still remained a serious dispute between Poland and Lithuania over the city of Vilna, which the former had taken by force in October 1920. Otherwise, however, the territorial

Russo-Polish War, and Treaty of 1921

British and American governments. The British government had already committed itself, in 1917, to Zionist demands for a "Jewish home land" in Palestine. See below, pp. 775–776. National minorities, other than Jewish, were to share in the new treaty rights, partly because the Jews did not wish to be singled out by name and partly because the Allies felt apologetic about incorporating large numbers of Germans or Magyars with Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Rumania.

[1] See below, pp. 672–674.

settlement appeared satisfactory both to Russia and to the new national states which had seceded from her. At a congress of their representatives in Warsaw in March 1922, Russia, Poland, Latvia, Estonia, and Finland agreed to confirm the existing treaties with one another and in future to arbitrate all disputes.

The revolutions of 1918–1920 in central Europe and the international peace treaties of 1919–1923 were two phases of the aftermath of the World War. A third, the emergence of a more nationalistic state-system, we shall next discuss.

3. TRIUMPH OF THE PRINCIPLE OF NATIONALITY

Nationalism was greatly forwarded by the World War and its aftermath. The doctrine of national self-determination, the doctrine that people who speak a common language and cherish common historic traditions should live under a polity of their own making, was invoked during the World War by Tsarist Russia against the Ottoman and Habsburg Empires, by Germany against Russia, by the Allies against the Mid-European Confederacy, and, most enthusiastically of all, by President Wilson. Aroused national sentiment proved a most efficacious stimulant of popular morale in waging the war, and hope of achieving national independence spurred on the various subject peoples in the empires of central and eastern Europe.

Back in 1815 the Congress of Vienna, in its territorial settlement of Europe, had almost wholly ignored the principle of nationality. The principle was then too novel and too closely identified with the vanquished France of the Revolution. By 1919, however, the principle could not be ignored. It had become enshrined in the historic "unifications" of Italy and Germany; and during the second half of the nineteenth century and the first decade of the twentieth it had been gaining devotees in an ever widening area. The World War began as a despairing effort of the imperial domain of Austria-Hungary to stay the disruptive process which the principle of nationality, as represented by Serbia, was fostering. Indeed, the World War, however much economic imperialism was associated with some of its participants, was basically and strikingly a nationalistic war. It was an extension, on a colossal scale, of the series of nationalistic wars of the third quarter of the nineteenth century. It was an herculean effort to complete or

World War a Nationalistic War

restore the national unifications of France, Germany, and Italy, and to follow them up with national unifications of Rumanians, Greeks, and the several Slavic and Baltic peoples. In this respect the World War was eminently successful. The Congress of Paris of 1919–1920 recognized the principle of nationality and wrote it into the public law of Europe. At last, the political map of the Continent was radically revised and re-drawn. Big imperial domains and fragmentary nations were wiped out, and in their place appeared an emphatically nationalistic—and novel—state-system.

Followed by Nationalistic Peace

Four great imperial domains were dismembered—the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire, the Russian Empire, the German Empire. Moreover, certain small states or provinces whose inhabitants comprised but a part of a given nationality lost their historic identity—for example, Montenegro, Croatia, Bohemia, Transylvania, Galicia, Livonia, Courland, Schleswig. From the welding together of disjointed members of the same linguistic nationality and from the partition of multi-national empires, six national states were newly created—Poland, Czechoslovakia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Finland; six existing national states were enlarged and consolidated—Serbia (Yugoslavia), Rumania, Greece, Italy, France (by recovering Alsace-Lorraine), and Denmark (by obtaining northern Schleswig); and five states which had previously been imperial were compressed within national limits—Germany, Austria, Hungary, Turkey, and Russia. Altogether, where there had been twenty-one sovereign states in 1914, there were twenty-seven in 1920, and almost all the twenty-seven were national.

Destruction of Empires

Construction of National States

The Communists in Russia were as ready to recognize the principle of nationality as was the peace congress at Paris. Not only did they consent, as we have seen, to the break-up of the historic Russian Empire and the secession of Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, but they acquiesced in the incorporation of Bessarabia with Rumania and they reorganized what remained of the Empire on a federal basis. Much the greater part of it—the part peopled by Great Russians—became the "Russian Soviet Socialist Republic," with its capital at Moscow. But federated with this Great Russian state, and accorded some degree of cul-

Communist Russia's Concessions to Nationalism


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3
1
Smolensk
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Posen
Warsaw
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Kiev
Cracow
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5
6
8
7
POLAND
1771
1 Russia
2 Finland
3 Sweden
4 Prussia
5 Austria
6 Hungary
7 Transylvania
8 Turkey

2
3
6
4
5
Baltic Sea
Smolensk
Vilna
Danzig
1
7
Posen
Warsaw
Brest
Pinsk
Kiev
Cracow
Lemberg
10
8
9
POLAND
1921
1 Russia
2 Finland
3 Estonia
4 Latvia
5 Lithuania
6 Sweden
7 Germany
8 Hungary
9 Rumania
10 Czechoslovakia
BLACK SEA

tural nationalism and local autonomy, were "Soviet Socialist Republics" for Ukrainians, White Russians, etc.[1]

To re-cast the political map of eastern and central Europe on a strictly national basis was extraordinarily difficult. To bring together all Poles, for example, in a single Polish state, involved the inclusion of a considerable number of Germans, as well as Jews. In general, as we know, the new boundaries were drawn by the peacemakers at Paris in such a way as to reward the nations which had favored the Allies in the World War and to penalize those which had opposed them. Thus it befell that whereas the Italians gained all of "Italia irredenta," new "irredentas" were created for Hungary, Bulgaria, and Germany. Sizable German minorities passed under the sway of Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Italy; Magyar minorities, under the rule of Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia; and Bulgarian minorities, under the dominion of Yugoslavia, Rumania, and Greece. And, contrary to the principle of nationality, German Austria was prohibited from uniting with Germany. Besides, the arbitrariness with which frontiers were delimited between some of the Allied national states—for example, between Italy and Yugoslavia, and between Poland and Lithuania—tended to accentuate, rather than to allay, nationalistic rivalry. To the same end operated the compulsion which the Allies exerted on newly founded or enlarged states, such as Poland and Rumania, to get them to accord special rights to national minorities within their respective territories.

New Irredentas in Europe

Nationalism could not be so aroused in belligerent countries during the World War or so applied to the post-war territorial settlement in eastern and central Europe, without affecting the whole world. In Belgium, the Flemish- or Netherlandish-speaking population grew embittered against their French-speaking countrymen, some going so far as to demand political autonomy or even independence; and after the war, the Belgian government felt obliged to make several significant concessions to the Flemish national movement, such as emphasizing the equality of the Flemish language with French and transforming the University of Ghent into a purely Flemish institution. In Spain, simultaneously, there was a marked recrudescence of autonomous agitation among

Nationalism in Belgium

In Spain

[1] See below, pp. 675–676.

Catalans and Basques. In Iceland, nationalism reached such a threatening stage that Denmark agreed in 1918 to recognize her ancient colony as a sovereign state; henceforth the only bond between Iceland and Denmark was a common king.

In Iceland

In Ireland, too, separatist nationalism produced a veritable revolution. At the beginning of the World War the Irish masses (outside Ulster) had seemed content to follow John Redmond and his parliamentary Nationalist party. But the Home Rule Bill, already passed,[1] was not applied, while, on the other hand, the British government inflicted the direst punishment on the handful of Irishmen who participated in the Easter rebellion of 1916 at Dublin [2] and likewise proposed to enforce military conscription on all Irishmen. In the circumstances, the relatively mild home-rule nationalism of John Redmond lost popular support in Ireland, and the more uncompromising nationalism of the Sinn Fein party gained ground.

In Ireland

The Sinn Feiners were not at all content with mere home rule; they would have a fully self-governing Ireland. Nor would they await any concessions from the British Parliament at Westminster; they would act independently. They possessed, moreover, several resourceful leaders, including Arthur Griffith,[3] the real founder of this new type of Irish nationalism, and, quite as notably, Eamon De Valera and Michael Collins. De Valera, born in New York in 1882 of a Spanish father and an Irish mother, had been educated at Dublin and had developed into a strenuous advocate of national independence for Ireland; he participated in the armed insurrection of 1916, and escaping from a British prison in 1919 he toured the United States and collected funds for the Sinn Fein organization. Collins, born of a peasant family near Cork in 1890, resigned a position in the British civil service at London to join the "Irish Volunteers" and engage in the 1916 rebellion; managing to get out of jail and thereafter to elude arrest, he soon became a guiding spirit of the Sinn Fein movement.

Sinn Fein and Its Leaders

In the general elections to the British Parliament in December 1918, three-fourths of all the Irish constituencies—which formerly had elected Nationalists of the Redmond party—returned

[1] See above, pp. 363–365.

[2] See above, p. 600.

[3] On Griffith and the origins of Sinn Fein, see above, pp. 362–363.

GOVT. GIRLS CO
SRINAGAR

Sinn Fein candidates. As many of these as were not in jail, acting on the principles enunciated by Griffith, promptly met at Dublin (instead of taking seats in the British Parliament at Westminster), and proclaimed themselves the legal Parliament (or Dail) of the "Irish Republic," with De Valera as president and Griffith as vice-president.

Irish Republic, 1918

A desperate struggle ensued between the nationalist "Irish Republic," on one hand, and the British government and Ulster Unionists, on the other. There were frequent skirmishes between Republican riflemen and British troops, many assassinations, and much destruction of property. For three years matters went steadily from bad to worse.

In 1920 David Lloyd George, the British prime minister, with Unionist support, attempted to solve the problem by putting through the British Parliament a new Home Rule Act, providing for two separate and partially autonomous governments in Ireland, one for the six counties in Ulster and the other for the twenty-six counties in the rest of the country. The Unionists in Ulster accepted the Act as a satisfactory compromise and accordingly instituted at Belfast a local government of their own, the government of "Northern Ireland." But the Act was bitterly opposed by the Republicans of the south, as sanctioning the division of Ireland and as conferring little power on the proposed Irish Parliament at Dublin.

Home Rule Act of 1920

Finally, when no other solution seemed possible, Lloyd George invited the "Irish Republic" to send delegates to London to negotiate terms of peace with Great Britain. The outcome was the treaty of London, signed in December 1921, which provided for the establishment of an "Irish Free State" as a self-governing Dominion within the British Empire, similar in status to Canada; Ulster could join the Free State if it so determined by plebiscite, or it might continue under the separate government provided by the Home Rule Act of 1920. The treaty was speedily ratified by the British Parliament, and, despite the impassioned opposition of De Valera, by the Irish Dail also. Of the new Irish Free State Griffith became provisional president and Collins prime minister.

Treaty of London, 1921: Irish Free State

The Irish Free State began its career in most difficult circumstances. Ulster voted to stay out. Republican followers of De Valera terrorized southern Ireland. Griffith soon died, and Collins

was assassinated. Nevertheless, the "provisional government," guided by Collins's successor, William Cosgrave, slowly but surely gained strength and stability. The British military forces duly evacuated Ireland. A working agreement was reached between the Free State and the Government of Northern Ireland. A democratic constitution was adopted by the Dail and ratified by the British Parliament. The greater part of Ireland, under the inspiration of Sinn Fein nationalism, had thus definitely joined Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa as a self-governing Dominion.

Nationalism in British Dominions

The triumph of nationalism in Ireland synchronized with special manifestations of nationalism in other parts of the British Empire. Each of the self-governing Dominions—Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa—experienced special pride in its military exploits during the World War, faith in its increasing importance in the future, and determination to have its voice heard in the counsels of the world, not indirectly through London, but directly from its own national capital. Each of these Dominions signed the peace treaties of Paris as a sovereign Power, and each was admitted to separate membership in the League of Nations. Three of them—South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand—acquired individual "mandates" for German colonies.

Balfour Report, and Statute of Westminster

The nationalism implicit in these developments was affirmed as a principle in the so-called "Balfour Report," which was adopted by an Imperial Conference of the statesmen of Great Britain and the self-governing Dominions in 1926: "They [Great Britain and the several Dominions] are autonomous communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations." It remained to have this principle enacted into imperial law, and this was accomplished in December 1931, with the passage of the "Statute of Westminster" by the British Parliament.

The Statute recognized the legal equality of the Dominions with the mother-country and their practical independence of one another. It provided that no law of the British Parliament might be applied to any Dominion without the latter's express consent,

that no law of a Dominion parliament might be "disallowed" by the British government, and that no alteration in the laws concerning the royal succession or titles might be made without the assent of all the Dominion parliaments as well as the British. Implicitly, at least, each Dominion was to be free to direct its foreign affairs as it would. Thereby, an important part of the British Empire—Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and likewise the Irish Free State—was legally transformed into a merely sentimental alliance of independent nations, officially styled the "British Commonwealth of Nations."

British Commonwealth of Nations

Rising nationalism was indeed a characteristic and almost universal phenomenon of the post-war years. It manifested itself, among all the victorious European Powers and in the self-governing Dominions of the British Empire, and likewise throughout Asia and Africa, and most intensely, as time would show, in that country which had suffered the most humiliating defeat and loss of prestige—Germany. Particular features of the peace-settlement of 1919–1920 and other consequences of the World War would shortly be altered or mitigated, but the nationalism which both the war and the peace had quickened would be an enduring and very troublesome legacy. To it we must repeatedly refer in the remaining pages of this book.[1]

Nationalism Universal

4. TEMPORARY VOGUE OF DEMOCRATIC REPUBLICANISM

The immediate aftermath of the World War seemed to confirm Woodrow Wilson's contention that the war had been waged "to make the world safe for democracy." For, with the exception of Russia, where the Tsarist régime was supplanted by a Communist dictatorship,[2] all the Great Powers and most of the lesser ones adopted or elaborated democratic forms of government. And with the extension of democracy was associated a vogue of republicanism.

In 1914, six of the Great Powers were monarchical. In 1919, only three remained such, and these three—Great Britain, Italy,

[1] On post-war nationalism in general, see below, pp. 767–795, and on its aggressive and totalitarian developments in Europe, especially in Italy and Germany, see below, pp. 686–696, 710–734.

[2] See above, pp. 607–608, 611–613, and below, pp. 669–686.

and Japan—had reconsecrated their political institutions by military victory. The three most famous European dynasties—the Habsburg, the Romanov, and the Hohenzollern—had ceased to reign, and lesser princely families had been expelled from the several German states. All the newly created states of central Europe were republics—Poland and Czechoslovakia, Lithuania and Latvia, Estonia and Finland. Not only were the American continents almost wholly republican, but Europe was now predominantly so, and even in Asia the vast and populous country of China was at least nominally republican, while from the ruins of the Ottoman Empire was rising a Turkish Republic.

Advance of Republicanism

Moreover, democracy seemed triumphant. Thoroughly democratic constitutions were evolved by popularly elected assemblies in the revolutionized Central Empires and in the newly founded or newly unified states of central and eastern Europe. The German constitution, adopted by the Weimar Assembly in 1919, retained the federal organization of the German Empire while lessening the powers of the several states and broadening those of the central government. For the exercise of the latter, it entrusted authority jointly to the Reichstag, representing the people, and to a Reichsrat, representing the states, and executive authority to a president, elected by the people for seven years, and to a chancellor and his associate ministers, responsible to the Reichstag. The suffrage was accorded to all German citizens, male and female, over twenty years of age; a detailed bill of rights was included; and provision was made for the initiative, referendum, and recall, and for proportional and professional representation. Contemporaneous changes in the state constitutions of Prussia, Bavaria, Württemberg, Saxony, and all the others guaranteed the democratic character of the whole German Republic.

Advance of Democracy

In Germany

The Austrian constitution of 1920 established a federal republic of eight diminutive states, with a legislature similar to Germany's, and an executive like the French—a titular president elected by the legislature (for four years instead of seven, however) and a directing ministry responsible to the legislature. The Czechoslovak constitution of 1921 were alike modelled on that of the French Republic. Each provided for a

In Austria and Czechoslovakia

bicameral parliament—a Senate and a Chamber of Deputies—which should choose the president, enact the laws, and control the ministry. Both constitutions—and the Austrian likewise—were more democratic than the French, in that they enfranchised women as well as men.

In Yugoslavia and Rumania

Yugoslavia and Rumania retained the institution of monarchy, but adopted constitutions, the one in 1921 and the other in 1923, which resembled the democratic constitution of the Italian kingdom. Both guarantied individual liberties, parliamentary government, and ministerial responsibility. Both, despite provincial opposition, affirmed the unitary, rather than the federal, character of the state, and provided for local administration under prefects appointed by the central government. Both granted universal manhood suffrage.

In Baltic Nations

Simultaneously, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania adopted constitutions at once republican and democratic. Sweden, Denmark, and Iceland, though remaining nominally monarchical, removed all property qualifications for the exercise of the suffrage and enfranchised women.

In Britain

In Great Britain, the earlier electoral reforms of 1832, 1867, and 1884–1885 [1] were consolidated and supplemented by an important democratic Act of 1918, enfranchising all men who were over twenty years of age and had maintained a residence or place of business for six months, and all women who were over twenty-nine years of age and had owned or tenanted premises for six months or were married to men who owned or tenanted premises. Voting in a general election would take place on one and the same day. No person could vote in more than two constituencies. Parliamentary seats were redistributed so that each would represent approximately 70,000 of the population Subsequently, in 1928, the British Parliament took an additional step toward the democratic goal and granted the suffrage to women as freely as to men.

In Ireland

Meanwhile, the constitution of Northern Ireland, embodied in an act of the British Parliament of 1920, conformed in democratic tenor with the British reform of 1918, while the constitution of the Irish Free State, as adopted in 1923, went farther. It enfranchised all citizens over twenty years of age and elaborated a system of proportional representation.

[1] See above, pp. 53–54, 199–200.

In Belgium, an electoral reform of 1919 abolished the existing system of plural voting and substituted for it the system of one-man-one-vote, and a further reform of 1921 partially enfranchised women. In the Dutch Netherlands, democratic government was attained in 1917 by the extension of the suffrage to all men and women and the establishment of proportional representation.

In Belgium and Holland

In general it may be said of all the newer constitutions and electoral reforms of the years from 1917 to 1923 that special emphasis was put on representative, democratic government, on ministerial responsibility, and on guaranties of individual liberty. In most of the changes, the enfranchisement of women stood out conspicuously; it seemed an appropriate recognition of the significant rôle which women had played in the World War and were playing in industrialized society, as well as a logical application of the principle of political democracy. Full suffrage was accorded to women, on the same basis as to men, in Germany, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, the Baltic and Scandinavian states, the Netherlands, Luxemburg, Great Britain, and the Irish Free State. In the United States, moreover, a constitutional amendment providing for universal woman suffrage was approved by the Congress, ratified by the federated states, and formally proclaimed in 1920.

Woman Suffrage

Japan, too, felt the surge of the democratic movement in Europe and America; she did not enfranchise women, but in 1925 she put an end to property qualifications and extended the parliamentary suffrage equally to all adult male citizens.

Democratic Reform in Japan

All this radical democratizing of political institutions was hailed as a world-wide fruition of the seed which had been planted in France and the United States in the eighteenth century, which had germinated and sprouted in western and central Europe in the second half of the nineteenth century, which in the first decade of the twentieth, on the eve of the World War, had pushed its shoots upward through the unpromising soil of the Russian, Ottoman, and Chinese Empires, and which now, in the aftermath of the World War, seemed unmistakably to assure to the whole world a common type of political aspiration and achievement. The world, it was boasted, was at last safe for democracy, and politi-

Seeming Final Triumph of Democracy

cal democracy would amply justify itself in its rapid amelioration of social conditions and international relations. There was still, during the immediate aftermath of the World War, a remarkable note of optimism in European thought and word.

Yet the seemingly all-but-universal triumph of democracy came at the moment when international relations were embittered by the World War and the Peace of Paris, when the gravest problems of economic reconstruction were confronting statesmen and peoples, and when nationalism, rather than democracy, was commanding the deepest affections of the masses of mankind.

Menaced by Emerging Dictatorship

In the circumstances, the triumph of democracy, at least of the traditionally liberal type, was more apparent than real. It proved but a passing phase of the immediate aftermath of the war. Already, in fact, it was menaced by the rise of Communist dictatorship in Russia and by vigorous widespread agitation for like dictatorship elsewhere. Presently, it would be menaced and largely undone by forceful establishment of a startling array of other dictatorships.

To understand such an outcome, we must bear in mind that the post-war years were characterized not only by democratic experimentation and an intensified nationalism, but also by a most distressing economic instability. The nature of this instability and some of its significant aspects, we shall now discuss, leaving to another chapter the treatment of the several dictatorships which eventuated.

5. ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY

The economic situation in Europe during the post-war years was extremely difficult. The war had been terribly expensive and destructive, and its conclusion was attended by grievous handi-

Post-War Economic Difficulties

caps to economic and social reconstruction. The governments of the several belligerent nations found themselves saddled with huge war debts, and, in addition, with extraordinary obligations for the rehabilitation of wounded men and devastated areas. Then, too, the demobilization of the gigantic armies, the release of millions of men from trench and camp and their return to rural field or urban factory glutted the labor market at the very time when the special de-

mand of the preceding years for munitions and foodstuffs sharply declined. Furthermore, the scrapping of numerous war industries involved a stoppage of the abnormal profits and wages which had been accruing therefrom to capitalists and workingmen respectively; and the prospect of reaping comparable returns from the resumption of ordinary industrial and commercial enterprise was dimmed alike by renewal and intensification of international competition and by sharp diminution of the purchasing power of the general public. Besides, the intense nationalism which was developed by the war and the peace settlement militated against normal economic recovery, for this nationalism, being economic as well as political, led not only to an increase in the number of states in Europe but also to the adoption by each of high protective tariffs which seriously checked international trade and hence domestic production.

Economic Nationalism

Immensely aggravating the situation was the expectation of the victorious European nations that reparation payments could and would be made by Germany (and the other vanquished countries) sufficient in amount to cover their own expenditures on reconstruction of devastated areas and rehabilitation of soldiers and also to enable them to discharge the debts which they owed to one another and most largely to the United States.[1] Germany and her confederates were compelled by the peace treaties, as we know, to promise large reparation payments, and through subsequent negotiations the European Allies agreed to a schedule of debt payments to the United States. But it was one thing to promise and quite another thing to keep the promises.

Reparations and Inter-Allied Debts

Relatively little in the way of reparations was actually forthcoming from Austria, Hungary, or Bulgaria. These states were so reduced in area and resources, and so hemmed in by tariff barriers which their neighbors erected against them, that, if they were to escape internal bankruptcy, they would have to receive, rather than give, financial assistance abroad. Bulgaria was a

[1] These so-called "inter-allied debts" included large loans which Great Britain made to her Continental Allies during the first three years of the World War and still larger loans which the United States made to Great Britain, France, and Italy (and other Allies) during the last year of the war and just after the armistice. The American loans totalled over eleven billion dollars.

GOVT. GIRLS C
SRINAGA

very poor country anyway, and Austria and Hungary were no longer the hubs of an extensive and fairly prosperous imperial domain. Hungary was now a petty agricultural country without ports or markets, while Austria lacked means of sustaining her overgrown urban population at Vienna. Very soon the finances of both Austria and Hungary were so wrecked by inflation that the League of Nations felt obliged to arrange for foreign loans to them.

Insolvency of Austria, Hungary

In the case of Germany, from which the creditor nations naturally expected most, the payment of reparations involved manifold difficulties. The German people were not minded to pay reparations at all. They felt that the promise to pay had been extorted from them under duress and they resented its coupling with the allegation that they were "guilty" of the war. They and their government would pay only what they were compelled to pay. And in compelling Germany to pay, the Reparations Commission which represented the several creditor nations had its hands full.

Problem of Making Germany Pay

The Allies—and the Reparations Commission—took the stand immediately after the war that Germany must be made to pay the most that she could pay, and yet nobody knew just how much that might be; the estimates of economists were far more modest than those of statesmen, especially of French statesmen. No precise amount had been fixed by the peace treaty, and the resulting uncertainty was troublesome and exasperating. It sharpened the rivalry among the Allies for preferential treatment of their respective claims, and at the same time it retarded Germany's economic recovery and lessened her ability to pay. In 1920, after much haggling, the Allies agreed, at an international conference at Spa, upon a percentage division of whatever reparation payments Germany could be compelled to make.[1] Then, in 1921, after more haggling, the Reparations Commission fixed the total German indemnity at thirty-two billion dollars.

There remained no little doubt as to whether Germany really could pay this staggering sum, and no little perplexity as to how she would pay it if she could. It was argued at first that she would pay a considerable part of it in kind, that is, by giving her creditors coal, locomotives, textile machinery, and other products of

[1] According to the agreement at Spa, France would have 52 per cent, Great Britain 22, Italy 10, Belgium 8, and the others 8.

her mines and factories; and in fact she did make some payments in kind. The more she thus paid, however, the louder grew the complaints in Allied countries that they were being deprived of markets for their own goods; and presently the Allied governments called a halt on payments in kind from Germany.

Money payments were supposed to constitute the major part of the indemnity, but they could be made by Germany only if she enjoyed a favorable balance of trade, that is, if her exports exceeded her imports. But this condition was very difficult of attainment. Russia, which had formerly provided a valuable market for German manufactures, was now in chaos and virtually closed to economic penetration from the outside world. Germany no longer possessed overseas colonies or "spheres of influence" where her goods might receive preferential treatment. Moreover, neighboring Poland was entering into economic competition with Germany, levying high tariffs against German imports and diverting her own exports from customary German routes to a newly established route across the Polish "corridor." For a brief time, such handicaps to German enterprise were partially offset by currency inflation, which artificially stimulated Germany's production and enabled her to undersell her chief competitors—Britain, France, and the United States—even in their home markets. But these countries soon erected additional tariff walls against the flood of "cheap" German goods, while within Germany inflation reached such a stage that the currency became practically worthless.

Already, in the latter part of 1922, Germany had declared her inability to meet her financial obligations to the Allies and had requested a two-year moratorium. The British government, anxious to expedite the resumption of normal commercial relationships, gave favorable ear to the request, but the French government, then presided over by Raymond Poincaré, resolved to apply force. Wherefore, in January 1923, a French army crossed the Rhine and took possession of the rich mining region of the Ruhr, the very nerve-centre of Germany's industrial life. The event proved sorry for all concerned. The Germans, outraged by the hostile incursion and yet unable to oppose it by force of arms, were welded together in patriotic fervor and in stubborn determination to pursue a policy of passive resistance

German Default and French Occupation of Ruhr, 1923

to French demands, even if such a policy meant the economic ruin of their own country. The French, on the other hand, were scandalized by the general strike which almost completely paralyzed industry in the Ruhr and indicated Germany's purpose to prevent the collection of reparations, and they were still more scandalized by the eventual discovery that their expedition into the Ruhr cost them more money than they got out of it. By the autumn of 1923, it was obvious, even to the French, that Germany's economic life was in dissolution and that the reparation arrangements would have to be revised.

In 1924, therefore, as a result of international negotiations and of deliberations by a commission of economic experts headed by an American banker, Charles Dawes, new arrangements were agreed to by the Allies on one side and by Germany on the other. There was no change in the total amount of the German indemnity, but it was made payable over a long period of time in annual installments and in accordance with special regulations to be administered by a neutral "agent-general for reparation payments." Simultaneously Germany cancelled her inflated currency and, at great cost to a large part of her population, restored the pre-war mark and instituted new taxes, while France withdrew her armed forces from the Ruhr and awaited the flow of money from Germany.

For a time the "Dawes Plan" gave promise of working well. German industry quickened, and reparation payments were made promptly. But the plan was admittedly only a temporary expedient, and there were serious flaws in it. Germans were impatient with the close regulation of their domestic affairs by foreigners, a regulation which threatened to be interminable, and they insisted that the total amount of the indemnity was beyond all reason and must be pared down. With this latter contention there was considerable sympathy in most Allied countries, especially in Great Britain and the United States, but all the European Allies and particularly France were anxious to couple with any reduction of the debt which Germany owed them a corresponding reduction of the debts which they owed to the United States. In the United States, however, the government and the weight of public opinion opposed any cancellation of the inter-allied debts and supported a tariff protectionism which further handicapped the debtor nations.

Dawes Plan, 1924

In 1929 a second commission of economic experts, under the chairmanship of another American financier, Owen Young, met at Paris and recommended a radical revision of the "Dawes Plan" of reparation payments. The total amount of such payments would be reduced by three-fourths—from thirty-two billion dollars to eight billion—and the payments would be made by Germany during a term of fifty-eight years without direct foreign supervision. These recommendations, together with a provision for complete and immediate Allied evacuation of the Rhineland, were embodied in an international agreement signed at The Hague early in 1930.

Young Plan, 1929

By this time, however, a world-wide economic depression of the most serious kind had set in, and German national sentiment was solidly inimical to further payment of reparations. In 1931, the creditors of Germany felt obliged to grant her a moratorium, and in 1932, through an international conference at Lausanne, they finally expressed their willingness to fix the remaining German indemnity at the modest figure of 700 million dollars if the United States would agree to a corresponding slashing of the inter-allied debts. The United States would not agree, but in the industrial paralysis of the time the Allies ceased paying anything to the United States or receiving anything from Germany. Practically, both reparations and inter-allied debts were thus wiped off the slate of international accounting, but only after they had grievously impaired the economic stability of the world.

Collapse of Reparations and Inter-Allied Debts

Complicating the situation was the continuing heavy expenditure of most governments not only on industrial and agricultural reconstruction but also on armaments. Instability and uncertainty in national finance combined with fierce and distrustful nationalism to foster governmental fear and popular alarm in respect of foreign nations and hence to sustain and even intensify the international rivalry in armaments. Naval rivalry was accentuated between the United States and Japan, between the United States and Great Britain, and likewise between France and Italy. Moreover, big armies were maintained by France and Italy, and relatively big ones were built up by the newly created or unified states of central and eastern Europe. Even in Germany, where, in accordance with the treaty of Versailles, the regular army was

Heavy Expenditure on Armaments

greatly restricted, a rapidly growing number of men received military training in national militia or in semi-private organizations. All this cost money. And the cost, in turn, contributed still more to economic instability within nations as well as to ill-feeling among nations. It was all a vicious circle.

Certain social consequences of the general economic developments of the post-war decade should be remarked. The traditional titled aristocracy, as a class, suffered serious losses. Throughout eastern Europe, they were shorn of much of their landed wealth and political influence. In Russia they were dispossessed altogether of their property and either put to death or driven into more or less penurious exile. In Germany and Austria they were stripped of special privileges and largely supplanted in public office by commoners. In Rumania, Poland, and other states of east-central Europe, they bowed to the threat of popular revolution and acquiesced in a series of land-reforms which transferred large portions of their ancestral estates into peasant farms.

European Social Classes in Post-War Era: Landed Aristocracy

The peasantry, speaking generally, profited—at any rate temporarily. The war increased the demand for farm products, and the economic instability succeeding the war proved less disturbing to agriculture than to manufacturing. In particular, the depreciated currency of most European countries enabled peasants to pay off mortgages on their holdings at the very time when in several countries new land legislation was enabling them to add to their holdings. For some years after the war it seemed as though the greater part of continental Europe was undergoing a social transformation in the direction of peasant proprietorship of land and as though the newly emancipated farmers, by means of coöperative enterprise, would make significant contributions to the stability and conservatism of European society and perhaps in the long run to the orderly economic reconstruction of the world. Yet there were many gradations in European "peasantry." Some peasants were mere agricultural laborers without land of their own and utterly dependent on a highly disorganized and uncertain labor market. Others had holdings too small to be of profit to themselves under the most auspicious circumstances. Those who were the best off were handicapped by increasing burdens of taxation, direct or in-

Peasantry

direct, and by decreasing stability in finance, trade, and industry.

Among the middle classes—or bourgeoisie—a distinction must be made. A group of financiers and investors, together with captains of certain key industries—collectively the *haute bourgeoisie*—amassed handsome personal fortunes, in part from war-time "profiteering" and in part from post-war speculation. On the other hand, the lower middle class—professional men and salaried employes and many shopkeepers—suffered greatly from the general economic instability and especially, just after the war, from depreciated currency and resulting inflation. In Germany, inflation reached such an extreme in 1923 as to render valueless the bonds which had been issued during the war and which were held principally by the middle class. In France, inflation was not quite so drastic in effect, but it sufficed by 1926 to reduce by four-fifths the principal and income of domestic stocks and bonds. And Russia's repudiation of all her foreign indebtedness added to the difficulties. Altogether, throughout the greater part of continental Europe, the lower middle class saw its savings wiped out and its pensions and insurance reduced to zero. The economic instability of this class promoted its political instability and tended to make the class as a whole impatient with democratic government and receptive to dictatorship.

Bourgeoisie

Post-war developments were beneficial to some of the industrial proletariat and injurious to others. In Russia the entire class was peculiarly favored by the Communist revolution; its major efforts were directed in their behalf. In Germany, at least for a time, the artificial stimulation of industrial enterprise by reparation payment and inflation assured full employment to urban workers, while Socialist participation in the country's government guarantied the maintenance of favorable labor-legislation. In France and Belgium, too, the rebuilding of devastated areas provided gainful employment for workingmen. On the other hand, the unsettled conditions in commerce and manufacturing reacted unfavorably upon workingmen almost everywhere. Feverish activity quickly alternated with depression and unemployment, and increase of wages hardly kept pace with increasing cost of living. In Austria, the peace treaties deprived industrialized Vienna of usual markets, with terrible economic consequences to proletariat as well as to bour-

Industrial Proletariat

geoisie. In Italy, proletarian distress was evidenced immediately after the war by an epidemic of strikes and a contagion of Communist agitation. In Great Britain, an army of unemployed men, aggregating two million in 1921, was being supported by government doles and public taxation.

Economic and Social Instability

Economic instability, with its fateful effects on the traditional social classes of Europe, made for political instability. The democratic governments which had been strengthened or newly established in 1919–1920, when relief from the bloodletting of the World War brought on a brief reign of optimism, encountered a rising tide of criticism and popular disfavor as the stern realities of economic reconstruction gave rise to a new sense of pessimism.

Marxian Socialism

In the circumstances, Marxian socialism appeared to numerous Europeans to promise the most practical way of escape. It had been growing and spreading its influence before the war. It had taken possession of Russia during the war. It now had larger followings than ever before in Germany, Austria, France, Italy, and Great Britain. It might soon, some hoped and others feared, replace everywhere merely democratic governments with socialist governments. Yet, Marxian socialism after the World War was no longer the single well-knit international movement which it had been before the war.

"Reformists" *vs.* "Direct Action"

One large fraction of Socialists was now thoroughly committed to "reformist" tactics—emphasis on political democracy and the evolutionary character of social change, willingness to collaborate with bourgeois reformers, and recognition of the special claims of national patriotism. The other large fraction was now quite devoted to "direct-action" (or syndicalist) tactics—revolutionary seizure of power by industrial workers, forceful socialization of industry through a "proletarian dictatorship," uncompromising opposition to the bourgeoisie, and minimizing of political (though not necessarily cultural) nationalism.[1] The former comprised the "regular" majority parties of Social Democrats in most countries of central and western Europe. These had much to do with guiding the democratic revolutions of 1919–1920 and with operating the resultant governments, and for mutual coöperation in forwarding

[1] On differences between right-wing "Reformists" and left-wing "Syndicalists" before the World War, see above, pp. 272–274.

their program of radical but hardly revolutionary social reform they reconstituted the international organization—the "Second International"—which the war had disrupted. The "direct-action" Socialists, on the other hand, comprised the successfully revolutionary (Bolshevik or Communist) party in Russia and imitative minority parties which sprang up in other countries and took the title of Communist to distinguish themselves from the "Social Democrats." In 1919 they formed at Moscow a world organization of their own, in open rivalry with the "Second International," and known therefore as the "Third (or Communist) International."

Social Democrats *vs.* Communists

Rival efforts of "Communists" and "Social Democrats" to capture the urban proletariat were attended by mutual recriminations. Communists accused Social Democrats of condoning the exploitation of the masses. Social Democrats accused Communists of sabotaging efforts at general amelioration. There was undoubtedly a drift after 1920, wherever economic instability was most pronounced, from Social Democracy to Communism.

Nevertheless, it was not Marxian Communism which eventually, outside Russia, made for dictatorship. Rather, it was nationalism, which gathered together under its banners critics of democracy, foes of Marxism, and victims of economic insecurity. How actually the advance of political democracy was halted and turned back by the development of nationalist dictatorships in central Europe, as well as of Communist dictatorship in Russia, we shall discuss in the following chapter.

CHAPTER XXVI

DEMOCRACIES AND DICTATORSHIPS

UROPE, at the close of the World War, seemed to be committed to political democracy. Twenty years afterwards, the situation was obviously different.

Democratic government, to be sure, still subsisted in a fringe of countries on the Atlantic seaboard—Great Britain, France, Scandinavia, Belgium, and the Netherlands. It was still flourishing in Switzerland and overseas in the United States and the British Dominions. But most of central and eastern Europe, and much of the outside world had already repudiated liberal democracy in favor of some novel kind of dictatorship. In Russia and the lands attached to her, the dictatorship was Communist. In Italy, Germany, and the lesser countries of central Europe, and likewise in Turkey, Persia, and Japan, the dictatorship was Nationalist.

In some quarters, the rapid rise and spread of dictatorship was interpreted as a temporary result of economic crisis and social unrest following the World War, a result which would gradually pass with the inevitable return to "normalcy." In other quarters it was interpreted as a "realistic" demand for the accomplishment of reforms which "romantic" democracy had proved itself unable to achieve, and therefore as ushering in a new and perduring kind of political action. Without endorsing either interpretation, let us survey European politics during the post-war period, treating of the new dictatorships, the surviving democracies, and the waverings, in certain countries, between the two.

The first of the dictatorships in point of time, and the one which has gone farthest in socialist experimentation is the Russian "dictatorship of the proletariat." To it we devote the first section of the present chapter.

I. COMMUNIST DICTATORSHIP IN RUSSIA

From March to November 1917, Russia was presided over, as we have elsewhere explained,[1] by a revolutionary "provisional government," desirous of establishing political democracy as well as of prosecuting the World War, but quite unable to agree upon any effective program of internal social reform. Indeed, by November 1917 this provisional government was so divided in its counsels, so uncertain as to what it should or could do, and so devoid of any large popular support that it was at the mercy of a mere handful of resolute persons well organized and fearlessly led. Which explains why it was then actually overthrown by the Bolshevik faction of Marxian Socialists.[2]

Bolshevik Leaders

Marxian Socialists comprised a very small part of the vast Russian population, and of that part the Bolshevik faction was hardly a half.[3] Yet what the Bolsheviks lacked in numbers they compensated for in leadership, in definiteness of purpose, and in tactical resourcefulness.

Lenin

The outstanding leader of the Bolsheviks was Vladimir Ulyanov (1870–1924), popularly known by his pen-name of N. Lenin. He belonged to a middle-class family, and as a law student at the University of Kazan he had become an ardent disciple of Karl Marx—a discipleship in which he was confirmed by the execution of his older brother for complicity in a plot against the Tsar Alexander III (1891). In 1894, the year of the accession of the Tsar Nicholas II, young Ulyanov—or Lenin—undertook Marxian propaganda in St. Petersburg, for which he was imprisoned and then exiled for three years to Siberia. This exile he utilized to write a book on Russian capitalism, which subsequently attracted considerable attention in Socialist circles. From 1900 to 1917 Lenin made his headquarters in Switzerland, with the exception of the two years (1905–1907) when revolutionary disturbances in Russia invited and enabled him to return home. Wherever he was, he directed a tireless agitation in behalf of Marxian socialism and (after 1903) of its Bolshevik wing. Lenin was undersized, with a wide forehead and piercing eyes. He had great driving force, and, with an iron will

[1] See above, pp. 607–608.

[2] See above, pp. 611–613.

[3] On the two factions of Marxian Socialists in Russia before 1917—the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks—and on the rival "Social Revolutionaries," see above, p. 479.

and a fanaticism about the ends he sought, he combined a keen sense of political expediency. It was this man who returned finally to Russia in April 1917 and who, by converting the St. Petersburg "soviet of workers and soldiers" to his views, managed to precipitate the revolution of November 1917 and to inaugurate a dictatorship of his own.

Trotsky

Lenin had several capable lieutenants, of whom two merit special mention. Levi Bronstein (or Leon Trotsky as he called himself) was a flaming person who came of a middle-class Jewish family and was educated at the University of Odessa. Arrested as a revolutionary and exiled to Siberia, he had escaped in 1902 to western Europe where he made the acquaintance of Lenin, though he then sympathized more with the Menshevik Socialists than with the Bolsheviks. Trotsky returned to Russia in 1905 and took an active part in the St. Petersburg soviet of that period. Then, after a second arrest and exile to Siberia, he escaped again and led a roving existence. From Paris he was expelled for pacifist agitation in 1916, and from New York, where he briefly found refuge, he sailed in March 1917 for Russia, arriving at St. Petersburg shortly after Lenin. Here, during the ensuing summer, he definitely cast his lot with the Bolsheviks and played a rôle hardly second to Lenin's in preparing the way for the November revolution.

Stalin

Joseph Stalin, the son of a Georgian peasant shoemaker in the Caucasus, was no such theorist as the middle-class Trotsky or Lenin, but he was a sturdy and persistent propagandist of the latter's doctrines. Dismissed from an Orthodox seminary in 1896, when he was seventeen years of age, for "unreliability and lack of religious vocation," he joined the extremist Socialist group, and thenceforth until 1917 he waged implacable warfare with the Tsarist régime, suffering frequent arrests, imprisonments, and Siberian exiles, but never seeking escape abroad and always fomenting Bolshevik agitation within Russia.

Bolshevik Program, 1917–1918

Lenin's party of professed Bolsheviks was small when he seized power in November 1917, but his program was calculated to enlist popular support. He proclaimed that his dictatorship was a "dictatorship of the proletariat," including workers, peasants, and soldiers; and upon each of these numerous classes he proposed to confer immediate benefits. In behalf of the industrial workers, he decreed the con-

fiscation of private factories and their transformation into government institutions, with shop committees of workers in control of production, purchase, and sale. In behalf of the peasants, he decreed the expropriation of landlords and the nationalization of the land, with peasant-communities in charge of its partition and use. In behalf of the war-weary soldiers, he took Russia out of the World War and concluded with the Central Powers the treaty of Brest-Litovsk (March 1918).[1] He also issued, in November 1917, a "Declaration of the Rights of Peoples," recognizing the principle of cultural nationalism and promising to accord to subject peoples in Russia the right of national self-determination.

This program appealed to numerous soviets which had been set up all over Russia during 1917, and through them Lenin extended Bolshevik sway beyond St. Petersburg and Moscow to the country at large. At first there was a good deal of opposition, not merely from habitual supporters of the Tsardom—bureaucrats, army officers, nobles, and Orthodox clergymen—but also from many Constitutional Democrats ("Cadets") among the bourgeoisie and from the radical parties of Social Revolutionaries and Menshevik Socialists. Indeed, anti-Bolsheviks obtained a majority of seats in the Constituent Assembly which had been provided for in 1917 (prior to Lenin's seizure of power),[2] and which met at Moscow in January 1918. The Bolshevik central government, however, denounced the democratically elected Assembly as an agency of "reaction," and Bolshevik soldiers broke it up, while Bolshevik soviets throughout the country, representing at the time only a minority of the population, albeit a determined minority, terrorized the majority.

Rejection of Democratic Assembly, 1918

The Bolsheviks were resolved to achieve a thorough social revolution, and against "reaction" of any sort they struck hard. "Direct action" was employed against recalcitrant nobles and capitalists and against army officers and bureaucrats of the old régime; such as could not flee were put to death. Energetic measures were taken, in accordance with a decree of January 1918, to disestablish the Orthodox Church in Russia and to silence all Christian clergymen. In July 1918 the Tsar Nicholas II, his wife, and children, who had been held under guard at Ekaterinburg (near the Urals), were slaugh-

Execution of Tsar, 1918

[1] See above, p. 613.

[2] See above, p. 608.

tered by order of the local soviet. And against all dissident political groups, even that of the Menshevik Socialists, Bolshevik soldiers and revolutionary tribunals conducted a veritable reign of terror. A considerable part of the opposition was won over, or at any rate was frightened into passivity, but thousands were killed and other thousands escaped death only by flight abroad.

Terrorism

The terrorism was aggravated by the hostility with which most of the outside world viewed the Bolshevik dictatorship in Russia.

German Interference, 1918

During and immediately after the negotiations for the treaty of Brest-Litovsk (March 1918), the Germans interfered most actively in Russia. Their purpose was to strengthen their own military position and to prevent the spread of Communism in central Europe. They extracted from the Bolshevik government a formal promise not to countenance subversive propaganda in the Central Powers. They encouraged leaders of the "liberated" border countries to set up anti-Bolshevik governments quite free of Russia and dependent on Germany. Not until the final military collapse of the Central Powers in November 1918 were the Russian Bolsheviks relieved of the menace of German intervention.

But already the Allies were intervening. Statesmen and leading citizens of France, Great Britain, Japan, and the United States were infuriated by the actions of the Bolshevik dictatorship in withdrawing from the war, in making a separate peace, in repudiating Russia's foreign debts, and in preaching a world-wide social revolution. Allied intervention in Russia began in March 1918 as a war measure against Germany. Refusing to acknowledge the treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the Allies declined to recognize the government which agreed to it, and enforced an economic blockade against Russia. Moreover, they landed "expeditionary forces" at Murmansk, the single ice-free port of Russia on the Arctic Ocean, at Vladivostok in eastern Siberia, and at Odessa on the Black Sea.

Allied Intervention, 1918–1919

Under protection of the Allied expeditions, various Russian generals of the old régime collected against the "red" armies of the Bolsheviks several "white" armies of the opposition and precipitated civil war within Russia. Thus Allied intervention, beginning as a war measure against Germany, speedily assumed the character of a domestic and

Domestic Revolt

foreign crusade of the forces of capitalism (and perhaps democracy) against the forces of socialism (and revolutionary dictatorship). For a time, toward the close of 1918 and throughout 1919, it seemed as if Lenin's government would be unable to cope with foreign intervention and domestic revolt. Allied troops, reënforced by Russian malcontents, captured Archangel in the north, occupied the Crimean peninsula in the south, and overran the greater part of Siberia from the east. From the Crimea, General Denikin, perhaps the ablest of the anti-Bolshevik leaders, advanced in the direction of Moscow; while at Omsk, in western Siberia, members of the dissolved Constituent Assembly set up an anti-Bolshevik government as the legal successor to Kerensky's "provisional government" of 1917, and this was supported by forces under the command of Admiral Kolchak.

Gradually, however, the Bolsheviks got the upper hand. They were favored by the personal ambition and rivalry of the opposing generals and by the chronic dissensions between such of their followers as advocated the establishment of a democratic republic and such as wanted a restoration of the Tsardom. There was no like uncertainty among the Bolsheviks as to what they expected to do, and with singleness of purpose they combined a fanaticism, a ruthlessness, and withal an adroitness of popular appeal and an adeptness at military organization which were of inestimable advantage to them. Leon Trotsky, as Lenin's Commissar of War, proved himself the man of the hour. He enflamed the masses of Russian peasants and workers with hatred of the "whites" as agents of "reaction," and though the "red" soldiers whom he rallied to the defense of the Bolshevik dictatorship were often ragged and poorly armed, they were much more numerous by the end of 1919, and far more enthusiastic, than their foes.

Bolshevik Resistance

The Bolsheviks were also favored by the fact that foreign governments, no matter how much they might detest Lenin's Socialist régime, were in no position at the close of the World War to conduct extensive military operations in Russia. Germany certainly was impotent. France, which had most at stake in the way of financial investments, was too war-weary and too occupied with penalizing Germany to undertake forceful debt collection in Russia. Great Britain was restrained by a multiplicity of other imperial concerns and by the

Foreign Impotence

attitude of the rapidly growing Labor party at home. Japan was more interested in obtaining privileges in nearby China than in overthrowing a government in faraway European Russia.

The result was the withdrawal of Allied expeditionary forces, from northern Russia in the autumn of 1919, and from Siberia in the spring of 1920. Then, with the loss of active Allied support, the anti-Bolshevik rebellions in Russia collapsed or were suppressed. Admiral Kolchak had to surrender Omsk in November 1919, and in the following February he was captured and shot at Irkutsk. As for General Denikin, his early successes were followed by reverses, and by his flight to Constantinople.

For a while longer, France sought to incite peoples on the Russian border to fight the Bolsheviks. In 1920 she encouraged the desire of Poland for territorial expansion eastward and egged her on to attack Russia. At the same time France enabled a Russian émigré, Baron Wrangel by name, to raise another "white" army and renew General Denikin's attempt to invade southern Russia. And some nationalistic Ukrainians took the field in alliance with Wrangel and the Poles.

Polish Effort and Failure, 1920

At first the Franco-Polish effort promised success, but in July 1920 the "red" armies of Bolshevik Russia defeated the Poles and drove them back to the very gates of Warsaw. Here the Poles rallied and defeated the Russians, but they were no longer sanguine of ultimate victory. So Poland agreed to an armistice, and later, in March 1921 at Riga, concluded a peace treaty with Russia. Meanwhile, in the autumn of 1920, "red" armies overwhelmed the "white" forces in the Crimea and obliged General Wrangel to follow General Denikin into exile at Constantinople, while other "red" armies, in conjunction with Bolshevik Ukrainians, put an end to the "independence" of Ukrainia.

Bolshevik Mastery of Russia, 1921

By 1921 the authority of the Bolshevik government was not seriously disputed in Russia. Domestic opposition was suppressed and foreign intervention stopped. In 1922, moreover, Germany formally recognized the Bolshevik dictatorship, and presently the Allies followed suit: Great Britain, France, and Italy in 1924; the United States ultimately in 1934.

But if foreign countries failed to destroy Marxian socialism in Russia, the Russian Bolsheviks failed to revolutionize the world

at large. They continued to preach Communism abroad and to intrigue through the international federation (the "Third International," or "Kominturn") which they had formed at Moscow in 1919 of the several Communist parties in Europe and overseas. Nevertheless, outside the confines of the former Russian Empire, only Hungary experienced an actual Bolshevik dictatorship, and then very briefly.[1] Communist minorities were vocal and active elsewhere, but the most threatening ones were circumvented and silenced, as we shall presently see in the cases of Italy and Spain.

The principle of nationality was respected by the Russian Bolsheviks. They sanctioned the right of national self-determination, and accordingly agreed, as we have already pointed out,[2] to a shrinkage of Russia's territorial dominion. Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland were recognized by a series of peace treaties, in 1921–1922, as independent nations with non-Bolshevik governments of their own choosing. Bessarabia was suffered, with only formal protests from Russia, to unite with Rumania. "Spheres of influence" and special privileges which the Tsar's government had obtained in Turkey and Persia, were renounced. To cap the climax, the constitution of Bolshevik Russia was based on a "Treaty of Union" concluded in July 1923 by representatives of the major nationalities in what remained of the former Russian Empire.

Territorial Losses

By this treaty, the "Russian Empire" was supplanted by a "Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," comprising (at first) four and subsequently (in 1936) eleven states: (1) the Russian (that is, Great Russian), with its capital at Moscow; (2) the White Russian, with its capital at Minsk, (3) the Ukrainian (or Little Russian), with its capital at Kiev; (4) the Armenian, (5) the Georgian, (6) the Azerbaijan, these three being in Transcaucasia; (7) the Turcoman, (8) the Uzbek, (9) the Tajik, these three being in southern Turkestan; (10) the Khirgiz, in eastern Turkestan; and (11) the Kazak, covering a large expanse of northern Turkestan and southwestern Siberia from the Caspian Sea to Mongolia. The Russian was, of course, the largest and most important of these states; it contained nearly two-thirds of the population and three-fourths of the area of the entire Union. Regardless of size, nevertheless, each state was

Soviet Union, 1923

[1] On the Bolshevik dictatorship of Béla Kun in Hungary, see above, pp. 629–630.

[2] See above, pp. 645–646.

treated as a national entity and pledged to accord cultural rights to still smaller nationalities within its borders. Altogether, by 1936, some thirty-three groups were officially recognized as "nations" within the Union and encouraged to foster their several national cultures.

The Treaty of Union of 1923 also prescribed the form of government which should obtain both in the federal state and in its constituent parts. Nominally, it was democratic. Local soviets chose deputies to regional soviets, and these were represented in Congresses of Soviets for the several federated states and also in the All-Union Congress of Soviets for the entire federation. The All-Union Congress, which in theory was the supreme governing body of Communist Russia, comprised about two thousand delegates thus indirectly chosen by the majority of the people. The All-Union Congress, however, was too large and unwieldy to exercise real power. Its actual functions were to assemble once in two years, to listen to reports, to ratify acts of government, and to elect a Central Executive Committee to which the cabinet—the Council of People's Commissars—was supposedly responsible.

Form of Government

The government of the several states was modelled after the Union's, with local and regional soviets, with central Congress, Executive Committee, and Council. Each state might enact laws concerning matters of local justice, health, and education, but the Union might annul any state legislation at variance with its own.

In practice, the democracy of Communist government, whether of the Union or of its federated states, was largely nullified. Certain categories of citizens were expressly disfranchised; and for the rest the indirect and highly complex system of voting was so arranged as to discriminate against the peasant majority of the country and in favor of the working-class minority of the cities. There was also the all-important rôle of the Communist party.

Single Communist Party

No political party other than the Communist might exist in Russia, and no person might belong to the Communist party unless he avowed an unquestioning faith in the principles of Marx and Lenin, promised strict obedience to the party discipline, and proved his sincerity and zeal

during a probationary period. Numerically the party was small. At first it was almost infinitesimal, and though it grew as success attended Lenin's policies, it embraced as late as 1935 only two and a half million persons, a slight fraction of the whole Russian population. Of its membership, over two-thirds were urban workingmen. Peasants (still the vast majority of the nation) constituted less than a fifth of the Communist party, and professional men less than a seventh.

The organization of the Communist party resembled that of the Union. Party "cells," in factories, offices, and villages, were represented in regional committees, which sent deputies to an All-Union Party Congress, which in turn elected a Central Committee, with its supreme "political bureau" of nine members. This "political bureau" proposed the major policies of Communist Russia, and after securing their endorsement by the Party Congress it utilized the party machinery to ensure their adoption and enforcement by the government. In practice, slight distinction prevailed between the party and the government.

The Communist party was the only organized group which could put up candidates for government office. It alone had the means of enforcing its will and of silencing opposition. It controlled the "red army." It directed a drastic censorship of the press and of public meetings. It dominated an extraordinary tribunal for the summary trial and execution of its opponents.

The Cheka, as this revolutionary tribunal was originally styled, was formally abolished in 1922. But the next year it was revived, under the initials OGPU, as a "third section of the police," with a staff of 45,000 agents. Under either title, it might arbitrarily seize, imprison, exile, or sentence to death any persons suspected of "counter-revolutionary" (that is, anti-Communist) tendencies in politics or economics. "Shooting," said one of the party leaders, "is the highest measure of social defense." And year after year, not only during the period of uncertainty from 1918 to 1921 but also afterwards when the Communist régime seemed to be firmly established in Russia, thousands were imprisoned without any hearing and other thousands were shot without any public trial. Tsarist

Cheka and OGPU

methods of repression were improved upon by the Communists. Persons too tepid in their devotion to the new dictatorship as well as persons too heated in their opposition to it were mercilessly put to death.

Dictator

Within the Communist party and therefore within the Soviet government was a supreme dictator—the man who, through his personal influence and with the aid of revolutionary tribunal, red army, censorship, and party discipline, could actually rule as few despots in history have been able to rule. He had to have the wholehearted support of a compact group, such as the core of the Communist party provided, but, once assured of this, he was in a position to make his will prevail throughout the huge Russian domain.

Lenin, then Stalin

First the dictator was Lenin, who held the two posts of President of the Council of Commissars in the government and President of the Political Bureau in the party. By 1922, however, Lenin was suffering grievously from overwork; he was partially paralyzed and beginning to lose the power of speech. Whereupon ensued a bitter rivalry for the succession between Trotsky, the Commissar of War in the government, and Stalin, the secretary of the Central Committee of the party. Gradually the latter gained the support of the party, which meant the favor of the government, so that when Lenin died, in 1924, Stalin became the acknowledged dictator. Trotsky was immediately dismissed from the Commissariat of War; in 1927 he was expelled from the Communist party; in 1928 he was banished to Turkestan; and in 1929, in danger of his life, he fled abroad. Stalin did not directly preside over the government. He was content to remain as secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist party and chief member of its Political Bureau, and from these party-posts to exercise his virtual dictatorship over the government.

Communist Goal

The central purpose of the Communist dictatorship, whether of Lenin or of Stalin, was to realize in Russia the material and economic millennium promised to the "toiling masses" by Karl Marx. Capitalism would be destroyed. The profit-making motive would be removed. Russian society, instead of comprising a minority of wealthy idlers and a majority of poverty-stricken workers, would consist of a single class, all of whose members would enjoy the fruits of their labor.

Simultaneously, under social ownership and control, the latest and best machinery would be introduced into Russian factories and onto Russian farms, increasing their yield, raising the general standard of living, and endowing all the masses with ever multiplying material comforts.

Practical Difficulties

The first few years of the Communist dictatorship seemed to indicate that no such social millennium would eventuate and that the Russian people at large would actually be in a worse economic plight than they had been under the reign of capitalism and the Tsar. A part of the difficulty was obviously attributable to the fact that the Communists began their experiments when most of Europe, and Russia in particular, was reeling from the effects of the World War. Russia had suffered more from the war than any other country, and her economic life was already seriously disordered before Lenin executed his *coup d'état*. Then, too, we should remember that from 1918 to 1920 Lenin had to devote major energy to fighting off foreign foes and putting down domestic revolts, and that this protracted twofold struggle aggravated the economic distress within Russia. But aside from the handicaps resulting directly from the war and its aftermath, the Russian Communists were confronted with grave obstacles in the conditions and habits of Russian life. The masses of the population were illiterate, ignorant, and quite inexperienced in the technics required to give effect to the elaborate socializing program of the Communists.

Socializing the Land

The Communist dictatorship decreed at the outset the confiscation of private property and the repudiation of debts (domestic and foreign). It was one thing, however, to expropriate and expel noble landlords and bourgeois capitalists, and quite another thing to procure the competent proletarian bureaucracy and the needful public funds for maintaining and developing socialized industry, trade, and agriculture. The peasants were glad to get rid of landlords, but they wanted to appropriate the confiscated lands for themselves rather than for the state. Only a small portion of the land actually came under the direct control of the government; most of it was parcelled out among the peasants as if it were their private property.[1] And the peasant-farmers gave little evidence of

[1] In 1914 there had been sixteen million farms in Russia. In 1929 there were over twenty-five million.

abandoning the profit motive of capitalism or of acting at the mere behest of governmental authorities at Moscow.

Socializing Industry

Large industrial plants were socialized. But the workers in charge of them were more prone to engage in political discussion than in hard labor, and they were neglectful of repairs to machinery. The government attempted to remedy the evil by employing technical experts, even those who were known to be critical of Communism. For some time, nevertheless, the government was unable to maintain industrial production at pre-war levels. Trade with the outside world was cut off. Trade within the country was paralyzed. No adequate funds were available, either from internal taxes or from foreign loans, to replace worn-out machinery in the factories or rolling stock on the railways. With the breakdown of the railways, the diminishing production of farms and mills, and the rapidly swelling number of migratory persons, practically homeless and penniless, a scourge of famine visited Russia in 1921–1922. The grain harvest of 1921 was only two-fifths of the harvest of 1913, and what there was of it could not be expeditiously distributed. The results were frightful in city and countryside. Forty million persons suffered from malnutrition and five million starved to death. Millions more might have perished but for the arrival of foreign relief expeditions.

Famine of 1921–1922

In 1921, on the eve of the great famine and just when civil and internal disturbances were ceasing, Lenin and his Communist colleagues proclaimed a "new economic policy," essentially a compromise between socialism and capitalism. On one hand, socialization would be pressed in respect of big industry and public utilities. On the other hand, foreign as well as Russian engineers would be encouraged by liberal financial rewards to oversee and develop industrial production, private business would be tolerated on a small scale, and the peasants would be permitted to rent land, hire labor, and sell grain to private traders.

NEP, Temporary Compromise, 1922–1928

The New Economic Policy (or NEP, as it was styled) did not prevent the famine, but it undoubtedly contributed to the steady economic rehabilitation which characterized Russia after the famine. The production of pig iron increased from a paltry 115,000 tons in 1920 to 4 million tons in 1928, and in the same period the production of coal increased from 10 million tons to

42 million and that of petroleum from 25 million barrels to 88 million. By 1928, Russia's foreign trade, which had been negligible in 1920, was valued at 867 million dollars, about two-thirds of its value in 1913. Simultaneously, there was notable improvement in the lot of a considerable number of peasants, though "socialized agriculture" made comparatively little headway. By 1928 a million peasants were organized in "collectivist coöperatives," and another million worked on "state farms." Yet state and collective farms together produced less than 2 per cent of the country's grain. That profits were accruing to Russian farmers was evidenced by the growing class of "kulaks," or "rich peasants." [1]

The NEP, in the minds of the Communist leaders, was only a temporary makeshift. They had no intention of establishing a peasant proprietorship in Russia or of favoring agriculture at the expense of industry. They had a predilection for mass production of goods and a fondness, almost a veneration, for the latest mechanical devices. Their fundamental ambition was to transform Russia from an economically "backward" and predominantly agricultural country into a "progressive" and predominantly industrial country. This they would do by means of a "planned economy," a systematic collectivist development of basic industries and an industrialization of agriculture.

Accordingly, and in the light of their experience with the NEP, Stalin and his lieutenants worked out a "Five-Year Plan" and put it into effect from 1928 to 1933. The production of coal was increased from 42 million tons to 77 million; pig iron, from 4 million tons to 7 million; petroleum, from 88 million barrels to 150 million.[2] Besides, new blast furnaces, automobile and tractor plants, and machine-shops were erected, and the supply of electric power was almost tripled. Much progress was made, moreover, in socializing and mechanizing agriculture. More than 200,000 "collective farms" were

First Five-Year Plan, 1928–1933

[1] It was over the kulaks that Trotsky and Stalin quarreled after the death of Lenin. Trotsky demanded an immediate "drive" against the kulaks and an intensive socialization of the land. Stalin, fearful of precipitating a class war among the peasants, contended that the kulaks should be tolerated for a time.

[2] In 1928 the Soviet Union stood sixth among the nations of the world in coal production, sixth in pig-iron production, and third in petroleum production. In 1933 it had advanced to fourth in coal production (after the United States, Great Britain, and Germany), third in pig-iron production (after the United States and France), and second in petroleum production (after the United States).

organized and over 800 million dollars were invested in farm machinery. The share of the country's grain production which "socialized" farming furnished was raised much above the 2 per cent of 1928, though it fell considerably short of the 40 per cent contemplated by the Five-Year Plan.

Later Five-Year Plans

From 1933 to 1938 a Second Five-Year Plan still further increased the output of coal, iron, petroleum, electric power, and the socialization of agriculture. It also put new emphasis on the improvement of internal transportation and on the manufacture of goods for popular consumption. There followed a Third Five-Year Plan.

Education and Propaganda

The progressive gains in socializing and mechanizing Russia under the "New Economic Policy" and the "Five-Year Plans" were aided and fortified by attendant educational and propagandist activities of the Communist dictatorship. Lenin and Stalin and their chief associates in the Communist party understood perfectly well that unless the masses were inspired with an enthusiastic, even fanatical, attachment to the new order, mere decrees of the Soviet government would be without lasting effect. A socialistically trained citizenship was as necessary as economic planning.

Suppressing Dissent

From the outset, the Communist dictatorship had banned any education or propaganda in Russia which might have purposes at variance with its own. Dissident political groups were dissolved, and the dissemination of their ideas was prohibited and rigorously penalized. Newspapers multiplied in Russia under the Soviet régime, but only orthodox Communist opinions might be expressed in them. Radios and cinemas spread rapidly, but they too might not be agencies of "reaction." The universities and learned societies of Tsarist times were retained and enlarged, but they were purged of scholars unsympathetic with Communism and newly staffed with persons willing to interpret their subjects according to Marxian principles. Museums and art galleries and theatres were kept open, and the common people were encouraged to attend them; so as not to cripple them, they were permitted to retain many of their former officials and actors but these were scrupulously watched for any overt hostility to the new order.

The Communist dictatorship was particularly determined to counteract religious influence. The Communist leaders, being

Marxian in philosophy and therefore dogmatically materialist, were not merely indifferent but actively antagonistic to all supernatural religion. To them, historic Christianity of every form was superstitious and worse: it was an instrument of reaction, an opiate of the people, a means of obscuring the realities of this world in a dream of another world. As early as January 1918 the Communist dictatorship decreed the separation of church and state in Russia, the confiscation of all church property, and the suppression of all church schools. Clergymen were disfranchised, and during the ensuing years, as the dictatorship strengthened its hold on the country, the Orthodox Church and all the other Christian bodies—and Judaism and Islam likewise—were reduced to the status of barely tolerated private cults. Many clergymen were exiled or put to death. Many church edifices were transformed into national museums or recreational centres. Public teaching of religion was forbidden. While "groups of believers" were empowered in 1929 to contract with the government for the use of church buildings for exclusive purposes of worship, they were estopped from any other religious activity.

Repressing Christianity

The government, while curbing Christianity, gave free rein and active encouragement to atheistic propaganda. A militant "Society of the Godless" arose and throve, establishing permanent exhibitions of anti-religious paintings and cartoons, holding frequent demonstrations, and conducting a systematic campaign of vituperation against priests and of jeering at religious rites and beliefs. To the younger generation of the Russian masses, the so-called "anti-religious front" of the Communist party and the Society of the Godless mainly addressed themselves, and with much success. The older generation was less affected; many of them persevered in their habitual Christian worship. But with the younger generation cut off from Christian religious instruction and simultaneously exposed to the unrestrained counter-propaganda of atheism, the Communist dictatorship had reason for being optimistic about the outcome. It would be miraculous if in the long run historic religion could impede the fulfillment of the Soviet program, and the only miracles in which the Communist put much stock were those of modern technology.

Encouraging Atheism

Communism was a kind of religion itself. It was not purely

an economic program or a set of political principles. It had a dogmatic philosophy. It promised a millennium—one, to be sure, that was material and secular, but one that was as emotionally attractive as it was problematical. And it inspired its devotees with a faith and an ardor transcending ordinary human experience. Not since the Jacobinism of the French Revolution had there been such an all-compelling non-supernatural religion as was this Russian Communism of the twentieth century. Like the French Jacobins, the Russian Communists evinced the faith within them by a wealth of symbolism and a fever of missionary zeal. They paraded red flags, sang proletarian anthems, addressed one another as comrade, and raised Marx and Lenin to the stature of divinities. The great city of St. Petersburg, which had been patriotically rechristened during the World War as Petrograd, was renamed Leningrad. In the central "Red Square" of the capital city of Moscow was enshrined in 1924 the embalmed body of Lenin as a perpetual object of public worship. In workmen's tenements and peasants' cottages, lithographs of Lenin and Marx were hung, like icons, in the midst of customary candles. The religion of Communism was formal, but it was also very serious and sincere, and, as we have said, very intolerant.

Communism as Religion

If Communism was a substitute for other religions, its "church" was the Communist party. The party was indeed the organized and eager preacher of the new dispensation throughout Russia. For its importance lay not only in its control of the Soviet government and its direction of public policies but also in its missionary labors among the masses, getting them to accept and to coöperate in the achievement of Communist aims. To this end, the party strove especially to convert the youth of the land. It organized as a feeder and auxiliary to itself a "Communist League of Youth" (the so-called "Komsomol"), and for younger children an association of "Communist Pioneers."

For the conversion of the rising generation to Communism, as well as for the assurance of needful literacy to the whole nation, the Communist party and the Soviet government introduced far-reaching educational reforms. Elementary schools were rapidly multiplied in town and country, always under strict governmental control and always with teachers and textbooks of Communist sympathies. In 1931

Educating the Masses

the central government decreed that every child within the Soviet Union must attend a primary Communist school for at least four years, and in 1933 a supplementary decree lengthened the period of compulsory attendance to seven years. For the maintenance and extension of such schools, ever heavier charges were made on the budgets of localities as well as on that of the state. By 1935 Soviet Russia was expending a great deal more on public education than the Tsarist régime had spent.

The Red Army

Another agency of Communist propaganda, as well as of national defense, was the Red Army. This had originally been recruited by Trotsky and had been greatly enlarged by him during the trying days of 1918–1920. After the overthrow of the "white armies" and the failure of foreign intervention, the Red Army had been largely demobilized, and Trotsky's scheme for a well-organized professional army, with a territorial militia, was not immediately realized because of shortage of funds. Under Trotsky's successor, however, a decree of 1925 provided for a permanent Red Army on the theoretical basis of compulsory military training for all able-bodied men between the ages of nineteen and forty. Practically, a selection was made from those liable to serve in the army, both in order to save expense and in order to assure a preponderance of confirmed Communists. By 1935 the Red Army of Soviet Russia was larger than the army of pre-war Germany. About half of the rank-and-file and three-fourths of the officers were full-fledged members of the Communist party or of its affiliated "Communist League of Youth." And the Soviet government's expenditure on army surpassed its expenditure on education.

Experimental Character of Communism

There can be no doubt that under the Communist dictatorship much was done to better the economic condition of the Russian masses, to make them literate, and to elevate their standard of living. There can also be no doubt that the Russian standard of living was still relatively low and that any advance of literacy or improvement of economic condition was attended by most drastic restrictions of the freedom of individual intelligence, initiative, and personality. The Communists promised that these qualities would come to the fore and be amply respected when economic and social equality was fully attained, but there was no little uncertainty outside Communist circles as to whether such equality

would ever be attained. Disparities of station and of opportunity continued to exist in Soviet Russia between leaders and followers, between party comrades and ordinary citizens, between urban proletariat and rural peasantry, between "rich" peasants and extremely poor peasants, between the cunning and the stupid, the thrifty and the shiftless.

Constitution of 1936

A new constitution, adopted at the end of 1936, was widely advertised as strengthening political democracy and broadening personal liberty within the Soviet Union. It did provide for a bicameral parliament (or Council)—one chamber popularly elective, and the other representing the several nationalities—but it left intact the unique position and practical domination of the small Communist party; and its pledges of personal liberty were purely verbal. Not only did the Communist dictatorship continue ruthlessly to repress any opposition or dissent, but it carried on during 1937–1939 a veritable reign of terror against "foreign" influence and a systematic purge of the Communist party itself, executing hundreds of members, including many in high office, on charges ranging from sabotage to treason. Stalin appeared to be guided less by faith in the emancipating principles of Communism than by fear for his own despotic power.

Renewed Terrorism

2. FASCIST DICTATORSHIP IN ITALY

Italy Liberal and Democratic in 1918

At the close of the World War, Italy seemed to be committed, in common with all other nations of central and western Europe, to the perfecting of democratic institutions. In fact, however, Italy was sorely beset with post-war difficulties, more so than any of the other Allies (except Russia). Economic conditions were bad. The country was relatively poor, its industry and trade were disorganized, its agriculture was stagnant, and in the cities unemployment was rife. Public indebtedness had been vastly increased by the war, and post-war budgets showed ever bigger deficits.

Resurgence of Marxian Socialism

Such conditions invited a resurgence of Marxian socialism, with its left wing of revolutionary syndicalism. It was newly inspired and rendered more extreme by the apparent success of Lenin and his "dictatorship of the proletariat" in Russia; and the plight of urban workingmen in Italy, particularly in the north, afforded to its

apostles a favorable seed-ground for their propaganda. Italian Socialists, in the general election of November 1919, secured 156 seats in the Chamber of Deputies (out of a total of 574), and, while they demonstrated in the Chamber against the existing government, they took "direct action" outside parliament against the existing economic and social order. They conducted strikes. They committed sabotage. In some instances they appropriated industrial plants and attempted to operate them.

Another movement, not at all revolutionary in purpose but very troublesome to the government, gathered headway at the same time. This was the rise of a Catholic political party, the so-called Popular party, headed by a Sicilian priest, Luigi Sturzo, and supported by Catholic intellectuals who wished to counteract the traditional hostility of the Liberal régime and by Catholic peasants who were sympathetic with the party's program of democratic social reform, especially with its project of distributing large landed estates among peasant proprietors. In the election of November 1919, the Popular party secured 101 seats in the Chamber.

Catholic Popular Party

Against the Socialists on one side and the Popularists on the other, both with fairly well-defined purposes, the middle-class Liberal majority in the Italian parliament could present no united front. Indeed, the factionalism which had characterized Liberal groups in Italy before the war reappeared in an acute form just at the time when unity and firmness were most needed. In June 1920 the veteran Liberal politician Giolitti contrived to form his fourth ministry.[1] He was an old man, however, and either unable or unwilling to press for any real social reform or to employ armed force against lawlessness and disorder. Internal troubles reached a zenith in the winter of 1920–1921. While Communists kidnapped capitalists, set up "revolutionary tribunals," and armed themselves as "red guards," while strikes paralyzed the metal industries, the railways, and even agriculture, the government remained irresolute and supine.

Impotent Liberal Ministries

Giolitti

In April 1921 Giolitti dissolved parliament and appealed to the country. The ensuing elections only emphasized the radical differences of purpose and method among Italians. The Socialist representation in the Chamber was cut from 156 to 122, but

[1] On Giolitti and his earlier ministries, see above, pp. 422, 426, 427.

alongside the Socialists appeared a definitely Communist party with 16 representatives. The Popularists increased their representation to 107, but a new nationalist group, the Fascist, obtained 35 seats. Liberals were now a quarrelsome minority. In June 1921 Giolitti resigned, but the premiers who succeeded him were mediocre and apparently impotent to halt the growing violence of Communists and Fascists.

Advent of Fascism

The Fascists had abler leadership and larger popular following than the Communists. The latter were becoming too extreme for the majority of Socialists, and they had no leaders of outstanding ability or determination. The Fascists, on the other hand, appeared to a rapidly growing number of Italians as the one bulwark against national disintegration and social chaos, and in Mussolini they possessed a leader both resourceful and resolute.

Mussolini

Benito Mussolini (born in 1883) had been identified during most of his life with left-wing Marxian socialism. His father, a blacksmith, had been a vehement revolutionary and anti-Catholic before him, and he himself had joined the Socialist party in his late teens while he was studying in a normal school. For a time he lived in Switzerland, engaging in Socialist journalism, and organizing Socialist trade unions. Expelled from one canton after another and eventually from the Swiss Confederation, he was patriotic enough to return to Italy for required military training, but his subsequent participation in Socialist agitation cost him an imprisonment in 1908. Shortly afterwards, he betook himself to Trent (then in Austria), where he edited a newspaper in support both of revolutionary Socialism and of Italian irredentism, until the Austrian government suppressed the paper and expelled the editor. Returning to Italy once more, Mussolini espoused revolutionary syndicalism, denounced parliamentary government, and lauded Sorel's advocacy of violence and Nietzsche's plea for the "superman."[1] For opposing the Tripolitan War of 1911–1912, he was imprisoned for five months. This made him a hero in Socialist circles all over Italy, and at the end of 1912 he became editor of the official organ of the Italian Socialist party.

Mussolini's break with the Socialist party began over the question of participation in the World War. The majority of the

[1] On Sorel, see above, pp. 273–274, and on Nietzsche, see above, pp. 262–263.

party leaders opposed participation, while Mussolini favored it. He argued that Italy was a "proletarian nation," committed by the doctrine of class-conflict to war against the "capitalist nation" of Austria-Hungary, and that the surest way of converting the Italian masses to Socialism was to identify it with a national cause.

His Break with Marxian Socialism

Forced out of the editorship of the official Socialist newspaper, he established at Milan a "National Socialist" journal of his own, through whose pages he conducted a strenuous campaign first for Italy's participation in the war and then for working-class coöperation in winning the war. In 1915 he joined the army and served in the trenches as private and corporal until wounded in 1917. Then, back on his newspaper, he zealously combated pacifism, and commenced to inveigh against the "menace" of Russian Bolshevism.

His Personal Following

Gradually the personal following of Mussolini swelled. At first it embraced only a small minority of Socialist workingmen, but, with the termination of the war and the demobilization of the Italian army, it gained the adherence of a large number of ex-soldiers and youthful intellectuals, and then, when the existing government seemed unable to cope with economic unrest and Communist violence or to satisfy popular demands for the annexation of Fiume, it enlisted the support of numerous property-holders and patriots. These gave willing ear to Mussolini's plea for transforming Italy from a "liberal" to a "fascist" state.

His Expanding Organization

The words "Fascist" and "Fascism" were derived from the "fascio" (or "club") which Mussolini organized among his followers at Milan in March 1919 for the general purpose of propagating his brand of national socialism and for the specific purpose of fighting Marxian Communists and Socialists. During the next two years, a network of similar "clubs" (or "fasci") was spread over the industrial towns of Italy, and the members indulged in constant counter-violence against the strikes and other activities of the "reds." In April 1921 some 35 Fascists (together with 10 Nationalist disciples of D'Annunzio) were elected to the Chamber of Deputies, and in November of the same year the Fascist political party was definitively constituted with a graded hierarchy (headed, of course, by Mussolini), with a rigid discipline, and

with a wealth of symbolism and ceremonial. As Garibaldi's volunteers had worn red shirts, so Mussolini's distinguished themselves with black shirts, and as the word Fascist suggested not only the "fasci" (or "clubs") of modern Italy but also the "fasces" which officials of the ancient Roman Republic had borne, so Fascism was symbolized by a bundle of rods enclosing a battle axe, and Fascists saluted their chief—Il Duce ("The Leader")—with the outstretched hand of the old Roman salute.

With mounting enthusiasm (and violence) and with perfecting organization and resolution, the Fascist movement gathered momentum rapidly during 1921–1922. Simultaneously, the opposing groups in Italy weakened. Giolitti, the most famous of the Liberal leaders, was in his eighties and widely distrusted. The Socialist party lacked competent leadership and at its congress in 1922 it split on the question of coöperation with the Communists. The Communists were a sect, rather than a national party, and they too lacked resourceful leadership. The Popular (or Catholic) party, despite the endeavors of its chief, Sturzo, was also disintegrating: its left wing was too revolutionary to collaborate successfully with the Liberals; its right wing was drawn toward Fascism; and the Pope was becoming sceptical of the official participation of Catholics in Italian politics and distrustful of Sturzo.

Weakening Opposition to Fascism

In October 1922 the Fascists held a congress at Naples. Forty thousand of them paraded the streets in military formation, and Mussolini, in a grandiloquent speech, declared that "either the government will be given to us or we shall march on Rome." On October 27 the Liberal premier resigned, and the Fascist "army" at Naples moved on Rome. The regular army stood aside, and King Victor Emmanuel III, without a government and with Fascist fighting men pouring into the capital, sent for Mussolini and asked him to form a ministry.

Fascist March on Rome, 1922

Thus, at the end of October 1922, Mussolini became prime minister of Italy. From the terrified parliament he at once obtained a grant of dictatorial powers for a year, and then proceeded, on the one hand, to extend and consolidate the Fascist organization throughout the country, and, on the other, to conduct and reform the public administration. With his harsh voice and short crisp sentences,

Mussolini, Prime Minister

with his flashing black eyes and magnificent scowl, with his Napoleonic bearing, he mightily impressed the nation, as well as king and parliament; and his great energy and exacting attention to details soon produced effects. Order was restored throughout the country. Strikes were suppressed and Socialist agitators punished. Economies were introduced into government. Public works were undertaken and unemployment relieved.

Fascist Electoral Triumph

In November 1923, Mussolini persuaded parliament, despite opposition from Socialist and Popularist members and from some Liberals, to enact an essentially revolutionary electoral law. Thereby, in the future, the political party securing a plurality of votes in the general election would be entitled to two-thirds of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies, while the remaining third would be distributed among the other parties on a proportional basis. The first election under the new arrangement was held in April 1924. The Fascists, better organized than their rivals and freer to exercise compulsion, obtained four and a half million votes out of a total of seven and a half million and therefore appropriated two-thirds of the seats in the Chamber, leaving the combined Socialists, Popularists, and Liberals in a helpless minority.

Suppressing Dissent

The kidnapping and murder of a Socialist leader by Fascists just after the assembling of the new Chamber, temporarily filled many Italians with mingled fear and indignation, and for a time in 1924 the anti-Fascist minority in the Chamber threatened to form a compact group and make some trouble for the Fascist government. Mussolini, however, disclaimed any responsibility for the crime, and by strict censorship of the press and forceful police measures he managed to weather the storm. A reign of terror ensued. Political opponents were imprisoned or intimidated, and critics were silenced. Sturzo escaped into exile, together with some Socialist leaders and a number of Liberals. Others, especially those most nationalistically inclined, espoused Fascism, and still others merely retired into private life and set a seal on their lips. By the end of 1924 Italy was definitely resigned to a dictatorship of Mussolini and the Fascists.

By enactments from 1925 to 1928 the Fascist majority in parliament empowered the government to dismiss "disloyal" officials, to dissolve all political parties except the Fascist, to

abolish Freemasonry and all other secret societies, to set up a tribunal of summary justice for the trial of political offenders, to confiscate the property of "seditious" persons, to suppress seditious newspapers, and to centralize the administration. Mussolini, as prime minister, was authorized to initiate all legislation, and offenses against his person were made direfully punishable. The local prefects, whose powers were strengthened, were to be directly responsible to him, and he would appoint governors (or podestàs) of cities and villages. To cap the climax, the popular election of members of parliament was transformed, by a law of 1928, into a mere plebiscite; henceforth, the electorate would simply vote yes or no on a list of candidates approved by the Fascist party. Political democracy, as previously practiced in Italy, was at an end, and liberty was sharply abridged.

Establishing Fascist Dictatorship, 1925–1928

Formally, the central Italian government continued to be "constitutional." The King was still the nominal sovereign. The Parliament, composed of Senate and Chamber of Deputies, was still the legal law-making body; and to it was still responsible the ministry (or cabinet). Actually, however, the whole government was dominated by the party organization of the Fascists, just as the contemporary Soviet government of Russia was controlled by a single Communist party. And in Italy, as in Russia, the dictatorial party comprised a relatively small minority of the population.

Single Fascist Party

In 1932—ten years after the "March on Rome"—the Fascist party numbered about a million and a quarter. No person was admitted to it unless he had demonstrated his loyalty to its principles and undergone preliminary training. In 1933, out of 600,000 applicants for membership in the party, 200,000 were accepted. The members of the party were distributed among some 10,000 local "fasci" (or "clubs"), which were federated by provinces, and ultimately directed by the Party's Grand Council. This Council, as reconstituted in 1928, included the leaders of the "March on Rome," the general secretary and certain other officials of the party, and representatives of Fascist corporations, about twenty persons in all.

The chairman of the Grand Council of the Fascist party was prime minister of the country. The Council not only ruled the party and shaped its policies, but also nominated candidates for

parliament, and inasmuch as no other party existed after 1928 to make nominations or to conduct organized campaigns against Fascist nominees, all the members of parliament were practically certain to be members of the Fascist party, quite obedient to the dictates of the Grand Council. To make doubly sure of the supremacy of the party's council over the state parliament, it was further provided in 1928 that the Council must be consulted on all matters affecting the constitution, the royal succession, the powers of the prime minister, the relations between church and state, and the ratification of treaties involving territorial changes. And to enforce its will throughout the country, the Grand Council had at its disposal a special body of Fascist militia and a special tribunal of Fascist magistrates.

The machinery of the Fascist party and that of the Italian state were thus closely interlocked, and the supreme manipulator of both was Mussolini, "Il Duce." He was chairman of the Grand Council and through its discipline, its militia, and its tribunal he was master of parliament and the country at large. He was also prime minister of the state, initiating legislation, appointing officials, advising the king, and directing the whole national administration. No statesman since Napoleon (except Lenin and his successor in Russia) had exercised such wide and dictatorial powers.

Mussolini, Dictator

Mussolini and his fellow Fascists in Italy sought to gain the support of the working classes by undertaking social reform and substituting a "corporate state" for the previous "liberal state." Individualism would be frowned upon, and the differences between capital and labor minimized. With these ends in view, an enactment of 1926 abolished non-Fascist trade unions, prohibited strikes and lockouts, and at the same time legalized thirteen "syndicates" (six of employers, six of employees, and one of professional men), under whose joint auspices special tribunals should be established for the settlement of labor disputes. In 1927 a "charter of labor" was promulgated: while guarantying private property and encouraging private initiative, it forbade employers to work their men more than eight hours a day or six days a week or to discharge them on the score of illness or military service; it obliged employers to contribute to the insurance of their men against illness, accidents, old age, and unemployment; and it

Social Reform and Corporate State

empowered the labor corporations to train apprentices and maintain employment bureaus. In 1928 the electoral law entrusted the thirteen syndicates with political functions; each would nominate parliamentary candidates to be passed upon and approved by the Grand Council of the Fascist party before a general election. In 1930 the thirteen syndicates were reformed and coördinated as "corporations" under a general Fascist Confederation of Industry, headed by a state Minister of Corporations. In 1934 a National Council was created of deputies from the various corporations in order immediately to advise parliament on economic and social legislation and eventually to supplant parliament as the law-making body of the realm.

Mussolini and his fellow Fascists sought also to secure the support of the Catholic masses by reversing the anti-clerical policies which liberal governments had pursued since the time of Cavour and reaching a friendly agreement with the papacy on the "Roman question." To Mussolini's overtures, Pope Pius XI responded sympathetically; he was no advocate of Fascism but he perceived an advantage to the church in ending the conflict which since 1870 had forced Italians to choose between loyalty to their national state and obedience to their religious head.[1] Consequently, the treaty of the Lateran was concluded in 1929. Italy agreed to the sovereignty of the Pope within a small but independent Papal State, embracing the Vatican and St. Peter's (the so-called Vatican City) and also the estate of Castel Gandolfo outside Rome. In return the Pope recognized the Kingdom of Italy, surrendered his claims to the greater part of Rome, and promised to "remain extraneous to all temporal disputes between nations and to international congresses convoked for the settlement of such disputes unless the contending parties make a joint appeal to his mission of peace."

Religious Conciliation and Lateran Treaty, 1929

Simultaneously with the signing of the Lateran Treaty, a financial agreement and a concordat were concluded between the papacy and the Italian government. The financial agreement provided for the payment to the Pope of a sum of about 100 million dollars in lieu of the annual appropriations which Italy had been making as indemnity for

Concordat with Church

[1] On the conflict between Papacy and Italian government, see above, pp. 177–178, 420–422.

the seizure of Rome in 1870 but which the papacy had hitherto refused to accept. The concordat, on the other hand, provided for the future relations of church and state in Italy. The Pope would appoint all bishops in Italy, but before doing so he would communicate each nomination to the Italian government "in order to be sure that the latter has no objection from a political standpoint." The state would continue to pay the salaries of bishops and priests, and bishops, before taking office, must swear loyalty to the state, the king, and the government. Religious instruction would be given in the state schools by persons approved by the church. The church might engage in popular propaganda of a religious nature but not in political activity, and no ecclesiastic might belong to any political party.

This sensational termination of the long feud between the Italian state and the Catholic Church was acclaimed alike by devout Catholics and by enthusiastic Fascists. Some friction continued, nevertheless. In 1931 the dissolution of Catholic clubs by the Fascist dictatorship, and in 1938 its promulgation of anti-Semitic decrees, evoked vigorous protests from the Pope.

The Fascist régime devoted much attention to popular education. The number of schools was increased, and the laws providing for compulsory attendance were more rigor- Education ously enforced. In 1921, just before Mussolini took office, some three million children were attending elementary schools in Italy; in 1935, there were four and a half million. In 1921 the percentage of illiteracy in the country as a whole was over a fourth; in 1935 it was less than a fifth, and in northern Italy it was fast reaching zero. The great stress in the schools was on training for Fascist citizenship. The teachers were Fascist in sympathy; and Fascist in principle and aim were the curricula and textbooks. For many children, moreover, Fascist training in the schools was supplemented by similar training in the party's auxiliary organization of youth. For all young men, furthermore, it was supplemented by intensive training in the army, which of course was Fascist in its command and conduct. The Fascist party might be relatively small, but the younger generation of the whole Italian nation was being educated in Fascism.

Nationalism was emphasized and extolled by Mussolini and his fellow Fascists. Italians were ceaselessly reminded of their past greatness and future destiny as a nation. For patriotic

reasons as well as to provide work for men otherwise unemployed, the government fostered a great variety of public works.

Nationalism

Pride in the past was stimulated by repairing ancient monuments, unearthing and reconstructing the old Roman forum, and erecting memorials to Julius Cæsar and Augustus. Faith in the future was aroused and confirmed by a host of "modern improvements." The railways were refurbished. Palatial steamships were built for transoceanic service, and the Italian merchant marine, which in 1913 had been hardly a fourth as large as Germany's or a half of France's, reached in 1935 a tonnage almost equal to either the French or the German. New cable lines were laid. The radio industry was fostered. Airplanes were manufactured and increasingly utilized for passenger and mail service throughout the country. Agricultural works were also undertaken, involving extensive reforestation and the reclamation of swamp lands. Industrially, Italy's lack of coal and iron was partially compensated for by a remarkable development of hydro-electric power, which by 1935 represented a horsepower of almost five million, more than twice the developed water power of any other country.

As far as might be, economic self-sufficiency (or, in other words, economic nationalism) was a Fascist policy and goal. In keeping with it were the hydro-electric developments, the agricultural works, and the national merchant marine. In keeping with it, likewise, were the new national syndicates, the heightening of previous protective tariffs, and the drastic regulation of banking and currency.

Economic Nationalism

Militarism was another conspicuous feature of Fascist Italy. Not only was the army kept on the basis of universal compulsory service, but it was better equipped and rendered more efficient, and it was paraded much more frequently in public view and lauded by Mussolini more often and more ostentatiously. The Italian navy was increased, and the air service of both army and navy was perfected. In 1934 some military training was definitely prescribed for all Italian boys from the age of eight.

Militarism

Imperialism was another aspect of Fascist thought and ambition. The Italian population was growing faster than that of most other European countries. Already it was surpassing the French, and to Mussolini and other patriots it required a com-

mensurate colonial expansion. Hence Mussolini, who as a Socialist had decried the seizure of African territory in 1911, now as a Fascist loudly championed a greater imperial domain for Italy. In 1935–1936 he subjugated Ethiopia and made King Victor Emmanuel III its Emperor.[1] In 1939 he annexed Albania.[2]

Imperialism

For all the enterprises of the Fascist government in Italy—military, naval, and imperial, economic, educational, and ecclesiastical—expenditure was immensely increased. Yet, despite general post-war depression and special economic difficulties in Italy, the increase of expenditure was made without serious popular murmuring. Italian finances continued to be perilous, but the Fascist government was more rigorous and probably more honest than its predecessors in spending money, and it had the help of able financiers.

Financial Strain

To all appearances, at any rate, the Fascist dictatorship was becoming solidly entrenched and popular in Italy. In the general election of 1929—essentially a plebiscite on the Fascist list of candidates for parliament—eight and a half million electors voted "yes" and 140,000 voted "no." In the general election of 1934, ten million voted "yes" and only 15,000 voted "no." In both elections, about 90 per cent of the electorate went to the polls.

Popular Support

3. DEMOCRACY IN WESTERN EUROPE

While a Communist dictatorship was being established in Russia, and a Fascist dictatorship in Italy, most of the countries of western Europe (and the British Dominions) clung to the principle of the "liberal state" and to the practices of political democracy. In these countries, to be sure, the difficulties of operating democratic government were more obvious than formerly. Parliaments and their responsible ministers had now to cope with intricate post-war problems of economic reconstruction.

Personal liberty and parliamentary government were traditions of long standing and great weight in Britain, and hardly less so in France, Belgium, and Switzerland; and they had long been the goal of political aspiration in the Netherlands and Scandinavia. Moreover, the economic conditions within Britain, France, and Belgium

Strength of Democracy in West

[1] See below, p. 803.

[2] See below, pp. 738, 808

after the war, though serious enough, were certainly better than in Russia or Italy, while those in the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Scandinavia (which had been neutral during the World War) were much better. Furthermore, the peoples of Britain, France, and Belgium were more loyally attached to an existing régime which had "won the war" and dictated a peace satisfying to national prestige than were either the Russians who had suffered crushing defeat or the Italians who were keenly disappointed with the peace.

1. Great Britain

In Great Britain, the outstanding problems of the post-war years were economic. The difficulty of resuming normal peacetime production in the face of increasing foreign competition and of diminishing foreign markets jeopardized Britain's century-old position as "the banker and workshop of the world." Her production of coal and iron, of cotton and certain other basic industries, was still impressive, but it showed a decline from pre-war standards both in absolute amount and in relation to the production of other industrial nations, most notably the United States and France. Hence, there was a shortage of jobs in mines and factories for the masses of British industrial workers, and unemployment promised to become chronic and acutely troublesome. The number of registered adult workers who could not obtain work was over two million in 1921 (out of a total of about twelve million); and around that figure it subsequently hovered.

This standing army of unemployed persons and the still larger host of their dependent families had to be provided for in some way. But the national debt had been so enormously increased by the war that the interest charges alone amounted to 360 million pounds sterling in 1921–1922 as over against 22 million ten years previously. To meet those charges and at the same time to defray current expenses of army, navy, and civil administration and extraordinary expenses of unemployment relief meant national taxation so heavy as to threaten the capitalistic system on which Britain's industrial supremacy had been built.

Lloyd George's National Ministry, 1916–1922

The British government which first had to face these economic problems was that coalition of Liberals and Conservatives, headed by Lloyd George, which had been formed in 1916 and which had received a thumping vote of confidence from the country at large in

the "khaki election" of December 1918.[1] It negotiated the peace treaties of 1919–1920, and effected the peaceful demobilization of the conscript war armies. It opposed the republican movement in Ireland, but finally, though reluctantly, agreed to the treaty of 1921 establishing the Irish Free State. It extended the insurance of workingmen against illness and unemployment and greatly increased the governmental subsidies (or "doles," as they were called) to the unemployed. It also managed, by introducing many economies and by imposing very heavy income taxes, to balance the budget. In 1921, with the purpose of arresting the industrial decline, it departed from the long-established policy of free trade and imposed tariff duties on the importation of certain foreign manufactures which were underselling British key industries in the home market.

Conservative Ministry, 1922–1924

Following a repudiation of the coalition government by a Conservative caucus in October 1922, Lloyd George resigned, and King George V entrusted the premiership to Bonar Law, the nominal leader of the Conservative party. The ensuing general election returned a clear Conservative majority, though the Laborites, under the guidance of Ramsay MacDonald,[2] secured a larger representation than they had ever had before and in excess of the Liberal party's. It was obvious that liberalism of the pre-war kind was being ground between the upper and nether millstones of conservatism and labor.

The Conservative victory proved abortive. Bonar Law, on account of illness, soon retired from the premiership in favor of Stanley Baldwin, a business man who had occupied several important financial offices since 1917. Baldwin's announcement

[1] On the pre-war career of Lloyd George, see above, pp. 343–353; on the formation of his Coalition ministry in 1916 and his war-activities, see above, p. 615; and on the parliamentary election of 1918, see above, p. 633.

[2] Ramsay MacDonald (1866–1937), the son of a Scottish workingman and largely self-taught, had been conspicuous in the Labor party from its origin, serving as secretary until 1912 and then as leader until 1914. He professed a kind of right-wing Socialism, and for his pacifism during the World War he suffered political ostracism and temporary imprisonment. His marriage in 1896 to a niece of Lord Kelvin, the famous scientist (see above, p. 237), had brought him considerable wealth and strengthened his desire to ally intellectuals and "respectable" middle-class reformers, as well as trade unionists, with the Labor party. Such a desire he largely realized after the war, and this, along with popular reaction against the horrors of war and the sorry economic conditions of the time, helps to explain why the Labor party expanded rapidly after 1918.

that tariff protectionism was the remedy for the country's economic ills evoked dissension among Conservatives as well as strenuous opposition from Laborites and Liberals. On the tariff issue, Parliament was dissolved and new elections held in December 1923. This time the Conservatives were reduced to a minority, while both the Laborites and the Liberals gained ground. Early in 1924 the new parliamentary majority voted Baldwin out of office and permitted Ramsay MacDonald to form a Labor government.

MacDonald's Labor Ministry, 1924

But the Labor government was short-lived, too. It could last only as long as the Liberals were willing to support it, and the "moderation" which they insisted upon was likely to alienate the extremist element among the Laborites. Before coming into office, MacDonald had advocated a capital levy and other drastic socialist measures for dealing with the domestic situation. Once in office, however, he dropped all such proposals and contented himself with obtaining from Parliament the repeal of some of the existing tariff duties and an authorization for the construction of workers' dwellings. Presently, while a section of his own party grumbled at his "moderation," the Liberals took alarm at his "extravagance" and the mounting cost of unemployment relief; and when he finally decided to recognize the Communist dictatorship in Russia, the Liberals repudiated him. In vain he appealed to the British electorate in October 1924. Though the popular vote for Labor candidates went up by a million, the Conservative party, on a platform of opposition to the "Red Peril," secured an overwhelming majority in the House of Commons. MacDonald's Labor ministry was succeeded by a Conservative ministry under Baldwin.

Second Baldwin Ministry, 1924–1929

The second Baldwin ministry lasted almost five years, from November 1924 to May 1929. It sponsored several important measures. One was the definitive adoption of tariff protectionism. Another was the enfranchisement of women on the same basis as men. A "general strike" of British workingmen in May 1926, the climax of protracted and bitter labor troubles in the coal mines, created grave apprehension and led to the enactment of a Trades Dispute bill, outlawing general strikes and imposing restrictions on trade union activity.

At the regular general election in 1929, the Conservatives met defeat. The Labor party obtained a plurality of seats in the

House of Commons, and, though still dependent for an absolute majority upon the remnant of Liberals headed by Lloyd George, there was no question about its assuming the conduct of government. Accordingly, Baldwin resigned and Ramsay MacDonald formed his second Labor cabinet, including for the first time in English history a woman member—Margaret Bondfield as Minister of Labor. At the outset of his second ministry MacDonald appeared to be less "compromising" than he had been during his first ministry, but fundamentally he was more intent upon a pacific foreign policy than upon domestic social reform and temperamentally he was more susceptible to the appeals of persons of birth and substance than to the urgings of lower-class extremists in his own party. As economic conditions grew rapidly worse in Britain, reflecting in an acute form the world-wide depression which set in seriously in 1930, MacDonald abandoned any idea which he may previously have had of resorting to radical socialistic expedients. In 1931, against the counsel of the majority of his cabinet, he endorsed the proposals of his Chancellor of the Exchequer, Philip Snowden, to reduce governmental expenses and to effect drastic economies in unemployment relief. This split the Labor party. A minority stuck by MacDonald and Snowden and took the title of "National Laborites." The majority repudiated the prime minister.

Second MacDonald Ministry, 1929

Split in Labor Party, 1931

Whereupon MacDonald invited the Conservatives and the Liberals to unite with him in backing a "national" government. The Conservatives responded with alacrity, and so did a fraction of the Liberals, with the result that the new ministry, as formed in August 1931 under MacDonald's titular headship, comprised two or three "National Laborites," two or three "National Liberals," and a majority of Conservatives (including Baldwin and Neville Chamberlain). In the ensuing elections, the Coalition won eight-ninths of all the seats in the House. To be sure, the opposing Labor party polled a popular vote of six and a half million and elected four times as many members as did the National Labor party of MacDonald; but the parliamentary representation of the Laborites as a whole was sharply cut, and against 68 National Liberals who supported the Coalition, only Lloyd George and three other Liberals remained in opposition.

National Coalition

Thus, the British government was essentially conservative and nationalist during the crisis of economic depression from 1931 to 1939, as it had been in the crisis of peace-making and post-war readjustment from 1918 to 1922. In name; it was a coalition government. In fact, it was a government of the Conservative party; and just as formerly the Conservatives had taken Lloyd George, a radical Liberal, in tow, so now they had captured MacDonald, the Labor leader. Under MacDonald until 1935, under Baldwin until 1937, and then under Neville Chamberlain, the government pursued policies at once conservative and patriotic. Tariff protectionism was elaborated by an act of 1932, and certain features of the old Corn Laws were revived.[1] British imperialism was given a new slant by the Statute of Westminster (1931), in accordance with which the self-governing Dominions were recognized as "nations" and grouped together as a "Commonwealth."[2] National appropriations for army and navy were maintained at a relatively high level (averaging 115 million pounds sterling annually during the decade from 1925 to 1935 as compared with 64 million in 1910), and rising in 1939 to dizzy heights. At the same time, national expenditure for unemployment-relief remained large; and only by withholding debt payments to the United States and abandoning the gold standard did the government appreciably lighten its grievous financial load.

Conservative Predominance

During most of the post-war period, and in its most critical years, the Conservative party was dominant in Great Britain. The Liberals, who had been in power for almost ten years immediately preceding the World War, were now rent by internal dissension and deprived of any large popular following. Principal opposition to the Conservative party had definitely passed from the Liberals to the Laborites, and, though the latter suffered a set-back through the secession of Ramsay MacDonald and his fellow "National Laborites" in 1931, there was evidence aplenty that the set-back was only temporary and that a new political (and social) alignment was becoming ever more sharply defined between Conservatism and Labor. This did not signify, however, that Britain was necessarily headed toward revolution or dictatorship.

Labor Opposition

[1] On the Corn Laws, see Vol. 2, pp. 402, 759, and above, pp. 59–60.

[2] See above, pp. 653–654.

It is true that there was an unusual amount of criticism of parliamentary government in post-war Britain. At one extreme, some workingmen and some intellectuals espoused Communism of the Russian variety. At the other extreme, Sir Oswald Mosley, a volatile aristocrat, who had been in turn a Conservative and a Radical Laborite and was always something of a poseur, underwent a sudden conversion to Fascism of the Italian (and German) kind and began to inveigh against Parliament and the Jews and to organize a band of "black-shirts." Nevertheless, the confessed Communists in Britain, though noisy, were not numerous, and Sir Oswald's Fascists were an object of popular derision.

Few Communists and Fascists

The vast majority of Britishers continued to support the parliamentary party of the Conservatives or that of the Laborites, and both parties were seemingly as desirous as the dwindling Liberal party to retain the characteristic political institutions of modern England. The strength of monarchical tradition was vividly illustrated by the popular enthusiasm which greeted the accession of Edward VIII on the death of his father, George V, in 1936; and less than a year later, when the new king abdicated rather than give up a divorced woman with whom he was infatuated, by the even greater enthusiasm attending the succession of his more prosaic brother, George VI.

Two democratic governments were maintained in Ireland from 1922 onwards. One was the government of Northern Ireland, which functioned at Belfast under the premiership of Sir James Craig (Viscount Craigavon), with a parliamentary majority of Unionists and in subordination to the British government at Westminster.[1] The other was the government of the Irish Free State, which exercised sway at Dublin over the greater part of Ireland in accordance with the written constitution which it adopted (with the sanction of Great Britain) in 1922. This government was directed for ten years, from 1922 to 1932, by William Cosgrave with the backing of moderate Sinn Feiners. Internal order was

2. British Commonwealth: Ireland

[1] Northern Ireland, though accorded a local parliament of its own in 1921 (see above, p. 652), continued to be represented in the British Parliament. It is interesting to note that the title of "United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland," which had been the official designation of the British monarchy since the Union of 1801, was changed, after the creation of the Irish Free State, to "United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland."

restored, religious and other individual liberties were respected, the Irish (Gaelic) language was given an equal legal status with English, and much was done to promote Irish agriculture, industry, and public works. Following the electoral success of extreme Sinn Feiners in 1932, Eamon De Valera became premier and under his guidance a more intensely nationalist policy was pursued. The oath of allegiance to the King was abolished. Appeals to British courts were forbidden. By a new constitution of 1938, the state was re-named "Eire," and the British governor was replaced by a "President." [1] In the same year a favorable trade agreement was negotiated with Great Britain.

Not only Ireland but all the other and older self-governing Dominions of the British Empire stuck to political democracy.[2]

Canada

In Canada, the government was directed from 1917 to 1921 by a coalition of Conservatives and Liberals, then almost continuously for nine years by a Liberal ministry headed by Mackenzie King, then for five years by a Conservative ministry under Richard Bennett, and from 1935 by another Liberal ministry under King.

Australia

In Australia, the government was in the hands of a patriotic coalition during the war and throughout the post-war period, except for two years (1929–1931) when the Labor party was in power. In New Zealand, the ministry of William Massey, which had originally been formed in 1912, lasted until his death in 1925, and the same moderate and conservative elements which had supported him retained control of the government until 1935, when the Labor party won the general election and formed a ministry.

South Africa

In South Africa, General Smuts, with the joint backing of moderate Boer nationalists and British unionists, was prime minister from the death of General Botha in 1919 until 1924, when he was succeeded by General Hertzog, who had the support of extreme Boer nationalists and also of labor. Hertzog was a democrat as well as a nationalist, and under his leadership the franchise was extended

[1] The first President of "Eire" was Douglas Hyde (see above, pp. 361, 362).

[2] On the previous history of these self-governing Dominions, see above, pp. 367–376.

to all men and women of white extraction, while immigration was restricted to persons coming from "Nordic" nations. In the elections of 1933, Smuts joined forces with Hertzog, and the coalition triumphed.

In all the English-speaking countries (including the United States), there was more concern with radical movements after the war than previously, more talk about Socialism and even Communism, and at the same time more manifest nationalism. But in all of them, democratic traditions were still cherished and democratic usages observed.

3. France

It was likewise in France. Here, the democratic and parliamentary institutions of the Third Republic continued to function in much the same way as they had functioned before the war. True, extremes of "Left" and "Right" were more vocal with subversive propaganda and more active with hostile demonstrations. On the one hand, a Communist party arose and flourished, denouncing the "bourgeois" Republic and demanding a "dictatorship of the proletariat." On the other hand, the royalist and ultra-patriotic Action Française,[1] intensifying its campaign against the existing régime, gained the allegiance of many youths, especially at Paris, and contributed to the growth of a Fascist movement. Yet the agitation of one extreme tended to counteract the other's, and between the two extremes stood the vast majority of Frenchmen.

National Bloc, 1919–1924

From 1919 to 1924 the French government was controlled by the "National Bloc," in which the conservative and very patriotic groups of the Centre and Right were particularly influential, though Socialist Radicals of the Left continued to man the strategic departments of education and the interior. Clemenceau, prime minister during the latter part of the war and during the peace negotiations, retired from office in 1920, following his defeat for the presidency of the Republic in succession to Poincaré.[2] Millerand, once a Socialist and now a conservative and nationalist, became prime minister and shortly afterwards was elevated to the presidency.

[1] See above, p. 416, note.

[2] Poincaré had been succeeded as President in 1920 by Paul Deschanel, but later in the year Deschanel resigned and was succeeded by Millerand

The successive Bloc ministries labored with remarkable success to reconstruct the war-devastated areas of northern France and to restore economic prosperity. Factories were rebuilt and equipped with the most up-to-date machinery. The output of mines and foundries was greatly increased and hydro-electric power was highly developed. Indeed, French machine-industries —both textile and metal—advanced, rather suddenly, into a class with those of Germany and Britain. This industrial advance, coupled with the maintenance of normal agricultural production and the persistence of peasant proprietorship, helps to explain why there was no such pressing problem of unemployment in France as in Great Britain, and why there was no such social disturbance or political revolution as in central or eastern Europe. To be sure, the public debt of France was prodigiously swelled by the war and by post-war reconstruction, and the Bloc ministries, counting upon reparation payments from Germany, failed to balance the budget.

The "National Bloc" was less anti-clerical than the pre-war Radical governments of France had been. It resumed diplomatic relations with the papacy and left the relations of church and state in the recovered provinces of Alsace-Lorraine to be regulated by the concordat of 1801 rather than by the "laic laws." [1] Throughout France, moreover, it eased the enforcement of the Associations Act of 1901 and tolerated the revival of Catholic religious communities.

Left Cartel, 1924–1926

In the elections of 1924 the Socialist Radicals deserted the "National Bloc" and re-created with the Socialists a "Cartel of the Left," which, profiting from popular disappointment at the failure to make Germany pay, won a majority of seats in Parliament. Whereupon Millerand, who had openly opposed the Cartel in the elections, was forced out of the presidency of the Republic, and under his less assertive successor, Gaston Doumergue, a Radical ministry was installed with Edouard Herriot as premier.

Herriot's Radical ministry lasted barely a year. It withdrew French armed forces from the Ruhr and otherwise evinced a willingness to compromise with Germany. At the same time it undertook an anti-clerical campaign, breaking off diplomatic

[1] On the "laic laws" and French anti-clericalism in general, see above, pp. 404–406, 413–416.

relations with the papacy and threatening to denounce the concordat in Alsace-Lorraine and to stiffen and enforce the "laic laws" throughout France. The result was an alienation of moderates, and their counter-campaign against the Cartel was seconded by many patriots who thought Herriot too conciliatory toward Germany and not conciliatory enough toward Alsace-Lorraine. But what chiefly brought about Herriot's downfall was the sorry state of public finance, and the differences within the Cartel over the means of remedying it. Inflation and a capital levy, advocated by Socialists and extreme Radicals, were repugnant to moderate Radicals, while the former were most reluctant to seek a balancing of the budget through drastic economies and ordinary taxation, which the latter favored. In 1925, with financial affairs reaching a critical stage and the government seemingly powerless to handle them, Herriot resigned. For a year longer his Radical supporters composed ministries which succeeded one another in kaleidoscopic fashion, until at length in 1926, following an alarming decline of the franc and a riotous demonstration at Paris, Herriot and his Radicals on the Left broke with the Socialists and joined the groups of the Centre and Right in constituting a ministry of "national union" under Poincaré's premiership.

Poincaré's "national" ministry rehabilitated French finances. It stabilized the currency, with the franc at about a fifth of its pre-war value. It increased taxes and introduced many economies. It gave France a businesslike administration, completed the reconstruction of the country, and fostered production alike of fields and of factories. Simultaneously, it appeased the Catholics by restoring diplomatic relations with the papacy and by reversing the anti-clerical policies of the Herriot ministry. In 1928, for the benefit of workingmen, it sponsored the enactment of a comprehensive social-insurance law.

Poincaré's National Coalition, 1926–1932

The general election of 1928 was a decisive victory for Poincaré and his ministry of National Union, but he was already in bad health and the next year he felt obliged to retire from public life.[1] His immediate successors, however, relied upon the same backing and pursued similar policies, until 1932, when new elections again brought forward a "Left Cartel" and enabled Herriot to form another Radical cabinet.

[1] Poincaré died in 1934. Briand predeceased him in 1932.

The Cartel, this time, was very precarious. The Socialists at the Left were more disposed to fraternize with the Communists at the extreme Left, and the Radicals could not quite make up their minds whether they should go with the Socialists or break with them and join the Centre. Besides, a most unedifying scandal came to light concerning a financial promoter by the name of Stavinsky and involving a number of republican politicians, especially in the Radical camp. Herriot's ministry, which had been formed in June 1932, was forced to resign in December, and during the next fourteen months five other Radical ministries rose and fell. In February 1934 popular resentment against the Radicals was utilized by extremists, both Royalist and Communist, to precipitate at Paris a series of street riots, in which several persons were killed. Whereupon, to allay the resentment and prevent civil strife, the Radicals united with groups of Centre and Right to constitute the "national union." Gaston Doumergue, whose term as President of the Republic had expired the previous year,[1] headed the new coalition ministry. He conducted affairs much as previously, in similar circumstances, Poincaré had conducted them. He was not quite so forceful, and he did not have quite as much personal prestige. And, failing to get Radical support for a constitutional law which would enable the ministry to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies and hold new elections, he resigned in 1935.

Left Cartel Again, 1932–1934

Doumergue's National Union, 1934–1936

In 1936 the Socialists and even the Communists formed with the Socialist Radicals a coalition—the so-called Popular Front—on a platform of defending democracy, resisting Fascist tendencies, and effecting social reform. Following the victory of the coalition at the polls in June, the Socialist leader, Leon Blum, headed a Popular Front ministry which lasted a full year and carried out a large measure of its electoral promises. Fascist organizations were dissolved and a good deal of radical labor legislation was enacted.

Popular Front, 1936–1938

By the middle of 1937, however, the Popular Front government was encountering serious dissension within its own ranks as well as embittered criticism from without. On the one hand, the Communists were dissatisfied with its compromising mod-

[1] Doumergue's successor in the presidency was Paul Doumer, who was assassinated in 1932. Albert Lebrun was then elected President, and reëlected in 1939.

eration and its failure to intervene actively in Spain, while, on the other hand, many Radicals were alarmed by the epidemic of strikes and labor troubles which its policies seemed to invite and by the rapidly growing financial deficit which its prodigal expenditures appeared to entail. For a time after Blum's resignation the coalition troublously continued under a succession of Radical premiers, but eventually in 1938, as public finances went from bad to worse, the Socialist Radicals again broke with the extreme Left and, under the leadership of Edouard Daladier, formed a coalition with the Centre and Right. To Daladier the Parliament at once entrusted limited dictatorial powers in order to introduce needful economies and to restore public confidence.

Daladier's National Ministry, 1938

Democratic institutions were also maintained and respected throughout the post-war period by the peoples of Belgium, the Dutch Netherlands, and Switzerland. In each of these countries there were grave economic and financial problems and in Belgium a special cultural problem arising from differences between Flemings and Walloons,[1] but all such problems were dealt with in orderly democratic fashion and with considerable success. In all three countries, there was a weakening of the middle-class Liberal parties and a corresponding access of strength for the more democratic parties of Socialists and Catholics. Communist groups arose and obtained some representation in the several parliaments, but their popular following was relatively small and unimportant.

4. Other Democratic Countries

In the Scandinavian kingdoms of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, and likewise in the neighboring republic of Finland, political democracy was firmly established and popularly supported. In the kingdoms, Socialists or Laborites comprised nearly half of the membership of the several parliaments and frequently presided over the responsible ministries, but the large majority of Scandinavian Socialists were democratic social reformers, willing to coöperate with liberals and even with agrarians, and not disposed to champion a social revolution or a political dictatorship. Under Socialist premiers, Denmark banned strikes and lockouts in 1933 and Sweden enacted an unemployment-insurance law in 1934. Finland, under a democratic government of conservative leanings, outlawed Communist

[1] See above, pp. 435, 436–437, 650.

propaganda in 1930, suppressed a Fascist movement in 1932, and in 1933 forbade the preaching of direct action and the maintaining of armed forces by any political group.

4. FROM DEMOCRACY TO DICTATORSHIP IN GERMANY

German Republic, 1918–1933

The German Republic, which had been proclaimed at the time of the collapse of the Hohenzollern Empire in November 1918 and provided with a democratic constitution by the Weimar Assembly in 1919,[1] was gravely handicapped by the post-war requirement of making vast yet indefinite reparation payments to the Allies. The story of what this involved—currency inflation, cancellation of internal indebtedness, drastic taxation at home and big borrowings abroad—we have elsewhere related.[2]

Yet, bad as were the economic circumstances of post-war Germany, it is very doubtful whether they were essentially worse than those of post-war Britain or even post-war France. Britain's burden of taxation was considerably heavier, her industrial recovery much slower, and the number of her unemployed much larger. France's war debt was staggering, and unlike Germany (or Britain), she had to rebuild an extensive war-devastated area. Nevertheless, in grappling with their economic problems, both the British and the French possessed governments which were of long standing, which had been newly consecrated in popular esteem by the seemingly victorious war they had waged, and which therefore were not readily subject to subversion.

The Germans, on the other hand, were undertaking a novel experiment in self-government; and a people who had thought of the Hohenzollern Empire as a Great Power, occupying a preëminent position in arms and diplomacy, in science and industry, in world prestige, were naturally prone to abuse the Republic which had begun its career by accepting the treaty of Versailles with all its humiliations for Germany.

Nor could the Republican government obtain from the Allies such timely modification of the treaty of Versailles or of the reparation arrangements as might have served to disarm its critics and strengthen its hold upon the German masses. The concessions which it did obtain—the paring down of reparations and the withdrawal of foreign troops from the Ruhr and

[1] See above, pp. 623–625, 655.

[2] See above, pp. 658–663.

the Rhineland—were made too haltingly and with too poor grace.

Despite all these unfavorable circumstances, the German Republic managed to survive under its democratic constitution for fourteen years—from 1919 to 1933. At first, while popular reaction against the war was still potent, the republican parties of Socialists, Centrists, and Democrats commanded a large majority of the German electorate and hence of the Reichstag, and through close coöperation these parties constituted the ministries and directed the policies of the state.[1] As domestic and foreign difficulties multiplied, there were frequent changes of ministry, but every ministry comprised Centrists and Democrats and everyone was supported, if not directly participated in, by Socialists. From 1923, moreover, when French occupation of the Ruhr called forth a united German resistance, the People's party (formerly the National Liberal party) was induced by its leader, Gustav Stresemann, a prominent industrialist and perhaps the most statesmanlike of all post-war Germans, to abandon its opposition to the republican form of government. Stresemann himself headed a coalition ministry in 1923, and though he soon resigned the chancellorship he retained the post of foreign minister under successive Chancellors until his death in 1929.

Republican Governing Coalition

From 1923 to 1929, indeed, the German Republic seemed to be gathering strength and securing stability. There was some improvement, through the "Dawes plan" and the "Young plan," in the arrangements about reparation payments. There was a marked revival of business. There was some balm to national pride in certain successes which attended Stresemann's diplomacy: he negotiated the "Locarno Pact"[2] to lessen the danger of another war between France and Germany; and he gained the admission of Germany to the League of Nations and to a place, as a Great Power, on its Council. At the general elections of 1924, the republican coalition polled eighteen million votes out of a total of twenty-nine million. At the general elections of 1928, it polled almost twenty-three million out of a total of thirty-one million.

Its Seeming Strength

[1] On these parties of Socialists, Centrists, and Democrats, and also on the People's party, see above, pp. 623–625.

[2] See below, pp. 760–761.

The Republic seemed to be more solid than it really was. The governing coalition as a whole might win elections and might collaborate in maintaining the democratic constitution, in distributing offices, and in sustaining Stresemann's conduct of foreign relations, but its elements were too diverse to enable it to adopt and pursue any consistent policy in respect of internal reforms, which were popularly demanded, or in respect of the opposition which beset it from the Nationalist Right and the Communist Left.

Its Inherent Weaknesses

Communism of the Russian variety had been preached in Germany during the republican revolution of 1918–1919, but its apostles were then few and ineffectual, and the riots which they precipitated were fairly easily put down. Presently a leader emerged in the person of Ernst Thälmann, a mechanic of Hamburg; and a definitely Communist party was organized with local "cells" and regional "soviets" and in intimate relationship with Moscow. Its popular vote increased from half a million in 1920 to nearly six million in 1932, the increase being almost entirely at the expense of the Socialist vote. Thälmann had no such organizing or managing ability as Lenin or Stalin; and his lieutenants were second-rate, lacking in personal initiative and repeating the phrases rather than emulating the deeds of the Russian Communist leaders. Yet the growing membership of the Communist party in Germany and its intransigent attitude toward the existing order served to stimulate and intensify extremist counter-propaganda.

Communist Opposition

Subversive propaganda from the extreme Left was troublesome enough to the German Republic, but more disturbing and eventually more fateful was subversive activity by the extreme Right. Here, the original core of the opposition was the landed Prussian aristocracy, long identified with the monarchy and with high office in its army and civil service, and now organized in an anti-republican and anti-democratic Nationalist party. At first the popular following of the Nationalist party was not impressively large. In the election of the Weimar Assembly in 1919, the party polled only three million votes out of a total of thirty million, and for some time afterwards it seemed to be powerless, despite constant vehemence and occasional violence,[1] to arrest the democratic movement and

Nationalist Opposition

[1] Erzberger, a Catholic Centrist leader, was assassinated by fanatical National-

restore the old order. In vain one of its leaders, Wolfgang Kapp by name, with the assistance of General von Lüttwitz, executed a *coup d'état* at Berlin in 1920 and put the Republican government to flight; a strike of Socialist workingmen promptly turned the tables, so that Kapp and Lüttwitz ran away and the Republican officials returned. In vain an odd team of nationalistic fanatics, the renowned elderly General Ludendorff and a hitherto inconspicuous young man by the name of Hitler, attempted another *coup* at Munich in 1923; they were arrested and Hitler was jailed.

If Nationalists were as yet unable to overthrow the Republic, they at least could rejoice by 1924 that their cause was gaining ground. For the prevalent financial disorder and economic insecurity of the preceding four years, which was swelling the ranks of the revolutionary Communist party, was operating also, along with widespread popular hatred of foreign tutelage and growing impatience at the seeming ineffectualness of the Republican government, to reënforce the reactionary Right. In the regular election of 1924 the Nationalists polled over five and a half million votes.

Early in 1925 the Nationalists, by clever manœuvring, obtained an even more ominous success. The death of Friedrich Ebert, the Socialist who had been president of the Republic since 1919, necessitated the popular election of a successor; and against the candidate of the Republican coalition, Wilhelm Marx (a leader of the Centre party), the Nationalists put forward Field-Marshal Paul von Hindenburg, Prussian squire and national hero of the battle of Tannenberg.[1] Thanks to Hindenburg's personal fame and thanks to the fact that Thälmann, the Communist leader, entered the campaign as a third candidate, the Nationalists secured a plurality (though not a majority) of the votes cast and thus elected Hindenburg to the presidency. Hindenburg was an old and doubtless overrated man, but he had a venerable appearance and great prestige. It was well known where his basic loyalties were—to Empire, to army, to landed nobility, to the Protestant state-church of Prussia; and it was the hope of reactionary Nationalists, as it was the fear of democratic Republicans, that

Hindenburg, President, 1925

ists in 1921, and Walter Rathenau, a leader of the Democratic party and an outstanding Jewish capitalist, suffered a like fate in 1922.

[1] See above, pp. 584–585.

he would employ his new key-position to forward attempts at restoring the Hohenzollern Empire.

His Co-operation with Republican Coalition

Hindenburg did nothing of the sort, however. Instead, throughout the seven years of his full presidential term, from 1925 to 1932, he coöperated with the Republican majority in the Reichstag and with the Republican chancellors and ministries. It was a source of disappointment to the Nationalists, as it was of satisfaction to the Republicans.

Economic Crisis of 1929

What eventually created havoc for Republicans was the economic depression which began in 1929. Business "prosperity," which had been artificially stimulated for several years by foreign loans and which had been accompanied by industrial overproduction and financial speculation, came to an abrupt halt. There was disappearance or diminution of profits for middle-class persons as well as for landlords and peasants. For workingmen there was decline of wages and rise of unemployment. Desperately but unavailingly the government sought financial relief. Foreign loans could no longer be negotiated, and yet the Allies were exasperatingly dilatory about lightening the load of reparation payments which Germany was expected to carry. Economies in internal administration only swelled the ranks of the unemployed. Heavier taxation only impeded the recovery of business. And the death of Stresemann in the fateful year of 1929 cost the government a remarkably capable foreign minister and a statesman who had linked the industrialists with the cause of the Republic. In the circumstances, the moderate democratic majority in Germany was rapidly whittled away.

Rise of National Socialist (Nazi) Party

It was not that the conservative Nationalist party was making gains; it was scarcely holding its traditional followers. It was rather that a much more popular and militant nationalist party—that of the National Socialists, or "Nazis" as they were commonly styled—was being built up by a plebeian (and magnetic) person. This person was Adolf Hitler, the very one who had been jailed in 1923 for an attempted *coup d'état* against the Republic. He was not widely known at that time, and there was little in his previous career to indicate that he would ever emerge from obscure mediocrity. He had been born in Austria

Hitler

in 1889 of a family of the lower middle class and had grown up with only ordinary schooling and with only frustrated ambitions. As a youth he had failed to gain admission to the Austrian Academy of Painting and had eked out a meagre livelihood by working long hours in an architect's office at Vienna and, from 1912, as a free-lance illustrator at Munich, solacing himself meanwhile with enthusiastic appreciation of Wagner's operas, Nietzsche's philosophy of the superman, and the anti-Semitic writings of Stewart Chamberlain.[1] Influenced by these sources, he had already become an ardent German nationalist when the World War broke out. Though still an Austrian citizen, he enlisted in the German army, and in it he served throughout the war. He was awarded an iron cross for his valor, but he was never promoted beyond the rank of corporal; and his cup of bitterness was filled to overflowing when the victory of the Allies was followed by the republican revolution within Germany. "My brow burned with shame," he wrote, "and my hatred against the man who had brought about this crime grew and grew; I decided to become a politician."

In 1919, therefore, Hitler had joined with a handful of his youthful army acquaintances in forming a political organization—the National Socialist (or Nazi) party. In 1920 the group adopted an "unalterable program." It was certainly radical. It denounced the entire Peace of Paris and demanded the union of all Germans in a Greater Germany, the restoration of the German colonies, and the full rearming of Germany. It assailed Jews within Germany as "aliens," denied them German citizenship, and threatened them with exile. It proposed to prohibit foreign immigration, to ban all "unpatriotic" newspapers or associations, and to "nationalize" popular education. It called for the adoption of economic reforms in harmony with the principle of national, rather than Marxian, socialism. It condemned the "corrupting parliamentary system" and championed professional representation directed by "a strong central authority."

His Program

Almost simultaneously with the adoption of this program,

[1] See above, on Wagner, pp. 121–122; on Nietzsche, pp. 262–263. Chamberlain, a Teutonized Britisher, was the son-in-law of Richard Wagner and the author of a ponderous tome, *Foundations of the Nineteenth Century*, in support of the thesis that virtue and civilization are the product of the "Aryan race" and are endangered by the "Semitic race."

His Oratory

Hitler made the significant discovery that he had oratorical ability, that by "letting himself go" in frenzied exposition of woes and wrongs of Germany and in fierce denunciation of Jews and foreigners he could attract and hold large audiences. To a person who had been thwarted all his life, it was gratifying to know that he had at least one talent which he could put to effective use. So, with zest, Hitler took to spellbinding; and in a country where political oratory was relatively rare and customarily restrained, and where of course the general economic and psychological conditions were especially propitious, Hitler's spellbinding drew circus-crowds.

The attempted *coup* of Hitler in 1923 was premature. As yet he was a local rather than a national figure, and his convinced disciples were few. The ensuing year, however, was helpful to him and to his cause. The notoriety which he gained from his arrest, trial, and imprisonment served to arouse widespread interest in him and in National Socialism, at the very time when French occupation of the Ruhr was producing financial chaos and an outraged state of mind all over Germany. Furthermore, Hitler utilized the enforced leisure of a year in jail to write *Mein Kampf*, a sensational account of his life and ideas, a kind of Nazi bible, which soon became a "best seller."

Nazi Propaganda and Organization

During the next four or five years, Hitler and his lieutenants perfected the party organization and staged ever bigger demonstrations against the Republic. In general, the organization of the National Socialist party in Germany was similar to that of the Communists in Russia or of the Fascists in Italy. Under the dictatorial party headquarters (at Munich) were local "cells" of regular dues-paying members, affiliated societies for youths and children, and also, most important of all, what amounted to a private army consisting of a special police force (the so-called S. S.) and a brigade of "storm troops" (the so-called S. A.). The storm troops, including veterans of the World War as well as many more youthful adventurers, were clad in the party uniform—a brown shirt with the "Aryan" emblem of the Swastika in black on a red arm-band—and were expected to protect party meetings and to break up the meetings of other parties. The special police were a smaller and more select body, wearing the distinctive uniform of a black shirt with a skull as a badge, and acting

as personal guards for the party leaders and as executioners of their behests. The Nazis were prepared to supplement Hitler's oratory with acts of violence.

The real opportunity for Hitler and the National Socialist party was provided by the serious economic depression which began in 1929. By this time the organization and methods of the party were highly efficient, and the very violence which it preached (and practiced) in behalf of "national regeneration" attracted to it a multitude. Emotional youths flocked to it in crowds. The lower middle class rallied almost solidly to it. Landed aristocrats of the conservative Nationalist party, though still prone to regard Hitler as a vulgar upstart, were quite willing to climb on his band-wagon, which they fondly thought they could subsequently steer. Even industrial magnates commenced to contribute money and votes to the Nazis.

Brüning's Effort to Save Republic

Early in 1930, in a desperate attempt to retrieve the fortunes of the Republic, Heinrich Brüning, a Centrist and one of the ablest men in the Reichstag, was entrusted with the chancellorship. Brüning was sincere and courageous, and he succeeded in bringing about a drastic revision of the reparation arrangements and the final withdrawal of foreign troops from the Rhineland. Nevertheless, neither his achievements nor his abilities availed in the internal situation. The Communists assailed him and the "bourgeois" Republic, while from the opposite extreme the Nazis denounced him and the "traitorous" Republic. Nor could he take energetic measures against the extremes. He was himself a liberally minded person, conscientiously opposed to meeting violence with violence; Socialists on whom he had to rely were tender of the Communists; his more moderate supporters were tender of Nationalists; and both extremes were making dangerous inroads into the electoral strength of democratic republicanism. In vain Brüning appealed to the country in a special election of September 1930. The Communists gained over a million votes and the Nazis almost six million.

The upshot was that the republican coalition no longer had a dependable majority in the Reichstag. The Socialists, who held a balance of power, remained aloof from Brüning's ministry, and whenever they threatened to withhold parliamentary support he had recourse to the article in the constitution which empowered

the President to govern by decree. It thus transpired that for two years, from 1930 to 1932, the government of the German Republic was perilously carried on by Brüning with the apparently loyal coöperation of President von Hindenburg.

Hindenburg's Re-election, as President, 1932

So convincing was Hindenburg's loyalty and so strong was his hold on the country at large that Brüning and the Republican coalition labored manfully in the spring of 1932 to ensure his reëlection to the presidency of the Republic for another term of seven years. Against him, Hitler was the candidate of the National Socialists, and Thälmann, of the Communists. The results seemed reassuring. Hindenburg was reëlected.

Hindenburg's reëlection was hailed alike by Centrists, Socialists, and Democrats as a victory for the Republic. It turned out to be nothing of the kind, for Hindenburg proceeded to disappoint his republican supporters in 1932, just as back in 1925 he had disappointed his monarchical supporters, only now more quickly and more utterly. There is little doubt that at heart the Marshal had always been unsympathetic with the republican régime which he headed, and now that he had received a supreme vote of popular confidence in himself, he felt free to heed the more congenial advice of aristocrats and conservatives like himself. These, as we know, were chiefly identified with the Nationalist party, and they sedulously instilled in the old man—now a very old man—a fear that Brüning was much too radical and the hope that a Nationalist government might utilize the numerous Nazis in order to get rid of radicals and to restore things as they had been in the "good old days." At any rate, a month after his reëlection, Hindenburg took sudden fright at proposals for breaking up the large landed estates in his native East Prussia and peremptorily dismissed Brüning from the chancellorship.

His Dismissal of Brüning

In Brüning's place Hindenburg appointed Franz von Papen, an aristocrat who had once been a member of the Centre party but who had quarreled with its democratic leaders and had left it to ally himself with the Nationalists; and with Papen was associated a ministry of ultra-conservatives, including General Kurt von Schleicher. The new government, though enjoying the confidence of Hindenburg and clothed by him with practically

Reactionary Ministries of Papen and Schleicher, 1932–1933

dictatorial powers, was confronted with a hostile majority in the Reichstag and with a threatening situation in the key state of Prussia, where Socialists held the premiership and commanded the police. Furthermore, it had to rely upon the backing of Hitler and the National Socialists as well as upon that of the conservative Nationalists, and between the two groups were notable differences of size and divergencies of aim. The Nationalists, who constituted the government, wanted to use the Nazis for their own conservative ends, but the Nazis, whose following was far more numerous, would tolerate the new government only as a means of enabling themselves to get into power.

In the meantime Papen and Schleicher, with the help of Nazi fury and violence, sought to remove the handicaps which beset the reactionary government. In July 1932, they executed a military *coup* against the Socialist premier and police officials in Prussia. The latter refrained from calling a general strike, such as had defeated Kapp's monarchical *coup* ten years earlier, and meekly surrendered their posts, alleging in justification of their pusillanimous behavior that resistance would have aided the Communists. This collapse of the Socialists overjoyed Papen and his Nationalists, and the Nazis likewise. Then, eleven days after the *coup*, a general election was held in an effort to secure an amenable Reichstag. This effort was not so successful. Papen's party lost seats in the Reichstag, and in carrying on the administration he was more than ever dependent on the friendship of Hindenburg and the favor of Hitler.

Collapse of Socialist Resistance

In November 1932 Papen had Hindenburg dissolve the Reichstag again, and once more he appealed to the verdict of a general election. This time the conservative Nationalists made some gains, but they were more than offset by gains of the Communists. Disappointed, Papen resigned; and Hindenburg, still averse from turning over the government to the plebeian Hitler, appointed General von Schleicher as Chancellor. For two months longer Schleicher carried on without a Reichstag majority, in the face of open opposition from Hitler, and in the midst of secret intrigues on the part of Papen and influential landlords and business men who were now convinced that the conservative cause could best be served through outright collaboration with the National Socialists.

This conviction was finally implanted in Hindenburg, and in January 1933 the senile president dismissed Schleicher and appointed Hitler to the chancellorship, with Papen as Vice-Chancellor. "And now, gentlemen," declared Marshal von Hindenburg, "forward with God!"

Hitler in Power, 1933

It was really "Forward with Hitler." For Hitler was at last in power, and to the discomfiture of his opponents he was in power in accordance with the letter of the constitution.[1] His government, to be sure, was not yet a unit; it represented a coalition of National Socialists with conservative Nationalists. But the latter were a convenient link with Hindenburg and "respectability," and in view of their relatively small popular following they were less likely to oppose the Nazi phalanx than to be absorbed by it. The important thing was that Nazi members of the government commanded the public police as well as the private "storm troops," and thereby Hitler was enabled to suppress opposition and overawe the country. Moreover, a timely burning of the Reichstag building in Berlin was blamed upon Communists and utilized both to justify strong measures against them and to increase the popular following of the Nazis. Amidst excitement and terrorism, new elections, in March 1933, resulted quite favorably to the latter. Their popular vote went up to seventeen and a quarter million while that of the conservative Nationalists remained at three million. Of the other parties, only the Centrist held its own; the Socialist and the Communist both lost ground, and the Democratic and People's parties almost completely disappeared.

End of German Republic

President von Hindenburg at once decreed that the Republican flag of black, red, and gold should be hauled down and replaced by two flags: the black, white, and red of the old Empire, and the swastika of the new nationalism. And on April 1 the Reichstag voted to delegate its powers, for a term of four years, to the Hitler government. Thus the democratic German Republic formally passed away and was succeeded by what was styled the "Third German Empire"[2]

[1] Both the Socialists and the Centrists and also organized labor protested otherwise, but their protests were platonic. Schleicher at first was minded to defy the President, but he hesitated and presently acquiesced. Communist demonstrations against Hitler were suppressed by Nazi storm troops.

[2] The "First" had been the Holy Roman Empire, from 962 to 1806, and the "Second," the Hohenzollern Empire, from 1871 to 1918.

and what was essentially a National Socialist dictatorship.

"Third Empire"

The change was not merely one of name. It was a real break with Germany's past, not only with the liberal and democratic traditions of the Frankfurt Assembly of 1848 and the Weimar Assembly of 1919, but also with the conservative traditions of the Hohenzollern Empire from 1871 to 1918. Conservatives who helped Hitler to bring about the change hoped no doubt that it would be but a prelude to the restoration of the former Empire, but in this they were disappointed. Hitler's main backing was popular and radical rather than aristocratic and reactionary, and by means of it he was enabled not only to overthrow the democratic Republic but to hold conservatives in check and forestall any restoration of constitutional monarchy. The Third Empire was something new: a dictatorship, less evolutionary than revolutionary.

Popular Enthusiasm

The revolution which inaugurated the Third Empire was attended by intense popular enthusiasm, skillfully worked up and exploited by propagandists of the new régime. Press, radio, and cinema were alike utilized to stir patriotic emotions and to direct them into National Socialist channels. For the same purpose was staged a rapid succession of imposing public demonstrations: brown-shirted storm troopers parading and saluting, young people singing and cheering, multitudes listening to inflammatory speeches and waving swastika flags. Such methods were usual with the Nazis, and they were developed to the full and employed with overwhelming effect under the guidance of one of Hitler's chief lieutenants, Joseph Goebbels,[1] who had a genius for showmanship and was given an official post as "Minister of Propaganda and Public Enlightenment." Like a whirlwind the hysteria swept the country. On all sides the new order was hailed as "restoring the self-respect of the nation," and any doubt about it on the part of individuals or groups had to be dissembled.

[1] Goebbels was born in the Rhineland in 1897 of peasant and artisan stock. Undersized and afflicted from infancy with a club foot, he was rejected for army service in the World War. Endowed with a good mind and aided by scholarships, he attended several universities, eventually obtaining the Ph. D. degree from Heidelberg in 1921. He joined the National Socialist party in 1924, becoming the editor of its Berlin newspaper in 1926 and a member of the Reichstag in 1928. In 1929, as director of the party's propaganda, he found a most congenial field for his talents: his vituperative fanaticism, his fondness for the spectacular, his great organizing abilities.

The hysteria of the Nazi revolution was heightened and extended by spectacular "drives" of Hitler and his aides against certain groups—notably Jews and Marxists—who were made scapegoats for Germany's misfortunes during and since the World War. On April 1, 1933, the very day on which the dictatorship was formally established, the government sponsored a nation-wide boycott against Jewish shopkeepers and professional men, and shortly afterwards it decreed that only "Aryans" (that is, German citizens who were not Jews and whose parents and grandparents were not Jews) might occupy civil or military posts or serve as judges, policemen, school teachers, or university professors. There followed a wholesale dismissal of Jews (and Christians with Jewish blood) from state institutions and public offices, an active discrimination against them in the learned professions and in business, and spasmodic assaults upon them individually and collectively. Thousands of German Jews fled abroad, and the much larger number who could not or would not flee suffered grievously in mind and estate. Such rabid anti-Semitism evoked indignation in foreign countries, but in Germany it was excused and gloried in as making for national unity and patriotic regeneration.

Anti-Semitism

On May Day 1933, while the anti-Jewish "drive" was still in full vigor, Hitler's government climaxed its parallel campaign against Marxists by staging at Berlin a monster counter-demonstration of "German labor." Hundreds of thousands of Nazi workingmen paraded and saluted, sang and cheered, while Nazi storm troops cowed Communist and Socialist workingmen into silence. So utterly cowed, indeed, were the latter that the government proceeded promptly and without trouble to ban all Marxian propaganda in the country, to abolish all Socialist as well as Communist trade unions and confiscate their funds, and to substitute a single labor organization, the "German Labor Front," directed and controlled by the National Socialist party.

Anti-Marxism

Taking advantage of the rising popular enthusiasm for the "new Germany" and of the swift and spectacular suppression of Jews and Marxists, Hitler and his Nazi lieutenants moved next to rid themselves of possible political opposition. In May 1933 the parliament of the key state of Prussia was obliged to confer on the local premier dicta-

Suppression of Dissent

torial powers similar to those which the Reichstag had already conferred on the Imperial Chancellor, and to the new dictatorship in Prussia Hitler at once appointed his close friend and associate, Hermann Göring.[1] Simultaneously the other German states were subjected to "governors" named by Hitler and responsible to him. Moreover, leaders of the conservative Nationalist party, and likewise of the People's party, perceiving at last that they were but tails to the Nazi dog (and powerless to wag the dog), were induced to break up their respective political organizations and to accept "guest membership" in the National Socialist party. In June 1933, furthermore, the government decreed the destruction of the Socialist and Democratic parties, and early in July, through a concordat which Papen in Hitler's behalf negotiated with the Vatican, Pope Pius XI agreed to the dissolution of the Catholic Centre party in return for a pledge that the Catholic Church would continue to enjoy full religious freedom in Germany. Whereupon Hitler decreed that in the Third Empire there should be but a single political party, and that the National Socialist party.

Hitler, Dictator

Thus, within six months of Hitler's advent to the chancellorship, he was the practical dictator of Germany. Hindenburg still remained titular "President of the Republic," but the Republic was dead and Hindenburg was dying. The living state was now the highly centralized Third Empire, and the real power in it was Hitler's. To Hitler, at once Chancellor of the Empire and leader of the sole remaining political party in Germany, had been subjected the central Reichstag, the several state governments, the entire civil and military bureaucracy, the press, the radio, the schools, and all individual liberties. A clean sweep was made of all elements who had opposed the Nazis during recent years. Not only Jews and Marxists suffered, but a large number of other German citizens. Open dissenters who were not hounded into exile were herded in "concentration camps." The masses seemed acquiescent and even enthusiastic.

[1] Göring, who shared with Goebbels the special confidence of Hitler, was born in Bavaria in 1893, the son of a Prussian army officer and colonial administrator. He himself had a brilliant record as an aviator during the World War, and his disappointment with the outcome of the war made him a temporary drug-addict and a permanent convert to National Socialism. Göring was wealthy and resourceful, and with energy and ruthlessness he combined a fondness for art and show.

By the autumn of 1933 Hitler was ready to seek a national endorsement of the Nazi revolution which he had effected, and in order to obtain the greatest possible endorsement he cleverly availed himself of an international issue which would appeal to German patriots. At an international conference then pending at Geneva on the limitation of armaments and sponsored by the League of Nations, Hitler's representatives had proclaimed the right of Germany, under the Versailles treaty, to rearm herself fully unless the other Powers should straightway reduce their armaments to a level with hers. In October, when the conference failed to reach any agreement about mutual disarmament or to sanction any rearmament of Germany, Hitler withdrew his delegates from the conference and announced Germany's secession from the League. If foreign nations would not recognize Germany as an equal, he said, Germany should go her own way without them. This was the issue which he presented to the German electorate. He called for popular ratification of his action in breaking with the League of Nations and simultaneously he called for the election of a new and "loyal" Reichstag.

The plebiscite and the election of the new Reichstag were held in November 1933. In the former, forty and a half million Germans voted "yes" and two million voted "no." In the latter, thirty-nine and a half million cast their ballots for the list of candidates nominated by the National Socialist party—the only party which could nominate candidates—while three and a half million ballots were "blank" or "spoiled." Despite the fact that the opposition was minimized by the electoral system and methods, there could be no doubt that Hitler and his Third Empire had received an overwhelming popular endorsement.

Popular Endorsement

With a Reichstag unanimously devoted to him, Hitler buttressed the new régime with two important constitutional laws. The first, adopted in December 1933, provided that the National Socialist party "is inseparably united with the state," and that "its regulations are determined by the Leader" (that is, by Hitler personally). The second, ratified by the Reichstag in January 1934 on the anniversary of Hitler's accession to the chancellorship, formally abolished the state parliaments and transformed the several states (Prussia, Bavaria, Saxony, etc.) into mere administrative districts of the

Centralizing Government

Empire, and at the same time empowered the central government to alter the imperial constitution at will.

The Third Empire, then, emerged as a National Socialist dictatorship. It was highly centralized and emphatically national. What neither the Hohenzollern Empire nor the Weimar Republic had ventured to undertake—the destruction of local autonomy and the complete submerging of Prussia and the other historic German states—was now finally achieved.

As there was only one government in the Third Empire, so there was only one party, the National Socialist. This was splendidly organized, with headquarters at Munich in a famous "brown house" (reconstructed and enlarged in 1934), with an intricate hierarchy of departments, vocational, educational, and recreational, with a Political Bureau, with a Labor Front, with a Youth Movement, with an extraordinarily adept Propaganda Agency, with disciplinary courts of its own, and with armed forces of its own—the picked party police (the S. S.) and the more numerous storm troops (the S. A.). The enrolled membership of the party was relatively small; it was kept down by a system of careful selection and probation, and comprised, in the autumn of 1933, fewer than two million. Nevertheless, it was a militant membership, in close and manifold touch with the masses all over Germany, and disciplined and directed from above.

Single National Socialist (Nazi) Party

The dictator of the Third Empire, of course, was Adolf Hitler. This he was in virtue of his leadership of the National Socialist party, of his official position as Chancellor, and of his own personal qualities. Before his advent to public office there had been a tendency to regard him either as an ignoramus incompetent to rule or as a demagogue whose vogue would be fleeting. After his advent, however, it became apparent, even to his bitterest foes and detractors, that he possessed remarkable qualifications for dictatorship: not only oratory and histrionics, but insight into popular psychology, quickness in making decisions and energy in carrying them into effect, adroitness in managing men and inspiring their confidence, and untiring application to the details of administration.

There was some danger of conflict within the National Socialist party. It had a "left" wing and a "right" wing, disposed respectively to stress or to belittle the "socialism" in the party's

name and platform, and some of its leading men had rival personal ambitions. To Hitler the danger seemed acute in the spring of 1934, when the ambitious commander of the storm troops, Ernst Röhm by name, growing critical of the government's economic "conservatism" and indignant at its talk of reducing and reforming his command, was suspected of conspiring with the ex-Chancellor, General Kurt von Schleicher, to overthrow Hitler. At any rate, Hitler, in conjunction with Goebbels, Göring, and the secret police, took drastic action at the end of June 1934 to nip any such conspiracy in the bud and to terrorize the National Socialist party into unity and the country at large into obedience. Röhm with several of his aides was murdered at Munich in Hitler's presence. General von Schleicher was dragged from his home at Berlin and slain. Simultaneously, some of Papen's associates were slaughtered, and so too were certain Catholic and labor leaders. Altogether, in the "purge of 1934," several hundred persons were murdered. "Reasons of state" and of "morality" were all that Hitler would advance, and the unquestioning acceptance of his explanation clearly demonstrated the strength of the dictatorship he exercised over the party and over the country.

Purge of 1934

About a month after the "purge," President and Marshal Paul von Hindenburg died on his estate in East Prussia. Then, following grandiose funeral rites on the battlefield of Tannenberg, at which Hitler was chief mourner and orator, Hitler decreed that, subject to ratification by popular vote, Hitler should be President as well as Chancellor under the new official title of Imperial Leader (Reichsführer). Ratification was given in a plebiscite in August 1934. Although four and a quarter million Germans voted "no," thirty-eight and a quarter million voted "yes." At last, by popular will as well as by his own, Adolf Hitler was sole Leader of Germany, real successor of the Hohenzollerns and of Hindenburg and with far more authority than any of them.

Death of Hindenburg, 1934; Hitler as Reichsführer

Reënforcing the dictatorship was incessant preaching of the philosophy—one might say the religion—of National Socialism. This philosophy was essentially Fascist but more extreme (in certain ways) and more devotional. Like Italian Fascism, it taught that people exist for the state, not the state for its people,

and that the state must be national and imperial, military and expansive. Like Italian Fascism, too, its ideal was the "totalitarian state," a state which should embrace an entire nationality and should regulate all the activities of its members, political, economic, and cultural. Likewise, after the manner of Italian Fascism, its program called for an "authoritarian state," in which a single select political party would rule and from which personal dissent and class conflict would be banished, and for a "corporate state," which, while retaining private property and class distinctions, would subordinate them to national welfare and would make occupational groups, rather than individuals, the units of economic and political life. Thus, like Italian Fascism, German National Socialism was the implacable foe of liberalism, democracy, Marxian socialism, and also of pacifism and internationalism and of what were deemed the traditional Christian virtues of humility, meekness, and charity. Beyond Italian Fascism went German National Socialism in respect of its distinctive doctrine of racial superiority—that the Germans, being "pure Aryans," are inherently superior in moral virtue and military prowess not only to all their "Slavic" and "Latin" neighbors but also to the alien and contaminating "Semitic" Jews in their midst. Fiercer and more evangelical, too, was the ardor with which National Socialism inflamed its votaries. Mussolini had a sense of humor, but not Hitler. Fascism was ceremonial and even theatrical, but the rites of National Socialism were performed with deadly earnestness.

Totalitarian State

"Aryan" State

The inculcation of Nazi doctrine was masterfully directed by Joseph Goebbels, "imperial minister of propaganda and public enlightenment," and by Alfred Rosenberg, "supervisor of the party's educational and spiritual work." [1] The latter was the theorist, expounding the "gospel" and detecting "heretics" among writers, artists, university pro-

"Coördination"

[1] So designated by Hitler in January 1934. Rosenberg, born in 1893 at Reval (then in Russia and now in Estonia) and educated as an engineer in Russia, migrated to Germany after the war and joined the National Socialist party in 1919. A prolific writer of brochures and books, and from 1921 the editor of the principal Nazi newspaper, he made amends for his Jewish name and his Russian background by becoming the most rabid anti-Russian leader of the party. A big book of his, published in 1930, *The Myth of the Twentieth Century*, is the most ambitious exposition of the philosophy of the Nazi movement.

fessors, and intellectuals generally. The former was the executive, responsible for the staging of public demonstrations and for the even more important work of "coördination." This meant the bringing of all cultural agencies into harmony with National Socialism and their utilization for its promotion. All the press throughout Germany was thus "coördinated." So were the radios and the cinemas and the theatres. So was the entire school system—the teachers and the textbooks in all educational institutions from kindergarten to university.

Some difficulty was experienced in "coördinating" the Christian churches. Prior to Hitler's appointment to the chancellorship, the bishops of the Catholic Church in Germany had forbidden the faithful to join or support his party on the ground that its incitements to hatred, war, and racial intolerance were basically anti-Christian.[1] Then, following Hitler's establishment in office and his apparently conciliatory negotiation of a concordat with the Vatican, promising religious freedom to the church, the bishops acquiesced in the dissolution of the Centre party and withdrew their formal condemnation of National Socialism. The concordat, however, brought about a restless truce rather than real peace between the Catholic Church and the Third Empire. Hitler and his associates, regarding the concordat as a first step in "coördinating" the church, interfered with Catholic societies and publications of all kinds, compelling them to serve Nazi ends or else suppressing them. Moreover, appropriations for Catholic worship were decreased and a campaign was waged against Catholic schools and religious orders. All this was interpreted in Catholic circles as willful violation of the concordat, and many bishops and priests protested against the "tyranny" and "paganism" of the Nazi régime. Nevertheless, neither church nor government was anxious to engage openly in another Kulturkampf.[2] The government preferred a gradual undermining of the church, and Catholic leaders were apprehensive about losing popular support if an out-and-out conflict was joined with the nationalist government. The uncertainty on both sides made for caution but not for harmony.

Ecclesiastical Difficulties

[1] Hitler in childhood had been baptized and reared a Catholic, but in manhood he was hardly a practicing one. He sometimes styled himself a Catholic; but National Socialism, rather than Christianity, was his real religion.

[2] On the Kulturkampf of Bismarck's time, see above, pp. 304, 307.

German Protestantism had been always allied with secular government and usually quite subservient to it. But there were several different Protestant churches in Germany, not only the Lutheran and the Calvinist, but the separate state churches of Prussia, Saxony, etc., and in each were different shades of individual opinion. The problem here, then, for Hitler and his colleagues was twofold: first, to combine all the Protestant churches into one, as the Catholic Church was one; and second, to coordinate the unified church with the Empire. They did succeed in effecting a corporate union—in name—under an "Imperial Bishop" warmly sympathetic with National Socialism, but they failed to "coördinate" the whole union or even to hold it together. Before long it was apparent that many Protestants as well as Catholics, though willing to coöperate politically with National Socialism, would resist dictation in the field of religion.

Nazi "Pagans"

On the other hand, extremists among the Nazis pressed for a national repudiation of Christianity altogether and a revival of the pre-Christian tribal and pagan religion of the ancient Germans, with at least symbolical worship of Thor and Woden and veneration of the warrior-heroes of Valhalla. Prominent among such extremists was Alfred Rosenberg, "the philosopher" of National Socialism.

Flight of Intellectuals

Accompanying the Nazis' forceful campaign to establish uniformity of thought and action in Germany was a remarkable emigration of intellectuals—scholars, scientists, publicists, professors—who would not or could not be "coördinated." Some of these were Jews, but many were non-Jews. Though the government tried to arrest the emigration, thousands managed to get away to foreign parts, spreading hatred of the Nazi régime and incidentally depleting Germany of independent men of genius and reputation.

Militarism and Forceful Expansion

The chief reason why Hitler kept his hold upon the German masses was the striking success which attended his foreign policy. For a decade before his advent to power he had been an impassioned and much publicized champion of Germany's tearing up the treaty of Versailles, rearming herself, and recapturing all "German" lands; and during the first five years of his dictatorship he actually achieved an impressive part of this very program—to the delight of Germans and the chagrin of foreigners. How he was enabled to do

it, we shall explain in the next chapter. Here it suffices to point out that in 1935 he repudiated the treaty restrictions on Germany's military and naval forces and proceeded to create an army comparable with that of the Hohenzollern Empire; that in 1936 he remilitarized the Rhineland in flat violation of the treaty



GERMANY (HOHENZOLLERN EMPIRE), 1871–1918

NOTE. This is after Bismarck's partition of the German Confederation and his enlargement of Prussia. The numerals refer to provinces of Prussia: (1) East Prussia; (2) West Prussia; (3) Pomerania; (4) Brandenburg; (5) Posen; (6) Silesia; (7) Saxony; (8) Hanover; (9) Schleswig-Holstein; (10) Westphalia; (11) Hesse-Nassau; (12) Rhineland.

of Versailles and retracted the German signature to the war-guilt charges in the same document; that in 1938 he seized Austria by force and began the partition of Czechoslovakia; that in 1939 he completed the destruction of this state, and extorted Memel from Lithuania.

Austria, which the peace treaties of 1919 had reduced to narrowly German confines, managed to preserve its independence

for nineteen years—from 1919 to 1938. At the outset its government was carried on by a coalition of Social Democrats and Christian Socialists,[1] but presently the latter gained a predominance under the leadership of a distinguished priest and statesman, Ignatius Seipel, who was Chancellor

Austria, 1919–1938

GERMANY (THIRD EMPIRE) IN 1939

NOTE. This shows the single centralized state with which Hitler superseded the Federal Republic of 1919–1933, including Austria and the German regions of Czechoslovakia which he annexed in 1938, and (with different markings) the Czech and Slovak "protectorates" which he created in 1939.

of the Republic from 1922 to 1924 and again from 1926 to 1929.

The majority of both Christian Socialists and Social Democrats were loyal to the Republic, but it was difficult for them to coöperate. The former were Catholic and chiefly rural and agrarian; the latter were Marxian and almost wholly urban and

[1] On the democratic constitution of the Austrian Republic, and on the parties of Christian Socialists and Social Democrats, see above, pp. 630–631, 655.

wage-earning. The former were jealous of provincial autonomy; the latter were eager to subordinate the countryside to the capital city of Vienna. To complicate matters, the Social Democrats had a left wing which, under the stress of sorry economic conditions at Vienna, grew more numerous and more inimical to collaboration with any "bourgeois" government,[1] while a right wing of the Christian Socialists was so antagonistic to Marxian Socialists that it stood ready to make common cause against them with extreme Nationalists.

Parties

There were two types of Nationalist in Austria. The first, corresponding to the Conservative in Germany, was aristocratic, aiming at a repudiation, so far as possible, of individualism and democracy, a restoration of the Habsburg dynasty, and an alliance or federation with Germany. The second type was more plebeian; it was embodied in a National Socialist (Nazi) party, which, imported from Germany, availed itself of the desperate economic conditions prevalent from 1929 to win converts, especially from the restless youth and the impoverished middle class, to the entire program of Hitler, including the submergence of Austria in a militant German Empire.

When Seipel retired from politics on account of ill health, another Christian Socialist leader, Engelbert Dollfuss, came to the fore. Dollfuss was of peasant stock, young in years and diminutive in stature, but full of energy. For a time he sought collaboration of the Social Democrats with his Christian Socialists, but it was difficult to obtain, and, as the menace of National Socialism rapidly increased in Austria after its triumph in Germany, he gradually reached the conclusion that democracy must be sacrificed for a dictatorship of his own party. This was accomplished by a new constitution which he put into effect in April 1934, and which described the new régime as "a Christian Corporate State."

Dollfuss and Dictatorship

To the Christian Socialist dictatorship both Social Democrats and National Socialists were violently opposed, and against both the government directed repressive measures. In February 1934, on the eve of the adoption of the new constitution, the proclama-

[1] Social Democrats controlled the municipal government of Vienna, which sponsored expensive public works, including noteworthy construction of model tenements. In July 1927 they organized against the national government a monster demonstration at Vienna, which was terminated by state police and militia.

tion of a general strike by Socialist leaders was answered by an attack of government troops on Socialist strongholds in Vienna, resulting in four days' street fighting, the outlawing of the Social Democratic party, and the merging of all trade unions in a national union under governmental guidance and control.

Then, in July 1934, National Socialists attempted a *coup* against the government. Dollfuss was assassinated at Vienna and widespread rioting occurred in the provinces. In the face of threats from Mussolini, however, Hitler did not venture to intervene; and under the leadership of Kurt Schuschnigg, who succeeded Dollfuss in the chancellorship, order was restored and the peculiar Austrian dictatorship continued on its difficult course for four years more.

Schuschnigg and Austria's End

By 1938 Schuschnigg was in a desperate situation. His dictatorship had only minority support. The Nazis were multiplying and becoming more unruly. The Socialists were still numerous and sullen. Hitler was constantly threatening, and Mussolini was no longer minded to halt him. Economic conditions were growing steadily worse. In vain Schuschnigg made direct overtures to Hitler for an understanding; Hitler was patently hostile to him. Then in March 1938 Schuschnigg suddenly called for a plebiscite of the Austrian people to decide on the future of the country and appealed especially to the Socialists to back him in a supreme effort to preserve Austrian independence. The response would probably have been favorable, but before it could be given Hitler intervened; and against the overwhelming force and great speed of the German army, Austria was helpless. As German troops poured across the borders, Schuschnigg resigned (and was imprisoned) and the Nazis took possession of the country. Ruthlessly they silenced dissent and extracted from the masses an almost unanimous assent to the union of Austria with the German Empire under its militant dictatorship.

5. TREND TOWARD DICTATORSHIP ELSEWHERE IN EUROPE

All the lesser national states in east-central and southeastern Europe issued from the World War as democracies, and most of them as republics.[1] Within them, however, the operation of democratic government soon proved difficult. They were newly created or newly unified states, confronted with the task either of

[1] See above, pp. 654–658.

getting people to govern themselves who had never done so before or of welding together hitherto disparate populations. They were handicapped, too, by social and economic conditions of the utmost gravity—by losses and costs of the war, by staggering public and private indebtedness, by urgent requirements of reparation or reconstruction, by ruinous inflation, and simultaneously by pressing popular demands for agrarian and other social reform. Moreover, to surmount their handicaps and perform their tasks, the new democracies had to rely upon parliaments whose members were generally inexperienced in the practical conduct of public affairs and split up among a large number of mutually antagonistic political parties representing many varieties of opinion from the extreme of feudalism to that of communism.

Obstacles to Democracy

Czechoslovakia had in some degree the same difficulties as its neighbors and certain grave difficulties peculiar to itself. It was an artificial state, geographically misshapen and ethnically incongruous. Czechs and Slovaks comprised a scant majority of its total population, and between these two peoples, despite a similarity of language, were significant differences of tradition and ambition. The Czechs, concentrated in the western provinces of Bohemia and Moravia (which had long been associated with Austria), were inclined to look down upon the Slovaks of the eastern provinces (which had been connected for a long time with Hungary) and to deny them the autonomy to which they aspired. Moreover, in the western provinces the Czechs were disliked by a large minority of Germans, while in the east the Slovaks were despised by a large minority of Hungarians. To add to the ethnic confusion, the city of Teschen was Polish and the mountainous region in the far east was almost entirely Ruthenian (Ukrainian).

Czechoslovakia

Nevertheless. the great prestige of Thomas Masaryk, who in a very real sense had been the "father of his country" and who was its first President, enabled Czechoslovakia to hold together under its centralized democratic government for eighteen years. There were spasmodic conflicts between Socialists and Catholics and between Czechs and Slovaks, and much grumbling by the minor-

ities. Yet noteworthy progress was made in army, education, and transportation, and at least until 1930 in economic and financial rehabilitation.

From 1935, when Masaryk retired on account of age and infirmity, the situation grew gradually worse. The large German element in Bohemia and Moravia, egged on by Nazi propaganda from Germany, became more united in opposition to the Czech government and more insistent on political as well as cultural autonomy. Germany's annexation of Austria in March 1938 served not only to encircle the main part of Czechoslovakia with a formidable foreign Power but also to embolden her own German inhabitants in their subversive efforts; and to these was now added a big wave of disaffection among the other national minorities. At length in September 1938, following an acute international crisis,[1] Czechoslovakia was partially dismembered, the German districts of Bohemia and Moravia being appropriated by Germany, the city of Teschen by Poland, and the Magyar regions of Slovakia by Hungary. At the same time, Masaryk's successor, Edward Beneš, resigned as President and fled the country; semi-autonomous governments were set up for Slovaks and Ruthenians, and the Czech government at Prague became quasi-dictatorial.

Its Partition, 1938–1939

The final partition of Czechoslovakia occurred in March 1939. The Czech prime minister tried to depose the head of the separatist Slovak cabinet, whose reply was a prompt appeal to Hitler for German "protection." Whereupon, Hitler forced the Czech government not only to accede to Slovak demands but to place itself under his domination. German troops poured into Prague, Bohemia and Moravia were made a dependency of the German Empire, and Slovakia was transformed into a German protectorate. Simultaneously Hungary invaded and conquered the Ruthenian province of Carpatho-Ukraine. Czechoslovakia thus disappeared, and its democracy was replaced by dictatorship.

Yugoslavia was troubled by somewhat similar differences in culture and political ambition between the Serbs and the Croats. The former were Orthodox and "backward"; the latter were

[1] See below, p. 807.

Catholic and "progressive." Furthermore, though both were devoted to the "greater Yugoslavia" which the World War had brought into existence, the former regarded it as a mere expansion of Serbia and insisted therefore upon manning the whole centralized administration of the realm, while the latter strove for a federal state with "home rule" for Croatia. Frequent fights between Serb and Croatian deputies in the Chamber at Belgrade reached a climax in June 1928 with the killing of Stefan Radič, the Croatian leader, and several of his lieutenants. Whereupon, early in 1929, King Alexander, with the support of the army, dissolved the parliament, suspended the constitution, and proclaimed himself dictator. He personally appointed the ministers and all local officials. He exercised a rigorous press censorship and directed a ruthless suppression of dissent. In 1931 the royal dictatorship was formally ended by the promulgation of a new constitution. Practically, however, the dictatorship continued, for the new constitution was issued by the King and enabled him to control both the military and the civil service, to name half the Senate, and indirectly to dominate the elections to the Chamber of Deputies. As was expected, "government candidates" carried the ensuing general election, and for the next three years the ministry was solidly Serbian with no Croatian representation. In 1934 King Alexander, on a trip to France, was assassinated at Marseilles. His son, a boy of eleven years, succeeded as Peter II with a regency which pursued a more conciliatory policy.

Yugoslavia

Rumania managed under parliamentary auspices to unify, politically and administratively, the newly acquired provinces of Transylvania, Bukovina, and Bessarabia, and also to effect an important land reform throughout the kingdom, involving the expropriation of 13,000 landlords and the partition of their combined estates of fourteen and a half million acres among a million peasants. Nevertheless, the agencies of democratic government—elections, parliament, and ministries—continued to be manipulated by cliques of professional politicians, some of whom were notoriously corrupt and all of whom were inclined to be arbitrary if not dictatorial. On the death of the war-king, Ferdinand I, in 1927, his infant grandson, Prince Michael, succeeded to the throne under a regency, but by a *coup d'état* in 1930 Michael's father, who had been

Rumania

legally debarred from the succession on account of his infatuation with a woman of unsavory reputation, deposed the child-king and crowned himself as Charles (Carol) II. Charles II, in a somewhat mercurial manner, exercised practically dictatorial power, at one time banning a Nazi party known as the "Iron Guard" and at another time entrusting the premiership to a fanatical anti-Semite.

Poland

Poland, the largest and most populous of the new states of central Europe, achieved a remarkable amount of consolidation and reconstruction, administrative, financial, and educational, but she did so at the expense of liberal parliamentary democracy. From the outset, the Polish electorate, and consequently the Polish parliament, was split into an extraordinarily large number of political factions, the chronic rivalries and intrigues of whose leaders made the successful operation of constitutional government almost impossible. At length in 1926 Marshal Joseph Pilsudski, the Polish hero of the World War, executed a military *coup d'état*, overturning the cabinet of the day, assuming the premiership of a "nationalist" ministry, and becoming virtual dictator. Pilsudski refused to be called a dictator and showed notable reluctance to appear as one. He declined to accept the presidency of the republic, and in 1930 he relinquished the premiership. Nevertheless, with the army in back of him, he tolerated in the presidency and in the ministry only such persons as would do his will, and shortly before his death in 1935 he compelled a reluctant parliamentary majority to accept a new constitution under which the powers of the president were enhanced and those of parliament curtailed.

Lithuania

In Lithuania, similar political turbulence prevailed, until a similar *coup d'état*, likewise in the year 1926, put General Anton Smetona, an ardent nationalist, into the presidency. Then, in 1928, the adoption of a new constitution provided Smetona with legal basis for his dictatorship.

Latvia and Estonia

In the other Baltic states, Latvia and Estonia, the radically democratic constitutions which had been adopted just after the World War were discredited by the free scope which they gave to conflicting and paralyzing agitation of Communist and Fascist extremists. A dictatorship was maintained in Estonia from 1934 to 1936, and another was established in Latvia in May 1935. In both countries Communist propaganda was outlawed.

Hungary, of all the states of central Europe, was least affected by the wave of liberal democracy which had followed in the wake of the World War. The Magyars, long accustomed to government by the land-owning families of the old aristocracy, looked all the more readily to them for guidance after the partition and humiliation of the country by foreigners and the failure of Béla Kun's Communist efforts.[1] From 1920 onwards, Hungary was nominally a "constitutional monarchy," but really an aristocratic and semi-Fascist state, much as it had been before the World War and with no partition of the large landed estates. Its head or "Regent," Admiral Horthy, and its successive prime ministers directed public affairs in quite arbitrary fashion, and were sustained in parliament and in the country at large by a well-organized patriotic party—the National Unity party. Not only was revolutionary radicalism suppressed, but agitation of "legitimists" in behalf of a Habsburg restoration was discouraged.

Hungary

In Bulgaria, under King Boris III, the post-war years were marked by intense party strife and frequent crimes of political violence. In 1923 the able Agrarian premier, Stambulinsky,[2] was deposed by a *coup d'état* and murdered, and during the next three years a nominally "democratic" but essentially reactionary ministry conducted a campaign of terrorism against "radicals" whether of town or of countryside. A more truly democratic government was installed in 1926, but before long it felt obliged to manipulate elections and to stamp out a growing Communist party; and in May 1934 it in turn was forcefully overthrown by a group of army officers intent upon transforming Bulgaria into a Fascist state. For a year these Fascists ruled, only to be supplanted in 1935 by still another *coup d'état*, engineered this time by the King.

Bulgaria

In Albania, the attempt of an Orthodox bishop who had been educated in the United States, Fan Noli by name, to create an enduring democratic republic was brought to naught by a young Moslem army officer, Ahmed Zogu, who, becoming president in 1925, had himself proclaimed King as Zog I in 1928. Then in 1939 Italy seized the country, supplanting King Zog with her own Fascist rule.

Albania

As Albania relapsed from republic to dictatorship, so Greece

[1] See above, pp. 629–630.

[2] See above, pp. 631–632.

wavered between monarchy and republic. The Greek parliament compelled King George II to quit the country in December 1923, and in March 1925 it voted the de- **Greece**
thronement of the dynasty and the establishment of a republic, which was promptly endorsed by popular plebiscite. The change, however, was only one of name; and under the republic, as under the monarchy, Greek politics continued turbulent and at times bloody. Venizelos, the country's veteran statesman, contrived to return to office in 1928, but his enemies, of whom he had many, combined against him, and in 1933 an acknowledged Royalist became premier. In 1935 Venizelos inspired a revolt, which was put down with considerable bloodshed, and Venizelos fled abroad. There followed immediately a military and royalist *coup d'état*, and after the formality of a plebiscite, the restoration of King George II to the Greek throne. In 1936 the King sanctioned a dictatorship by an army officer, General John Mataxas.

From what we have already said in the present section, it must be apparent that throughout east-central Europe the post-war political trend was toward dictatorship, while re- **East-Central Europe Generally**
taining some parliamentary forms. This was one lesson of the dismembered Czechoslovakia. It was true, likewise, of the remaining larger states: the republic of Poland and the kingdoms of Rumania and Yugoslavia. It was true, too, of the small republics on the Baltic: Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. It was true, also, of the small states on the Danube and in the Balkan peninsula: the nominal kingdom of Hungary, the actual kingdom of Bulgaria, Greece which was royalist and then republican and then royalist again, and Albania which was republican and then royalist and finally Fascist.

It was similar in the southwestern peninsula of Europe—in Spain and Portugal. In Portugal, the nominally democratic republic which had been fashioned back in 1910, con- **Southwestern Europe: Portugal**
tinued after the World War, as before, to be the plaything of a swift succession of professional politicians and army officers until, in 1926, one of the latter, General Antonio Carmona, inaugurated a practical dictatorship of more enduring and constructive character. He appropriated the office of president by military *coup d'état*. In 1928 he secured election to the office for a regular term of four years, and this term, by decree in 1932, he lengthened to six years. Then, in

accordance with a new constitution which was drafted by the dictator and approved by general plebiscite in 1933, he was confirmed as president for an additional term of seven years. Under General Carmona's "democratic" dictatorship, public administration was reformed, national finances were improved, and revolutionary agitation was sternly suppressed. Strikes and lockouts were prohibited, and provision was made for the compulsory arbitration of labor disputes.

Spain

Spain, at the close of the World War, was still nominally a constitutional monarchy, with a parliament elected by universal manhood suffrage and with a ministry appointed by the king but responsible to the parliament. Actually, however, the Spanish government was still manipulated in part by the king and in part by professional politicians and ambitious army officers, with the masses largely indifferent and with irreconcilable factions of "revolution" and "reaction" indulging in chronic criticism. The royal government had momentarily profited in popular esteem from the economic advantages which accrued to Spain as a neutral in the World War, but with the cessation of the war Spain was deprived of exceptional markets for her products, the financial returns to her farming class diminished, unemployment increased among her laboring class, and fault-finding with the existing political and social order became more pronounced. Republicans, Socialists, and Anarchists intensified their subversive propaganda and multiplied their ranks. A Communist party was organized. An epidemic of strikes paralyzed industry and threatened revolution.

Aggravating the situation were the protracted and apparently disastrous efforts of the royal government to put down native uprisings in the northern part of Morocco which had been allotted to Spain before the World War. For years the fighting in Morocco had taken a heavy toll of Spanish soldiery and Spanish treasure, without achieving its objective, and in July 1921 it reached a sorry climax in an utter rout and almost complete extinction of a Spanish army. This ultimate disaster outraged patriotic sentiment in Spain and turned it against King Alphonso XIII, to whose personal interference with the military command in Morocco the disaster was chiefly attributed.

In a desperate attempt to save his throne and silence his critics, Alphonso XIII connived at the forceful establishment of

a dictatorship, in September 1923, by Primo de Rivera, a nobleman and army officer who had served with distinction in the Spanish-American War and in Morocco. He suspended the constitution, exercised a rigid censorship of the press, and for seven years (from 1923 to 1930) maintained a kind of Fascist dictatorship with the motto, "country, monarchy, religion." He infused new energy into the Moroccan enterprise, and in coöperation with French arms he finally brought it to a successful issue in 1926.[1] Within Spain, Rivera aimed at a "corporate state," directed by a single Nationalist party. To this end, he set up in 1928 a state department of national economy and prescribed the compulsory arbitration of labor disputes, and in the same year he convoked an advisory assembly to draft a new national constitution.

Primo de Rivera, Dictator, 1923–1930

Primo de Rivera was an honest man and not without personal ability. But he had no such popular following in Spain as Mussolini had in Italy, and he was not forceful (or unscrupulous) enough to overcome opposition. He failed to build up a strong supporting party or to allay popular discontent, which continued to express itself in strikes, riots, and occasional mutinies, and he was handicapped by interference and intrigues of the King. Eventually, disillusioned and broken in health, Rivera resigned and retired to private life in January 1930 as suddenly and unexpectedly as he had seized power. His successor at once yielded to public clamor and restored the democratic constitution.

In the ensuing local elections of April 1931 the Republicans won an overwhelming victory, and their leader, Niceto Zamora, threatened a general insurrection unless the King should immediately abdicate. Alphonso XIII replied by flight. He did not formally abdicate, but merely "suspended the exercise of the royal power." At once, Zamora proclaimed Spain a republic, and putting himself at the head of the "provisional government" of this Second Spanish Republic,[2] called for a parliamentary election—the first in eight years. The election held in June 1931, in the midst of great excitement and of coercion by revolutionaries, returned a large

Republican Revolution of 1931

[1] The Moroccan War cost Spain some 800 million dollars and an average of over 13,000 lives a year during the decade 1916–1926.

[2] On the First Spanish Republic, see above, p. 201.

majority favorable to a republican form of government and to drastic social and religious changes.

The parliament adopted in December 1931 a republican constitution, containing guaranties of personal liberty, prescriptions for the separation of church and state and the nationalizing of church property, and provisions for democratic government. Zamora was elected first president of the Spanish Republic, and Manuel Azaña became its first constitutional premier with a coalition ministry of Radical Republicans and Socialists.

In 1932 the parliament, in response to demands of the Catalan regionalists, enacted a home-rule law for Catalonia, delegating certain powers to a local legislature and a local president of its own choice and putting the Catalan language on an equal footing with Castilian. Similar measures of local autonomy were proposed for the Basques and for the province of Galicia. In the same year, moreover, the central parliament authorized the expropriation of all lands owned by the nobility.

Also, with its strongly anti-clerical majority, the parliament took severe measures against the Catholic Church. In 1932 the Jesuits were banned and their schools and other property confiscated for "social welfare," and every Catholic clergyman in Spain, whether regular or secular, was deprived of governmental salary or subsidy. A law in 1933 transferred all ecclesiastical property, valued at half a billion dollars, to the state, and another law of the same year required all Catholic congregations to pay taxes and to report regularly to the government and forbade them to engage in industry, commerce, or education. The Pope protested against these measures as "infringements on the liberty of the church," and Catholics in Spain began to organize an electoral resistance.

Local elections in the early autumn of 1933 showed a strong popular reaction against the radical, particularly the anti-clerical, policies of the government. Azaña resigned the premiership, and, following the failure of the Moderate Republican leader, Alejandro Lerroux, to command a majority of the deputies, President Zamora dissolved the parliament and ordered the election of a new one. In this general election, in November 1933, the first under universal suffrage, the masses of the population participated—of twelve and a half million electors, at least 80 per cent voted. It confirmed the conservative trend evident

in the preceding local elections. The coalition of Radical Republicans and Socialists was decisively defeated, the representation of the latter being cut in half and the Radical coalition as a whole being outnumbered three to one. The new majority comprised groups of Moderate Republicans, among whom the balance of power was held by the Catholic Popular Action Party, organized and led by the wealthy José Gil Robles.

With the defeat of the Radicals and Socialists, and with the support of Gil Robles, Lerroux was enabled to form a fairly stable ministry of Moderate Republicans and to hold in abeyance the execution of the land laws and some of the anti-clerical measures previously enacted. But this aroused the active hostility of the revolutionary minority. Terrorism by Communists and an attempted general strike were overcome by the government in December 1933, and in October 1934 a more serious insurrection, in which Socialists and Catalan Regionalists and even the Radical ex-premier, Azaña, participated, and which involved considerable loss of life and destruction of property, was crushed by government troops.

The rigorous repressive measures taken by the government served to alienate some of its supporters and at the same time to unite opposing Radicals, Socialists, and Communists in a so-called "Popular Front." Consequently, in the general election which President Zamora ordered in February 1936, though Moderates obtained a popular majority, the Popular Front secured a majority of seats for the new parliament. Zamora was forced out of the presidency as being too moderate, and was succeeded by Manuel Azaña; and the new Radical government, while announcing its intention to execute earlier social and ecclesiastical enactments, seemed unwilling or unable to prevent its Communist and Anarchist allies from burning churches and monasteries and terrorizing priests and anyone suspected of reactionary sentiments. Spain appeared in the early summer of 1936 to be drifting into anarchy.

Then, suddenly, on July 19, 1936, General Francisco Franco, commander in Spanish Morocco, landed at Cadiz with his Moorish troops and called for a rising of the Right against the Popular Front government of the Leftists. About three-fourths of the regular army and half of the navy joined the revolt, which spread quickly throughout southwestern Spain. In September

Franco's Revolt, 1936: Civil War in Spain

General Franco established a provisional Nationalist government at Salamanca with himself as military and civil dictator. It was promptly accorded recognition, and supplied with men and munitions, by Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany and was supported within Spain by the factions of Constitutional Monarchists, by Carlists,[1] by the majority of Catholics, and by a newly created Fascist organization, the Spanish Phalanx.

The Popular Front—or Loyalist—government was at first staggered by the suddenness of the revolt and sorely weakened by the desertion of the bulk of trained soldiery. In September, however, its resistance stiffened under the leadership of a Socialist premier, Francisco Caballero, who utilized officers and supplies from Soviet Russia and volunteers from France and other countries to transform levies of Spanish radicals and of Basque and Catalan regionalists into disciplined fighting forces. Subsequently, in May 1937, Caballero, who was deemed too tender of the Anarchist element in Catalonia, was replaced in the premiership by another Socialist, Juan Negrin; but the latter's Loyalist government remained adamant against any compromise with Franco's Nationalist government.

Meanwhile the revolt had become a fierce and protracted civil war, with international complications.[2] Franco's repeated assaults on Madrid long met with failure, but in 1937 he accomplished the piecemeal conquest of the Basque provinces and Galicia in the mountainous north, and in March 1938 he turned east and drove a wedge between Loyalist armies in Catalonia and those in the Valencia-Madrid zone. The struggle was terrific and was accompanied on both sides by wanton destruction and shocking outrages against civilians.

At length, early in 1939, Franco conquered the whole of Catalonia, including the key city of Barcelona, and Loyalist resistence to him all but ceased. Azaña resigned the presidency, and General Miaja, assuming charge of the Loyalists, prepared for final surrender. In vain, Negrin and groups of extremists urged continuing resistance. Miaja obliged Negrin to flee and the extremists to disarm. At the end of March, Madrid, Valencia, and the other places still in Loyalist hands capitulated unconditionally to General Franco and the Spanish Nationalists.

[1] See above, pp. 429, 431.

[2] On these, see below, p. 804.

The Spanish Civil War was often represented by persons sympathetic with the Loyalists as a contest between fascism and democracy, and by persons favorable to the Nationalists as a combat between democracy and communism. It was really far more complex than either of these easy generalizations. Whatever democracy there may have been in the Spanish Republic, it was clearly superseded, under the exigencies of the Civil War, by dictatorship no less on the Loyalist than on the Nationalist side; and whatever the final issue of the Civil War, it could hardly be liberal democracy. Spain was no exception in the general trend of the 1930's from democracy to dictatorship.

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CHAPTER XXVII

INTERNATIONAL ORDER AND DISORDER

VOICING the aspirations of large sections of mankind, Woodrow Wilson had proclaimed a twofold purpose of American intervention in the World War—"to make the world safe for democracy" and "to end war"; and at the close of the World War the wide vogue of political democracy was accompanied by popular demand for a new international order.

Nevertheless, just as disillusionment about political democracy grew, and one nation after another reacted against it during the post-war era, so in the same period difficulties about operating the League of Nations and achieving the new international order became ever more manifest, with similar disillusionment.

I. THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Prior to the World War, The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 had been hailed as foreshadowing a new order in international affairs, and propaganda in behalf of a permanent league of nations had been conducted by numerous individuals and organizations in Europe and America.[1] To such propaganda, the World War gave impetus. It was eloquently argued that the catastrophe could have been prevented if a league had been in existence in 1914. It was argued, likewise, that if half the nations of the world could pool their resources of men and money and coöperate as allies in a protracted war, then it should be as possible as it was desirable for all of them to form an enduring alliance in the common cause of peace. To these arguments, statesmen paid respectful attention, and the President of the United States appended to his famous peace program as its fourteenth and last point: "A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose

[1] See above, pp. 543–548.

of affording guaranties of political independence and territorial integrity."

In Woodrow Wilson's program this point might be last but it was not least. It would be, he reiterated, "the most essential part of the peace settlement." He insisted upon its unqualified acceptance by the Allies and by Germany as a condition of the armistice, and in the peace negotiations at Paris he labored most assiduously for a league of nations.

League Covenant, 1919

Concerning just what the league should be there were wide differences of opinion, ranging from the hope of Lansing, the American Secretary of State, that it should be no more than an improved Hague Court for international arbitration, to the desire of Clemenceau, the French premier, that it should be a military alliance for the enforcement of peace. The compromise eventually agreed to was embodied in a "Covenant," and this was incorporated with the major treaties signed in 1919–1920 by the Allies and the enemy-states.

Structure of League

The Covenant, in establishing the League of Nations, provided for an international body of two houses: (1) an Assembly, consisting of delegates from the several members of the League (each member having one vote and not more than three delegates), and meeting at Geneva in neutral Switzerland; and (2) a Council, a smaller body, holding more frequent sessions and composed of representatives of permanently designated Great Powers and of a few lesser Powers selected from time to time by the Assembly.[1] In addition, it provided for a Secretariat, responsible to the Assembly and Council, and served by a staff of officials with headquarters at Geneva. In close association with the League, furthermore, provision was made for a permanent Court of International Justice and for an International Labor Office.

Purposes of League

The purposes of the League, as stated or implied in the Covenant, were four: to prevent war, to organize peace, to discharge certain special duties imposed by the peace treaties of 1919–1920, and to promote international coöperation in that undefined field where the interests of nations

[1] At first, the permanent seats on the Council were assigned to Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, and the United States, and the temporary seats to Belgium, Brazil, Spain, and Greece. Subsequently Germany and Russia were given permanent seats, and the number of temporary seats was raised.

are common or subject to amicable adjustment. Of these purposes, the main one, at least the one uppermost in the minds of the framers of the Covenant, was the first—to prevent war.

1. To Prevent War

Article 10 obligated members of the League "to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence" of one another. Article 11 empowered the League to "take action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations" and authorized any member to bring to the attention of either Council or Assembly "any circumstance whatever affecting international relations which threatens to disturb international peace." Article 12 required the members to submit disputes either to arbitration or to inquiry by the Council and "in no case to resort to war until three months after the award by the arbitrators or the report by the Council." Article 13 bound the members to "carry out in good faith" any arbitral award and not to resort to war against "any member of the League that complies therewith." Article 15 prescribed that any dispute which could not be settled by arbitration must be submitted to the Council and it prohibited any resort to war in contravention of a unanimous decision of the Council (exclusive of the parties to the dispute). Article 16 ordained, in summary, that a member which should resort to war in disregard of these provisions of the Covenant, should "*ipso facto* be deemed to have committed an act of war against all members of the League." Finally, in respect of any dispute between a member and a non-member, Article 17 declared that if the non-member "refuses to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the purposes of such dispute and shall resort to war against a member of the League, the provisions of Article 16 shall be applicable as against the state taking such action."

War was not altogether forbidden by the Covenant. Armed rebellion and civil war were plainly excluded from the League's jurisdiction by a stipulation in Article 15. Even international war might legally be waged if the parties to it had previously submitted their dispute to mediation and the Council had failed to reach an unanimous decision. Even to prevent "illegal" war, the League, having no armed force of its own, could rely only upon the "moral obligations" which its members assumed.

The Covenant did specify "sanctions" to be taken by the League against recalcitrant members (and non-members). If any state resorted to war in disregard of the Covenant, Article 16 required the other members of the League "immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations," to prohibit "all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking state," and to prevent "all financial, commercial, or personal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking state and the nationals of any state, whether a member of the League or not." In such a case, furthermore, it would become the duty of the Council to recommend "what effective military, naval, or air force" the members of the League should severally use to uphold the Covenant.

"Sanctions"

In such fashion the League of Nations would attempt to prevent international war. But the League was not to confine itself to a merely negative rôle of prohibiting war and recommending "sanctions" against nations which engaged in it. The League was expected to do more—to act positively and constructively to uproot underlying causes of war and to organize peace. The central agencies of the League—Secretariat, Council, and Assembly—were designed for this long-range purpose as well as for the immediate purpose of preventing war, and so was the permanent Court of International Justice, which, authorized by the Covenant, was duly founded in 1921. This Court was similar in certain respects to The Hague Tribunal which had been established by the Peace Conference of 1899; it had its seat at The Hague (rather than at Geneva), and it was a judicial rather than a diplomatic or political body. But whereas The Hague Tribunal was not a permanent organic institution but only a panel of judges from which arbitrators might be selected for a particular dispute, the Court of International Justice was a continuously functioning bench of fifteen judges, appointed for a term of nine years by joint action of the League's Council and Assembly, and empowered "to hear and determine any dispute of an international character which the parties thereto submit to it" and to "give an advisory opinion upon any dispute or question referred to it by the Council or by the Assembly."

2. To Organize Peace

International Court

In the belief that secret treaties had contributed to bringing

on the World War, the framers of the Covenant sought to outlaw them. Provision was accordingly made that treaties should be published and that none would be binding unless registered with the Secretariat. Besides, a pledge was exacted from every League member that it would abrogate all existing "obligations or understandings" inconsistent with the terms of the Covenant and would not enter into any new ones, though a special proviso was inserted—at American request—that "nothing in the Covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of international engagements, such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine, for securing the maintenance of peace."

Publication of Treaties

The Covenant recognized, moreover, the peril, in a changing world, of too rigid insistence on a *status quo* consecrated by treaties of the past. It expressly enabled the Assembly to "advise the reconsideration, by members of the League, of treaties which have become inapplicable and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world."

Treaty Revision

Furthermore, the Covenant aimed at doing away with big competitive armaments, which were generally regarded as a major cause of past war. It therefore obliged the members of the League to "recognize that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety" and also that "the manufacture by private enterprise of munitions and implements of war is open to grave objections," and it instructed the Council to formulate definite plans alike for the limitation of armaments and for the prevention of "the evil effects" attendant upon their private manufacture.

Limitation of Armaments

In addition to preventing war and organizing peace, the League of Nations was to perform certain tasks bequeathed to it by the peace treaties of 1919–1920. It was to supervise the plebiscites in Schleswig, East Prussia, and Upper Silesia. It was to administer the Free City of Danzig. It was to govern the Saar for fifteen years and then hold a plebiscite there to determine whether the district should revert to Germany or pass to France or remain under the League.[1] It was to oversee the enforcement of the special treaty provisions

3. To Execute Peace of Paris

[1] See above, p. 638.

concerning "minority rights." [1] Besides, the League of Nations was to possess at least a nominal suzerainty over the former German colonies and Ottoman territories which were "mandated" to other Powers, and the League Council was to receive annual reports from the Mandatories and to seek the advice of a permanent commission of the League "on all matters relating to the observance of the mandates."

Minority Rights and Mandated Territories

Finally, the League was charged with promoting coöperation in matters of general humanitarian concern. To this end, all previously established international bureaus and commissions were placed under the League's direction, and to it were entrusted the making and oversight of international agreements to secure "fair and humane conditions of labor for men, women, and children," "just treatment of native inhabitants" of colonies belonging to members of the League, "freedom of communication and of transit and equitable treatment for the commerce of all members of the League," and regulation of "the traffic in women and children," "the traffic in opium and other dangerous drugs," and "the trade in arms and ammunition with the countries in which the control of this traffic is necessary in the common interest." To the same end, the League was "to take steps in matters of international concern for the prevention and control of disease" and "to encourage and promote the establishment and coöperation of duly authorized voluntary national Red Cross organizations" for "the mitigation of suffering throughout the world."

4. To Promote Humanitarian Cooperation

In intimate association with the League, and serving as its instrument in the labor field was a special international organization, separately provided for by the "Labor Convention" adopted at Paris in 1919 and, like the Covenant of the League of Nations, incorporated in the several peace treaties. The Labor Convention recognized "relations between capital and labor" to be "matters of international concern," and for their regulation created an International Labor Conference and an International Labor Office.

Labor Convention

From what we have now said, it must be obvious that under the Covenant the League was expected to be the cornerstone of a new world-order of pacific coöperation and general security.

[1] See above, pp. 643–644.

It must also be obvious that, if the League was to fulfill this expectation, its membership should embrace almost if not quite all of the sovereign states of the world. The Covenant, in fact, invited all the Allies and almost all neutral nations to accede to it "immediately" and "without reservation," and thus to become initial members of the League. Further, it provided for the subsequent admission of any "fully self-governing state, dominion, or colony" by two-thirds vote of the Assembly, and, membership being voluntary, for the withdrawal of any member on two years' notice.

League Membership

In January 1920, pursuant to the call of President Wilson of the United States, the League of Nations was formally inaugurated at Paris with an initial meeting of the Council, and the first Assembly convened at Geneva in the following November. By this time all the Allies in the World War save one and nearly all the invited neutrals had ratified the Covenant and joined the League—a total of forty-two members.[1] In time, the former enemy states and the Russian Soviet Union joined it, and by 1935 the number of countries which had adhered to the League reached the impressive total of sixty-two—twenty-eight in Europe, twenty-one in America, eight in Asia, three in Africa, and two in Australasia.

Inauguration of League, 1920

From the outset, a very serious handicap to the League of Nations was the abstention of the United States. It meant the withholding of the moral support and active coöperation of a Great Power which had taken a decisive part in the World War and whose President had been chiefly responsible for creating the League. How the United States came to adopt an attitude of such grave import to post-war international relations calls for special explanation.

Abstention of United States

While fighting went on, most Americans had been proud of the diplomatic leadership which the Allies accorded to the President of the United States, and few raised serious or sustained

[1] The "Allied and Associated" Powers which promptly joined the League numbered twenty-nine: Great Britain and her five "Dominions" of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and India, France, Italy, Japan, Belgium, Portugal, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Greece, China, Siam, Liberia, Brazil, Cuba, Panama, Haiti, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Honduras, Peru, Bolivia, and Uruguay. Thirteen neutral Powers similarly adhered: Spain, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Persia, Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Venezuela, Paraguay, and Salvador.

protest against President Wilson's statement of war aims or his championship of a league of nations. But with the defeat of Germany, acute political partisanship was resumed in the United States, and Wilson as the leader of the Democratic party became the target of the rival Republican party, which carried the Congressional elections of November 1918 and obtained a majority in the Senate (whose consent was necessary for the ratification of treaties). Then the President, hoping no doubt that the peace settlement would redound to the political advantage of himself and his party, widened the breach with the Senate majority by taking Democrats but no prominent Republican with him to the Peace Congress at Paris. In the circumstances the Republican party sought especially to discredit him and his work. At first he was assailed because he seemed too conciliatory toward Germany. Later, when the terms of the peace settlement were disclosed, he was accused of fatally compromising his own principles, of agreeing to a peace of vengeance rather than of justice, of sacrificing American interests, and of ensnaring the United States in European quarrels.

When President Wilson returned to America in July 1919 and sought the necessary ratification of the League Covenant and the treaty of Versailles, he encountered widespread popular opposition and stubborn hostility from the Senate majority. Among his adversaries were those who objected to the League of Nations as tending to impair American sovereignty and vitiate certain constitutional powers of the American Congress, or as tending, in disregard of the admonitions of George Washington, to entangle the United States still more in the meshes of Old World diplomacy. There were others who objected to the treaty of Versailles: idealists who contrasted it with the "Fourteen Points"; patriots who denounced its concessions to Japan and Great Britain; German Americans who resented the degradation of the Fatherland; Italian Americans who thought it unfair to Italy; Irish Americans who thought it too fair to Great Britain. All these insisted that the United States should not underwrite a "vicious" and "unjust" peace.

For almost two years a deadlock ensued between President Wilson and the Senate majority, the latter stubbornly refusing to ratify the League Covenant except with "reservations" which the President quite as stubbornly declined to accept. In Septem-

ber 1919 Wilson undertook a tour of the country in order to reënlist popular support, but he was stricken with a paralysis from which he never fully recovered. Henceforth a broken and almost helpless man, he faced death and, what undoubtedly seemed worse to him, the defection of his own country from that League of Nations upon which he had set his mind and heart. The longer the deadlock continued, the higher mounted the wave of Senatorial hostility to the President's peace program. In November 1919 and again in March 1920 the Senate adopted by majority vote some fourteen drastic reservations to the League Covenant, but the minority, faithful to the President's injunctions, blocked ratification with these reservations.

The dispute was settled and the deadlock broken by the verdict of the American people in the presidential election of November 1920. At that time the candidate of the Democratic party, a supporter of the policies of President Wilson, was overwhelmingly defeated, and Warren Harding, a Republican Senator, was elected to the presidency. The new President, addressing the Congress shortly after his inauguration, in March 1921, declared that "in the existing League of Nations, world governing with its super-powers, this Republic will have no part."

After concluding separate peace treaties in 1922 with Germany, Austria, and Hungary, the United States persistently held aloof from the League of Nations. Eventually, some partial and halting coöperation was achieved through the presence of American "observers" at Geneva, through American representation on certain League commissions, through American participation in special conferences (such as those on disarmament) called by the League, and, in 1934, through America's acceptance of membership in the League's Labor Organization.

Other Abstentions or Withdrawals

The abstention and critical attitude of the United States undoubtedly injured the League of Nations. But there were other and hardly less grave gaps in the League's membership. For fourteen years after the establishment of the League, the Russian Soviet Union was not a member, partly because its Communist dictatorship regarded the League as an international agency for preserving capitalism and hence either feared or despised it, and partly because most Powers in the League were hostile to the Russian dictatorship and sceptical of its willingness or ability to coöperate with them.

For six years, moreover, Germany was excluded from membership; and afterwards in 1933 both she and Japan withdrew, and in 1936 Italy also. Thereafter, only three Great Powers remained in the League—Britain, France, and Russia.

Nevertheless, despite weaknesses in its membership and growing doubt about its ability to perform the primary task for which it had been organized—the prevention of international war,—the League demonstrated that in other respects it was effectual and serviceable. Its Secretariat gathered and published much useful data about world conditions, political, economic, social, and cultural. Through its agencies, it did much to check the spread of typhus and the international traffic in opium. Through its associated Labor Office and Labor Conferences, it prompted a good deal of international collaboration in dealing with problems of industrial labor. Through its Court of International Justice, a considerable number of controversial matters were successfully adjudicated; and through special committees which it sponsored, a start was made toward a codification of international law.

League Services

In the adjustment of disputes between nations and in the prevention of war, the League was least successful. It undoubtedly helped in these respects with its convenient agencies, with its painstaking investigations and reports, and with its less tangible but still important contributions to the formation of pacific public opinion. And in disputes between lesser Powers, it actually mediated with some success. For example, a dispute between Finland and Sweden in 1920 over the ownership of the Aland Islands in the Baltic was referred to the League, and the Council, after investigation by a special commission, awarded the islands to Finland. Again, a dispute between Poland and Germany over the boundary line which should be drawn in Upper Silesia following the confused plebiscite there, was referred to the League in 1921, and the Council adjusted it by a compromise. Then, too, in 1925 a Greek attack upon Bulgaria in retaliation for frontier incidents was stopped by remonstrances of the League Council and the threat of an economic boycott against Greece. Similarly, hostilities between Colombia and Peru resulting from the seizure in 1932 of a town in the former's border province of Leticia by armed forces of the latter, were averted by a League commission, which took

League Mediation in Minor Disputes

charge of Leticia in June 1933 and brought about a year later an amicable agreement between the two countries whereby Peru tendered apologies and Colombia regained the province.

Failure of Mediation in Major Disputes

League mediation usually failed in disputes to which Great Powers were party. True, the good offices of the League were utilized to settle in 1926 a protracted dispute over the ownership of the rich oil fields of Mosul between Great Britain as mandatory for Iraq on the one side and the weaker state of Turkey on the other, but this case was not a conclusive test of the League's strength. For, inasmuch as the settlement was favorable to Great Britain (and Iraq), the Great Power gladly accepted it, and the lesser Power was induced, by minor British concessions, to acquiesce.

Flouting League

In a dispute of 1923 between Poland (backed by France) and Lithuania over the city of Vilna, attempted League mediation was pushed aside and Poland's armed seizure of Vilna was upheld by an independent accord between France and the other Great Powers of Britain and Italy. In another dispute of the same year between Italy and Greece, arising from the murder, presumably by Greek bandits, of several Italian members of an Albanian boundary commission, Italy without recourse to the League demanded of Greece an apology and heavy indemnities and, to enforce quick compliance with her demands, bombarded and occupied the Greek island of Corfu. In vain Greece appealed to the League. Italy flouted it, maintaining that its intervention would be an infringement of her own national dignity and sovereign rights, and only consenting to evacuate Corfu through the friendly mediation of her "equals"—Britain and France—and on terms necessitating Greek acceptance of her major demands.

The League could not prevent Japan from forcibly appropriating Manchuria and conducting military operations against China. China besought the League to interfere, but the only tangible results were a paper report from a League commission and the withdrawal of Japan from the League. Nor could the League stop a war which broke out in 1928 between two of its South American members, Bolivia and Paraguay, over the long-disputed intermediate territory known as the Gran Chaco. When Paraguay was called to account by the League in 1934, she simply followed Japan's example and withdrew from the League.

In 1935, too, the League failed to prevent Italy from undertaking the conquest of Ethiopia. After Italian troops had actually invaded the African state (a fellow member of the League), the League Assembly vainly authorized the application of economic "sanctions" against the aggressor. These could not be made effective. Ethiopia was practically abandoned to her fate, and Italy withdrew from the League.

Meanwhile, the succession of League failures to bring about any limitation of armaments, concerning which we shall say more in the next section, not only occasioned Germany's secession in 1933 and her repudiation of the restrictions of the treaty of Versailles on her own armaments, but spread and intensified distrust of the League as a guarantor of national security and international peace. The League of Nations, serviceable as it was in non-controversial matters, was apparently ineffectual in disputes vitally affecting the political prestige of a strong and self-willed nation. It sufficed neither for ambition nor for security. By 1938 it was thoroughly impotent. It not even took note of the extinction of Austria or the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia.

Breakdown of League, 1938

2. THE QUEST FOR SECURITY

Endangering the new international order envisaged by Wilson and other champions of the League of Nations were basic differences among the Powers about the "security" which they all anxiously sought during the post-war period. The nations did not want another big war. But how to forestall it? How to secure themselves? Unfortunately, what was "security" for one nation might be a threat against the "security" of another. A victor nation, such as France, would interpret "security" and seek its attainment in a different way from a vanquished nation, such as Germany.

Problem of Security

France utilized the prestige which she gained from the World War and the military superiority which she retained after 1918, just as Germany had done after 1871, to exercise for several years a kind of premiership in international affairs and to advance plans for her own "security." Not all of these plans could be realized, however, in the face of determined opposition from other Great Powers, and consequently the history of French diplomacy during the period

French Foreign Policy, 1919-1931

is the story of a perpetual search for new devices whereby France could be secured against any new aggression by Germany.

At first, while the Paris Peace Congress was in progress, the French government and Marshal Foch pleaded earnestly that the future security of their country, and therefore the peace of Europe, depended upon the severance of the whole left bank of the Rhine from Germany. Then, when President Wilson pressed for a League of Nations, the French negotiators pleaded that the League be furnished with "teeth," that it be provided with a strong international army to enforce strict observance of the treaties of peace. Neither President Wilson nor Lloyd George (on behalf of the British government) would assent to the League's being made a hard-and-fast military alliance or to the extension of French frontiers to the Rhine, and eventually France agreed, though reluctantly, to an alternative plan for her special security. This was to be a defensive triple alliance by the terms of which the United States and Great Britain would jointly guaranty the territorial integrity of France and would come to her military assistance if she should be attacked by Germany. The treaties of alliance were duly signed at Paris, and on the strength of them France abandoned her claims to German lands (except Alsace-Lorraine) and accepted an innocuous League of Nations. But the refusal of America to accept President Wilson's advice and to endorse the Franco-American treaty rendered the alliance inoperative for Great Britain as well as for the United States, and left France to seek security by other means.

Projected Triple Alliance with Britain and America

One obvious means was to tie in defensive alliance with France the lesser states of Europe which had a common interest with her in supporting the peace settlement and opposing treaty revision, and this means she exploited to the full. She contracted a formal military alliance with Belgium in 1920; with Poland in 1921; and with Czechoslovakia in 1924. The last-named country had already formed, in 1920–1921, a "Little Entente" with Rumania and Yugoslavia to safeguard territories which they had severally appropriated from Hungary, and this arrangement helped France to draw into her own circle of alliance Rumania in 1926 and Yugoslavia in 1927.

Alliance with Belgium, Poland, and Little Entente

There were drawbacks about these French alliances. They

were expensive, because they had to be buttressed by fairly frequent loans. They were none too reliable, because the parties to them, other than France, were minor Powers, widely scattered, whose fighting abilities, if not patently slight, were unproved. Besides, the alliances involved France in all the controversies of eastern, as well as western, Europe, and they especially aroused the distrust of Italy. Indeed, Italy, in furtherance of her own ambitions and as a counterpoise to the French alliances, wooed Hungary, Austria, and Bulgaria, and encouraged them to hope for treaty revision.

Wherefore, France sought additional means of security in a strengthening of the Covenant of the League of Nations. From her point of view, there were two fatal weaknesses in the Covenant: (1) it did not define "aggression"; and (2) it did not specify with sufficient exactitude the action to be taken against an "aggressor." To remedy these weaknesses, she sponsored the drafting by an international commission, in 1923, of a "treaty of mutual assistance," which, as revised in 1924 under the title of "Geneva Protocol," was submitted to the members of the League for ratification. It prescribed the settlement of every international dispute by arbitration or by conciliation. A state which refused to accept the award, or which in any way prejudiced the peaceful solution of a dispute, was *ipso facto* the "aggressor." Against such an aggressor, each signatory of the Protocol would undertake to act "in the degree which its geographical situation, and its particular situation as regards armaments, allows."

Projected Geneva Protocol, 1924

Practically, what France wanted from the Protocol was a more effectual underwriting of the peace settlement by the whole League, and particularly by Great Britain as its most puissant member. Britain was very chary of the Protocol, however. In general, she disliked the idea of obligating herself either to obey or to enforce each and every decision of an international body in which France and the Continental satellites of France would probably have a preponderant voice. And, backed by public opinion at home and in her self-governing Dominions, she advanced two specific objections to the Protocol. First, it might involve her in war with the United States, which, being outside the League and spurning its agencies of arbitration and conciliation, might be deemed an "aggressor" in any serious

Blocked by Britain

dispute with a League member. Second, it would almost certainly require her to serve as a police officer all over the world, including regions, such as eastern Europe, where she was not directly interested. The first objection France could have overcome by exempting American cases from the scope of the Protocol, but the second was insurmountable. So Great Britain withheld ratification, and the Protocol of Geneva collapsed.

In 1925 Franco-German relations underwent some improvement, thanks to the temporarily successful operation of the Dawes Plan for reparation payments,[1] and thanks also to the mutually conciliatory attitude of the foreign ministers of the two countries, Briand in France and Stresemann in Germany. Both of these statesmen had come to believe that they could promote the security of their respective nations by direct agreements, and as this belief was consonant with British interests, Britain's foreign minister, Sir Austen Chamberlain, encouraged the negotiations and persuaded the Italian government to do likewise.

Pact of Locarno, 1925

The outcome was a group of treaties, drafted in October 1925 in idyllic surroundings at the Swiss health resort of Locarno on Lake Maggiore, and collectively styled the Pact of Locarno. Germany would enter the League of Nations and receive a permanent place, as a Great Power, on its Council. Simultaneously, Germany would definitely desist from seeking treaty revision by force of arms and would settle by arbitration or conciliation every dispute which might arise between her and France, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, or Poland. Germany would reserve the right to seek a peaceful modification of her eastern frontiers but she would expressly recognize the permanence of her new western borders. Wherefore, as the most significant feature of the Pact, Germany and France and Belgium would forever respect their mutual frontiers and refrain from war with each other except in self-defense or in accordance with the stipulations of the League Covenant; and Great Britain and Italy would guaranty this feature of the Pact by giving armed assistance to any of the three Powers if it should be faced with a violation of the Pact by any other of the three.

The Pact of Locarno, though assailed by extremists in both Germany and France, was generally hailed at the time as an epochal event: as marking a final reconciliation between victors

[1] See above, p. 662.

and vanquished and constituting a big step forward toward world peace. In the afterglow of optimism thus engendered, the American Secretary of State, Frank Kellogg, acting on a suggestion of Briand (who in turn derived the suggestion from an American scholar [1]), proposed to all the nations of the world that they pledge themselves by a solemn pact "to outlaw war," that is, "to renounce the use of war as an instrument of national policy." Briand was not completely satisfied with the form which Kellogg gave to his suggestion. The American Secretary was insistent, however, that the pact should embody only a principle and that its enforcement should rest solely upon the "good faith" of the several signatories. Regretfully, and perhaps a little cynically, Briand finally acquiesced in this interpretation; and with a great flourish was signed at Paris in August 1928 the so-called Kellogg-Briand Pact. Being but a pious declaration, it was speedily adhered to by almost every nation. What it really amounted to was indicated by the ironic fact that its ratification by the United States Senate was accompanied by the enactment of a bill materially increasing the strength of the American navy.

Kellogg-Briand Pact, 1928

Not the Kellogg-Briand Pact and not even the Locarno Pact actually solved the problem of security. On the Locarno Pact, France and Germany put very different interpretations. France imagined it meant German acceptance of the treaty of Versailles. Germany expected that it would be followed by a revision of the treaty of Versailles. Both were mistaken. Germany pressed the harder for annulment or amendment of those clauses in the treaty charging her with war-guilt, imposing heavy financial burdens on her, limiting her armaments, and contracting her historic eastern borders. Against such pressure, France was adamant. She would make no further concessions; and now that she was assured of British and Italian assistance in preserving the territorial arrangements of the treaty of Versailles concerning the West, she felt all the freer to oppose any alteration of those affecting the East. Consequently, France renewed and strengthened her military alliances with Poland and Czechoslovakia; and in the spring of 1931, in concert with Italy, she estopped Germany from forming a close tariff-union (Zollverein) with Austria. This

Franco-German Impasse over Treaty Revision

[1] Professor James T. Shotwell.

last action brought out in bold relief the widely divergent goals of German and French foreign policy and the illusory nature of the "security" which the Pact of Locarno had aimed at achieving. Henceforth the spirit if not the letter of Locarno was dead, and apparently the only remaining way of seeking security was through some delicate balancing of national armaments.

Problem of Armaments

There had been no general disarmament after the World War. France, it is true, cut her standing army in half by reducing the term of service from three years to eighteen months; Italy called fewer men to the colors; and, in accordance with the peace treaties, the armies of Germany, Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria were drastically curtailed. Yet the principle of universal military service was in effect not only in most countries which had adopted it prior to 1914 but also in all the newly created or newly unified states. Russia, too, gradually built up a larger, and probably more efficient, army than she had had before the war. Moreover, while the British navy was smaller than it had previously been, it was still a superior fighting force; and the navies of the United States and Japan were considerably stronger than they had been. Altogether there was a vast deal of continuing "preparedness." It was costly. It consumed a large part of the financial resources of the several governments and gravely embarrassed their post-war efforts at economic reconstruction. It was dangerous. It kept up and even exaggerated the rivalry, the sudden alarums, and the chronic sense of danger, which had attended the "armed truce" of Europe from 1871 to 1914.

Statesmen understood the perils of continuing international competition in armaments, and the delegates to the Paris Peace Congress of 1919–1920 had given three pledges of a determination to put a stop to it. First, they severely restricted the armaments of Germany and her European allies in the World War. Second, they declared in the peace treaties that they imposed these restrictions on the vanquished nations "in order to render possible the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations." Third, they recognized in the Covenant of the League of Nations that "the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety" and provided that the League Council "shall formulate plans."

Yet, despite these pledges, no general limitation of armaments

was achieved. Each nation wanted some other nation to take the initiative in the matter, and no nation would take it. Every state was convinced that the armaments of other states, but not its own, were inconsistent with "national safety." The United States and Great Britain continually found fault with France and Poland for not reducing their armies and applying the sums of money thus saved to the discharge of their foreign debts. But France and Poland both retorted that they would gladly reduce their armies if they could definitely count on assistance from the United States and Great Britain in protecting them against possible German aggression and that in the meantime the English-speaking Powers should evidence their sincerity by reducing their navies.

The basic difficulty, indeed, was one of security. National armaments might be dangerous in the future, just as they had been before the World War, but to get rid of them would be still more dangerous. If France and Poland, for example, should reduce theirs to a level with Germany's, what would prevent Germany from tearing up the treaty of Versailles and renewing the World War? But if France and Poland would not reduce their armaments, why should Germany be expected to keep hers reduced at the sacrifice of her security?

With every nation in quest of security through armaments, it proved quite impossible to bring about general disarmament. All that was practically possible was to try to keep down the armaments of those nations which had been vanquished in the World War, and among other Powers to arrange such balancing of existing armaments as would temporarily serve to uphold the *status quo* and to prevent the actual increase of national armies and navies from becoming madly competitive.

Washington Naval Conference, 1921–1922

An international conference on the limitation of naval armaments was held at Washington in 1921–1922 and attended by representatives of all the naval Powers, not only the United States, Great Britain, and Japan, but France and Italy.[1] The outcome was an agreement to retain for ten years approximately the existing ratio among

[1] The Washington Conference, being called to consider general international questions in the Pacific and the Far East as well as the specific question of naval armaments, included representatives also of China, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Belgium. On the resulting agreements which dealt with matters other than naval limitation, see below, p. 795.

battleship tonnages of the several Powers: Great Britain 5, the United States 5, Japan 3, France 1.67, Italy 1.67. In vain the United States sought to include a limitation of light cruisers; Great Britain successfully opposed it. In vain Great Britain sought to include a prohibition on any use of submarines in war; France refused to agree to it. The Washington Conference did halt—for ten years—the highly provocative and expensive building of so-called "capital ships." But its failure to agree upon a similar check for other naval craft meant that in this respect naval rivalry continued, and the sense of security, instead of growing, actually lessened. Britain complained about the submarines which France proceeded to build, and the United States, about Britain's excess of cruisers.

Another conference was held at Geneva in 1927, but no agreement could be reached about cruisers. In 1930 still another conference was held at London. This was hardly more successful than the earlier ones in effecting a general limitation of naval armaments. Assent was given, it is true, to a prolongation of the Washington agreement to 1937; and the United States and Great Britain managed to supplement it with an arrangement between themselves whereby Britain would be allowed a superiority in light cruisers and America a corresponding superiority in large cruisers. In this arrangement Japan acquiesced, though very reluctantly and only on condition that she be accorded parity with the others in the matter of submarines and some increase of her ratio for cruisers. But neither France nor Italy would adhere to it. Consequently the London agreement bound only three of the five naval Powers, and its binding of the three was weakened by a provision (the "escalator clause") that any of them was free to exceed the specified tonnage totals if it should deem its "national security" to be "materially affected" by naval increases of another Power.

Geneva and London Conferences, 1927, 1930

The London agreement, and the Washington agreement too, proved short-lived. In 1934 Japan served notice that she would not consent to a renewal of either unless she was accorded full naval parity with the United States and Great Britain, and on the refusal of these Powers to meet her demands, she formally resumed complete freedom of action in 1937. By this date a fearful race in naval armaments was plainly developing. There was now far more naval "prepared-

Failure of Naval Limitation

ness," and far more naval expenditure, than ever before in the world's history. Naval agreements, promising though they had been, had failed to provide security.

Attempts to negotiate a general limitation of land armaments were even less successful. In 1925 the League of Nations created a special commission to study the problem and draft recommendations preparatory to the calling of a "disarmament conference." The Commission soon discovered that both technically and politically the problem was well-nigh insoluble. Technically, the chief difficulty was in distinguishing between what was strictly and immediately military and therefore to be limited and what was only incidentally military and hardly susceptible of limitation. An actual standing army and its actual arms and equipment could be recognized and perhaps dealt with, but what about a potential army and its potential resources? What about army reserves, militias, and police forces? What about ordinary mail and passenger airplanes which could easily be converted into military planes? What about a nation's wealth and man-power and industrial production, employed in peaceful pursuits today but employable for military purposes tomorrow? If answers could be found to these and similar technical questions, a supreme political question would remain. How to reconcile the military needs of a nation intent upon preserving the *status quo* with the military demands of a nation zealous to change it?

League Commission on Armies, 1925

For five years the Commission toiled at the problem, and eventually, like the proverbial mountain, it brought forth a mouse. It took the form of a "draft treaty," providing for a limitation, "in principle," of the number of men in active service in land, naval, and air forces, of governmental expenditure on army material, and of military (but not commercial) aircraft; a condemnation of the use of poisonous gases and "all bacteriological methods of warfare"; and a permanent commission to collect information and report periodically on the progress of "disarmament." As if to prove that the "draft treaty" should not be taken too seriously, it contained a special "escape clause," proposed by the United States and providing that if a "change of circumstances constitutes, in the opinion of any high contracting party, a menace to its national security, such high contracting party may suspend temporarily, in so far as concerns itself, any provision or

provisions of the present convention other than those expressly designed to apply in the event of war."

In the hope that by some miracle a large diplomatic congress might succeed where a small expert commission had failed, the long-promised Conference on Disarmament was convoked at Geneva in February 1932. It was attended by official representatives of all the members of the League of Nations and, in addition, by delegates of the United States and the Russian Soviet Union. Its task was not only to debate and if possible to agree upon the "draft treaty" as submitted by the Commission, but also to supply its most glaring omission—the exact specification of the future size of each nation's army and of the future expenditure of each nation on war material. The task was humanly impossible in existing circumstances, and no miracle occurred. From the beginning the viewpoints of France and Germany were diametrically opposite. France would be insecure if she reduced her army to a level with Germany's, and Germany would be insecure if France didn't. Utterly unable to find a way out of this impasse, and yet reluctant to admit failure, the Conference floundered about in a bog of irrelevant discussion. In October 1933 Germany, by this time dominated by Hitler, impatiently quit the Conference and proclaimed her purpose of rearming without regard for the restrictions of the treaty of Versailles.

Geneva Army Conference, 1932–1934

For several months longer the Conference continued, but with Germany gone, its discussions grew ever more futile. Finally, in the summer of 1934, Great Britain, the Power most interested in limiting armies (if not navies), acknowledged that the failure of the Conference was definitive and that therefore she would proceed to enlarge her own armaments, particularly her air forces. The Conference then faded away, and in 1935 Germany independently reëstablished the kind of army which she had had before the World War.

Failure of Army Limitation

The collapse of protracted efforts at Geneva in behalf of a general limitation of armaments thus nicely synchronized with the breakdown of the Washington and London naval agreements. Obviously, security was not obtainable through an international balancing of national armaments. This method was a failure, and

indeed worse than a failure. For, instead of leading to even a slight reduction of armed forces, it led to Germany's getting rid of the reduction previously imposed upon her and to an increase of armaments, both military and naval, of all Great Powers and of almost all lesser Powers.

Every nation was left to seek security by the supposedly discredited pre-war methods of arming itself to the teeth and negotiating special alliances and ententes to overawe and hold in check the military might of possible foes. It meant a return to international anarchy, and to a balance of power peculiarly shifting and precarious.

International Anarchy

Before taking up the precarious international situation in the late 1930's, let us consider another complicating factor during the post-war period—the intensification of nationalism throughout the whole Europeanized world.

3. INTENSIFICATION OF NATIONALISM THROUGHOUT THE WORLD

It must be apparent from what we have said in the preceding sections, that efforts without precedent were made during the fifteen years from 1920 to 1935 to establish a new world-order of national security and international peace. Never before had there been such an array of peace machinery—League of Nations, World Court, mutual security pacts, international conventions and commissions and conferences galore. Nevertheless, it must be equally apparent that all this machinery did not create a sense of security, and that at the end of the fifteen years the new world-order was but a dissolving dream.

Peace machinery existed, but its successful operation required a public opinion within every nation favorable to the subordination of national interest and policy to international adjustment. This, however, was significantly lacking. On the contrary, the bulk of public opinion in every country, instead of keeping pace with the development of peace machinery and becoming more internationalist, grew ever more nationalist, more devoted to the concept of national honor, the defense of national rights, and the unrestrained pursuit of national interests.

Public Opinion Preponderantly Nationalist

Elsewhere we have explained how nationalism was quickened in Europe (and the British Dominions) by the World War and the Peace of Paris.[1] Here we must remark its progressive intensification and spread during the post-war period. Indeed, it was more ubiquitous than either democracy or dictatorship, and more universally compelling than pacifism, communism, or supernatural religion. It affected men's minds and hearts as the Industrial Revolution affected their bodies, only faster and more completely. If the Industrial Revolution promised to draw peoples together in a common material civilization, nationalism actually wrought a psychological and spiritual separation of peoples resembling primitive tribalism.

Everywhere, nationalism was intensified. It was extolled as a philosophy of life for all men, as a veritable religion. And its most conspicuous spokesmen no longer represented it as the "liberal" nationalism which had been influential in Europe back in the mid-nineteenth century, but rather as a much more exclusive and intolerant kind—a "totalitarian" nationalism. Like the liberal variety, it would base the state system of Europe, and the world, on the principle of nationality and the practice of national self-determination. But unlike the liberal variety, it would exalt the national state above humanity and above the individual. Each nationality, and consequently each national state, would be an end in itself, a consummation of all virtue and an object of supreme adoration. It would emphasize its peculiar culture, its own past greatness, its own future "mission," and, in extreme instances, its own "racial" purity and superiority. It would pursue exclusively national interests, and it would pursue them militantly. At home, it would suppress individual dissent and dominate every group activity, economic, social, religious, and educational. Abroad, it would stand ready to avenge its honor and extend its power. For, according to a famous exponent of the new nationalism, "a nation declines when it loses military might."

Totalitarian Nationalism

Everywhere, moreover, this creed of "totalitarian" nationalism was spread among the masses with astounding rapidity and success. The technique of mass propaganda was much more highly developed after the war than before, and the masses of mankind were much more responsive to it. Compulsory public

[1] See above, pp. 646–654.

schooling was finally enabling almost everyone to read and write, at least a little, and thus to give eye or ear (if not critical reflection) to the cheap newspapers, the cinemas, radios, and amplifiers, which modern technology was simultaneously perfecting. With these helps, it was comparatively easy for demagogues to sway entire nations; and in view of the intense emotions aroused by the World War and of the widespread economic instability and political unrest which ensued, it was easy for apostles of violent nationalism to obtain numerous and fanatical disciples.

Nationalism and Dictatorship

There were different degrees of patriotic fever in different countries. Everywhere, however, it was rising, and in Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany it approached the boiling point. For here a thoroughly totalitarian nationalism was at once the basis and the object of all political and social activity. The preaching of it had enabled a Mussolini and a Hitler to become dictators, and once they were dictators they permitted the preaching of nothing else. Of course, such dictators were apt to be less reckless in deed than in speech, less bellicose abroad than at home. They felt the responsibility and feared the consequences of carrying their nationalism to its logical conclusion and precipitating international war. Yet, having gotten into power by inflaming their respective nations, they had to employ the same method to keep themselves in power.

Nationalism and Democracy

Popular nationalism was sharpest and most rampant in countries which passed under dictatorships, and the number of such countries notably increased from 1922 onwards. But in countries which remained democratic, preponderant public opinion was only a degree less nationalist. If dictators pursued exclusively national policies as a matter of principle, democratic leaders pursued them out of deference to electoral majorities. The outcome was much the same all over Europe and in the United States: the pursuit by every nation of policies which either its dictatorial faction or its democratic majority thought conducive to its particular interests—commercial and military, territorial and imperial. If the pursuit of any such national interest could obviously be forwarded by an international pact or conference or by some device of the League of Nations, the government concerned was ready, with popular support at home, to act accordingly, and thus to appear as a champion of international coöperation and peace,

while actually serving its own ends. But if its ends could not easily be served thereby, if its pursuit of national interests seemed to be impeded, then, with noisier and more heartfelt support at home, it would sacrifice internationalism to nationalism and go its own way.

Nor was this supreme pursuit of national interests confined to Europe and the United States. It was world-wide. Indeed, fully as significant as the intensification of nationalism in Europe during the post-war era, was the simultaneous appearance of the same phenomenon outside Europe: in parts of Africa and all over Asia, both in the Near East and in the Far East, and throughout the American continents. In all these extensive areas, "Europeanization" went on apace,[1] but in its latest phase it involved not merely the introduction of material aspects of European civilization but also a general acceptance of its latest cultural fashion—the fashion of nationalism, of nationalist dictatorship, of strenuous pursuit of narrowly national interests.

Nationalism World-Wide

The Moslem Near East became belligerently nationalist. It had started in this direction before the World War, but the war and its immediate aftermath were decisive in clarifying the goal and hastening its attainment. The traditional religious unity of the "Moslem world" and the age-long political comprehensiveness of the Ottoman Empire went down in ruins together, and in their stead emerged the separate nationalisms of Turk, Arab, Egyptian, and Persian.

In Moslem Near East

In a previous chapter we have related how, following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the World War, a forceful and very patriotic Turkish army officer, Mustafa Kemal, established the national republic of Turkey, with its capital at Angora and with himself as its president, and how, by fighting and diplomacy, he wrung from Greece and the Allied Great Powers a revision of the peace settlement (in the treaty of Lausanne of 1923) assuring to his state possession of all ethnically Turkish lands—the whole of Anatolia and Asia Minor and the European district of Constantinople.[2]

Turkey: Dictatorship of Mustafa Kemal

[1] On the "Europeanization" of the world during the preceding era, from 1870 to 1914, see above, pp. 510–543.

[2] See above, pp. 641–643. To emphasize the nationalist character of the new Turkey, the Greek name of "Constantinople" was supplanted by the Turkish, "Istanbul."

Turkey, as thus constituted, was only a portion of the former Ottoman Empire, but it was an important portion and it was a strictly national state.

Nominally the new Turkey was republican and democratic. A "fundamental law" of 1921 proclaimed the doctrine of popular sovereignty and vested supreme authority in a National Assembly; and an elaborated constitution of 1925 provided for the election of the Assembly by universal suffrage of the Turkish people every four years and for the choice by the Assembly every fourth year of a President of the Republic. Actually, however, the new Turkey was conducted by Mustafa Kemal as a nationalist dictatorship. This he was enabled to do by reason of the personal fame which attended his military successes and which earned him the popular title of "Ghazi" ("The Victorious"), and by reason likewise of his continuing leadership of the army and the single well-organized political party in the country, the People's party. As chief of the People's party, he controlled the Assembly, dictated its policies, and ensured his election to the presidency. As President of the Republic, he appointed the officials. As commander of the army, he enforced obedience to his Assembly, his agents, and himself.

Under Mustafa Kemal's dictatorship, Turkey was rapidly nationalized. Not only was the old imperial Ottoman tradition destroyed by the overthrow of the Sultanate and the expulsion of Mohammed VI in 1922, but, what was even more fundamental, Turkish institutions were pried loose from their historic Moslem setting and endowed with a purely secular and national character. Mohammed VI and his Ottoman predecessors had been not merely Sultans of an Empire but Caliphs of all orthodox Moslems, and their authority resided as much in the Caliphate as in the Sultanate. With the deposition of Mohammed VI in 1922, his cousin, Abdul Medjid II, was suffered to succeed him as Caliph though not as Sultan. This proved but a makeshift, for Mustafa Kemal soon took steps to destroy the religious as well as the political influence of the imperial family and to undermine the hold of Islam on the country. In 1924 Abdul Mejid II was expelled from Turkish soil and the Caliphate was abolished; and in the same year, governmental appropriations for religion were suppressed and religious schools were transformed into state schools. Then in 1926 the old legal system, which had been based

on prescriptions of the Koran and decisions of Moslem judges, was superseded by a modern national system. Polygamy was prohibited, and marriage, to be binding, must be performed by civil rather than religious officials. The Gregorian calendar was substituted for the Moslem, and the Roman alphabet for the Arabic. The metric system of weights and measures was adopted. The fez and turban were outlawed in favor of hats and caps; women were forbidden to wear veils; and the Turkish people were told to take surnames.[1] By government decree, the Moslem holy day was changed from Friday to Sunday. In 1928, by a constitutional amendment, the Turkish Republic was expressly declared to be independent of Islam.

Of course, most Turks continued to be Moslems, but their religion was henceforth a private and not a public concern; and the dictatorship which wrought this astounding change was fully determined not to grant to Christianity or other supernatural religion any favor which it denied to Islam. Christian missions in Turkey were regulated by Mustafa Kemal's government more rigorously than they had been by any Ottoman Sultan.

Many Moslem clergymen were aggrieved by Mustafa Kemal's religious policy, and in 1924–1925 the fanatically Moslem Kurds rose in revolt. At the same time, leaders of the Union and Progress party,[2] which had guided Turkish affairs during and just before the World War, reëmerged from obscurity and began to form a "Republican Progressive" party in opposition to the new régime. Kemal hit back promptly and with vigor. He put down the Kurdish revolt, and against political adversaries he conducted a reign of terror, exiling some and executing others.

Simultaneously, in order to arouse the patriotism of the Turkish masses and make it a prop for his own party and policies, he inaugurated an extensive program of education and propaganda. He equipped every sizable town with a public school for children and with a reading and radio centre for adults. Into all the radio centres was poured a stream of nationalistic speeches and news bulletins from Angora, and into all the schools were put uniform nationalistic textbooks prepared under Kemal's personal auspices and expounded by teachers of his own selection. Everybody was pressed to become literate, adults as well as children.

[1] Kemal took for himself the name of "Ataturk" ("Chief Turk").

[2] See above, pp. 491–493.

One result of these educational endeavors was to reduce Turkish illiteracy, which had long been notoriously high. From 95 per cent in 1920, it was brought down in the next fifteen years to 65 per cent. Another and still more significant result was to enlarge the scope and increase the effectiveness of governmental propaganda. The Turks were learning to read, as well as being accustomed to hear, that they were a pure and superior "race," descended from the highly civilized ancient Hittites, that throughout the ages they had had a "mission," that now, under the mighty and benign guidance of the "Ghazi," they were again fulfilling their destiny, and that in the future they would be a truly great people if only they would be intensely loyal to their race and nation and to the People's party.

The nationalist dictatorship of Mustafa Kemal gave much attention to Turkey's economic betterment. A twelve-year public works plan was launched in 1929, providing for railway extension, harbor construction, and a large number of irrigation and reclamation projects. In 1933 a five-year industrial plan was adopted, calling for the development of hydro-electric power, the exploitation of coal, copper, and oil deposits, and the erection of state factories in Anatolia. All these undertakings were to be national, with minimum financial borrowing from foreign countries and without any onerous concessions to them.

Turkey under Mustafa Kemal was proudly self-reliant. She would pursue her own interests and tolerate no external interference. By force of her own arms she had torn up the treaty of Sèvres and imposed on unwilling foreigners the treaty of Lausanne. Thereby she had rid herself of political and economic tutelage to other Powers, and in particular had secured the abolition of the so-called "capitulations" which in Ottoman days had deprived the government of jurisdiction over foreign residents in Turkey. For the retention of these gains she would rely above all on her own efforts. Mustafa Kemal was a military man, and as such, and as an ardent nationalist too, he kept the Turkish army strong and ready for any emergency.

In foreign affairs, once he had secured Turkey's independence and "national" frontiers, Kemal was generally conciliatory. It was the best way, he believed, of serving national interests, of upholding the *status quo* established by the treaty of Lausanne and assuring an uninterrupted development of nationalist reform

within Turkey. With the Russian Soviet Union he concluded a treaty of mutual guaranty and neutrality in 1925. He cultivated friendly relations with Greece and arranged an entente with the Greek government in 1930. He brought Turkey into the League of Nations in 1932, and in 1934 he made Turkey a party to a Balkan Pact with Greece, Rumania, and Yugoslavia. In 1936 he regained for Turkey the right to fortify the approaches to Constantinople, and in 1938, by an agreement with France, he was enabled to garrison Alexandretta. Kemal died in 1938, but the Turkish nationalist dictatorship continued.

Nationalism was also rife during the post-war period among the Arabs, though these, unlike the Turks, possessed no comprehensive state and no leader whom they would all follow. Arabs comprised the large majority of the population in all the former Asiatic provinces of the Ottoman Empire which were not included in the new Turkey, but the peace settlement of 1919–1920 partitioned them among various sovereignties: the nominally independent kingdom of Hejaz; the British mandates of Palestine and Mesopotamia; and the French mandate of Syria. This partition and especially its attendant subjection of the major parts to European Powers served to accentuate and give direction to Arab nationalism. In all Arab lands, agitation was ceaselessly vocal and sometimes violent; it would create as much trouble as possible for British or French rule. In other words, Arab patriots were less immediately concerned with building a unified national state than with opposing alien imperialism in the several existing states.

Arab Nationalism

Shortly after assuming her mandates, Great Britain thought to conciliate the Arabs by entrusting Mesopotamia to Prince Feisal, a son of King Hussein of Hejaz, with the title of King of Iraq, and the trans-Jordan part of Palestine to another son, Abdullah by name. The appetite of Arab nationalists was only whetted thereby. Especially in Iraq, the agitation for self-government and complete independence, adroitly guided by King Feisal, gathered strength and momentum. Bit by bit the British High Commissioner gave way, making one concession after another. At length, after protracted negotiations, Great Britain concluded a treaty at Bagdad in 1930, recognizing the independence of Iraq, promising to sponsor its admission to the League of Nations, and agreeing,

Iraq and King Feisal

when this was brought about, to renounce all mandatory rights over the country and within five years to withdraw all troops. In accordance with the treaty of Bagdad, Iraq was admitted to the League in 1932 and the last of the British garrison was evacuated in 1935. Britain retained a defensive alliance with the country and some economic privileges in it. In the meantime, in 1933, King Feisal died and was succeeded by his son Ghazi, but Iraq was already a practically independent Arab state, with rich natural resources, a fairly strong army, a form of parliamentary government, and a resolute national spirit.

Trans-Jordania

Trans-Jordania was not so successful in achieving independence. Its population of 300,000, though solidly Arab, was largely nomadic and much more backward than the comparatively settled population of Iraq, and Abdullah was less forceful than his brother Feisal and more dependent on British financial and military assistance. Hence, while Great Britain agreed in 1928 to a measure of self-government for the region, confirming Abdullah as Emir and authorizing him to create a Council and an elective Assembly for the enactment of local laws, actual British control continued. British armed forces might be sent into the country at any time, and acts of the Emir or of the Assembly might be disallowed by a resident agent of the British High Commissioner of Palestine.

Palestine: Arab vs. Jewish Nationalism

In Palestine proper—that is, the portion of the British mandate west of the Jordan—the situation was complicated by the promise which the British government had made, in the "Balfour Declaration," [1] to respect the national aspirations of Jews as well as Arabs. Palestine had long been an Arab country—largely Moslem, though in part Christian—but as soon as a British administration was installed after the war a tide of Jewish immigration set in, rapidly increasing the Jewish minority from barely 70,000 in 1920 to over half a million in 1938. The Jewish newcomers, with superior

[1] This Declaration had been made by Arthur Balfour, British foreign minister, in response to pressure from Jewish Zionists (on Zionism, see above, pp. 320–321) in November 1917, while the World War was in a critical stage and just before General Allenby had captured Jerusalem (see above, p. 619). It stated: "His Majesty's Government view with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of that object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country."

technical skill and with financial subsidies from Zionist organizations in the West, undoubtedly contributed to an economic and industrial renaissance in Palestine, but in doing so they displaced many Arabs in gainful occupations and thus added to the grievances and the nationalistic agitation of the latter.

The British administration did its best to soften the conflict between Arabs and Jews. It tried to respect equally the cultural traditions of both groups, religious, linguistic, and educational. While assuming a paternal attitude toward Jewish undertakings and encouraging their colonizing projects, it sought to reassure the Arabs by withholding special political privileges from the Jews and discouraging their indiscriminate immigration. Above all, it endeavored to dispense even-handed justice and to enlist the coöperation of both groups in matters of common interest and advantage—in modernizing Jerusalem, in promoting public health, in improving transportation, in increasing the yield of farm and factory. Yet the nationalism of neither Arab nor Jew was thereby mitigated. The Jews were eager to make Palestine theirs; the Arabs, to keep it theirs. The former wanted immigration to proceed without restriction; the latter demanded that it stop altogether. Neither would agree to schemes for a Palestinian parliament which the British put forward in 1922 and again in 1936, each fearing it would but serve the purposes of the other.

In the circumstances there was frequent incitement to acts of violence, and repeatedly there were bloody riots at Jerusalem and in the countryside. Serious Arab outbreaks against the Jews occurred in 1929 and 1933, and from 1936 disorders and outrages were chronic. The British government replied by reënforcing its garrison, by expelling Arab leaders, and by proposing in 1937 a partition of Palestine. To this proposal both Arabs and Jews objected and in 1939 the British tried in vain, through direct conferences at London, to induce the leaders of the two groups to coöperate in creating a single semi-autonomous state with minority rights for the Jews.

Syria

It was likewise with the French in Syria. Here the Arab population was large and relatively progressive, and its leaders were as eager for national independence as were those of Iraq. In order to lighten their task, the French, soon after assuming the mandate, cut off from Syria the region around Beirut, which was predominantly Christian and more

kindly disposed to a French protectorate, and constituted it the autonomous "Republic of the Lebanon," with a native President and an elective Assembly. The rest of the mandate—the main part of it—was then consolidated into the "State of Syria," with its capital at Damascus and under the direct rule of the French High Commissioner. Despite the fact that most of the occupants of this post were tactful administrators as well as able soldiers and that they did a good deal to develop the country, there was constant protest from Arab nationalists and on occasion serious rioting at Damascus. The worst rioting occurred in 1925, when a new and exceptionally untactful Commissioner appeared in the person of General Sarrail, and it was rendered more serious by a simultaneous revolt of the Druses, a peculiar Moslem sect of warlike mountaineers. Sarrail's failure to suppress the Druse revolt and his attempt to stop the rioting at Damascus by subjecting the city to a deadly forty-eight-hour bombardment created the gravest kind of unrest all over Syria and provoked a general insurrection. Hastily Sarrail was recalled to France, and a new High Commissioner sent out with military reënforcements. He restored order in 1927.

Whereupon the French High Commissioner authorized the popular election of an Assembly to draft a constitution for Syria. The result was a sweeping victory for Arab Nationalists and a consequent impasse between the Assembly, which demanded complete independence, and the French officials, who would admit only a qualified autonomy. In 1930 the High Commissioner dissolved the Assembly and decreed a constitution, providing for a Syrian Republic in subordinate alliance with France, though with a parliament of its own and a native president. The Syrian parliament, however, was as insistently nationalist as the Assembly had been, and after an unsatisfactory attempt to rule without it, France finally gave way and in 1936 signed a treaty with Syria, promising the gradual withdrawal of foreign troops and the eventual admission of Syria, as a fully independent state, to the League of Nations.

In the Arab state of Hejaz (lying along the coast of the Red Sea and embracing the Moslem "holy cities" of Mecca and Medina), King Hussein aroused patriotic opposition by his subservience to Great Britain and Moslem opposition by his pretentions to the Caliphate in succession to the

Hejaz

Ottoman Sultans. Both kinds of opposition were exploited by an ambitious Arab chieftain, Abdul Aziz ibn Saud, Sultan of Nejd (a primitive principality in the Arabian desert) and leader of the austere Moslem zealots known as Wahabis. After extending his sway over the nomadic tribes of the desert, Abdul Aziz invaded Hejaz in force in 1925. Hussein abdicated, his son Ali was defeated and expelled, and Mecca was captured. Early in 1926 Abdul Aziz took the title of "King of Hejaz and Nejd," and then subjugated almost all the semi-independent chieftains of the Arabian peninsula. In 1932 he changed the name of his enlarged realm from "Hejaz and Nejd" to "Saudi Arabia." Abdul Aziz ibn Saud gave Arabia a respite from tribal feuds and raids and a novel political unity. He promoted motor transportation throughout the country. He annulled foreign concessions, and in the interest of Arab solidarity, he made friendly overtures to the sons of King Hussein whom he had overthrown, and concluded treaties of alliance and arbitration with King Feisal of Iraq and Emir Abdullah of Trans-Jordania.

Saudi Arabia

Egypt was likewise Arab in speech. But its historical traditions, as well as its geographical situation, predisposed it less to any Pan-Arab nationalism than to a separate nationalism of its own. Though most Egyptians welcomed the final extinction of Ottoman suzerainty in 1914 and the accompanying change in the title of their immediate ruler from "Khedive" to "Sultan," many did not take kindly to the continuing and apparently strengthened British protectorate.[1] Especially after the accession of the Sultan Fuad in 1917, the native Nationalist party increased its popular following and its demands for national independence. The leader of this party, Saad Zaghlul, a lawyer of peasant stock, was insistent on Egypt's being represented at the Paris Peace Congress as a sovereign Power; and his arrest and deportation to Malta by the British authorities precipitated an insurrection which was put down in 1919 only by the energetic campaigning of General Allenby at the head of a British army of 60,000 men. Lord Milner was then sent out from London to "conciliate" the Egyptians, and in accordance with his recommendations a treaty was signed in 1921 between Great Britain and the Sultan Fuad, whereby Egypt would

Egyptian Nationalism

[1] On these events of 1914, see above, p. 601. On the previous history of Egypt, see above, pp. 377–379.

be nominally independent—the Sultan assuming the title of King—though still subject to "supervision" and "advice" of a British High Commissioner. The treaty was rejected by the Nationalist followers of Zaghlul, and, after more rioting and more military suppression, it was put into force by a unilateral proclamation of the British government in 1922.

In the Egyptian parliament which was created by a constitution of 1923, the Nationalists speedily got the upper hand, so that Zaghlul was recalled from exile to head a native ministry and, following his death in 1927, others of like mind held the premiership until after the death of King Fuad nine years later. Step by step the Nationalist régime wrung concessions from Great Britain, which ultimately agreed by a new treaty in 1936 to accept the status of "ally" instead of "protector," to recognize the independence of Egypt, to abolish the office of High Commissioner, and to withdraw all troops except a guard for the Suez Canal. In the next year Egypt was admitted to the League of Nations, and an international conference at Montreux (in Switzerland) consented to the eventual abrogation of foreign law courts and other "extraterritorial rights" in Egypt.

The mass of natives backed and applauded the Nationalist government in its successful struggle for Egyptian independence and also in its promotion of elementary schooling, but dissatisfaction developed with its failure to accomplish any important economic or financial reform. In 1938 King Faruk, the youthful son and successor of Fuad, abruptly dismissed the Nationalists from office, and his action received popular endorsement at the polls.

Persia, during the post-war years, underwent a revolution akin to Turkey's. The Persian counterpart to Mustafa Kemal was Reza Pahlavi, who, born in 1878 of a poor family near the Caspian Sea, had been a soldier since youth, serving under Russian officers before the World War and rising to chief command in northern Persia with the withdrawal of the Russians during the war. In 1921 Reza suddenly appeared at Teheran, the Persian capital, at the head of a disciplined fighting force, and with its loyal backing he set up a Nationalist government with himself as Minister of War. This post he utilized to reorganize the whole Persian army and bring it under his personal control, just at the time when Russia and Great Britain were ceasing their chronic interference in Persian

Persia: Dictatorship of Reza Shah

affairs. The result was that Reza could act freely without the risk of foreign intervention and that he could take advantage of the patriotic fervor which overspread the country with the removal of the long-standing threat of its partition by foreign Powers. Likewise, he was in a position to dominate, and if necessary to defy, the youthful and capricious weakling, Ahmed, who was nominal Shah of Persia.

Friction soon developed between Ahmed Shah and Reza Pahlavi. In 1923 the latter assumed the premiership, and, availing himself of the former's absence on a pleasure jaunt in Europe, called together the Persian Parliament, or Mejliss, and induced it to grant him wide powers independent of the Shah. Then in 1925 he caused the Mejliss to depose the still absent Shah Ahmed and to convoke a special National Assembly. This Assembly, late in 1925, elected Reza Pahlavi as Shah of Persia, with right of succession to his heirs. He was now titular as well as actual head of the state, and its military dictator.

Reza Shah was a warm admirer, and almost slavish imitator, of Mustafa Kemal. Following the example of the Turkish dictator, he abrogated the "capitulations" and banned all alien checks on national sovereignty. Moreover, he bodily introduced into Persia most of the novel laws and decrees which Kemal was issuing in Turkey, especially the laws directed against the influence and privileged status of the Moslem religion and the decrees looking toward a "modern" secularized nation, with European dress, calendar, weights and measures, legal codes, and social usages. Like Mustafa Kemal, too, Reza Shah sought to intensify the national patriotism of the Persian people by teaching them, in army and public school and by aid of all the technical devices of propaganda, to cherish their distinctive language, their glorious history, and their still more glorious "mission." In line with this purpose, he announced in 1934 that the nation would no longer be officially designated by the corrupt and unnational name of "Persia," but by the ancient and racial name of "Iran." The Persians, he explained, were the true "Iranians," the pure and aboriginal "Aryans." Also, like Mustafa Kemal, Reza Shah evolved schemes for the economic betterment of his country.

National dictatorship was confronted with greater obstacles in Iran (Persia) than in Turkey. The country was more rugged and less productive. Its people were more primitive and more

fanatically Moslem, and they were less disposed to subordinate their customary tribal life and their traditional religious habits to the exigencies of new secular nationalism. There were spasmodic revolts of tribesmen and steady resistance on the part of leading Moslem clergymen. Yet Reza Shah persevered, confident that the reformed army would sustain him in the near future, and that in the more distant future time itself was on his side.

The huge Empire of India seethed with nationalist agitation throughout the post-war period. A governmental reform which the British Parliament enacted in 1919,[1] setting up native provincial councils and giving them some supervision of education, agriculture, and public health, failed to offset the effects of repressive military measures [2] and only stimulated and spread the agitation. In 1920 control of the native "All-India Congress" [3] passed from "moderates" to "extremists," and these elected to its presidency Lajpat Rai, a Hindu lawyer and patriot, who had been deported in 1907 for advocating Dominion status for India, and who, after spending the war years in America, had returned home and become editor of an influential Nationalist newspaper at Lahore. Through his journalism and through his following in the Congress, Lajpat Rai spread his conviction, especially among Hindu intellectuals and among the masses in the Punjab, that India must have the same national status as that enjoyed by Canada or South Africa. But of even greater effectiveness in consolidating Hindu nationalism throughout India was another native lawyer, Mohandas Gandhi.

Nationalism in India

Gandhi came from a traditionally pro-British and devoutly Hindu family. After studying at the University of London, he had begun the practice of law at Bombay in 1892, but, called to South Africa the next year on professional business, he had remained there for twenty-one years, concerning himself with the sorry plight of lower-class Hindu immigrants and carrying on a tireless struggle in their behalf. On his return to India in 1914 he applied the methods which he had developed in South Africa to the home-rule movement and began to preach

Gandhi

[1] The "Montagu-Chelmsford reform," so called from its authors, respectively British Secretary for India and British Viceroy.

[2] These reached a climax in the "massacre of Amritsar," in the spring of 1919, when several hundred natives who had assembled to protest against the government were attacked and killed by British troops under the command of General Dyer.

[3] See above, p. 382.

resistance to the British by "soul force" and "non-coöperation." From 1919 his counsels grew more urgent and more widely influential. In 1920 he proclaimed a general campaign of "civil disobedience," that is, of "non-violent non-coöperation." As long as British rule continued in India, natives should refrain from supporting or participating in it. They should accept no public office. They should withdraw their children from government schools. They should not appear in law courts. They should not buy foreign commodities. They should boycott British machinery and restore the domestic spinning-wheel. Gandhi was earnest and ascetic, and quite opposed to the use of force, and he soon acquired an immense personal influence over the Hindu masses, who acclaimed him with the honorary title of "Mahatma" or "Great Soul." In 1921 Lajpat Rai joined Gandhi, and the All-India Congress voted to follow unquestioningly the dictates of the latter and of any successor he might designate. Gandhi sought, at first with some success, to make his movement truly All-Indian, to include in it not only the higher-caste Hindus but the lowest caste, the so-called "untouchables," and also the Moslems.

Eventually, however, Gandhi could not overcome Hindu intolerance of Moslems or Moslem contempt and distrust of Hindus. Nor could he restrain hotheads from committing acts of violence which indirectly embarrassed him and directly profited the British. In 1922 the British officials felt solid enough to arrest and jail him for sedition, and though they released him early in 1924 when he went on a hunger-strike, they no longer feared him. The Moslems were deserting him, and he himself was becoming ever more mystical and impractical. Nevertheless, if Gandhi failed to unite all India in a common nationalism, he at least performed a signal and lasting work by giving point and inspiration to the nationalism of the Hindu majority.

British Rule in India

The British régime continued to function in India under a succession of able Viceroys. Important labor laws were enacted by the Legislative Council in 1922–1924: a factory act restricting the employment of children, a mines act, and a workmen's compensation act. Agricultural production was increased by extensive irrigation works. Simultaneously, the output of mines and factories (especially cotton factories) forged steadily ahead. Though the number of schools was added

to, the government continued to spend much larger sums on army and police than on education, and in 1938 only 8 per cent of the 350 million natives could read or write. In 1931 splendid new government buildings were opened with pomp at Delhi, the capital of Britain's Indian Empire.

Meanwhile, Hindu Nationalists were pressing hard for self-government. In 1928, when the British cabinet in London sent out a special commission, headed by Sir John Simon, to study the political situation in India and to recommend what if any change should be made in the Act of 1919, the Nationalists held a convention and drafted a set of "minimum demands," according to which India as a whole should enjoy Dominion status within the British Empire and under a written constitution of her own. Such a constitution, the Nationalists proposed, should guaranty individual rights and provide for a federal system of government, with a central parliament at Delhi and with provincial parliaments in the several states, all to be elected by universal suffrage (both male and female) without any favor to minorities. This last proposal antagonized the mass of Indian Moslems and cemented their alliance with other opponents of Hindu "radicalism": Indian princes, who were fearful of democracy and anxious to preserve the *status quo;* "moderate" Hindus who stood to profit from the existing régime; and Britishers who desired, whether for selfish or for altruistic motives, to retain as much political and economic control of India as possible. Gandhi labored tirelessly to counteract these divisive developments and to promote harmony and concord within India, but he was only partially successful.

Indian Constitution of 1933

As an outcome of the recommendations of the Simon Commission and of a series of "round-table" conferences at London, the British government endorsed in 1933 the project for an Indian Constitution submitted by the Marquess of Linlithgow, a Conservative statesman and the official reporter for the round-table conferences. According to the proposed Constitution, all India directly under British rule, excepting Burma, would be divided into eleven states [1] and these would be federated with the states under native princes

[1] The eleven would be: Bengal, Assam, Bihar, Orissa, Madras, Bombay, the Central Provinces (centring in Nagpur), the United Provinces (centring in Lucknow), Sind, the Punjab, and the Northwest Frontier Province. Burma was to be excluded from the Indian Federation and provided with a separate government.

to form the United States of India. Each state would have a large measure of local autonomy, exercising it through a native prince or an elective native legislature, as the case might be; and for general legislation there would be a federal parliament, comprising appointed representatives of the princely states and elected representatives of the others, with a ministry responsible to it. Elections, both federal and state, would be restricted by qualifications of religion, property, and literacy to about 10 per cent of the men and about half of 1 per cent of the women in India. At the head of the whole Indian government would be a British Governor-General (subject only to the cabinet at London) who would direct foreign relations and military affairs quite independently of the Indian parliament and who might similarly employ "emergency powers" in crises involving religion, minorities, currency, and justice to Europeans.

This Constitution, after strenuous opposition to it on the part of extreme British Imperialists, was enacted by the British Parliament in 1935, and the Marquess of Linlithgow was appointed Viceroy of India and charged with the difficult tasks of obtaining the necessary ratification of it by the various native princes and of overcoming the hostility and securing the coöperation of the Hindu Nationalists.

Japan had become, before the World War, a Europeanized Power not only, but a Great Power. She already ranked with the leading nations of Europe and America in industrial and commercial development and in military strength and prestige, and her position was enhanced by the war and its aftermath. The defeat of Germany, the revolution within Russia, the depression in Britain, the absorption of France in problems of domestic reconstruction and security, all contributed to freeing Japan from checks upon the extension of her trade and sway in the Pacific and on the Asiatic mainland. And the industriousness and intense patriotism of the whole Japanese nation amply seconded the determination of its business men and statesmen to take full advantage of the opportunities thus offered.[1]

Japan

During and just after the war the Japanese government was controlled by the conservative party—the Seiyukai. Then, following a terrible earthquake which in 1923 wrecked the cities of

[1] The "divine" objects of national Japanese patriotism during the period were the Emperors Yoshihito (1912–1926) and Hirohito (1926–).

Tokio and Yokohama and united the urban electorate in demands for speedy and businesslike reconstruction, the liberal party—the Menseito—got the upper hand. It carried the general election of 1924, and, under one of its most eminent leaders, Viscount Kato, a wealthy industrialist who was premier until his death in 1926, it pushed forward the reconstruction of the devastated centres, pursued a conciliatory foreign policy, and in 1925 established universal manhood suffrage. After Kato's death, the Seiyukai contrived to man a ministry from 1927 to 1929, but a sweeping victory of the Menseito in the general election of 1930, the first under universal suffrage, seemed to promise to this party a long period of predominance and to Japan a continuing evolution towards national democracy and international peace.

Party Politics, 1920–1930

The promise was soon belied, however. The Menseito was not truly a popular party. It had gained its electoral victory by usual methods of political corruption, and the attitude of its leaders toward difficult national problems which were then becoming acute aroused the active hostility of large sections of the population. For example, the Finance Minister and party chairman, Junnosuke Inouye, seeking to overcome the economic depression which beset Japan in common with all other industrial nations, urged a drastic curtailment of governmental expenditure and a general policy of financial deflation (instead of inflation), which was strenuously opposed by governmental officials, both civil and military, by agricultural interests, and by organized labor. Again, the Foreign Minister, Baron Shidehara, in his desire to promote peace and lighten the burden of armaments, consented to the London naval agreement of 1930 and sought an amicable adjustment of Japan's differences with China, which outraged Japanese nationalists, particularly officers in army and navy. In the circumstances, nationalist propaganda against the government made rapid headway. While a cabal of army officers took it upon themselves to open hostilities against the Chinese in Manchuria, thereby nullifying the peace efforts of Shidehara, Fascist organizations sprang up in Japan, applauding the strong action of the military, demanding the overthrow of parliamentary government, and insisting that the only cure for domestic economic ills was a forceful extension of the Japanese Empire. Faced with a rising tide of

Military and Fascist Disturbances

popular conversion to militarist and Fascist propaganda, and unable to prevent attendant acts of terrorism, the Menseito ministry resigned in December 1931.

For a time a Seiyukai premier attempted to carry on. He dissolved the parliament and so manipulated the ensuing general election as to ensure the return of a large majority of his party. Yet he soon discovered, when he tried to assert the supremacy of civilian authorities, that the militant and Fascist groups were no more respectful of a Seiyukai ministry than of a Menseito government. There was a steady increase of insubordination and terrorism in the winter and spring of 1932, beginning with the assassination of Inouye, the leader and ex-minister of the Menseito, and culminating in the murder of the Seiyukai premier himself.

Following this murder, an extra-parliamentary ministry was set up, headed by Viscount Saito, elderly ranking officer of the Japanese navy and for several years strong-arm governor of Korea. Counter-demonstrations were repressed, a rigid censorship enforced, and steps taken to emphasize nationalism at home, in press, schools, and religion, and to promote imperialism abroad. Hostilities against China were vigorously pushed, and when the League of Nations ventured to protest, Saito's government announced the withdrawal of Japan from the League. Presently, too, announcement was made of Japan's purpose to terminate the existing naval agreements with the United States and Great Britain.

Nationalist Régime in Japan, 1932

Reserving to the next section an account of the virtual war which nationalistic Japan waged against China, and its international complications, we may remark here that militaristic and Fascist groups continued to dominate the Japanese government. Viscount Saito was succeeded in 1934 by a nationalistic naval officer, Admiral Keisuki Okada, but neither was nationalistic enough to satisfy the hotbloods in the Japanese army. They mutinied in 1936, killing Saito and several of Okada's colleagues and indirectly compelling the formation of a new and most nationalistic ministry. Japan still retained the form of parliamentary government but it was at the mercy of a jingoistic and imperialistic militar[illegible]group.

Japan's swiftly growing power in the Far East was at the expense of China, whose affairs, after the death in 1916 of the nominal president and actual dictator, Yüan Shih-kai, went from bad

to worse.[1] A form of republican government continued, but for at least a decade it was the plaything of greedy and unscrupulous provincial governors, who, with the aid of mercenary troops, wrung all the money they could from the people within their jurisdiction and intrigued and fought with one another for supreme control. One such "war-lord" might get the upper hand for a moment and install a "president" who would do his bidding, but he would soon fall prey to other "war-lords" and his puppet president would be replaced by another. The civil government of the Chinese Republic was not only kaleidoscopic but corrupt, and quite unable to command the united loyalty of the nation or to preserve its territorial integrity. Whole provinces and even larger areas were practically detached from any central authority. Then, too, as early as 1917, the central government at Peking was defied by a rival "nationalist" government which Sun Yat-sen established at Canton (in southern China). And while Russian agents were spreading Communist propaganda widely in southern China, Japanese agents were obtaining favors from the government in northern China.

Post-War Chaos in China

At first the nationalist efforts of Sun Yat-sen seemed as ineffectual as the more conservative régime at Peking. He had in back of him a party of intellectuals, the so-called Kuomintang, who helped him to organize his government at Canton in 1917 and formally conferred upon him in 1921 the title of "President of the Chinese Republic." But he was preacher and visionary rather than organizer, and for several years the Kuomintang lacked competent generals and was torn by internal dissensions. The best that Sun Yat-sen could do was to retain a precarious foothold in the city of Canton and the adjacent province of Kwantung and to welcome overtures from the government at Peking for a conference looking to the reëstablishment of national unity. He was participating in such a conference when he died at Peking in 1925.

Sun Yat-sen

With the death of Sun Yat-sen, he was extolled all over China as a national hero and his ideas became the inspiration for a revival and rapid extension of the Kuomintang. China, the party declared, must possess a democratic government, a higher standard of living for the masses, and an intensity of national feeling that would preserve her historic territory and distinctive culture

[1] See above, pp. 532–533.

and tolerate no foreign interference or tutelage; and, pending the achievement of these ultimate goals, China must submit to a dictatorship. Such was the program, and for its execution emerged an extraordinary leader, Chiang Kai-shek.

Born in 1886, Chiang had joined the Kuomintang in his youth and been entrusted in 1920 with the command of a military training school at Canton. In 1925 he was appointed chief of the Kuomintang forces; and during the next year, with military genius of his own and with no less helpful popular propaganda on the part of Communist advisers from Russia, he overcame opposition in southern China and advanced northward to the Yangtze River. In 1927 he occupied Nanking in force, and there installed the Nationalist government. In vain the remaining war-lords of the North put themselves under the direction of the governor of Manchuria and attempted to stem the tide. Their armies melted away; the remnant was overwhelmed; and the commander, retreating into Manchuria, was killed. In 1928 Chiang Kai-shek entered Peking in triumph.

Chiang Kai-shek

Peking was renamed Peiping ("Northern Peace") and the capital of the Chinese Republic was transferred thence to Nanking. In October 1928, on the seventeenth anniversary of the outbreak of the Revolution,[1] Chiang Kai-shek was inaugurated as President of the Republic. He thus combined in his own person the headship of the civil government, the chairmanship of the Kuomintang, and the command of the army. He reaffirmed his devotion to the program of Sun Yat-sen, save for its Communist tendencies, which he now expressly repudiated. He chose his chief advisers and lieutenants from the Kuomintang. He married the sister-in-law of Sun Yat-sen. In 1931 he convoked at Nanking a National Convention, which drafted a "provisional constitution" and elected a civilian as titular head of the government, though it confirmed the existing dictatorship by making the Kuomintang the only legal party in the state and by empowering Chiang Kai-shek to appoint the ministers and to direct military affairs.

Nationalist Dictatorship in China, 1928

The Nationalist dictatorship of Chiang Kai-shek fostered popular patriotic education, multiplying elementary schools and supplying them with textbooks in the simplified vernacular writing which had recently been devised by James Yen, a social worker

[1] See above, p. 532.

and a graduate of Yale University. By 1930 millions of farmers and day laborers were learning to read and write, although 60 per cent of the vast Chinese population were still illiterate. Above all, the government was intensifying the nationalism of those who could read. Foreign investors and traders and foreign missionaries were regarded with increasing suspicion and put under closer surveillance. Boycotting of foreign goods for political reasons was invoked more frequently and obeyed more generally.

Yet the task confronting the Nationalist dictatorship in China was herculean. The country was so big and its population so numerous. Banditry was so usual, corruption so habitual, and the opportunities for ambitious and grasping officials so great and alluring. The government of Chiang Kai-shek did better than its immediate predecessors in grappling with internal difficulties, but it possessed neither the financial resources nor the military strength to overcome all of these and at the same time to withstand, unaided and successfully, the forceful aggression of disciplined foreign Powers. It could hardly maintain its authority in China proper. It could not recover Tibet from the virtual protectorate of Great Britain or narrow the "sphere of influence" which France continued to exploit north of Indo-China. It could not prevent the Moslems in the extensive western territory of Sinkiang from revolting in 1928 and setting up a practically independent government. It could not control the tribesmen in Mongolia and keep those in outer Mongolia from falling under the domination of Soviet Russia. To cap the climax, it had to suffer Japanese conquest of Manchuria and other northern provinces and ultimately the horrors of a general war with Japan. How this occurred, we shall indicate in the following section.

Here it remains to sketch post-war political developments among major Latin nations on the American continents.[1] These reflected prevalent currents in Europe. There was similar dissatisfaction with traditional government, similar popular unrest, similar intensification of nationalism, a similar trend toward dictatorship, and in one significant instance a similar resort to war.

Post-War Latin America

In Mexico, the revolutionary movement, which had begun in 1910, took on a much more radical complexion as its original

[1] For an outline of the pre-war history of these nations, see above, pp. 513–518; and for a map of Latin America, see above, pp. 516–517.

leaders were supplanted in turn by Alvaro Obregon and Plutarco Elias Calles. Both these men were natives of the northern state of Sonora, the former a planter and the latter a school-teacher. Both had become "intellectual radicals" in their youth and voluble advocates of land reform in behalf of the native Indian population. Both had recruited Indian troops and risen to the rank of general in the revolutionary armies which put Madero into the presidency in 1911 and Carranza in 1914. Obregon was at first the more influential of the two. As acknowledged leader of the radical wing of Carranza's followers and as commander-in-chief of the army, he forced into the Constitution of 1917, against Carranza's wishes, some of its most revolutionary provisions, notably those promising the partition of large landed estates and vesting in the government the ownership of all mineral and petroleum resources. In 1920 an open break occurred between Carranza and Obregon: the former, seeking reëlection in violation of the Constitution, ordered the latter's arrest; and the latter, commanding superior forces, headed a revolt against the former. Carranza was deposed and murdered, and Obregon was elevated to the presidency, with Calles as his Minister of the Interior. Then, on the expiration of his term of office in 1924, he secured the election of Calles as President, with himself as Minister of War. Obregon planned to resume the presidency again in 1928, but after his election and before his inauguration he was assassinated. It was left for Calles to continue and develop the dictatorship, and this he did through the National Revolutionary party which he organized and led and which dominated the army and the parliament.

Mexico and Its Nationalist Dictatorship

Both Obregon and Calles championed an intense Mexican nationalism and directed it against every "alien" influence. They catered to the native Indian element, numerically large but long neglected. They sponsored a considerable amount of land reform and labor legislation. They prompted a campaign of popular education, establishing public schools in rural villages as well as in urban centres, and supplying them with nationalist teachers and textbooks. They extolled and encouraged native Indian art.

They were especially jealous of foreign influence or tutelage. They induced the parliament to impose severe limitations on foreign economic enterprise in Mexico, agricultural, industrial, mining, and commercial. Though they welcomed the recognition

which the United States accorded to their revolutionary dictatorship in 1923 and utilized it to strengthen their own position, they were careful not to make any exceptional concessions to the United States, and until 1931 they held aloof from the League of Nations. Moreover, it was to oppose "alien" influences, as well as to weaken the chief traditional prop of "reaction" within Mexico, that Obregon and Calles and their supporters waged war against the Catholic Church.

Controversy between church and state in Mexico was no novelty, but it was greatly embittered by the drastic ecclesiastical restrictions which were written into the Constitution of 1917, and it reached an acute stage during the presidency of Calles. In 1926 Calles had his subservient parliament enact a series of laws, applying and supplementing the constitutional provisions: the church might own no property, maintain no monastic establishment, conduct no school, and carry on no propaganda; the government might permit the use of church buildings for strictly religious purposes, but ecclesiastics would be subject to special regulation and close surveillance; no foreign priest might function or reside in Mexico; native priests must register with the government and assure it of their "good behavior"; and laymen as well as clergymen were forbidden to urge any alteration of these repressive measures. Even further went some of the local state governments, which, at the dictation of fanatical allies of Calles, closed churches altogether. Against all this legislation, and specifically against the requirement of registration, the Mexican clergy, with papal approval, went on "strike"; and for three years bishops and priests conducted no religious services in Mexico. In 1929 the government consented to a truce with the Catholic hierarchy, whereby assurances were given that the anti-clerical laws, without being repealed, would be leniently enforced, and religious services were therefore resumed. In 1931, however, a new tide of governmental activity set in against the church and indeed against all religion. In vain the clergy and the Pope protested. The papal delegate—a native Mexican—was expelled as a "pernicious foreigner"; and religious persecution became general.

The Mexican government was essentially a dictatorship, analogous to that of Russia or Germany. Only one political party was allowed to exist and engage in propaganda—the National Revolutionary party—and this, through its control of the army and the

civil administration, held every seat in the Mexican parliament, every ministerial post, and the presidency of the republic. The masses were largely indifferent to politics, and dissent or opposition among the classes was ruthlessly suppressed. There were, of course, some differences of opinion and some personal rivalries within the National Revolutionary party. Though solidly nationalist, it represented various degrees of devotion to socialism and to anti-clericalism, and gradually the preëminence of Calles in it was undermined by one of his lieutenants and protégés, General Lazaro Cardenas. Cardenas, born in 1895 of a family part Spanish and part Indian, had risen under Calles's auspices to be secretary of the National Revolutionary party and Minister of War, and these strategic positions secured his election to the presidency in 1934 for a six-year term. He was younger and more vigorous than Calles, less concerned with the somewhat stale issue of anti-clericalism, and more eager to forward economic policies of a socialistic character. He threw himself with energy into the prosecution of a "six-year plan" for the "Mexicanizing" of industry, the development of public works, the construction of model dwellings for urban workingmen, and the distribution of communal lands among agricultural villages. He also halted the religious persecution and tolerated resumption of church services.

If in Mexico nationalism was stressed by the protracted revolutionary movement and given an anti-religious and eventually socialistic slant, it was emphasized in two major countries of South America—Argentina and Brazil—by a sudden break in the orderly functioning of government which had long prevailed and a forceful seizure of power by conservative groups. In Argentina, the Radical government of Hipolito Irigoyen, who had been President from 1916 to 1922 and again from 1928, was overthrown in September 1930 by a *coup d'état* of General José Uriburu, who assumed a temporary dictatorship and utilized it to assure the election a year later of another Conservative officer as constitutional President of the Republic. In Brazil, a similar revolt in October 1930, led by Vetulio Vargas and supported by army officers and by popular sentiment against the existing hegemony of the state of São Paulo in national politics, drove the President and President-elect into exile and installed Vargas as dictator. Vargas suppressed a counter-revolt in São Paulo in 1932 and then decreed the election of a

Argentina

Brazil

National Assembly by universal suffrage (including women). The new constitution which issued from the Assembly in 1934, while retaining the federal character of the Brazilian state, enlarged the powers of the central government; and while prescribing that four-fifths of the Chamber of Deputies should be democratically elected by universal suffrage, it recognized the principle of the "corporate state" by providing that the remaining fifth of the Chamber should be chosen by professional and trade associations. The Constitution also granted nationalist demands by limiting foreign immigration and foreign investment. Likewise it favored the Catholic Church by permitting religious instruction in the schools, guarantying the freedom of religious congregations, and authorizing the substitution of religious for civil marriage. In 1934 the National Assembly formally elected Vargas as constitutional President, and in 1938 he suppressed a Fascist revolt.

The upheavals of 1930 in Brazil and Argentina were attributable in considerable part to the economic depression and financial instability then current throughout the world, and this factor was certainly important in the epidemic of revolutions which affected most other Latin American countries from 1930 and established dictatorships in most of them.

United States and the Caribbean

For several years after the World War, the countries of Haiti, Santo Domingo, and Nicaragua were occupied and governed, directly or indirectly, by armed forces of the United States. Gradually, however, the United States reconsidered and revised its imperialist policy, partly because of nationalist pressure from the natives, partly because of waxing hostility to the United States all over Latin America with attendant discrimination against traders and investors from the United States, and partly because of a growing concern of the American people with domestic and narrowly national problems. In 1924 American armed forces were withdrawn from Santo Domingo, and in 1933 they finally quitted Nicaragua. In 1930 the native Haitian parliament was permitted to assemble for the first time in seventeen years and to elect a native president, and in 1934 American troops evacuated the country.

It is also noteworthy, in this connection, that in 1934 the United States Congress, taking account of vigorous nationalist sentiment in the Philippine Islands, enacted a law, which was speedily ratified by the Philippine legislature, providing for the

transformation of the dependency into an autonomous Commonwealth, with power to devise its own constitution (subject to approval by the President of the United States), to elect a native Chief Executive and a native Congress, and to make and execute its own laws, and providing further for a gradual withdrawal of American troops and, if the experiment in self-government should prove successful at the end of ten years, for the formal recognition by the United States at that time of the complete independence of the Philippines. The Philippine Commonwealth was inaugurated in 1935.

And the Philippines

In the Philippines, then, and in the "backward" countries of the Caribbean and Central America, nationalism was coming to the fore. The same phenomenon was all the more in evidence in Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina, in Japan and China, in India and Egypt, in Persia and Turkey: indeed, in all the would-be "progressive" nations of America, Asia, and Africa, as of Europe also. In the circumstances, the pursuit of national interests was world-wide and ever more intolerant of restraints. Once a policy or an action appeared to serve national interest, the statesman who was loudest in urging it and most forceful in forwarding it was almost certain to be stalwartly backed, if not relentlessly pushed on, by the large majority of his fellow nationals. If such policy or action involved a violation of international engagements and a resort to arms, as it occasionally did, other nations might express regret, but hardly the nation immediately concerned. Its government and its people alike believed that in an emergency the strict observance of treaty obligations and the preservation of international peace had to be subordinated to the safeguarding of national interests. It was for each nation to decide, of course, what its interests were.

Universal Pursuit of National Interests

Such was the explanation for example, of the long and deadly war which the two South American states of Bolivia and Paraguay waged against each other almost continuously from 1928 to 1935. To both, the acquisition of the swamp-land of the Gran Chaco was a national interest so vital that they could not afford to negotiate any compromise between themselves or acquiesce in any arbitration by outsiders; they simply had to fight it out. One attempt after another was made to restore peace between the belligerents—by neighboring Powers jointly and singly, by the League of Nations,

Chaco War, 1928–1935, a Sympton

by Pan-American Conferences at Washington in 1928 and at Montevideo in 1934—all in vain. Only utter exhaustion of Bolivia and Paraguay stayed the fighting and eventually brought about a settlement in 1938. The Chaco War was a conflict between third-rate Powers, but it was symptomatic of a breakdown of international law and order, which by 1935 was becoming manifest in many parts of the world and, most menacingly, in the relations among European Great Powers.

4. SCRAPPING OF TREATIES AND RESORT TO VIOLENCE

The Paris treaties of 1919–1920, with the League Covenant which they enshrined, lasted as the public law of Europe and the guaranty of a pacific world order barely fifteen years. By 1935, with impunity and abandon, Germany was repudiating the peace settlement to which previously she had pledged herself, and Japan and Italy were waging wars against fellow members of the League of Nations. Thenceforth, matters went from bad to worse, and violence or the threat of violence loomed as the sole remaining recourse for Europe and the world.

The sequence of these sorry events was initiated by Japan in 1931. Ten years before, at the Washington Conference,[1] she had signed treaties with Great Britain, the United States, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Portugal, and China, affirming the independence and territorial integrity of China and prohibiting special arrangements "designed to create spheres of influence . . . in Chinese territories." Despite these "nine-Power treaties," and despite her adherence to the League Covenant and to the Kellogg-Briand Pact for the outlawry of war, Japan was ambitious to dominate China[2] and particularly Manchuria. This large and potentially rich province, in which Japan already had important investments and some soldiers, could be more fully and profitably exploited if it were separated altogether from China and brought under Japanese tutelage. But as such an outcome could not be secured by diplomatic negotiation with the Chinese Nationalist government

Japan's Ambition in China

[1] On the naval agreement of this same Conference, see above, pp. 763–764.

[2] Back in 1915, in the midst of the World War, Japan had presented to China "twenty-one demands," calculated to transform the whole country into a Japanese protectorate, and though she receded from some of them, under pressure from the United States and other Powers, she had compelled the Chinese government to accord her special economic concessions and police rights in southern Manchuria.

of Chiang Kai-shek, which naturally invoked the "nine-Power treaties," Japan felt impelled to obtain it by force.

Conquest of Manchuria, 1931–1932

Hostilities were opened in Manchuria by Japanese troops in September 1931, not on the authority of the civil government at Tokio but on that of military commanders, who insisted that forceful action was necessary to protect Japanese property (notably railway property) in the province, to repress banditry, and to restore order. Presently the Japanese government acquiesced in what it could not, and doubtless would not, prevent; and the dictatorship which issued from the *coup d'état* at Tokio in May 1932 committed itself completely to the Manchurian adventure and heavily reënforced the troops in charge of it. Japanese armies soon overran the entire province of Manchuria, dispersing the forces of the Chinese governor and putting him to flight. China appealed to the League of Nations, and a League commission, after six months' investigation, recommended that Japan be censured and Manchuria be given an autonomous government under Chinese sovereignty. Japan ignored the recommendations, withdrew from the League, and proceeded with her own plans for Manchuria. The League, unable to agree upon any joint "sanctions" against Japan, contented itself with expressing regret. Unavailing, too, was China's protest to the United States and other signatories of the nine-Power treaties and the Kellogg-Briand Pact. None was minded to go to war with Japan or even to take economic measures against her. China, left alone, was powerless.

Manchukuo

Already, in February 1932, the Japanese military authorities had installed at Mukden a native but sympathetic "provisional government" and inspired it to proclaim Manchuria an independent state with the name of Manchukuo. Then in March the ex-Emperor of China, Henry Pu-yi, who had been a pensioner of Japan since boyhood,[1] was placed in nominal charge of the new state; and with him Japan concluded in September 1932 a treaty, formally recognizing the independence of Manchukuo. In vain, patriotic Chinese attempted a boycott against the Japanese. A Japanese expeditionary force landed at Shanghai, and Japanese troops occupied the Inner Mongolian province of Jehol (south of Manchuria). At length in May 1933 the Chinese government of Chiang Kai-shek consented to a

[1] See above, p. 532.

truce with Japan, leaving Jehol to Manchukuo and providing for a demilitarized zone between it and China.

Within Manchukuo, Japanese arms dictated a political arrangement embodied in a constitution of March 1934. Henry Pu-yi was enthroned as the Emperor Kang Teh, with a native ministry, but with Japanese officers in command of the army and with Japanese advisers for foreign affairs, for financial and economic matters, and indeed for the whole central and local administration. Manchukuo was independent in name. In fact it was a Japanese dependency. All that the United States and the League of Nations did was to withhold official recognition.

Sure now that she would not be held to treaty obligations by other Great Powers and that through her own might she could realize further imperialistic ambitions, Japan in December 1934 denounced the Washington and London naval agreements. Then, in 1935, Japanese troops, on the pretext of safeguarding Jehol against Chinese bandits, crossed the Great Wall north of Peiping, invaded the provinces of Chahar and Hopei, and compelled the Chinese government to replace its officials in these provinces and in Peiping and Tientsin with new men acceptable to Japan.

Occupation of North China, 1935

Presently Japan extended on a wider front her forceful drive against China. To this she was induced not only by a tightening hold of militarists on the government at Tokio, but also by signs in 1936–1937 that China was at last achieving political unity and becoming correspondingly less yielding to Japanese demands. The Nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek put an end to civil war in Kwantung in the summer of 1936, and in the spring of 1937 entered into an agreement with Communist forces in the northwestern provinces for a "united front" against Japanese aggression. Already in December 1936 it rejected new Japanese demands and broke off diplomatic negotiations. Whereupon, in July 1937, some fighting between Japanese and Chinese troops in the vicinity of Peiping and Tientsin was the signal for the delivery of a Japanese ultimatum to China, and, on its rejection, for the launching of actual, if undeclared, war. In vain the League of Nations, and the United States also, condemned Japan for violating treaties and committing aggression against China. Japan went ahead without compunction or fear of consequences, and very soon the war in China

War with China, 1937–1939

reached colossal proportions. Japan was resolved, it appeared, to fight it out until the government of Chiang Kai-shek was overthrown and the whole of China was subjected to a régime which would do Japan's bidding.

The Japanese, with superior discipline and instruments of war, won a series of striking successes. They overran northern China, drove the Chinese government from its capital city of Nanking, shelled and seized Shanghai, conquered a large district along the lower Yangtze, and in October 1938 captured both Canton, the great port in the South, and Hankow, the principal city in central China. The Chinese put up all the resistance they could, but the destruction of life was appalling both of soldiers on battlefields and of civilians from bombing and famine, flood and pestilence. There was no halting of Japan's subjugation of China. Attention of other Great Powers was concentrated elsewhere.

For meanwhile, in January 1933, Hitler with his rabid nationalist following, had come to power in Germany, pledged to

Nazi Germany's Foreign Policy

free the Fatherland from restrictions imposed upon it by the treaty of Versailles and to regain for it the full independence and superior strength which it had possessed before the World War; and the shocking violence by which he achieved his ends inside Germany was ominous of the means he might employ outside. His first significant step in international relations was to cut through the impasse which had developed in the protracted Disarmament Conference, to seal its doom by withdrawing the German delegates, and at the same time, in the autumn of 1933, to denounce the League of Nations

Repudiation of the League, 1933

in scathing terms and to proclaim Germany's secession from it. Which, as we know, met with the approval of the German masses and enabled the Nazi dictatorship to clinch its hold on the country.[1]

Then, to the surprise of Europe and the discomfiture of France,

Pact with Poland, 1934

Hitler made friendly and reassuring overtures to Poland and persuaded her to accept in January 1934 a non-aggression pact, guarantying for ten years the ex-

[1] See above, p. 724. The obvious grave weakening of the League of Nations by Japan's secession in 1932 and Germany's in 1933 contributed, at least indirectly, to an epidemic of regional agreements for mutual help among the lesser Powers in 1934. The Little Entente of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Rumania was confirmed. A new Balkan League was created by Turkey, Greece, Rumania, and Yugoslavia. A Baltic Entente was formed by Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

isting boundaries between them. Poland thus eased a tension which had troubled her since the Peace of Paris and gained at least a respite for internal consolidation, while Hitler weaned away an ally of France and removed a serious obstacle to his plans for annexing Austria and rearming Germany.

The prohibition, in the treaty of Versailles, of Austrian union with Germany was no bar to Hitler. He actively encouraged Nazi agitation within Austria and connived at the attempted *coup d'état* there in July 1934 which was attended by the murder of Dollfuss. The *coup* failed of its primary purpose, however, partly because Hitler and the Nazi cause had as yet too slight a popular backing in Austria and partly because the Italian government of Mussolini threatened war if Germany should appropriate Austria; and Italy's strong stand was seconded by Czechoslovakia and France. Germany was not prepared for war with all these Powers, and so Hitler backed down, disavowing any complicity in the disturbances within Austria and any intention of seizing Austria.

Attempt to Annex Austria, 1934

To hold Hitler to his disavowals and to keep him out of Austria was, at the time, a cardinal point in Italian foreign policy. Mussolini adopted a new attitude of benevolence toward France, and the French government was quite responsive to his overtures. Accordingly, in January 1935 a Franco-Italian pact was signed at Rome. Not only did the two Latin Powers mutually pledge themselves to support the independence of Austria, but in return for French concessions to Italy in northern Africa, including secret arrangements about Ethiopia,[1] Italy promised to join France in opposing unilateral treaty revision in Europe.

Blocked by Italy and France

Simultaneously, in January 1935, the plebiscite in the Saar, provided for by the treaty of Versailles,[2] was held to determine whether the district should revert to Germany, be annexed by France, or remain under the League of Nations. The outcome was convincing proof of German patriotic sentiment in the Saar. Ninety per cent of the votes

Recovery of Saar, 1935

[1] France granted special privileges to Italy in Tunis and ceded her besides some 44,500 square miles bordering on Libya, a strip of French Somaliland on the Gulf of Aden, and a share in the ownership of the railway connecting the Gulf with Addis Ababa, the Ethiopian capital. By the secret arrangements, Italy would have a "free hand" in Ethiopia, so far as France was concerned.

[2] See above, p. 638.

favored reunion with Germany, and on March 1 the district was formally turned over to the Nazi Empire.

Elated and emboldened by its success in the Saar—a legitimate success—Nazi Germany strove the harder to "Nazify" other separated districts, preparatory to their annexation, legitimate or otherwise, by the Empire. In the free city of Danzig, Nazi sympathizers gained control of the local parliament. In Memel, they created grave difficulties for the Lithuanian government. Moreover, Nazi leaders in Germany made no bones about their ultimate intention of appropriating Austria, of "redeeming" the large German minority in Czechoslovakia, and even of detaching the Ukraine from Soviet Russia. As if to give speedy effect to this ambitious program Hitler dramatically announced on March 16, 1935, Germany's repudiation of all treaty limitations on her armaments and the reëstablishment of universal military service in the Empire, with a standing army of 550,000 men and an air-craft strength equal to the British or French.

Propaganda against Neighbors

Rearmament, 1935

Hitler's militant policies elicited loud popular applause in Germany, but abroad they aroused resentment and fear. In April 1935 at a conference at Stresa (in Italy), Mussolini joined the premiers of France and Great Britain in proclaiming that "the three Powers, the object of whose policy is collective maintenance of peace within the framework of the League of Nations, find themselves in complete agreement in opposing, by all practicable means, any unilateral treaty repudiation which may endanger the peace of Europe, and will act in close and cordial collaboration for this purpose." Then, in May, scarcely a month later, France concluded a defensive military alliance with Soviet Russia, and Russia concluded a like alliance with Czechoslovakia. It appeared as though these agreements and alliances would henceforth do what the League of Nations had failed to do and would effectually restrain Germany.

Efforts to Restrain Germany: Stresa Agreement, and Franco-Russian Alliance, 1935

Appearances were deceiving, nevertheless. Great Britain, jealous of the enhanced position of France and fearful of the effects of the Franco-Italian combination on her own naval supremacy in the Mediterranean, deemed it advantageous to herself to make a concession to Germany. Wherefore, in June 1935—only two months

British Naval Concession to Germany

after the Stresa Conference—she independently sanctioned German repudiation of the naval clauses in the treaty of Versailles in return for a pledge that the German navy should not exceed 35 per cent of the British. This alarmed and angered France, and impeded coöperation between the two countries, while diminishing the sense of security in each.

Italy's Ambition in Ethiopia

But more serious in ultimate effects was Italy's imperial ambition in Ethiopia, and its forceful realization. Ever since Mussolini had established his Fascist dictatorship he had been anxious to win for Italy a commanding position in the Mediterranean and particularly to bring the big and backward East African country of Ethiopia under Italian sway. Thereby, painful memories of the disaster inflicted on Italian arms at Adowa in 1896 [1] would be wiped out, and a promising region obtained for Italian colonization and exploitation. For several years Italy sought such imperial sway through diplomatic negotiation. In 1925 an agreement between Italy and Great Britain, while granting to the latter free water-rights in northern Ethiopia for the benefit of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, promised to the former a free hand in seeking concessions in the rest of the country. Ethiopia promptly protested to the League of Nations (of which she had been a member since 1923) against this foreign partitioning of "spheres of influence" within her territory and against the affront to her sovereignty which it implied, but the League contented itself with recording "explanations" from Italy and Britain which really did not explain. Then Italy attempted to ingratiate herself with the native rulers of Ethiopia—the usurping Empress Zauditu, daughter of Menelek II,[2] and her husband, Haile Selassie—and in 1928 agreed to a treaty with them, pledging "perpetual friendship" and arbitration of all disputes. But Haile Selassie, especially after the death of Zauditu in 1930 and his own accession as Emperor, doggedly refused the requests of his "friend" for exceptional concessions and favors, and gradually Mussolini reached the conclusion that Italy must use force against Ethiopia, even if it involved violation of existing treaties and a flouting of the League of Nations. He had no con-

[1] See above, p. 424.

[2] On Menelek II, see above, p. 542. He died in 1913 and was succeeded by his grandson, the Emperor Lej Yasu, a weak youth, who was deposed and imprisoned in 1916 by his aunt, Zauditu, and her ambitious husband, Haile Selassie. There was a good deal of tribal disaffection within Ethiopia.

scientious scruples himself, and that Italy could proceed with impunity was evidenced by what both Japan and Germany had recently done. To make doubly sure of success, he got France to agree in January 1935, as we have seen, to a "free hand" for Italy.

Alleging the necessity of suppressing disorder along the undefined Ethiopian border of her colonies of Eritrea and Somaliland, Italy despatched large forces to East Africa. Against the threatened aggression, Ethiopia appealed to the League of Nations, and the appeal won popular sympathy and presently governmental support in Great Britain, who now perceived in Italy's African ambitions a menace to her own imperial interests (and to the cause of "collective security") which she had not perceived (or at any rate acted upon) in the case of Japan's aggression in Manchuria or of Germany's rearmament. Britain mobilized her fleet in the Mediterranean and besought the League to take a strong stand. In vain France tried to effect a compromise acceptable to Italy and Britain (if not wholly so to Ethiopia). Italy went relentlessly ahead with military preparations, and in October 1935, disregarding alike the League Covenant and the Kellogg Pact, Italian troops invaded Ethiopia, captured Adowa, and pushed into the interior. Italy and Ethiopia were actually, if not legally, at war.

Italy at War with Ethiopia, 1935–1936

The military preoccupation of Italy in Africa and the accompanying embitterment of Anglo-Italian relations practically extinguished the hope which the Stresa Conference had given France of united European action against further treaty violations by Germany. France was left an uncomfortable choice: either to continue to support Italy, which would completely discredit the League and probably impel Britain to an accord with Germany; or to stick by the League and effect a rapprochement with Britain, which would undoubtedly antagonize Italy and might lead to a Fascist-Nazi entente. France chose the latter alternative. She joined Britain in backing action by the League of Nations. And most of the other League members fell in line behind Britain and France. Consequently in October 1935 the League formally adjudged Italy an "aggressor" and in November applied economic "sanctions" against her.

League Sanctions against Italy

Again, success attended the scrapping of treaties and resort to violence. Economic sanctions, though causing some distress in

Italy, failed of their purpose. They solidified the Italian nation in support of its Fascist government and in opposition to the League. Moreover, they were imperfectly applied; requisite war-materials which Italy could not import from League members she freely obtained from non-members, most notably from Germany. Besides, the war in East Africa did not last as long as had been anticipated. Italian armies made surprisingly quick work of Ethiopia. Their airplanes and motor trucks surmounted the country's physical difficulties, and they had munitions and supplies, competent generalship, and withal discipline and morale, which the native tribesmen lacked. Organized resistance was largely overcome by March 1936. Early in May the Emperor Haile Selassie fled abroad and Italian troops occupied the capital city of Addis Ababa. On May 9 Mussolini proclaimed the annexation of the whole country to Italy and King Victor Emmanuel III took the additional title of Emperor of Ethiopia.

Italian Success and League Failure

The results, in international relations, were sorry and far-reaching. Not only had the League of Nations flagrantly failed to preserve the integrity and very existence of one of its members, but the public law of Europe and any effective coöperation among the Great Powers had been dealt a body-blow. Italy had proved that might made right and that any determined Power could exercise its might without let or hindrance on the part of the League. To Italy, therefore, as to Japan and Germany, the League of Nations became a nonentity and its Covenant a garb of hypocrisy. Italy withdrew her representation from the League in May 1936 and in July the League publicly confessed its impotence by rescinding the economic sanctions against Italy.

The attempted utilization of the League of Nations by Great Britain and France to restrain Italy proved worse than a failure. It aroused bitter enmity of Italy toward France and Britain and thereby provided Germany with new and favorable opportunity for unilateral denunciation of treaty obligations. Already in March 1936, just when the Italo-Ethiopian War was reaching its climax, German troops marched into the demilitarized zones of the Rhineland which had been provided for by the treaty of Versailles and guaranteed by the Locarno Pact. Although the Council of the League of Nations obligingly adopted a resolution that Germany

German Militarizing of Rhineland, 1936

had thus violated treaties,[1] France and Belgium were the only Powers at all minded to penalize Germany, and they dared not attempt it unaided. Russia was too disinterested, Italy too hostile to France, and Britain too absorbed with Italy. The sole tangible result, aside from Germany's remilitarized western frontier, was Belgium's severance of her military alliance with France in October 1936 and the resumption of her "neutrality." [2]

By October 1936, too, Germany had entered into an open accord with Italy—the so-called "Rome-Berlin axis." It was a natural consequence of the close commercial relations between them during the Ethiopian War, of their common disdain of the League of Nations, and of their common repugnance to Britain and France. The first fruit of the accord was the recognition extended by Italy and Germany jointly in November 1936 to the rebel Nationalist government of Franco in Spain [3] and the military aid in men and munitions which in contravention of international law they immediately gave it. In this they were actuated no doubt by a desire to gain prestige (and political and economic concessions within a Nationalist Spain) at the expense of Communist Russia and democratic France and Britain, which directly or indirectly were supporting the Loyalist government in Spain. In this way the Spanish Civil War became, somewhat dubiously, a foreign issue between idealogies of "dictatorship" and "democracy" and, more practically and dangerously, a potential source of general European war.

Accord with Italy and Joint Interference in Spain, 1936–1939

Almost simultaneously, in November 1936, Germany concluded a pact with Japan. It was expressly directed against "Russian Communism" and was obviously intended to serve Japanese purposes in the Far East and German ambitions in Europe. In November 1937, following a state visit of Mussolini to Berlin, Italy acceded to the German-Japanese pact. A new balance of power was thus set up between Germany, Italy, and Japan, on the one side, and France, Russia, and Great Britain, on the other. It was a precarious balance, however, and one that the latter three Powers could hardly maintain. The Conservative government of Great Britain was much less dis-

Anti-Communist Pact

[1] See above, pp. 760–762.

[2] See above, p. 758.

[3] On Franco and the Spanish Civil War, see above, pp. 743–745.

posed than the Popular Front government of France [1] to co-operate with the Communist dictatorship of Russia, and yet France was anxious not to alienate Britain. In the embarrassing circumstances, one effort after another to reach an international agreement that would effectually close Spain to foreign soldiers and munitions proved abortive, and short of precipitating another World War, which neither Britain nor France would risk, these Powers had to resign themselves to watching the gradual conquest of Spain by Franco's forces and the bombing of their own ships in Spanish waters by Italian and German aircraft.

Meanwhile Germany continued to tear up the treaty of Versailles with impunity. In November 1936 she repudiated its provisions for international control of her waterways. In January 1937 she denounced the clauses charging her with war-guilt. Then in March 1938, she invaded Austria in force and incorporated it as a mere province in the Nazi Empire.[2] Other Powers might protest, but Italy, which in 1934 had threatened war to prevent Germany's seizure of Austria, was now so distracted by Ethiopian and Spanish adventures and so entangled with Germany that Mussolini pretended to approve the destruction of an independent Austria and the extension of the German Empire to the borders of his own country; and with Italy acquiescent, the protests of other Powers were purely platonic. Incidentally, Poland utilized the occasion to oblige Lithuania, on threat of war, to recognize the Polish annexation of Vilna [3] and to promise in future to live on "good neighborly terms" with her.

Germany's Seizure of Austria, 1938

Germany quickly followed up her success in Austria with virulent propaganda against Czechoslovakia and ostentatious preparations for going to the "assistance" of its German minority, which was thereby inspired, under a local Nazi leader, to demand of the Czechoslovak government full political autonomy. In this instance German ambition was aided by a change in British foreign policy.

From 1935 to 1938, while Sir Anthony Eden was foreign secretary, Britain had drawn ever closer to France and Russia and ever more hostile to Italy, whether in the Ethiopian or in the Spanish imbroglio. The result had been, as we know, to throw Italy into the arms of Germany and Japan and to array the Great

[1] See above, p. 708. [2] See above, p. 733. [3] See above, p. 645.

Powers dominated by Nationalist dictators against the others.

British Policy of Appeasement

Moreover, Eden's policy had not arrested, but perhaps even expedited, Italy's conquest of Ethiopia, Germany's seizure of Austria, and Franco's successes in Spain. If the policy were maintained, argued the British premier, Neville Chamberlain, it would lead to still worse humiliations for Britain or else to another and most terrifying World War.

In the spring of 1938, therefore, Eden was deposed amid bitter outcries by the Laborite and Liberal minority in Great Britain, and a new policy was inaugurated. Chamberlain, while retaining ties with France, would loosen those with Russia and would strive for an understanding with both Italy and Germany. With Italy he at once negotiated a set of treaties which were signed at Rome

British-Italian Accord

in April. In return for Italy's promise to withdraw from Spain "as soon as practicable" and to stop anti-British propaganda in Palestine and Egypt, Britain promised to use her influence with the League of Nations to secure general recognition of Italy's conquest of Ethiopia. Accordingly, Great Britain obtained from the League, amid many recriminations and against the despairing protests of the Emperor Haile Selassie, an authorization for its individual members to recognize, as they pleased, the King of Italy as Emperor of Ethiopia. It was an humiliating desertion of the League in behalf of a hoped-for Concert of Great Powers.

But even more humiliating was the general capitulation to Germany in September 1938. By this time the German minority in

Czechoslovakia and Crisis of Sept. 1938

Czechoslovakia, roused to fever pitch by Nazi agents and by speeches of Hitler himself, were demanding not mere autonomy but outright annexation to the Empire, and the government at Berlin openly declared its resolve to partition Czechoslovakia immediately by force if peaceful means lacked. The Czechs mobilized in defense and called upon France and Russia and the Little Entente for their promised assistance. On the other side, Italy and Hungary and Poland joined in Germany's truculent attitude toward Czechoslovakia. For a few days the crisis was severe and popular emotion was intense. Dramatically Chamberlain flew back and forth between England and Germany, begging Hitler not to precipitate war, while Daladier, the French premier, flew back and forth between Paris and London. It was perfectly obvious that neither France

nor Britain wanted to fight, and that Germany was as ready as Russia was unready for immediate hostilities.

The crisis was suddenly and sensationally ended by an accord signed at Munich on September 29, 1938, by Chamberlain, Daladier, Mussolini, and Hitler, by which peace was maintained but Germany received *carte blanche* to occupy and annex the preponderantly German regions of Czechoslovakia. It was another striking victory for Nazi Germany in tearing up the treaty of Versailles and expanding her territory and resources, and it was followed forthwith by Poland's appropriation of Teschen and Hungary's regaining of part of Slovakia. Czechoslovakia, in the circumstances, could do nought but submit to the loss of a third of her territory and trust that the integrity and independence of the remainder would be preserved through the joint guaranty which the four Powers attached to the Munich Pact.

Accord of Munich and Partition of Czechoslovakia

In fact, however, Great Britain and France were in no position to enforce any such guaranty. They were not ready for war and they lacked allies. Russia was alienated; the lesser Powers in eastern Europe were disillusioned; and Italy, in hostile mood, utilized the opportunity to demand territorial "concessions" from France. On the other hand, Germany emerged the strongest Power in Europe, more eager than ever to take "direct action" and less deterred by any moral scruple. In March 1939, only six months after the Munich Pact and precisely a year after Austria's destruction, Germany, without even consulting the other Powers, completed the destruction of Czechoslovakia.[1] The Czech regions were occupied in force and incorporated into the German Empire; Slovakia was made a German "protectorate"; and Hungary was allowed to seize and annex Carpatho-Ukraine. German nationalism was producing German imperialism.

With whetted appetite, Germany almost immediately bullied Lithuania into surrendering Memel to her.[2] Next, while Mussolini scowled at France and prepared to invade and appropriate Albania, Hitler pressed Poland to agree to German annexation of Danzig and "rectification" of the Corridor.[3] This was too much and too hasty for Poland and also for the British prime minister, Neville

Memel, and Polish Question

[1] See above, p. 735.

[2] See above, p. 730.

[3] Poland's outlet to the sea. See above, pp. 616, 638.

Chamberlain. The latter, in April 1939, suddenly and radically recast the foreign policy of Great Britain. Britain entered into a formal alliance with both France and Poland to guaranty one another's independence and territorial integrity, by war if necessary, against any aggression or threats; and Chamberlain proclaimed Britain's readiness to afford like assistance to Rumania, Greece, and Turkey.

New British Pledges

On the heels of this British attempt to halt the scrapping of treaties and resort to violence, came Italy's violent seizure of Albania. Neither Italy nor Germany nor Japan had been stayed by League of Nations, Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact, or any scheme of collective security. The new British policy might stop them, but perhaps only if it eventuated in another World War.

Italy's Attack on Albania

CHAPTER XXVIII

COSMOS AND CHAOS

I. THE DISILLUSIONMENT

LOYALTY to ideals which had characterized the "Enlightenment" of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries [1] was rapidly waning in the second third of the twentieth century. A novel "Disillusionment" appeared.

There was reaction against individualism. As big machines multiplied and were magnified, the individual was swallowed up in society. He was no longer a separate entity, no longer an autonomous unit. He was merely a cog in mechanized industry or agriculture. He merely performed a function, usually an extremely minor one, in mass production. More and more it was with crowds of fellows that he worked, lived, and travelled about; and, what was especially destructive of individualism, he was intellectually a ready-made product of mass education, of mass journalism, of mass sport and recreation.

Decline of Individualism

There was reaction against political democracy of the individualistic sort, with its universal equal suffrage, its representative parliaments, and its ministerial responsibility. All over central and eastern Europe and throughout the progressively "Europeanized" world, dictatorship was the new political order of the day. It might be Communist, as in Russia, or it might be nominally Corporate, as in Italy or Germany; it was clearly not Democratic in the conventional meaning of the word. It was more akin to the Cæsarism of the ancient Roman Empire or to the "benevolent despotism" which had immediately preceded the advent of modern democracy,[2] although

Ebbing of Democracy

[1] On the "Enlightenment" of the eighteenth century, see Vol. 2, pp. 506–555; and on its continuation in the nineteenth century, see above, pp. 507–510.

[2] On "benevolent" or "enlightened" despotism of the eighteenth century, see Vol. 1, pp. 346–356, 388.

it was much more intensive and efficient, and, unlike the earlier "benevolent despotism," it was almost never associated with titled aristocracy and only exceptionally with royalty.

There was reaction, too, against those individual liberties which had been struggled for and largely attained during the previous age. Economic liberalism, already weakened by the rise of tariff protectionism and governmental regulation of capital and labor, hardly survived the World War and its aftermath. Not only did the war necessitate a temporary conscription of industry and agriculture by every belligerent nation, but it left a legacy of financial disorder and social unrest highly favorable to economic nationalism.

Contraction of Liberty

The denial of economic liberty was attended, in Communist and Fascist countries, by drastic abridgment of personal liberty. There was increasing resort to arbitrary arrest and imprisonment, closer police surveillance of citizens, more restrictive regulation of immigration and emigration, mounting intolerance of internal dissent, a new and fiercer wave of anti-Semitism, and a new and ever more strenuous attempt to direct individual behavior and to control individual conscience. To the Age of Enlightenment, in which it had been fondly believed that liberty would continue slowly but surely to broaden out from generation to generation, was succeeding an age in which liberty was actually and obviously undergoing contraction.

The latest age likewise belied the confidence of the preceding age in steady progress toward a world-order of pacific and cooperating nations. The nationalism which overspread the world proved to be a divisive rather than a unifying force, and the concurrent industrial and technological [illegible] was made to serve primarily nationalistic ends. [illegible] formation of a League of Nations and the frequent repetition of peaceful protestations, there was little or no concrete evidence that the nations of the world were beating their swords into ploughshares, effecting any "moral disarmament," or lessening the causes and occasions of armed conflict. Indeed, the question uppermost in the minds of statesmen and publicists fifteen years after the conclusion of the World War was not whether there would be another world war but how soon it would come; not if it would be destructive, but whether greater destruction could be wrought by aviation than by artillery.

Disillusionment about Peace

It had formerly been widely held that if only the masses of mankind could be put in school and taught to read and write, they would become custodians as well as products of "enlightenment," that they would be equipped to appreciate and secure the benefits of peace, liberty, and democracy. It had accordingly been a central aim of the Era of the Enlightenment, and one of its outstanding achievements, to promote popular and secular education. So far as the promotion of public education was concerned, there was no reaction after the war. On the contrary, it was now pressed more vigorously and more universally than ever before. Under dictatorships, as in democracies, earnest and largely successful efforts were made to give everybody a schooling and to expose everybody to the supplementary instruction of newspapers, cinemas, and radios. Yet the results of all this educational endeavor were not quite in keeping with "enlightened" hopes. While the least literate nation in Europe submitted to a Communist dictatorship, the most literate stampeded to the Nazi dictatorship of Hitler. Apparently, literacy of itself did not predispose anybody to anything. It merely enlarged the opportunities for propaganda. And, in the dawning new age, expanding education became frankly and boastfully propagandist.

Propagandist Education

What has here been said is but an epitome and interpretation of the national and international events recorded in the two preceding chapters. The waning of individualistic democracy and parliamentary government, the contraction of personal liberty, the triumph of nationalism over internationalism, the failure of education to make people intelligent or critical and its extensive use to fortify dictatorship, all these were marks of a new age. But there were other marks, which we shall mention here and discuss at somewhat greater length in the following sections.

An idea of "progress" was still in evidence, confirmed by very real progress in producing material goods and creating an economy of abundance. But if material progress helped to solve old problems concerning the production of wealth, it gave rise to new and extraordinarily difficult ones affecting the distribution of wealth. For everywhere poverty was still paradoxically associated with progress.

"Progress"

Natural science continued to be cultivated and applied with ever more astonishing results. Yet in the midst of universal

reliance on the practical achievement of scientists, the scientists themselves, especially the physicists, were becoming curiously disillusioned about natural principles which had been regarded as axiomatic throughout the Era of the Enlightenment and fundamental to its philosophy. Mechanical certitudes were newly qualified by scientific doubt.

Changing Science

Finally, there was marked reaction against the claims of historic supernatural world-religion and the forms of classical and traditional art. In some places the reaction appeared in the guise of fanatical atheism, with attendant inculcation of materialist philosophy and encouragement of "proletarian" art. In other places the reaction involved an invocation of the "primitive" and the "tribal"—a conscious appreciation of antique and "barbarous" art, and an emotional exalting of a nation's aboriginal ancestors. The world, whose material civilization was being rapidly unified by a common industrialization, was simultaneously being rent asunder psychologically and culturally by a new tribalism. The cosmos which the Age of Enlightenment had envisaged was being reduced to chaos in an Age of Disillusionment.

Chaos in Art and Religion

2. PROGRESS AND POVERTY

The Industrial Revolution, which since its origin in England had been occurring in one country after another during the eighty years from 1830 to 1910,[1] reached a new stage of achievement in the next thirty years. Not only was the output of previously mechanized industries greatly augmented by technological improvements, but new machine industries sprang up and expanded with astounding suddenness. Not only was industrialization intensified in "capitalistic" countries, but it was sedulously fostered by the Communist régime in Soviet Russia and lavishly patronized by dictatorships in such "backward" countries as Turkey and Mexico. Not only was all Europe being swiftly mechanized, the east and south as well as the west and north, but the newest material features of what had been deemed distinctively "western civilization" were becoming common characteristics of what now appeared as "world civilization." There was no longer, in these respects, any difference be-

Great Industrial Progress

[1] On the Industrial Revolution from its beginnings to 1870, see above, pp. 3–46; and on its progress from 1870 to 1910, see above, pp. 206–225.

tween "West" and "East," or between Europe and the world.

Production of coal and iron—the twin bases of modern industrialization—was approximately doubled throughout the world between 1910 and 1930. The decline which appeared in Great Britain was more than offset by the gain in the United States. The coal production of both Germany and France went up by a third, and the lowering of Germany's iron output was counterbalanced by a doubling of the French output. By 1930, moreover, Russia was mining more coal than France and more iron than Great Britain. The world output of pig iron, which had risen from about 12 million tons in 1870 to about 40 million in 1910, reached almost 80 million tons in 1930. **Coal and Iron**

It was similar with the textile industries. While the world-production of cotton gained only slightly, that of wool increased by over a fifth, that of natural silk almost doubled, and that of artificial silk (or rayon) multiplied a hundredfold—mounting from 6 million pounds in 1910 to 600 million in 1933. This rayon development was one of the outstanding accomplishments of post-war industrialization. It had hardly begun before 1910, and it assumed large proportions only after 1920. From the start, too, it was a thoroughly mechanized industry: the raw material was made by machinery, and its whole manufacture of thread and cloth was by machinery. Furthermore, it became suddenly important all over the world—in almost every European country and in the United States and Argentina, Japan and Australia. The new rayon industry but emphasized the post-war trend of the older textile industries toward ever more automatic mechanizing and toward ever broader diffusion. **Textiles**

Along with the textile industries advanced other well-established industries: leather, pottery and porcelain, paper and printing, typewriters, cutlery, firearms, furniture, tinware, tools, canning and refrigeration, electrical goods. There was an especially marked advance of the electrical industries. Electric power was substituted more and more for steam power. Hydro-electric power plants were multiplied. Electric lighting was immensely bettered through the use of the tungsten filament lamp which had been invented just before the World War. **Other Industries**

Undoubtedly the most striking and significant industrial developments had to do with means of communication and trans-

portation. The existing network of railways was much extended in Asia, Africa, and South America, and rail locomotives, driven by steam or electricity, conveyed prodigious numbers of persons and prodigious quantities of goods. And over the whole earth messages were carried by telegraph and telephone wires. In 1930 the mileage of telegraph wires amounted to seven million.

Railways

The existing network of steamship lines was similarly expanded, and the total tonnage of the world's merchant shipping rose from 42 million in 1910 to 65 million in 1936. Great Britain retained a larger merchant fleet than any other nation, but the ratio of its tonnage to the world-total decreased from 44 per cent to 30. The tonnage of the United States and also of Italy and the Netherlands doubled between 1910 and 1936 and that of Japan tripled, while the merchant shipping of both France and Norway increased by a half.

Steamships

To telephone and telegraph, steamship and railway, which had already had revolutionary significance for communication and transportation in the nineteenth century, were now added new twentieth-century devices of automobile, motor truck, airplane, motion picture, and radio. Originating just prior to 1910, all of these were found quite practical and were greatly improved during the post-war period, when their production assumed colossal proportions as their operation wrought gigantic changes.

Production of motor cars and trucks developed principally and very rapidly in the United States. Here the annual manufacture of passenger cars rose from 181,000 in 1910 to 4¾ million in 1929, while that of trucks mounted from 6,000 in 1910 to 830,000 in 1929. Outside the United States, moreover, gradually increasing numbers of cars were produced in Great Britain, France, Germany, Spain, and Italy, and also in Canada and Japan; and regardless of where they might be manufactured, their use was ever extending.

Motor Transport

Aviation, just beginning in 1910, was enormously stimulated and developed by the World War, and was utilized immediately afterwards for commercial carrying of mails, passengers, and express. Regular airplane service was soon inaugurated between Paris and London and between other chief cities in Europe and also in America, and presently it was established from London to Alexandria in Egypt and on to Bagdad

Aviation

and India, from Paris across northern and western Africa to Brazil, and from New York southward to Mexico and Central and South America. For most flying, airplanes were employed, but particularly in and from Germany some airships or Zeppelins continued in use. In 1929 a Zeppelin circumnavigated the globe, from Friedrickshafen (in Germany) via Tokio and Los Angeles and New York back to Friedrickshafen, in twenty days. Already, in 1927, an American aviator, Charles Lindbergh, won international fame by flying an airplane alone and without a stop from New York to Paris. By airplane an American naval officer, Admiral Richard Byrd, explored the Arctic Ocean and visited the North Pole in 1926, and then in 1929 explored the Antarctic Continent and flew over the South Pole.

Petroleum

The fuelling of gasoline engines for the rapidly growing number of automobiles, motor trucks, and airplanes gave a great impetus to the petroleum industry—to the production of the crude oil and to its refining and distribution. Between 1910 and 1933 the world output of petroleum increased over fourfold, from 325 million barrels to 1,370 million.

Rubber

Another industry, which had been comparatively an infant in 1910 but which was brought to speedy maturity by the needs of the new motor transportation, was the rubber industry. This, like the petroleum industry, consumed multiplying quantities of raw material, rising from 75,000 tons in 1910 to 850,000 tons in 1933. Almost all the crude rubber now came, not from "wild" trees, but from cultivated "plantations," principally in the Dutch East Indies, the Malay peninsula, and Ceylon.

Concrete

Elaboration of motor highways attended the development of motor transport, and was attended in turn by an ever greater and more widespread utilization of "concrete." Concrete roads soon parallelled railways or provided a substitute for them, and in addition, concrete (reënforced by iron or steel) was increasingly employed for public buildings, industrial plants, garages and hangars, piers, bridges, and even shipbuilding.

Motion Pictures

Motion pictures were still another universal phenomenon of the post-war period. Though originally invented prior to 1910, they were perfected and popularized during the World War and more especially after 1920. In 1928 "sound" pictures (or "talking movies") were first made, and very soon afterwards they were being heard, as well as seen, all over

the world. The large majority of films displayed in the British Dominions, Latin America, and most countries of Europe, were American-made, although most foreign governments were beginning to censor and limit American imports and to favor domestic production.

Radio

Accompanying the rise of motion pictures and excelling them in revolutionary effect was the development of radio. Wireless telegraphy had been in some use since the opening of the twentieth century, but it was not until 1920 that the first permanent radio broadcasting station was put into operation—by an American concern, the Westinghouse Company—and private homes began to be equipped with radio-receiving sets. Thenceforth, progress in the production and use of radios was sensationally rapid. Within fifteen years every nation in the world had broadcasting stations; and everywhere there were enough receiving-sets to enable the vast majority of mankind, whether in town or country, to receive practically simultaneous news of what was happening in Rome or Manchester, Berlin or Moscow, Tokio or Mexico City, Calcutta or Melbourne, Cape Town or Minneapolis, Jerusalem or Mecca.

Television

From hearing at a great distance, it was only a step to seeing; and this step was initiated in the 1920's by experiments with television carried on more or less independently by several European and American physicists. In 1928 began the successful transmission of images and scenes across the Atlantic and in color.

Agriculture

Industrial advance of the post-war period was accompanied by an increase in the world output of foodstuffs. For the industrializing and mechanizing of agriculture continued,[1] and produced an ever larger yield of meat and grain, vegetables and fruits. In respect of grain, for example, the wheat crop of the world steadily enlarged from 3,250 million bushels in 1920 (which was about what it had been in 1900) to 4,550 million bushels in 1930, at the very time when scarcely smaller gains were being made in the world-production of rye, barley, oats, corn, and rice. Apparently the latest phase of the Industrial Revolution was providing humankind with an ampler supply of food and clothing as well as with more expeditious means of communication and a greater range of creature comforts.

[1] On the Industrial Revolution in agriculture, see above, pp. 26–29, 217–218.

And yet . . . Dogging the heels of industrial progress was dire poverty! In the midst of a boasted "economy of abundance," when there was much more for everybody to eat and wear than ever before in the world's history, a most disillusioning economic depression set in. It was by no means the first depression in modern times, but it was far more general, more severe, and more continuous than any previous one. Beginning in 1929, every country was affected in measure as it had been industrialized. Stocks and bonds depreciated in value. Factories and mills shut down. Industrial workers lost their jobs and their wages and had to be cared for by private charity or public doles. By 1932 the number of unemployed and destitute workers in western and central Europe, the United States, and Japan (the most highly industrialized portions of the earth) was estimated at 30 million. With these (and their families) thus deprived of purchasing power, the demand for the products of machine industry, and hence for raw materials and foodstuffs, markedly declined, with further deleterious effects upon industry and commerce and likewise upon agriculture. To the millions of persons who had no income at all were added many more millions whose income was terribly reduced.

Grave Economic Depression

Unemployment

Practically, what was done in most industrial nations to cope with the new and critical situation was for government to intervene—to provide subsistence for the enlarging armies of the industrially unemployed either by giving them outright doles or by paying them wages for public works, and to meet the resulting increased expense by imposing heavier taxes upon the wealthy minority or by borrowing huge sums of money from them. Such procedures could hardly be more than temporary or transitional makeshifts. For no intelligent or conscientious person could look forward with any satisfaction to an enduring situation in which a dwindling group of men would own all property and control all industrial and agricultural machinery and from their immense profits maintain the masses of mankind in a life of more or less chronic idleness, even if idleness were shorn of some of its worst features by a most benevolent patronage of popular education and of organized sport and recreation. And there were more immediate difficulties. Industry, even the most technically perfected industry, might not

Government Intervention

stand the continuing strain of governmental taxes and borrowings sufficient to provide for crowds of industrially unemployed persons ever increasing in number and demanding an ever increasing share of goods.

Government intervention was particularly conspicuous in countries subject to dictatorship, such as Russia, where the Communist régime attempted to abolish private capital altogether, and Italy and Germany, where Fascist dictatorships tried to regulate private enterprise and make it serve "national" ends. Undoubtedly the increasing vogue of dictatorial and bureaucratic government, especially after 1929, all over central as well as eastern Europe, and in many other parts of the world likewise, was enhanced by the contemporary economic crisis and by popular disillusionment about the ability of democratic government to remedy it.

Its Extremities

But to date, Fascist dictatorships have accomplished much more in destroying personal freedom than in getting rid of poverty or lessening its causes. The Communist dictatorship, at an even greater cost of personal freedom, has succeeded in increasing industrial production and at the same time in raising the standard of living for the masses (while lowering that of the classes), but in Russia the level of general living is still pretty low, and probably, as industrialization runs its course and the masses acquire a taste for greater comforts, the Communist bureaucracy will be faced with much the same fundamental difficulty as that confronting any capitalistic group—how to retain its power and harmonize progress and poverty.

No sure and practical solution of the basic problem of progress and poverty is now in sight. Yet everyone recognizes that some such solution must be found. It is a challenge to the present and succeeding generations.

3. MECHANICAL CERTAINTIES AND SCIENTIFIC DOUBT

The latest age has witnessed, as we noted in the foregoing section, the world-wide triumph of machines of precision, speed, and mass production. It is the machine age *par excellence*.

Importance of Science

Moreover, the progressive industrializing and mechanizing of the world has been intimately associated with the accumulating achievements of technology, of engineering and applied science, and, fundamentally, of experimental

science. Without intensive and manifold pursuit of the natural science which had developed during the eighteenth and ninteenth centuries, the twentieth century could not be the supreme machine age which it is.

Physics and Chemistry

Physics and chemistry have been the twin sciences most esteemed and forwarded throughout the whole Era of the Enlightenment—from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, through the nineteenth, and up into the twentieth.[1] And now their practical applications are particularly striking. It is applied physics which has been providing man with constantly improving automobiles, airplanes, radios, electric power and lighting, and all sorts of machinery. It is applied chemistry which has been enabling him to multiply the production of field and factory, to make synthetic goods and artificial ice, to preserve foodstuffs, to "take" pictures and produce "movies." There is, of course, no sharp cleavage between physics and chemistry. A practical application of the one has always involved some practical application of the other, and progress in the one has been accompanied by progress in the other. The physicist and the chemist are close allies—joint directors and dispensers of the marvellous realities of contemporary technology.

Biology

Biology has not had as long a vogue as physics or chemistry. It was, so to speak, an afterthought of the Era of the Enlightenment. But with its rapid rise and revolutionary progress in the second half of the nineteenth century, it had come to occupy a central position in scientific thought during the period from 1870 to 1910—and afterwards also. As it continued to be studied and applied, it ceased to be a rival of physics and chemistry and became rather their intimate associate. Indeed, in the latest age biology could almost be said to have been resolved into biophysics and biochemistry.

Medical Science

Biology, like physics and chemistry, has proved increasingly useful. Especially in physiology, medicine, and surgery, its utility is as certain as it has been sensational. Painstaking microscopic investigation of animal bodies has disclosed elaborate mechanisms, the existence of which had hardly been suspected previously, and has led to experimental work on them of prime significance to the physical health of human beings. For example, much has been discovered about the

[1] See above, pp. 236–241.

hitherto mysterious ductless glands, or secretory organs, in animals and humans. Likewise it is demonstrated that physical health requires in the diet certain "accessory factors," to which the name of vitamins is given, and thanks to researches of biochemists several different kinds of vitamins have been discovered and their respective functions described.

Darwinian Evolution

On the Darwinian theory of evolution, which had made such a stir in the second half of the nineteenth century, twentieth-century biologists amassed much factual data of considerable importance. The more evidence they accumulated, the more it confirmed the basic assumption of Darwin, that the process of life on the earth had been evolutionary. At the same time, however, it made clear that the process was not as simple as Darwin had surmised and certainly not as simple as Huxley or Haeckel had maintained. As a distinguished biologist said in 1922, summarizing contemporary scientific evidence for evolution: "In dim outline evolution is evident enough. From the facts it is a conclusion which inevitably follows. But that particular and essential bit of the theory of evolution which is concerned with the *origin and nature of species* remains utterly mysterious." In other words, the particular explanations which Darwin offered of the origin of species—natural selection, sexual selection, and inheritance of acquired characteristics—does not really explain. The inheritance of acquired characteristics, though still debatable, is extremely doubtful, and a new difficulty has recently arisen from the seeming dependence of variation on elements being lost and not gained.

Mendelian Heredity

Mendel's basic principles of heredity have been confirmed and their application extended. Many deficiencies and abnormalities, such as color-blindness and eye cataract, have been shown to follow Mendelian rules in their descent. One of the most brilliant contributors to exact knowledge of heredity was an American, Thomas Morgan (born 1866), for many years professor at Columbia University and latterly director of the biological laboratory at the California Institute of Technology. Morgan's painstaking investigation of the cell structure of the fruit-fly revealed that within each cell-nucleus is a number of thread-like bodies which have been called "chromosomes," and that there is a numerical correspondence between the number of groups of hereditary qualities and the number of pairs of chro-

mosomes. Additional study has disclosed that there are different numbers of paired chromosomes (or "genes") in different plants and animals: four in the fruit-fly, seven in the garden pea, eight in wheat, probably twenty-four in man. It has further been demonstrated that with twenty "genes" there would be, by permutations and combinations, over a million possible kinds of germ cells, and that with the juncture of two such sets (male and female) there would be a prodigiously greater number of possible combinations. Biology thus offers a scientific explanation as to why no two individuals in a mixed race are identical.

Psychology as Science

Not only has biology become increasingly practical in combination with chemistry and physics, but earnest efforts have been made to render psychology similarly practical by treating it as an exact physical and chemical science. Following in the footsteps of Wundt, the "father of physiological psychology," a Russian physician, Ivan Pavlov (1849–1936), had begun in the 1890's to make detailed psychological observations of animals and humans, not in terms of supposed internal consciousness, but in those of external physical stimuli and reactions. The outcome was a physiological psychology of "conditioned reflexes," which, as subsequently developed by an American professor at Johns Hopkins University, John Watson (born 1878), became widely known after the World War as "behaviorism."

Behaviorism

According to the behaviorist, no one from outside can detect a being's consciousness, sensation, perception, or will, and consequently these concepts must be regarded by the scientific psychologist as unreal and nonexistent. It suffices for him to suppose that "we talk and then we think—if indeed we think at all," and to concentrate on the study of stimulus and response.

Whatever may be the doubts about the "whole truth" of behaviorism, there can be no doubt that it was of practical value, especially in the observational and experimental study of child psychology. It also contributed, along with other types of psychological research, to the contemporary vogue of "intelligence tests" and "aptitude tests." Such tests have been numerously devised and extensively applied, and although there has been a tendency to claim too much for them, some of them are doubtless useful in indicating, at least roughly, what a child is mentally equipped to undertake.

Another novel and practical interpretation of psychology was made by Sigmund Freud (born 1856), an Austrian Jew, who, after studying medicine at Vienna and Paris, became a clinical neurologist and the foremost practitioner of "psycho-analysis." Freud invested psychology with a strict determinism, explaining everything, from our most trivial mistakes to our most cherished beliefs, as due to the operation of powerful instinctive forces, which mature with the body and which, if checked or distorted, may be the cause of mental ill-health. He particularly stressed (1) the existence of the "unconscious" and its dynamic influence on consciousness, (2) the existence of intrapsychical conflicts between various sets of forces, the chief of which is "repression," (3) the existence and paramount importance of infantile sexuality, and (4) the use of psychoanalysis, that is, of resuscitating buried memories through a process of "free association," as the remedy for mental disorder.

Freudianism

Freudian psychology had an immense vogue in the twentieth century. In 1908 the first international congress of psychoanalysts was held, and in 1910 a permanent international association was formed. Before long, Freudian principles and methods were being applied not only to living individuals but to historic personages and also to nations and to society at large. Many differences of emphasis arose among the disciples of Freud, and in the post-war years there has been a marked reaction against his excessive dogmatism and in favor of a considerably modified "psychiatry." Yet the latest and great vogue of psychiatry, and also of social and educational psychology, owes much, both in point of view and in method, to the pioneer work of Sigmund Freud.

Psychiatry

Just as, in the first quarter of the twentieth century, leading psychologists insisted that they were natural and experimental "scientists," so an increasing number of students of history, anthropology, economics, politics, and sociology made similar claims. These contended, more strenuously than ever before, that their several subjects were "social sciences," susceptible of the same objective treatment and mechanical interpretation as physics or chemistry or biology—involving the same minute observation of phenomena, the same marshalling of facts, the same eventual deduction of "laws." As the natural scientists collaborated in laboratories and research

Social Sciences

institutes, the social scientists took to coöperating in libraries, research councils, and field work. Vast masses of factual data were collected and published about man's present and past occupations and activities, about his social life, about his economic life, about his political life, about his cultural life. Never before had there been such an outpouring of doctoral dissertations, such a profusion of "scientific" monographs, such an elaboration of cooperative research and publication. Never before had governments and private corporations availed themselves so much or so consistently of the findings and advice of social scientists.

So much for the certainties of scientific and mechanical achievement in the twentieth century. But alongside the certainties, which represented a culmination of the scientific progress of the whole Era of the Enlightenment, have emerged some strange and troublesome doubts about scientific beliefs closely associated with the progress of that Era. These doubts portended the coming, in the domain of natural science, of a new Era of Disillusionment. They have done for long-flourishing scientific ideas what the World War did for pacifism, and the rise of dictatorship for democracy. Applied science might go on from its latest triumphs to still greater triumphs, but the philosophy and metaphysics of science could not confidently continue along the simply material and mechanical lines which it had been following since the seventh century.[1] For now there are doubts—very serious doubts—about Newtonian physics itself, about the very nature of matter and motion, about "natural laws," even about the conception of "cause and effect." Physicists have undergone a veritable revolution in thought, and the revolution in physics is bound to affect chemists and biologists, and in time psychologists and social scientists.

Revolutionary Developments in Science

Especially Physics

Three developments in twentieth-century physics inaugurated the revolution: the propounding of the quantum theory by Max Planck between 1901 and 1912; the demonstration of the principle of relativity by Albert Einstein from 1905 to 1915; and new studies of atomic structure and activity, especially by Sir Ernest Rutherford and Niels Bohr. These are too technical to admit of

[1] On the materialistic and mechanistic metaphysics of modern times, see Vol. 2, pp. 506–512; Vol. 3, pp. 254–256.

any detailed description here. It must suffice to remark that they have served to outmode the mechanical and material interpretation of the universe (and of everything in it) as built up during the Era of the Enlightenment. There now seem to be processes in nature which do not operate according to mechanical laws. Besides, matter itself is now indistinguishable from energy, and substance from behavior. Indeed, the classical conception of "substance," as something extended in space and persistent in time, has been rendered quite meaningless, since neither space nor time is absolute or real. A "substance" has become a mere series of events, connected in some unknown and perhaps unknowable way, and occurring in "space-time." And just as the new atomic and quantum theories have forced a radical revolution of ideas about the ultimate character of "matter," so the theory of relativity has led to strange new hypotheses as to the ultimate nature of the universe. According to Einstein's physics, space is curved, and the farther one moves out in it, the nearer one approaches the place where one started! The universe is not infinite, but finite!

We are too near to the contemporary revolution in physical science to hazard even a guess as to just what effects it will eventually have. We are too much disconcerted by the overturn of seemingly well-established laws and principles, too much taken aback by the destructive blows which physicists of our own day have been delivering against that mechanistic and deterministic world which the scientific labors of three centuries had been building. "A few years ago," writes a famous scientist, "the exact accuracy of Newton's law of gravitation and the permanence of the chemical elements were thought to be quite certain; and in fact, the probability in favor of those principles was so great that we all should have been willing to bet our last shillings at long odds on their truth. Yet Einstein and Rutherford have proved that we were wrong, and our money would have gone to that rash gambler who had the apparent (nay real) folly to take our bets."

Effects of New Physics on Other Sciences

We should bear in mind that ever since the time of Galileo and Newton the science of physics has provided the basic models and the most persistent thought-patterns for all other sciences and would-be sciences: not only the "natural sciences" of chemistry and biology, but the social sciences and psychology and philosophy. As one after

another of these subjects became "scientific," it tended to accept the assumptions and to reënforce the teachings of physics; and chief among such assumptions had been the material and mechanistic nature of the universe. Now, however, quite a different lesson is derivable from physics; and in view of the long and solidly established premiership of physical science, it would be strange indeed if its new assumptions should not have in the future far-reaching influence upon all kinds of scientific thought.

Already there are omens of such influence—for example, in philosophy. At the close of the nineteenth century the dominant philosophy was materialistic, based on Newtonian physics and fortified by "Darwinism": its extreme expressions were those of Herbert Spencer and Ernst Haeckel. But from the beginning of the twentieth century dissident types of philosophy were growing in favor. One was "neo-scholasticism," representing a serious effort to reconcile modern science with traditional Christian ideas, and latterly expounded by a brilliant French scholar, Jacques Maritain. Another, of very different complexion, represented an attempt to use biology as a road of escape from the mechanical view of things which physics apparently imposed. It had been foreshadowed, in a pessimistic way, by Nietzsche, but it was developed, and given an optimistic slant, by a French Jewish philosopher, Henri Bergson (born 1859). To him, the "élan vital"—or "vital urge"—was all important, and instinct and intuition were far more significant than reason; there might be final causes, but they did not matter, for immediate causes were moulded anew as creative evolution proceeded.

New Philosophy

Maritain and Bergson

A third philosophic tendency of the new age was a marked revival of the "idealism" which stemmed from Kant and Hegel. During the nineteenth century, this alternative to "materialism," though espoused by a succession of academic philosophers, had been repellent to almost all men of scientific and "practical" bent. Then, early in the twentieth century, it attracted anew an impressive group of apostles throughout Europe, particularly the Italian, Benedetto Croce (born 1866). Croce began in 1902 the systematic exposition of his "philosophy of the spirit," divided into æsthetic, logic, ethic, and history; and by the 1920's he was exercising an increasingly profound influence on thought. To him, "spirit" is manifest in the

Croce

whole content of actual human experience, that is, in history; and the business of history is not merely to amass factual data but to give it meaning and significance in terms of purpose and "spirit."

Simultaneously, a novel psychology was emerging and winning converts. It arose in Germany and was developed, under the name of Gestalt (meaning "shape" or "form"), especially by Max Wertheimer from 1912 onwards. It combated purely physiological psychology and particularly its tendency to reduce individual behavior to a sequence of conditioned reflexes and thereby to deprive it of any meaning or significance. According to the Gestalt concept, psychology, instead of ignoring everything except physical reactions to physical stimuli, must take into account the entire nature (or "shape") of a perception. Thus, the seeing of a square does not consist in seeing four equal straight lines enclosing four right angles, but is the perception of the square as a whole. In the same way a melody is the totality of a series of tones and not just a succession of separate tones. The whole should be regarded as greater than the sum of its parts.

Gestalt Psychology

For the "social sciences" of economics, politics, sociology, and history, the implications of the "new physics" are staggering. For two centuries scholars in these fields have consciously essayed methods and goals similar to physicists', and have usually made similar assumptions concerning a universe operated by discoverable "natural laws." Most such scholars will probably be carried along for a time by the momentum of their past traditions, for there has always been a "lag" between the social and the natural sciences.

Doubts about "Social Science"

Social scientists have certainly accumulated and digested a vast deal of information during the last century. Yet today there are doubts—multiplying doubts—about the ability of social scientists to achieve any such scientific objectivity as they have sought or to substantiate from the greatest possible mass of data any such ultimate "laws" as they have posited. In 1916 Croce pointed out, in dramatic fashion, that "scientific history" was nearing its end; that its devotees, who imagined themselves to be concerned only with objective "facts," were constantly revealing their own subjectivity by their selection and organization of facts;

and that, in any event, historical "truth" was not absolute but merely relative.

Of sociology, similar disillusioning criticism was voiced. It was shown how one sociological "system" after another had been put forth as "scientific"—Comte's and Herbert Spencer's and latterly Pareto's [1]—only to be regarded by succeeding generations as a "dated" commentary on the thought of a particular person or group at a particular time. In the case of politics and of economics, actual occurrences of the post-war era have been even more disheartening than academic discussion has been destructive. Just as "political science" could not predict, but only describe, the rise of dictatorships, so "scientific economics" could neither prevent nor cure the depression which overspread the world in 1930.

The newer scientific doubt, especially as it affects the social sciences, has recently been epitomized by a thoughtful American scholar, Dr. Charles Austin Beard. "Deprived of the certainty which it was once believed science would ultimately deliver, and of the very hope that it can in the nature of things disclose certainty, human beings must now concede their own fallibility and accept the world as a place of trial and error, where only those who dare to assume ethical and æsthetic responsibility, and to exercise intuitive judgment, while seeking the widest possible command of realistic knowledge, can hope to divine the future and mould in some measure the shape of things to come." [2]

4. RELIGION IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD

There had always been in Europe, especially in Catholic Europe, conflicts over the respective jurisdictions of state and church, and at least since the French Revolution a good deal of "anti-clericalism." On one historic occasion, that of the French Revolution itself, there had been a fierce but brief and unsuccessful effort to uproot Christianity altogether. Yet throughout the nineteenth century—as generally throughout earlier centuries—the large majority of Europeans (and Americans) adhered to one

[1] Vilfredo Pareto (1848–1923) published his *General Sociology* in 1916. It was an imposing pile of fact and conjecture, partially "positivist" and partially critical.

[2] C. A. Beard, *The Open Door* (1934), p. 20.

or another of the Christian churches, and their governments uniformly professed respect for the Christian religion. To be sure, there was, during the latter part of the century, a marked growth of scepticism and indifferentism; and many statesmen, like many scholars and other persons, ceased to belong to any church and actively prompted secularizing policies. Nevertheless, the trend was toward securing full toleration within presumably Christian nations for dissenters and toward depriving Christian churches of special privileges.[1]

Not until the twentieth century, not until after the World War and the rise of "totalitarian" dictatorships, did the trend change.

Atheism and Anti-Religion

Then, rather suddenly, conflict between church and state was transformed into conflict between religion and atheism, anti-clericalism was merged in anti-religion, and whole nations were rendered intolerant of even private practice of traditional faiths. Nor was the changed trend peculiar to Western Christendom. It has appeared, we may recall, in both Catholic and Protestant Germany and also in Catholic Mexico and Spain. But it is now most striking in Orthodox Russia and, outside Christendom, in Moslem Turkey and Moslem Iran. In some degree, indeed, it is world-wide. Just as strenuous efforts have been put forth in Germany to supplant the "imported" world-religion of Christianity with an "indigenous" tribal religion of primitive Aryanism, so in Japan the government has sedulously fostered a preference for native Shintoism as over against any "foreign" religion. Wherefore, every one of the historic world-religions is extraordinarily troubled, and its missionary endeavors seriously handicapped.

Yet, despite difficulties, old and new, with which it is confronted in the present age, despite universal progress of secu-

Continuing Religion

larization and relative decline of ecclesiastical influence on society and on the shaping of public policies, organized supernatural religion is by no means dead. Its roots are struck deep in human habits, if not in human nature; and apparently it satisfies vital human needs and aspirations in a machine age as formerly in an age of hand-tools. What decline it may have suffered is relative rather than absolute.

Of the major Christian bodies, the Catholic Church continues to be the largest and the most intransigent. The World War

[1] See above, pp. 404–406, 413–416.

caused it immediate political embarrassments, and the Pope of the time, Benedict XV (1914–1922), had to employ all his diplomatic talents to preserve his neutrality between the belligerents, while his earnest peace pleas fell on deaf ears.[1] In several ways, however, the war years proved advantageous to the Church. They witnessed a noteworthy revival of Catholic activity and influence in France and Italy; and the political map of Europe which resulted from the war enhanced the prestige of the Church. Catholics were numerically preponderant in the newly created nations of Poland, Lithuania, Czechoslovakia, and the Irish Free State, and they were numerous in the enlarged states of Yugoslavia and Rumania. And for several years after the war Catholic political parties dominated or held a balance of power in the governments of Germany, Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Hungary. This improved international position of the Catholic Church was made the most of by the exceptionally able successor of Benedict XV—Pope Pius XI (1922–1939).[2]

Catholic Christianity

Benedict XV, 1914–1922

Pius XI was scholar and statesman, as well as vigorous administrator and staunch upholder of the Catholic faith and tradition. He successfully negotiated with Mussolini the Lateran treaty of 1929, settling the "Roman question" and reëstablishing, after the lapse of fifty-nine years, an independent temporal sovereignty for the papacy. True, the seat of this sovereignty—"Vatican City"—was an extremely small part of Rome, but it sufficed to symbolize to the world that the Pope was no longer a "prisoner" of Italy or subject to Italian law, but that, instead, he was a supranational figure, guarantied as such by an international treaty.

Pius XI, 1922–1939

With most nations in Christendom, Pius XI maintained or newly established friendly relations, and with a considerable number of them he concluded significant concordats—with Latvia in 1922, with Poland in 1925, with Lithuania in 1927, with Czechoslovakia in 1928, with Italy, Portugal, and Rumania in 1929, with Germany in 1933. These concordats assured to the Pope the appointment of bishops within the countries concerned

[1] On the peace efforts of Benedict XV, see above, p. 610. An outstanding monument of his pontificate was the completion (1917) of the codification of canon law which had been begun under his predecessor, Pius X.

[2] Pius XI's Secretary of State succeeded in 1939 as Pius XII.

and to the Church the right of imparting religious instruction, and if in some instances they restricted political activity of the clergy they uniformly promised to respect Catholic social action.

On the other hand, there were some very serious set-backs for Catholicism. The Catholic minority in the Russian Soviet Union (largely concentrated in Ukrainia and White Russia) suffered from the anti-religious policies and actions of the Communist dictatorship; and repeated protests of Pius XI were unheeded. Nor could the Pope stem the anti-clerical and anti-Christian tide in Mexico; the papal delegate was expelled from Mexico City and the National Revolutionary dictatorship of the country made few concessions. In Spain, moreover, the establishment of the Republic precipitated an acute conflict between state and church and led to a series of drastic anti-Catholic enactments, and during the ensuing civil war the Spanish clergy suffered direfully. Then, too, not all the new concordats were scrupulously observed by governments which agreed to them, and especially in the case of Germany the Nazi régime flouted the concordat of 1933 and pursued an actively and bitterly anti-Catholic policy.

Under Pius XI, the missionary activities of the Church were extended farther in Asia and Africa. To meet native nationalist objections to "European" missionary enterprise, the Pope strove, with no little success, to create native hierarchies in China, Japan, and India, for example, and to entrust to them the conduct of the missions within their respective countries. Large numbers of European (and American) priests, monks, and nuns still labor in far-away fields, but to a much greater degree than formerly their labors are supplemented by those of native clergymen.

Several important encyclical letters were addressed by Pius XI to the Catholic world, discussing current questions and indicating the attitude which Christians should take toward them. Both "totalitarian" nationalism and atheistic communism were condemned. Limitation of armaments and judicial settlement of international disputes were urged. The principles and program of Catholic social reform as outlined by Leo XIII in 1891 were reaffirmed. Unnatural means of birth-control were denounced. The traditional "rights" of the Church, especially in the education of youth, were insistently reasserted.

Of the major Christian bodies, the Orthodox Church has been hardest hit by recent developments. It had never had any such

independence of secular government as the Catholic Church has had, and, with the recent overthrow of governments on which for centuries it relied, it has suffered a notable decline and shrinkage. The final disruption of the Ottoman Empire and the rise of the Turkish dictatorship of Mustafa Kemal have served to narrow the jurisdiction of the Orthodox Patriarch of Constantinople and to deprive him of any privileged position and of much of his prestige. Far more serious, and affecting indeed the large majority of the Orthodox communion, has been the revolution in Russia, with its destruction of the Tsardom, which had always supported the Church, and its establishment of the Communist dictatorship, which has zealously combated Christianity and actively championed materialistic atheism. Orthodox Christianity continues to exist and be practiced in the Soviet Union, but it is barely tolerated by the state and the vast majority of young people in Russia are being brought up in ignorance of it and usually in militant opposition to it.

Orthodox Christianity

Elsewhere Orthodox Christianity continues to function just about as it did before the World War. It is represented by national churches in Greece, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Yugoslavia. It has bishops in Albania, in Palestine and Syria, and also in Hungary and Poland. It has a growing number of adherents in the United States and Canada, though most of its missionary activity has been halted by the drying-up of its Russian source.

Protestant Christianity has developed since the World War along lines which had been marked out with some clearness between 1870 and 1910.[1] There are now as many professed Protestants throughout the world as ever before, and perhaps more. But Protestantism is less than ever a single coherent movement. On the one hand, "high-church" Anglicanism—latterly styled Anglo-Catholicism—has been coming to the fore and likewise a similar "high-church" trend in Lutheranism, while ritualistic observances have been growing in most Protestant churches and in some a "fundamentalism" has continued to be preached. On the other hand, the "broad-church" or "modernist" trend has become more pronounced. With multitudes of professed Protestants, little remains of historic Protestantism, that is, of Protestant faith and practice of the sixteenth century. There is a veritable repugnance to any-

Protestant Christianity

[1] See above, pp. 309–315.

thing savoring of dogma, a sharp reaction against "puritanism," and an absorption in "good works" and the "good life."

In the circumstances, Protestant sectarianism has lost much of its earlier distinctiveness and bitterness, and increasingly successful attempts have been made to federate, if not to unify, various Protestant denominations in particular countries. Thus, in 1922, was created an international council for coördinating Protestant missionary endeavors throughout the world. In 1925 an "ecumenical Christian conference on life and work" at Stockholm was attended by delegates of thirty-one non-Catholic bodies; it naturally refrained from discussing ecclesiastical organization and creed, but it issued a joint report on social and international morality. In 1938 an international federation of all these bodies was established.

Protestant missionary enterprise has remained impressive in Asia and Africa, though in China, at any rate, Protestant missions have been more adversely affected than Catholic missions by the rise of nationalism. And though there have been too few Protestants in Russia or Mexico to feel the heavy hand of irreligious or anti-religious dictatorships where Orthodox or Catholic Christians have most felt it, the Protestant majority in Germany have suffered from similar coercion.

Judaism has continued to comprise "orthodox" and "reformed" groups, the latter growing at the expense of the former.[1]

Judaism

It has continued, too, to be partly religious and partly national, to foster Zionism and to be plagued by anti-Semitism. It has latterly suffered from a systematic "racial" persecution of the most violent sort in Germany [2] and of some sort in Italy and throughout east-central Europe, and from a less violent but more subtle "materialistic" subversion within Russia.

Islam has begun, only since the World War, to encounter head-on the forces of opposition and criticism with which Christianity has long been confronted. But the encounter is as upsetting as it has been sudden. The Moslem Caliphate is now at an end. The process of secularization is already far advanced in Turkey and Iran, and is steadily advancing in Egypt, Syria, and India. Despite the fact that millions still profess allegiance to Allah and to Mohammed as his prophet, there is as yet no evidence of any profound or widespread revival of Islam. And

Islam

[1] See above, pp. 317–321.

[2] See above, pp. 715, 722, 727.

it is somewhat similar with the great traditional world-religions of the Far-East—with Hinduism and with Buddhism.

The basic religious question today is not one of "science" versus "theology." It is whether in the long run an exclusively "this-worldly" faith such as Marxian Communism or Totalitarian Nationalism can and will provide the masses of mankind with a satisfying substitute for "other-worldly" faith which from time immemorial humanity has cherished.

5. ART IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD

Art in the Age of Disillusionment has been symptomatically revolutionary and chaotic. Rebellion against conventions of the nineteenth century has characterized major monuments of recent twentieth-century literature, painting, sculpture, and music. But while all the different kinds of contemporary art evince a reaction, in greater or less degree, against traditions of the immediate past, every one of them displays an extraordinary variety of inspiration and goal. There is no single dominant fashion in present-day art-forms, such as "classicism" was in early modern times, or "romanticism" in the nineteenth century, or "realism" at the beginning of the twentieth. All these moods and modes still persist and are simultaneously exemplified by works of art in the latest age, but side by side with them appear strange new tendencies.

There is a novel "primitiveness," an enthusiasm for the simplicity of the antique, even of the barbarous. There is also a sophisticated "modernism," a cultivation of the abstract rather than the concrete, accompanied by much experimentation with geometrical design. There is, too, a related "functionalism," an earnest effort to render art peculiarly expressive of the massiveness and speed of the machine age and in many instances of the age's proletarian and Marxian trend. There is, moreover, an iconoclastic "futurism," a wild and willful flight from the past and even from the present, sometimes as a release for highly charged emotions of totalitarian nationalism, and sometimes as a mere stunt. At the opposite extreme, there is a reviving religious element in contemporary art, representing not so much a revival of the romantic medievalism of the nineteenth century as a novel reinterpretation of traditional religion in terms of the newest art forms (primitive or modernist or realist).

In literature the sociological and psychological interests of the

preceding "age of realism" have remained important, the psychological gradually outweighing the sociological and assuming more and more a Freudian complexion. In English literature, for example, such sociological "realists" as Bernard Shaw and H. G. Wells [1] have continued to treat provocatively of a wide range of social problems, but Shaw has latterly interspersed his pleas for socialism and his plays on nationalism with strangely subjective confessions of helplessness, while Wells, after resigning himself to the World War in his *Mr. Britling Sees It Through* (1916) and becoming almost theological in his *God the Invisible King* (1917), has rushed on to outline universal history in pessimistic vein, and in optimistic vein to psycho-analyze himself.

Literature

Shaw and Wells

After all, both Shaw and Wells survive from an earlier age, and though their remarkable adaptability has assured them a continuing popularity, they are probably less representative of the new age than certain other (and mainly younger) masters of English prose or poetry whom we may mention. Thus, John Galsworthy (1867–1933) inaugurated in 1906 the long series of his *Forsyte* novels, nicely articulating the psychological with the sociological in detailed studies of the decay of an upper middle-class family, and presently he was writing plays in terse and strictly natural dialogue about disturbing ethical problems of the time. James Joyce (born 1882), an Irishman who by preference resided abroad, chiefly at Paris, combined æstheticism with a revolutionary frankness about sex in his *Portrait of Artist as a Young Man* (1916) and in his still more sensational *Ulysses* (1922).

Galsworthy and Joyce

The most accomplished French novelist of the Era of Disillusionment was Marcel Proust (1871–1922). Proust came of a gifted Parisian family, his father being a professor of medicine and his mother of Jewish extraction. As a young man he contributed to Socialist publications, translated Ruskin into French, expounded the "creative evolution" of Bergson, and played a conspicuous part in polite society. About 1902, however, failing health induced him to withdraw from active life; and his new-found leisure he employed in penning an elaborate psychological exposé of the society he had known. He planned it as a series of fifteen novels under the general title of *A la Recherche*

Proust

[1] See above, pp. 279–281.

du Temps Perdu: the first volume was published in 1913; another in 1918; the third and fourth in 1921; and three others after his death. The characters are erotic and abnormal, having little in common with the generality of mankind; they are always in process of development and change, and they are frightfully futile. Proust won some recognition in France during his life, but only after the World War and after his death has his fame spread widely and his influence become profound.

In German literature, the foremost post-war novelist was Thomas Mann (born 1875). He came of a patrician merchant family of Lübeck, and in his native city he laid the scene of a remarkable character- and period-novel, *Buddenbrooks, the Ruin of a Family*, which he published in 1903 and which established his reputation. In this and in his later work, he displays a fondness for lingering among trivial details with considerable irony and great cumulative effect, and also a wistful regret at the apparently inevitable swamping of aristocracy in a modern sea of plebeian mediocrity. Mann received the Nobel prize for literature in 1929; and after the advent of the Nazi dictatorship, he was practically exiled from Germany.

Mann

Quite a different literary trend of the last twenty-five years has been the resurgence of a distinctively Catholic literature, represented by such varied authors as Claudel, Chesterton, and Undset. Paul Claudel (born 1868), long in the consular and diplomatic service of France, is the outstanding French poet of recent times. Trained in the school of the symbolists and particularly indebted to Rimbaud, [1] he broke away from them in essential respects and produced lyrics and mystery plays of surpassing beauty of form and deeply religious meaning. Gilbert Chesterton (1874–1936), an English journalist who entered the Catholic Church in 1922, was a voluble and paradoxical literary champion of traditional religion against such "materialists" as Shaw and Wells. Essays poured from his pen, and so did ballads, biographies, literary studies, and detective stories. Never was Christian civilization defended in manner so unconventional—or so witty. Sigrid Undset (born 1882), the daughter of a Norwegian archæologist, won local fame by a novel, *Jenny*, in 1912, and then international fame by two series of "realistic" novels of medieval

Claudel

Chesterton

Undset

[1] See above, p. 283.

Norway. These were no romantic idealizations, but very "frank" and almost photographic expositions of life and society in the middle ages, and they were presented in an ultra-modern style.

Futurist Literature

One other development in recent literature must be mentioned —a radical revolt against everything traditional, whether of content or of form, whether classicist or romantic or "realist." It has been defined as "futurism" by one of its loudest and most zealous apostles, F. T. Marinetti (born 1881), an Italian who was intimately associated with Mussolini in the early days of Fascism. In a pioneering manifesto of 1909, Marinetti denounced "the cult of the past" as the bane of all art, and went on to describe the goal of "futurist" literature in these words: "We futurists uphold the ideal of a great and strong scientific literature, which, free from all and every classicism and pedantic purism, will magnify the most recent discoveries, the new intoxication of speed, and the celestial life of aviators. Our poetry is poetry essentially and totally rebelling against all used forms. The tracks of verse must be torn up and the bridges of things already said must be blasted and the locomotives of our inspiration must be started toward the coming, toward the boundless fields of the New and the Future! Better a splendid disaster than a monotonous race daily re-run! We have put up too long with the station masters of prosody." Marinetti himself was an unbalanced egotist and hardly a literary genius, but he expressed ideas about literature which have found increasing favor in the latest age. And the result, whether it is called "futurist" or not, is the appearance in almost every country of strange new types of prose and verse—of verse that is prose, and of prose that only the author knows what if anything it means.

Painting

Matisse

Of the art of painting, Paris has remained the focal point, and here the "post-impressionism" inaugurated by such artists as Cézanne, Van Gogh, and Gauguin has been developed and given new (and revolutionary) direction, especially by two masters—Matisse and Picasso. Henri Matisse (born 1869), in full revolt against both classicism and impressionism, began where Cézanne and Gauguin left off. He varied and exaggerated the former's use of distortion, and he intensified the latter's bright coloring. Gradually he worked out an

essentially new technique, rendering form quite unconventional, and treating light, not as the impressionists had done, by means of the juxtaposition of minute touches of color, but by employing pure tones on a large scale and thus producing the effect of modelling and the illusion of space. As he reacted against the traditions of "civilized" painting, he became infatuated with the art of "barbarous" peoples—Polynesians, African Negroes, and Mexican Indians—with its abbreviations and accentuations of form, its bizarre coloring, and its "rhythm."

Pablo Picasso (born 1881), a Catalan Spaniard and son of an artist and professor at the Academy of Barcelona, settled in Paris in his youth and speedily became a leading post-impressionist and "naturalist." Choosing his subjects from the circus and the morbid side of life in a big city, he drew them with forceful directness and colored them with striking originality and restraint. Then, just before the World War, he took to painting still-life pictures of grouped fruit-bowls, bottles, or musical instruments, in manner more and more abstract and angular. This was a new manner, to which the name of "cubism" has been given: it was an attempt to cover the surface of a canvas with form and at the same time to reduce all form to simple geometric design. Picasso produced some attractive as well as astonishing "cubist" pictures, which enjoyed a considerable vogue and were widely imitated. After the war, however, Picasso tired of "cubism" and reverted to his "naturalist" style, applying it to both painting and sculpture. Next to Cézanne's, Picasso's is probably the greatest influence in ultra-modern art.

Picasso

Cubism has gone on without Picasso, and in its wake have issued from Paris a swift succession of other pictorial isms: "futurism," denouncing the static quality of all past painting and striving to portray motion; "lyricism," seeking a close analogy in expression between painting and music; "sur-realism," rejecting reasoned technique and depending upon inspiration to depict dreams and states of mind; "popularism," based on the supposition that common people without any technical training produce the most naïve and sin-

"Cubism," etc.

cere pictures and therefore the best. None of these isms—or of the many others which might be mentioned—has amounted to much in itself. Yet they are symptomatic of the turmoil into which painting has fallen, and suggestive of certain general tendencies among the large majority of contemporary painters the world over. "Naturalness" is eagerly sought after. Content matters less than form, and form must be unconventional, must convey some sense of thickness as well as of length and breadth, must express not merely concrete images but abstract conceptions.

Of course, ultra-modern painting is not just "art for art's sake." It is put to special uses, nationalistic, socialistic, religious. Of these, the nationalistic probably predominate, for ultra-modern forms seem peculiarly appropriate to the glorification of the primitive ancestors of one's nation or to the symbolizing of its abstract mass and might. Striking pictures of the kind, and some good ones, have been produced in Communist Russia and in Nazi Germany, and also by the native Mexican artist Diego Rivera, who, on one huge mural after another, has portrayed the primitive Indian life and labor of his country.

Of course, too, there are many contemporary painters who cling to past traditions. But most of them betray, in greater or less degree, the influence of newer schools. For example, the tradition of British portrait painting has been maintained and handed on from Sargent to such a "modern" as Sir William Orpen (1878–1932). Orpen's early work was marked by the use of quiet harmonies of gray and brown, in the manner of Whistler, but the influence of the French post-impressionists was evident in his later treatment of coloring and light. Orpen was the official British artist of the World War, and he painted the Paris Peace Congress of 1919.

Orpen

Significant, too, is an American artist, George Bellows (1882–1925). His painting represented a compromise between "realism" and "post-impressionism." He was a good draughtsman and a master of color. With dignity of composition he combined an intense vitality. Bellows pictured numerous sporting scenes quite realistically. Besides, he produced several

Bellows

religious works; his Crucifixion, for example, was what El Greco might have done if he had lived in the Age of Disillusionment.

The latest age has given impetus not only to new methods and fashions of painting but also to similar developments in all the pictorial arts. Many "modern" artists have devoted themselves to engraving and etching and have produced works of unconventional but real distinction in these fields. Moreover, the art of posters, beginning in a significant way with Gauguin, has since been stimulated by the propagandist activity of governments (especially during the World War) and by advertising exigencies of capitalistic industry. Then, too, the art of caricature, being particularly prized by a disillusioned public, has commanded the services of some of the best and most original draughtsmen of the latest age. For example, Forain, the most skillful of French cartoonists,[1] found new inspiration of his talents in popular disillusionment about the World War and the League of Nations. And so, in only lesser degree, did the famous English caricaturist, Sir Bernard Partridge.

Other Pictorial Arts

Architecture, as the most monumental and enduring of the arts, has always been more conservative than the others. It has been so in the latest age. Severely classic models have been followed, for example, in the post-war Commerce Building and Supreme Court Building in Washington, and in the War Cenotaph in London. Romantic Gothic has provided models for recent ecclesiastical edifices, notably the great Anglican cathedral at Liverpool (by Sir Gilbert Scott), and in New York the Riverside Baptist Church.

Architecture

Yet architecture responds more and more to current demands for new models in stricter keeping with contemporary developments, and the result is an accelerating "modernism" in all sorts of construction. Progressive industrialization of the past quarter-century has led to a general adoption of the building technique of industrialism—steel skeleton construction, and the wide use of reënforced concrete. It has also called for new types of office building, factory, garage, hangar. Moreover, growing urbanization of the population of every country has necessitated city-

[1] See Vol. 3, pp. 289–290; and the tailpieces on pp. 622, 667.

planning on a large scale and a revaluation of the aims of domestic as well as public architecture. Furthermore, the expanding cult of applied science has prompted architects to seek some "scientific," or "functional," expression of the new materials, to adapt the appearance of a building to its actual use. Steel and concrete both suggest the employment of strong vertical lines, wide spans, and slim supports; and, in addition, reënforced concrete lends itself to curving forms. And architects have shared in the widespread feeling engendered by the World War that the old order was passing away, and a new and quite different one was emerging. In view of all these considerations, it is not surprising that in the post-war years architecture has become steadily more "modernist."

Functionalism

Among preachers and practitioners of revolutionary architecture, Frank Lloyd Wright merits special mention. Born in Wisconsin in 1869, he was from 1895 a zealous advocate of "functionalism." Before the war he designed a number of "functional" structures, which were then deemed freakish, and, to secure disciples, he wrote several books and founded a training school. Then, after the war, he won international recognition by building at Tokio the great Imperial Hotel, an excellent example of the artistic beauty attainable by purely "modernist" methods.

Wright

Extreme "modernist" architecture has especially flourished in Germany, Austria, and Scandinavia. Here it appears in newer public buildings and factories, in apartment houses, and in war memorials. It is impressively exemplified in the Socialist housing developments in Vienna, in the Town Hall of Stockholm, and in the Finnish railway station at Helsingfors. The last named, in grandeur, in logic of design, and in decorative richness, is now the finest railway station in Europe.

The new architecture is in evidence in almost every country. It has been employed for new church edifices. It has been widely adapted to the fashioning of "cubicle" family-houses, all of them starkly simple and some of them very ugly. For some structures of marked beauty and dignity, it has been assimilated with traditional forms, for example with the Gothic, as in the Nebraska state capitol. In general, it has served to put a premium on simplicity, on the renouncing of superfluous architectural detail, and to invite a renewed dependence upon harmonious embellishment

with sculpture, painting, and mosaics. This dependence has been beautifully achieved, in several French war memorials, in which sculpture and architecture reach a new unity of effect, fresh and unconventional, and in the interiors of certain "modernist" churches, in which mural decoration of paint and mosaic is integrated with architectural material and design.

Sculpture, like painting, has reacted sharply against traditions of the immediate past and exhibited novel and even revolutionary trends. A leading sculptor of the age, and the chief exponent of "primitivism," is the Frenchman Aristide Maillol (born 1861). Beginning as a painter, he was induced by Gauguin to abandon impressionism, and for several years he worked on tapestry design, made majolica vases, experimented with glazes, and modelled wall fountains. Then, about 1910, becoming fascinated with archaic Greek statuary of the early fifth century B.C., he took to sculpture and thereafter produced a large number of monumental statues and terra-cotta statuettes, all characterized by a naïve "primitiveness." Perhaps Maillol's most distinguished statue is the reclining goddess *Fame* which he fashioned for a memorial to Cézanne.

Sculpture

Maillol

Indeed, much of the newer sculpture is consciously archaic in inspiration and in effect. It is imitative not alone of primitive Greek art but also, in many recent instances, of even more primitive art of ancient Etruscans or modern Negroes, Redmen, and South Sea Islanders. It represents in measure a reversion to paganism and barbarism.

On the other hand, much of the newer sculpture, like much of the newer painting, tends away from the primitive and concrete and toward an ever greater abstraction. This aspect of modern sculpture may be illustrated by reference to Jacob Epstein and Amadeo Modigliani. The former, born in New York in 1880, the son of Polish Jewish parents, studied at Paris and settled in London in 1905. The large sphinx which he carved in 1909 for the monument to Oscar Wilde in the Père Lachaise cemetery (at Paris) established his fame, and thereafter he extended his abstract experimentation with surer mastery and growing popular appreciation. Eventually, however, his radicalism lessened; and the fine series of bronze portraits (including that of Lord Fisher) which he executed during and after

Epstein

the World War were more traditional in form though still quite "modern" in feeling. Modigliani (1887–1920), a precocious Italian, commenced his artistic career as a "post-impressionist" painter but soon passed from "cubist" painting to a kind of "cubist" sculpture, utilizing such simple geometrical figures as the cube and the sphere as patterns for "abstract" portrait busts. Modigliani and Epstein are only two of a considerable number of gifted artists who have spread the vogue of abstract sculpture.

Modigliani

An outstanding sculptor of the latest age is a Croatian, Ivan Meštrović, who was born in 1883 and was apprenticed in childhood by his father, a peasant, to a marble-cutter at Spalato. Here he learned the trade so well and displayed such creative talent that his employer sent him to the art school at Vienna, and by 1906 his work attracted the favorable attention of Rodin. Meštrović has been thoroughly "modernist," but instead of following any one of the several modernist trends, he has managed to fuse them in a remarkable originality of his own. He is "primitive," "archaic," and at the same time "abstract," and yet not at all contemptuous of tradition.

Meštrović

In some ways comparable with Meštrović is the Englishman Eric Gill (born 1882), who studied architecture and then sculpture, and, reaching the conclusion that art and religion are inseparable, became a Catholic in 1913. Since then, while accepting and developing "modernist" art forms—primitivism, abstraction, and all the rest—he has employed them primarily for religious ends. Some of his work has been in stone, but he has excelled in wood-carving. Notable among his creations have been *Stations of the Cross* in Westminster Cathedral and a war memorial for the University of Leeds.[1]

Eric Gill

In music there has been reaction, akin to that in sculpture and painting, against tradition and convention, though more gradual and less complete. "New" music began to make itself heard in the Age of Realism, prior to 1910, and two composers associated with its origins we have elsewhere discussed, Richard Strauss and Claude Debussy. Debussy died in 1918, but during the post-war years Strauss remained productive

Music

[1] For examples of Eric Gill's art, see the tailpieces on pp. 745, 844.

and influential. New operas and pantomines he produced with a mastery of peculiar technique and gorgeous setting. And scores of younger musicians, consciously or unconsciously, have imitated his tricks and patterned their style after his.

Certain younger composers have gone much farther with "new" music. The chief of these is undoubtedly the Russian Igor Stravinsky (born 1882). A pupil of Rimsky-Korsakov, he created a sensation with his *Firebird* (1910), a ballet motivated by a Russian folk-tale but treated in quite novel musical diction. The qualities here displayed—freedom from rhythm as well as harmony, brilliant coloring, impetuous violence, and strangely penetrating charm—Stravinsky has developed and accentuated in numerous later ballets. More than anyone else, he has blazed new trails along which the latest generation of "modernist" musicians are proceeding. The general direction is toward "abstract" and "primitive" music—toward a new cosmos and perhaps a new chaos.

Stravinsky

To the reader of this book, it may appear that the latest developments in art, as in science, economics, and politics, are destructively revolutionary, that they signify a general revolt against traditional European civilization, especially against its "enlightened progress" from the seventeenth to the twentieth century, and portend a universal relapse into barbarism. There are, indeed, many thoughtful (and pessimistic) persons who regard the present age not only as one of disillusionment about the past but as one of despair for the future. Such is the burden of a big tome on *The Decline of the West* by a contemporary German philosopher, Oswald Spengler. He, at any rate, is sure that we are in the downward curve of another historical cycle comparable with that which involved the ruin of the ancient Roman Empire and its pagan civilization. As then, so now, the cosmos turns to chaos and civilization reverts to barbarism.

The world has undoubtedly been changing in our twentieth century—becoming more unified and contracted in some respects, more fragmentary and complex in others. But no past century has been without change—or without deprecation of change. A Spengler can hardly say worse of the present age than the Jewish prophet Jeremias said of the sixth century B.C., or the Christian

apologist Salvian said of the fifth century A.D. The lamentations of Jeremias were followed by the rise of Greek civilization; the lucubrations of Salvian, by the emergence of European civilization. It may well be that Spengler is but the darkness preceding the dawn of a still more glorious day in human civilization.

Nor should the student of history be unmindful of a central historical (and physical) fact, that change is always relative, that it always appears much greater at close range than from a distance. The French Revolution, for example, appeared to its contemporaries to be a complete break with the past and a veritable cataclysm; to us it seems less important for what it changed than for what it left intact or merely adapted. In all probability, the present age of world war, dictatorship, and chaotic art and science will seem to later generations progressively less revolutionary than it appears to us. And even to us it has significance only in relationship to, and as a continuation of, the whole story of mankind and particularly of that part of it which has constituted the subject-matter of this book.



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APPENDIX I

STATES OF THE WORLD IN 1939

Ranked According to Area and Population

[Note. SMALL CAPS indicate states whose language and traditional culture are European. Area is given in square miles. Population in each instance is according to the available census or estimate nearest to 1939. Imperial or colonial domains are not included.]

Area		*Population*	
1. RUSSIA	8,144,228	1. China	422,707,868
2. CANADA	3,694,863	2. India	336,747,616
3. BRAZIL	3,285,319	3. RUSSIA	168,000,000
4. AUSTRALIA	2,974,581	4. UNITED STATES	122,775,046
5. UNITED STATES	2,973,776	5. GERMANY	85,840,746
6. China	2,903,475	6. Japan (proper)	69,254,148
7. India	1,571,545	7. GREAT BRITAIN	46,189,176
8. ARGENTINA	1,078,278	8. ITALY	42,527,561
9. MEXICO	767,198	9. FRANCE	42,013,506
10. Iran (Persia)	628,000	10. BRAZIL	41,560,147
11. BOLIVIA	506,792	11. POLAND	32,347,300
12. PERU	482,133	12. Manchukuo	29,606,117
13. SOUTH AFRICA	471,917	13. SPAIN	24,583,096
14. Manchukuo	460,383	14. RUMANIA	19,033,363
15. COLOMBIA	443,985	15. MEXICO	16,552,722
16. Egypt	383,000	16. Turkey	16,158,018
17. VENEZUELA	352,051	17. Egypt	15,904,525
18. Turkey	294,492	18. Iran (Persia)	15,000,000
19. CHILE	286,322	19. YUGOSLAVIA	13,934,038
20. ECUADOR	275,936	20. ARGENTINA	12,561,361
21. Afghanistan	245,000	21. PHILIPPINES	12,082,366
22. GERMANY	243,657	22. Afghanistan	12,000,000
23. FRANCE	212,659	23. Siam	11,506,200
24. Siam	198,189	24. CANADA	10,376,786
25. SPAIN	196,607	25. HUNGARY	10,248,319
26. SWEDEN	173,157	26. SOUTH AFRICA	9,530,649
27. POLAND	150,013	27. COLOMBIA	8,698,634
28. Saudi Arabia (Hejaz)	150,000	28. NETHERLANDS	8,556,849
29. Japan (proper)	148,756	29. BELGIUM	8,330,959
30. FINLAND	134,557	30. GREECE	6,936,900
31. PARAGUAY	130,647	31. PORTUGAL	6,825,883
32. NORWAY	124,556	32. AUSTRALIA	6,677,167
		33. PERU	6,500,000

	Area		*Population*	
33.	ITALY	119,744	34. SWEDEN	6,250,506
34.	Iraq	116,600	35. BULGARIA	6,077,939
35.	PHILIPPINES	114,400	36. Nepal	5,639,092
36.	RUMANIA	113,886	37. CHILE	4,626,508
37.	NEW ZEALAND	103,415	38. SWITZERLAND	4,066,400
38.	YUGOSLAVIA	95,558	39. CUBA	4,011,088
39.	GREAT BRITAIN	94,278	40. DENMARK	3,706,349
40.	URUGUAY	72,153	41. FINLAND	3,667,067
41.	Syria (and Lebanon)	57,900	42. Syria (and Lebanon)	3,630,000
42.	HUNGARY	54,509	43. VENEZUELA	3,451,677
43.	Nepal	54,000	44. BOLIVIA	3,226,296
44.	GREECE	50,257	45. SLOVAKIA	3,000,000
45.	NICARAGUA	49,200	46. HAITI	3,000,000
46.	GUATEMALA	45,452	47. EIRE (IRISH FREE STATE)	2,965,854
47.	LIBERIA	45,000	48. Iraq	2,857,077
48.	HONDURAS	44,275	49. NORWAY	2,814,914
49.	NEWFOUNDLAND	42,734	50. ECUADOR	2,756,552
50.	CUBA	41,164	51. GUATEMALA	2,466,227
51.	BULGARIA	39,814	52. LITHUANIA	2,358,783
52.	ICELAND	39,709	53. URUGUAY	2,065,986
53.	PORTUGAL	35,490	54. LATVIA	1,950,502
54.	PANAMA	33,667	55. NEW ZEALAND	1,548,909
55.	EIRE (IRISH FREE STATE)	26,601	56. SANTO DOMINGO	1,544,549
56.	LATVIA	25,402	57. Saudi Arabia (Hejaz)	1,500,000
57.	COSTA RICA	23,000	58. LIBERIA	1,500,000
58.	LITHUANIA	20,431	59. SALVADOR	1,459,578
59.	SANTO DOMINGO	19,325	60. NICARAGUA	1,133,572
60.	ESTONIA	18,355	61. ESTONIA	1,126,383
61.	Bhutan	18,000	62. ALBANIA	1,003,068
62.	DENMARK	16,575	63. HONDURAS	962,685
63.	SWITZERLAND	15,940	64. PARAGUAY	931,799
64.	SALVADOR	13,173	65. COSTA RICA	591,862
65.	NETHERLANDS	12,692	66. PANAMA	467,459
66.	BELGIUM	11,775	67. DANZIG	410,000
67.	SLOVAKIA	11,000	68. Bhutan	300,000
68.	ALBANIA	10,630	69. LUXEMBURG	296,913
69.	HAITI	10,204	70. NEWFOUNDLAND	284,872
70.	LUXEMBURG	999	71. ICELAND	116,948
71.	DANZIG	754	72. MONACO	23,956
72.	ANDORRA	191	73. SAN MARINO	13,948
73.	LIECHTENSTEIN	65	74. LIECHTENSTEIN	10,213
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75.	MONACO	8	76. VATICAN	1,006
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APPENDIX II

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

The most reliable and useful bibliography on special topics in modern European history is to be found in the *Guide to Historical Literature* (1931), edited, under the auspices of the American Historical Association, by G. M. Dutcher, H. R. Shipman, S. B. Fay, A. H. Shearer, and W. H. Allison. It should be in every college and school library, and should be consulted by every student interested in detailed investigation.

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